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
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
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






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Griffiths
1875





THE CRIME

"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy."

"J'ACCUSE."

THE CRIME

(DAS VERBRECHEN)

BY

A GERMAN

THE AUTHOR OF "I ACCUSE!"

Grelling, Richard

TRANSLATED BY

ALEXANDER GRAY


VOLUME II

ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME

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NOTE

In the course of publication it has been found necessary to publish in two volumes what had originally been intended to form the second volume of *THE CRIME*. The third volume will comprise the section on War-Aims, and references to the various chapters in that section must now be interpreted as referring to the third volume.

Footnotes added in the course of translation are indicated in square brackets.



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
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THE CRIME



THE CRIME

CHAPTER I

THE PREVENTIVE WAR

PREVENTIVE WAR OR WAR OF CONQUEST?

IN *Paccuse* I have already pointed out with all possible emphasis that of the three descriptions which may be applied to this war, namely, that it is a defensive war, a preventive war, or an imperialistic war of conquest, in my opinion, so far as Germany is concerned, the third only is in point.

The first description, that it is a war of defence against attack, is the one which after two and a half years of war still dominates public opinion in Germany. It is the formula with which the war was begun, and with which it is still being carried on to-day. On August 1st, 1915, the first anniversary of the outbreak of war, the Emperor spoke, in almost the same terms as he had used a year earlier, of "the struggle in defence of the highest possessions of the nation, its life and its freedom." After the success of the third war loan, the Emperor emphasised in his congratulatory telegram to Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary to the Treasury, the immovable will of the German people to "continue to a victorious conclusion the war that had been forced upon us by a criminal attack." Until to-day the same formula has remained in force. But untruths are not converted into truths by frequent repetitions, and all the constantly renewed efforts of the German authorities to represent the war as a war of defence continue to be vain in the eyes of the world, and as may be hoped will in the end also be vain before the German people. Notwith-

standing all denials on the part of the guilty, History has already pronounced in favour of the persecuted, despised and reviled author of *J'accuse*, and has inscribed on her iron tablets in ineffaceable letters the judgment:

Germany and Austria are guilty of having consciously and intentionally brought about the European war.

As a result of the documentary evidence which I produced in my book and in this supplementary work, this question is, so far as I am concerned, disposed of, and I neither intend, nor do I see any occasion, to return to it in the near future.

Among the more astute people in Germany in all ranks in society, from the highest diplomatists and ex-ambassadors, down through professors and writers on international law, merchants, manufacturers, "intellectuals" of all kinds (who in part have found a meeting place in the "Bund Neues Vaterland") down to the Socialists on the Left, out of whom the authorities endeavour to drive the recognition of the truth by imprisonment and by proceedings for high treason, everywhere, even among *Kreuzzeitung* people like Schiemann and *Zukunft*-writers like Harden, it is coming more and more to be, not merely recognised, but acknowledged (although the acknowledgment under the influence of the censorship is concealed and veiled) that the war is in reality not a defensive war but a preventive war, or as I have expressed it in my book: "It is true that we were not attacked, but we would have been attacked later on, at a time which, from a military point of view, would have been more unfavourable to us; we therefore anticipated the attack at the moment that was more favourable to us."

This confession that it is a preventive war represents in itself a substantial gain for those of us whose diagnosis is that it is an imperialistic war of conquest. It is a half-way advance to our point of view. It involves a confession that all the resonant phrases which were used two and a half years ago to inspire the German people to war, and are still

incessantly repeated, rest on falsehood; that neither the Russians nor the French attacked us in the opening days of August, 1914, that the sword was *not* pressed into our hands to "defend ourselves to the last breath of man and horse," that we were not called upon "to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland, our very hearth, against a ruthless attack." Whoever says that this is a preventive war, necessarily in so doing expresses the view that every sentence which was then spoken and written, and which is still being spoken and written, to induce in the nation a belief in a war of defence is an untruth; that the German people have been deceived, that they have been led to the slaughter-house and stirred to enthusiasm for something which was in fact non-existent, for a fancy, for a dream.

So far as this negative aspect is concerned, the advocates of the preventive war and of the war of conquest are in agreement to the extent of denying that it is a war of defence. If they desire to be logical, the former group must also acknowledge that the German people have been deceived. No one, however, falsifies the truth out of mere pleasure, and since every deception must have a reason and an aim, these men must further admit that if the German people had known the truth, if they had known that they were not directly menaced, that they had not been attacked, they would not have allowed themselves to be involved in the war, or at least to be involved in it with such unanimity and enthusiasm. Those who adhere to the view that the war is a preventive war are bound to admit the deception, and they could at most plead in its justification that the deception was necessary, because defence against a present attack was comprehensible to the simple and sound sense of the nation, whereas the prevention of a future attack would have appeared incomprehensible and inexcusable as a ground for war. Everyone who denies that this is strictly a war of defence must therefore pass the same moral judgment on the behaviour of the German Government towards their own people; he may justify in any way he chooses the German war of aggression, he may consider it as an aggressive war which was necessary to prevent future ag-

gressive wars being waged by the opposite side, or he may consider it as an aggressive war arising out of purely imperialistic tendencies and designed to serve imperialistic ends—in any case he acknowledges that it is not a war of defence, and from this fact it follows that the Rulers and Governments have deceived the people.

* * * * *

As I have clearly indicated in my book, I myself am one of those who judge that the war may be appropriately described, not as a preventive war, but as an imperialistic war of conquest. I have endeavoured to prove the correctness of my view by citing a series of political facts and by collecting testimony of weight from the national imperialistic literature of Germany. These political facts have been described as insignificant, and the attempt has been made to discredit the literary evidence on the ground that it is not authoritative. My opponents have endeavoured to refute my account of the attitude of Germany at the Hague Conferences and in the ensuing negotiations for an understanding with England—a subject to which I shall return in a separate chapter. Pains have been taken to free the German Government from all responsibility for General Bernhardi and those who share his views, but no mention has been made of my pointed references to the views, the actions, and the writings of the German Crown Prince. In a further chapter I shall produce a copious selection from our Pan-German, chauvinistic and imperialistic literature, and I shall then prove that the matter is not disposed of merely by shaking off Bernhardi, that the Bernhardians still remain, people like Deimling, Keim and his satellites, the Pan-German Union with its Generals and its Admirals, with its influential Press, which unscrupulously directed itself to war as its object, and that, like the great Bernhardi himself, all the insignificant and petty Bernhardians have with a steady purpose (and yet with an unsteady mind) kept in view and have pursued the end which is expressed with all desirable clarity in the titles of Bernhardi's chapters: "Germany's Historical Mission,"

"World Power or Downfall," "The Right and the Duty to Make War."

To this we shall return later. At the present moment we are speaking, not of the imperialistic, but of the preventive war. It is true that a rigid, infallibly certain line of differentiation cannot be drawn between the representatives of the two points of view. In Imperialistic literature also the idea of prevention against a hostile attack may frequently be heard. It is not every Imperialist who has the honesty and sincerity of the Prussian General, who expressly excludes an aggressive war on the part of the Triple Entente, and assigns to our diplomacy the task "so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France. . . . Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests." It is not every Imperialist who is as candid as Bernhardi in expressing the view that Germany could arrive at the world-war which she desired and which was imperatively necessary for her future, only if she herself provoked the war. Many of our war-intriguers are more astute and prudent than the military plungers, and in addition to emphasising the necessity of a military ascent to world power, they also allow their writings to be coloured by the other motive, that of the "inevitability" of the war, the motive that if *we* do not begin, the others will begin at a moment favourable to them. This, then, represents a fusion of the preventive and the imperialistic motives, of which the latter are really decisive, whereas the former are hung round the naked brutality of war, like a mantle to conceal its shame.

All these grounds for what was formerly the war of the future but is now the war of the present rest, as we have said, on the same negative basis that they stamp as a lie the assertion that we are waging a war of liberation and defence. The preventive war and the war of conquest are alike wars of aggression, and there exists only this difference between the two, that the war of conquest is purely a war of aggression, whereas the preventive war is, so to speak, an anticipatory war of defence.

HONEST AND DISHONEST "PREVENTIVE-WARRIORS"

The necessary premise of the preventive war is an intended attack from the other side. It is not sufficient to maintain the existence of this aggressive intention on the other side; it must be *proved*. Amongst those who support the theory that this is a preventive war it is again necessary to distinguish between two groups, between those who have really believed in the aggressive intentions of the Entente Powers against the Central Powers, and those who have merely acted as if this were their belief, whereas in reality they were in no way apprehensive of such an attack, and merely considered that it would serve their imperialistic aims of conquest to induce the people to believe in it. The former are the honest, the latter are the dishonest, "preventive-warriors."

The arguments of the two groups are exactly the same, and since real belief or the mere affectation of belief is essentially a product of what occurs within the mind and the understanding, it is a matter of difficulty to distinguish in the case of each individual war intriguer whether he should be classed among the honest or the dishonest "preventive-warriors." The more intelligent among them would probably concur with the politicians of the Bernhardi school, who are purely bent on conquest, that neither France nor Russia nor England had in any way the slightest interest in provoking a European war, which, waged against the strongest military Power in the world, could not but be regarded as extremely dangerous for themselves, and as one of the greatest of calamities for Europe and the world. The less intelligent may really have believed the blood-curdling story:

That the Liberal English Cabinet which for almost ten years had sought an understanding with Germany in every possible way, and had endeavoured to secure international arbitration and a limitation of armaments, had contemplated the provocation of a European war with

a view to the destruction of their best purchaser and seller;

That the civil Government of the third French Republic, which had to take into account the unqualified pacifist views of Jaurès and his party as well as the sincere and universally recognised desire of the French people for peace, promised England, which was "envious" of Germany, to share in the attack in order to cool in a European deluge her forty-year-old lust for revenge;

That the Tsar, who was personally good-natured and peace-loving, the man who had suggested and promoted the Peace Conferences at The Hague, the ruler of a Russia which was already too great, internally unfree and permeated by revolutionary aspirations, supported his two accomplices in their plans for booty and revenge.

The arguments of the honest and the dishonest preventive politicians are the same. The recipe out of which the poisonous *ragoût* of Germany's peril was and is concocted is as follows: The historical calendars of the last fifteen years are opened and all the visits of Kings, Emperors and Presidents, all ministerial conferences, so far as they took place on the side of the Entente Powers, are carefully noted; mention is then made of the enthusiastic reception accorded to King Edward in Paris and to Fallières and Poincaré in Petrograd, of the meetings which took place in Reval and other maritime towns, of the imperial, royal and presidential toasts, of the jingoistic articles of the chauvinistic Press (known to exist in all countries, worst of all in Germany); the names of Delcassé, Clemenceau, Isvolsky, Northcliffe, Millerand and Poincaré are introduced as often as possible; the mixture is stirred and beaten together as may be required; King Edward's policy of "encirclement" is added as a sauce, and the dish is ready. It is served hot and steaming to the credulous German people, and appears in the menu as "The Entente Powers' *Blutgericht* for the German people." The bill presented for it takes the form of the approval of millions for new army

proposals, new soldiers, new cannons and new ships, and finally for the preventive war which is to save us from having to swallow the witches' brew concocted by the others at the moment which appears favourable to them.

Anyone who reads all the writings now being issued in vast quantities by the defenders of the German Government and of their angelic innocence, the works of men like Schiemann, Chamberlain, Helmolt, Rohrbach, the whole professorial literature of men like Oncken, Bergsträsser, Meyer, and their fellows, will find in all the same prescription: Articles in the French, English and Russian Press of an inciting character, meetings between monarchs and ministers, increases of military and naval forces (on the other side), diplomatic actions, entente agreements between England and France, between England and Russia, etc. The dishonest device, which by general consent has been and is still being applied in our chauvinistic literature with greater or less assurance and skill in order to place in the limelight before the German people the dangers of war which threatened from the side of the Entente Powers, consists primarily in representing all such incidents on the other side as preparations for a warlike attack, whereas all similar incidents on the side of the Triple Alliance are described merely as prudent measures of defence. If the German and Austrian General Staff confer with each other, as has indeed regularly taken place, in order to discuss together the condition of the two armies, to exchange strategical ideas, and to outline in consultation plans for any war that may arise, these are as a matter of course merely defensive measures to meet the contingency of an attack by the Entente Powers, and are void of any suggestion of offensive intentions. But if English and French generals act in the same way, or if a similar exchange of opinion takes place between English and Russian army or naval officers, the German imperialist and chauvinist Press at once cries "Murder!" depicts in the most alarming colours the aggressive intentions of the Entente Powers, and acts like the Gracchi lamenting insurrection.

The visits of King Edward to Paris, of Fallières and Poin-

caré to Petrograd, the presence of the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch at the French manœuvres, English naval practice in the North Sea and in the Baltic, the meeting between the Tsar and King Edward in the roadstead at Reval, even the harmless visit of courtesy paid by the "Einkreisung-King" to his old friend the Emperor Francis Joseph in Schönbrunn—all these events are emanations and symptoms of a devilish intention to attack Germany, which it was intended should in the first place be isolated and separated from her Austrian ally, and then strangled at leisure.

In this process of reasoning the corresponding occurrences which took place between the rulers of Germany and of Russia and between the rulers of England and of Germany are either discarded or represented as ceremonial visits without political significance or—a more effective course which is more frequently adopted—they are described as a cunning, lying manœuvre, by which the poor Germans were to be lulled into security so that later on they might be all the more easily crushed. The meeting at Potsdam between the monarchs of Germany and Russia in the presence of their leading Ministers is described by the historian Helmolt as "the great Potsdam lie"; according to the other historian, Schiemann, its only consequence "was the *appearance* of an improvement in the relations between Germany and Russia," notwithstanding the fact that Herr von Bethmann on December 10th, 1910, in summarising the result of the Potsdam interview was able to state that "the two Governments would not enter into any kind of combination which could be directed aggressively against the other party." According to Helmolt, the agreements bearing on Balkan policy and on Persia were certainly honourably intended by Germany, but not by Russia. Sazonof's accounts of the Potsdam agreement are described by Schiemann as "conscienceless." The practical result, however, by virtue of which Russia agreed to place no difficulty in the way of Germany's Baghdad Railway enterprise, but on the contrary expressed her readiness to encourage its connection with the Russian railway-net in North Persia, is passed over in silence by the Berlin *Kreuzzeitung* professor.

**SCHIEMANN "THE GERMAN DÉROULEDE" AND OTHER
"PREVENTIVE-WARRIORS"**

This Herr Schiemann, royal Prussian Privy Councillor, professor in the University of Berlin, Director of the Faculty of East European History and Geography, deserves a special chapter. He appears to be unable to sleep in peace unless he produces every month or two a new war pamphlet, published by the house of George Reimer, bearing the naked sword on the title page. He parcels out his great fourteen-volumed historical work, presumably because he has learned by experience that the parcelling business offers certain advantages, that the sum of the individual component parts, when divided into convenient pamphlets, represents—in opposition to the laws of mathematics which elsewhere hold good—a greater value when measured in sales than would be possessed by a solid study of the sources, which would be accessible to only a few purses. He has therefore been careful not to lose the opportunity of publishing a pamphlet of sixty-eight pages concerning and against my book, under the attractive title *A Slanderer, Notes on the Historical Antecedents of the War*. Of these sixty-eight pages, however, scarcely four or five are devoted to my book of three hundred and seventy-eight pages, while all the rest is vapid talk round about and over the subject. The pamphlet devoted to the slanderer which has been written by the former editor of the *Kreuzzeitung* almost produces on the unprejudiced reader the impression that it had already been prepared without reference to my book, and that then, to make it more attractive and piquant and with a view to a better sale, it had been adapted to my book by adding a few introductory and concluding words and the slanderer title.

The central part of *J'accuse*, the essential proof of guilt (Chapter III, pages 146-315), is disposed of with the crushing words:

We do not propose to enter into a polemic against his (the accuser's) exposition of the official publications

of documents dealing with the period which elapsed between the murder of the Archduke and the outbreak of war (page 67).

Thus the question of guilt is a matter of indifference. Who provoked the European war in the critical days between July 23rd and August 4th, 1914; who on the other hand endeavoured to prevent war and maintain peace—these are subsidiary questions into which the Berlin professor of history does not enter. He refers to others who have already discussed these questions, and who have refuted the demonstrations of the accuser. Who and what these others are we have seen in the course of this treatise (volume I). It is impossible to reduce them *all* to absurdity, unless one is prepared to write countless volumes or rather libraries. Acting on the principle: *in majore et minus continetur* it must suffice to refute Herr Helfferich, the most conspicuous and, as I gladly admit, the most adroit and skilful, whose arguments are more or less repeated by all the others. Herr Schiemann, however, who has the unprecedented audacity to bring at every step the charge of falsification, slander, malice and disloyalty against a book which deserves at least the recognition of having penetrated as a kind of pioneer with infinite industry and zeal into the difficult labyrinth of the immediate diplomatic antecedents of the war, was under an obligation to prove these charges in detail; he was under an obligation on this point not to stop at the less important chapter, "The Antecedents of the Crime," but to consider the chief and central chapter of my book, "The Crime." As he does not do this, but prefers to back out and conceal himself behind the shield of others, who, it is true, attack my arraignment but do not refute it, I throw back the charge of slander at Professor Dr. Theodor Schiemann, formerly editor of the *Kreuzzeitung* in Berlin, and declare that his pamphlet is a worthless scribble, which cannot dispose of a single sentence or a single letter in the documentarily supported proof which I furnished.

His insinuations as to the character of the accuser rebound ineffectively from the German who has neither a "past" to

conceal, nor anything for which to take "revenge," and who is not a "being far removed from his native soil." If the accuser does not mention his name, this is due to the fact that, unlike the Schiemanns, he is not in the happy position of being able to give free expression to his opinion under the domination of the military authorities and of the censorship in Germany, without exposing himself to the most grievous persecutions, without running the risk of being reduced to silence for the future—perhaps even the silence of death. For him the internal peace¹ would end in the peace of the dungeon, as in the case of the courageous Liebknecht, for whom in my first book I expressed my admiration—and to whom to-day, now that he has become a martyr for his conviction, I exclaim, "Greetings, brave comrade—you have been condemned to silence; all the more loudly and more distinctly will we who are left speak out."

THE TRUE TRAITORS

The accuser conceals his name, because he desires to keep unimpaired the right and the freedom to continue to speak and to act. All the unclean deluge of calumny and insinuation he calmly allows to pass over him, in the sure consciousness that he is honourably and incorruptibly serving the cause of truth and the true weal of the German people, more than all the Schiemanns taken together. For this may well be said to those who attack me: If they dare to denounce me as one who stands outside the German people, I reply, "You are not justified in speaking in the name of the German people. The true friends of Germany stand where I and those who think with me are standing. The Chauvinists and the Imperialists, the Nationalists and the Pan-Germans with the Junkers of the *Kreuzzeitung* at their head—these are the true enemies of the German people, these are the true traitors to their country."

The plan of procedure adopted by the instigators of war has on every side always been the same; they incite and pro-

¹ [Burgfrieden.]

voke by word and by writing, and when the counter-effect of their incitements becomes manifest in the other country they make use of what appears there in order to show it to their own people in as exaggerated a guise as possible and thus to inflame their passions anew more strongly than before. And so the game goes on from one side to the other, conducted by a few hundred, in the extreme case by a few thousand, persons. Every insignificant incident or episode, every irresponsible newspaper article, is exaggerated and inflated and used for the greater incitement of the nations, until in the end the witches' kettle, constantly overheated, reaches the bursting point and a fearful explosion destroys the life and the well-being of the nations. These few hundreds or thousands, journalists, generals, dealers in military stores, manufacturers of armaments, reactionaries and Junkers, who seek to smother in the blood and smoke of war the nations' impulse to freedom, men of ambition who thirst for the glory of battle, heroes of the pen who thirst for the laurels of patriotic bombastic phraseology—these are the people who are guilty of the war. These, Herr Schiemann, are the criminals; these are the traitors to their country from whom the reawakened nations will turn away with loathing and contempt, for whom, however, it may be hoped that another and more bitter destiny is also reserved, corresponding to the greatness of their unutterable misdeeds. We, however, who bring forward these accusations—and how few are we in this sabre-rattling time of bondage!—we do not fear your lightning. We know that our hour and yours will come, the hour when the nations from whom you now seal our word will nevertheless hear, comprehend, and obey it—the hour of accusation and of judgment.

FRANCIS DELAISI

Among all the German inciters to war, Herr Theodor Schiemann, the spokesman of the Junkers of the *Kreuzzeitung*, is one of the worst. He rightly bears the honorary title of "the German Déroulède," which a Frenchman, Francis

Delaisi, conferred upon him in his pamphlet *La guerre qui vient*. This pamphlet appeared in Paris in 1911, and Herr Schiemann devotes to it no fewer than five pages in his *Slanderer*, that is to say, more space than he gives to the whole of *J'accuse*. This French brochure is extraordinarily adapted to the purposes of the German war-intriguers; they have dug it out, translated it and published it, because it contains a sharp attack on the policy of the Anglo-French Entente, and represents a kind of *J'accuse* pamphlet against the then French Government. This is, in fact, a general characteristic feature of the polemics of our chauvinists, that they praise for their higher insight those penetrating intellects who in other countries, in England, France and Russia, endeavour to combat certain political forces and to prove that they are possessed of dangerous nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies; and these men they set up as the type of true patriots—elsewhere, across the frontier!

Francis Delaisi's pamphlet is called by Schiemann a significant essay, by which "too much dangerous truth . . . had been conveyed to the restricted understanding of the French people." He is for him "a man who has really something to say," etc. Exactly the same method of praising as truth and patriotism beyond the frontier what on this side is branded as slander and treachery is applied by all our war-intriguers, whenever they have occasion to speak of the Russian revolutionaries or of the English or French opponents of the war. The German Government bear the chief responsibility for the death of Roger Casement, since they supported his hopeless undertaking with arms, money and ships; yet Roger Casement, the revolutionary, is for our reactionary intriguers "the great Irish patriot." Bernard Shaw has even received the honour of being quoted by the Chancellor in his speech of August 19th, 1915, when he referred to his very true expression to the effect that the policy of the balance of power was an "incubator for wars;" and, as is known, it is for this reason that Germany desires to substitute for the mistaken policy of the balance of power a policy of German preponderance. What would have been said in Germany if Mr. Asquith or

M. Viviani had quoted the author of *J'accuse* as a clear-sighted German patriot? "Venal traitor of his country, stone him!" is the exclamation that has already been heard. What increase in the insults would have been devised if in other countries the same honourable mention had been accorded to the German Accuser as has been given by us to the opponents of English policy.

With what undisguised satisfaction and recognition are the English opponents of the war, the critics of Grey, men like Ramsay Macdonald, Trevelyan, Morel, Brailsford and Norman Angell, quoted even in the official German Press, although, as we have elsewhere seen, these English critics without exception ascribe to Germany the immediate responsibility for the European war. I am not aware that my book, which was widely circulated in belligerent and neutral countries, has ever been mentioned, praised or recommended by any English, French or Russian Minister, or by any official newspaper or telegraphic agency in these countries. On the other hand, I am aware that neither in England nor in France nor in Russia has the laudatory mention in Germany of the opponents of war in other countries been made into a rod for their backs, that they have not been branded as traitors, and had stamped on their foreheads the shameful sign of venality, that the praise accorded to them in Germany has not been represented as a proof of their depravity and infamy. Like so much else, this method of fighting is a speciality of the German chauvinist Press, which in this respect has received the shameful inheritance of Prussian hidebound reactionaries of the *Kreuzzeitung* set, of police spies and manufacturers of high treason. In the period following the foundation of the German Empire, these back-stair politicians fought even against the Junker Bismarck, who was one of their own class, resorting to the most outrageous personal calumniations when for ten years, in spite of the opposition of priests and junkers, he dared to govern on liberal principles the new Germany which had been built on a democratic electoral basis. Were not streams of ink poured out for years in the foulest insinuations and slanders even against Bismarck, the greatest

of all Prussian Junkers, who could not obtain forgiveness in the *Kreuzzeitung* camp for his apostasy—unfortunately only temporary—from the policy of Junkerdom and reaction?

Schiemann and his companions are unable to refute the accuser, and therefore they abuse him. Schiemann turns away from him with "loathing"; he purposes exposing him to "general contempt." The accuser, however, exclaims to his accuser: It is on your head and on the head of your comrades that the curse of the German people will one day fall, when it shall have awakened from the numbing slumber into which it has been sunk by the asphyxiating gases of your lies, falsifications and perversions, when it shall have recognised that it is not from without but from within, that the menace of destruction came, that no foreign enemy desired to annihilate, to crush, or enervate Germany, but that it is the enemies within, the war-intriguers and the chauvinists, the men greedy of power, of glory and of booty, who by their cunning activity continued through many years, have engendered in the German people the delusion that they were persecuted, in order in the end to convert those who passively imagined that they were persecuted into active persecutors and blind tools of their selfish endeavours.

The German Déroulède has the glory of being one of the chief leaders of the German people on the path to war. The Frenchman, Francis Delaisi, the man "who really has something to say," the clear-sighted analyst of the conditions then existing, the prophet of the conditions of to-day, accords to Herr Schiemann the following laudatory testimony:

I am quite aware that the chauvinist newspapers across the Rhine (for they exist in Germany as well as among us) give utterance to terrible threats. Professor Schiemann, the German Déroulède, has said: "In the event of a war with England, we shall take France as a hostage." And Harden, the old disciple of Bismarck, has stated: "We shall fall upon France, and impose upon her a war-contribution of 20 milliards, and with this money we shall defray the cost of our war against England." But these are all rodomontades which are now enthusiastically used by our

nationalists, but will not bear the slightest scrutiny." *La Guerre qui vient*, Germ. trans., page 34).

In his pamphlet on the *Slanderer* Herr Schiemann is of course silent as to this testimony; but as in other matters he praises the Frenchman for his absolute trustworthiness, he is bound to accept from him the honorary designation of "the German Déroulède," and he will be unable to clear himself of the charge of having inflamed the French chauvinists, by means of his German chauvinistic rodomontades, and thus of having added fuel to the fire on both sides.

SCHIEMANN AND GREINDL

The fatal significance of the part played by Schiemann in embittering and in rendering more acute the relations between Germany and the Entente Powers is emphasised in various passages of the Belgian ambassadorial reports, as well as in Baron Beyens's book *L'Allemagne avant la guerre*.¹

In his report of May 6th, 1908, Baron Greindl, of all Belgian Ambassadors the most friendly to Germany, refers to Schiemann's jingoistic activities on the occasion of the Moroccan conflict, which was then again breaking out; he testifies on behalf of the *Kreuzzeitung*-professor that "he is *persona grata* with the Emperor and in high favour with the Foreign Office, from which he obtains his information, and by which he is frequently inspired, without being in consequence in any way semi-official." In his report of May 13th, 1908, Greindl again emphasises that "serious consideration must be given to the articles of Herr Schiemann, although this journalist is in no way to be regarded as semi-official."

Herr Greindl is quite lost in admiration before the great Schiemann; in fact, he borrows from him a large portion of his views and his inferences. The attentive reader of Greindl's reports observes at every stage that the Belgian Ambassador was one of the most industrious and grateful readers of Schiemann's weekly reviews; everywhere in

¹ [English translation: *Germany before the War*. Nelson.]

Greindl we find the demonstrations of the Entente Powers' guilt with which the *Kreuzzeitung*-professor had coruscated, and with which he now coruscates in his war-pamphlets. "Herr Schiemann, whose great position as a journalist and whose relations to the Government are known to you, states . . . "; so we read in Greindl's report of February 17th, 1909, immediately after the visit to Berlin of King Edward and his consort.

The manner in which Schiemann, to the accompaniment of Greindl's enthusiastic applause, represents the result of the English King's visit, is so characteristic of the method of this arch-firebrand that I should like to devote a few words to this episode. Even a Schiemann could not deny that the visit passed off in a satisfactory manner, and that, occurring just when it did during the crisis in connection with the annexation of Bosnia, it was of the greatest importance. What therefore does he do? He expresses the view that it is necessary to wait at least five or six weeks, in order to learn the attitude of the English Press towards the royal visit:

We shall wait to see whether by then a calming down of public opinion in England with regard to the German danger will have taken place; for so long as this phantom rests like a nightmare on the English people, everything is possible. It will therefore be necessary to watch the attitude of the *Times*, the *Standard*, the *National Review* and their companions, in order to determine whether the campaign of incitement against Germany will be continued or whether it has at last come to an end. For the rest it is admitted that friendly political conversations have taken place but no agreements.

The Belgian Ambassador accompanies Schiemann's account with the very significant commentary:

On ne peut pas mieux dire que même si le roi d'Angleterre a un désir sincère de se rapprocher de l'Allemagne, il est malgré sa grande influence personnelle incapable de le réaliser,

It cannot be better expressed than by saying that even if the King of England should possess the sincere desire for an approximation with Germany, he would, notwithstanding his

aussi longtemps qu'un revirement ne se sera pas opéré dans l'opinion publique anglaise.—GREINDL.

great personal influence, not be in a position to give it effect, until a revolution will have taken place in English public opinion.—GREINDL.¹

Thus on this occasion it suits the *Kreuzzeitung*-professor and his docile follower the Belgian Ambassador, to describe King Edward the Encircler, as pacific, and his Berlin visit, as calculated, in intention at least, to promote peace. Herr Greindl is, indeed, compelled to state that King Edward's diplomatic attendant, in his consultations with the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary, was in agreement with the German statesmen

that the greatest efforts must be made to prevent any war arising out of the Balkan question, . . . there was agreement as to the necessity for calling a conference with the purpose, not of reviewing, but of recording the result of the negotiations taking place between the most interested Powers. Sir C. Hardinge thus assumed the Austrian standpoint. It was agreed that both parties should declare themselves satisfied with the result of the meeting in Berlin. Communications to the Press were drawn up in this sense.

The account thus given by Greindl affords the completest refutation of the charge brought by Herr von Bethmann and his semi-official writers against the English Government, that they did nothing during the Bosnian crisis to bring about a

¹ See *Belgian Documents*, 1905-1914; published by the Foreign Office (Berlin: Mittler & Son), No. 55.

The official German translation is here guilty of the small but important error involved in translating the words: "Si le roi d'Angleterre a un désir" by "if the King of England should possess (besässe)," etc. To be correct, it should be "possesses" (besitzt). There is the further error involved in translating "il est incapable" by "he would not be in a position" (er wäre ausserstande). It should be "he is not in a position" (er ist ausserstande). The difference between Greindl's original and the German translation is obvious: the Belgian diplomatist admits the possibility that the English King is really pacific, whereas the German translator entirely cuts off this possibility by the use of the subjunctive.

peaceful understanding, but on the contrary, pressed for an armed conflict. I shall elsewhere demonstrate in detail the emptiness and, indeed, the dishonesty of this charge. Greindl's report of February 17th, 1909, affords weighty support to this demonstration. Even at that time, however, in 1909, the obvious efforts for peace made by the English King and his Government in no way suited the purpose of Schiemann and Greindl, who nearly always pulled together; ostensibly the aggressive conspiracy against Germany had been forged eight months earlier, in June, 1908, between the Tsar and the King of England in the roadstead at Reval (this is Schiemann's discovery, which later on I propose to consider further). They were thus in a dilemma: an aggressive conspiracy in June, 1908, cannot very well be reconciled with pacific tendencies in February, 1909. As has been observed above, the German translator of Greindl's report helps himself out of the difficulty by a mistranslation of the French text. But how do Schiemann and Greindl get out of it? Nothing is simpler than this. On this occasion, by way of a change, they represent the English King and his Government, not as the leaders of the alleged English policy of encirclement and aggression, but as the slaves of certain English Press organs, and they make their recognition of the official English peace policy dependent on the gracious concurrence of these journals. In other words, with England it is a case of "the Jew is always burned."¹ If King Edward does something which can be turned or twisted into a war policy, then he is the undisputed leader of Great Britain's foreign policy; if, however, he does something which obviously serves the maintenance of peace, his action can have no significance, until certain organs of the Press have communicated their concurrence; in such a case he is not the intellectual director of English policy, but merely the executive organ of public opinion. Since in every country, and especially in a democratic country like England, authoritative organs of the opposition can always be found to criticise the actions of the

¹ [Der Jude wird verbrannt—*Nathan der Weise*.]

Government, it is always possible by resorting to this childish game to refuse any significance to the pacific actions of the Government, on the ground that they are not approved by public opinion. We shall elsewhere see in how masterly a fashion this cunningly devised system of accusation is carried out by the Schiemanns, and how confidently it is aped by the credulous Greindl, who in the course of his long residence in Berlin had become quite identified with the views of the Wilhelmstrasse.

* * * * *

The leading part played by the German Déroulède in the literature of incitement on this side of the Rhine is also confirmed, as has already been observed, by Baron Beyens, formerly Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, in his book already mentioned.¹ Beyens speaks of the pernicious influences exercised on the national sentiment by the chauvinist Press in Germany and in France, and in particular he depicts the effect of its daily perusal on the views and the decisions of the Emperor. Of all these criminal jingoes it is only Dr. Theodor Schiemann whom he mentions by name, exactly as in the case of Delaisi's pamphlet; he produces him as a specially appalling example "in order to form a conception of the haughtiness, insolence and bad faith of certain German publicists," and he explains Schiemann's fatal influence by reference to the fact that he then "had his little hour of favour and popularity at the Court of Berlin, and regaled the Gallophobe and Russophobe readers of the *Kreuzzeitung* in his political notes of the week every Wednesday morning."

It will be seen that among the political writers of Germany Herr Schiemann was, and is, one of the most significant and influential phenomena, though, to be sure, in the worst sense of the word—in the sense more or less in which Disraeli said of Gladstone: "He is a good man, in the worst sense of the word." The fact that he of all men should be let loose by the Wilhelmstrasse against the accuser redounds greatly to my honour. I propose to return this compliment by dealing

¹ *L'Allemagne avant la guerre*. [English translation. Nelson, page 36.]

as fully as possible with Schiemann's counter-pamphlet, and to place in the pillory, as he deserves, this noxious growth on the body of the German people, this chief journalistic instigator of the present war, this political poisoner of springs, who dares to charge those who are the true friends of their country with lack of patriotism.

THE ENTENTE AN AGGRESSIVE ALLIANCE?

It cannot be demanded of me that I should drain to the last drop the unpalatable concoction of Schiemann's and other similar war-writings, nor do I propose to impose upon myself such a task; I must be content to emphasise the essential points in these writings in order to place in their true light the historical *minutiae* of the *Kreuzzeitung*-professor and his colleagues. Schiemann, as well as Helmolt, Rohrbach and Chamberlain, all without exception proceed from what is for them the clearly established principle that England, France and Russia have for years, ever since somewhere about the beginning of the century, desired and prepared for war against Germany and Austria, and that they only waited until their preparations were completed to the last ship and the last man in order to strike the blow. The Entente has been an aggressive alliance. This is the starting point of all their discussions, and from this preconceived point of view, or rather from this point of view advanced against their better knowledge, they elucidate all the occurrences of the last fifteen years.

Now in all the writings of this category, absolutely and without exception, there is an entire absence of even the slightest proof of the theory from which they thus proceed to argue. King Edward VII. promoted the Entente with France (1904) and the quasi-Entente with Russia (1907). As we know, these Ententes were essentially nothing more than an agreement with regard to questions of interest within and without Europe, and as a result of the removal of these sources of friction a more and more secure relation of political friendship gradually arose. Military discussions also took

place, and it was intended that they should be continued. It is also unnecessary to dispute the fact that they were meant to be continued not only between France and England, but so far as naval matters were concerned between England and Russia as well. Schiemann and his comrades are greatly concerned because the extension of the military discussions to matters concerning the English and Russian navies was imminent or had in fact been initiated. As from all other occurrences on the side of the Entente, they infer from this fact the intention to conspire—an attempt which I have already illustrated elsewhere, and shall later have an opportunity to discuss more closely. Everywhere there are insinuations, nowhere is there any proof!

I am not in the happy position of knowing all that the Rohrbachs, the Helmolts and the Schiemanns maintain that they know with such enviable certainty with regard to secret agreements between rulers and diplomatists which have never been officially published. In my book and in this work also, I have restricted myself to publicly known historical facts and documents. I have nowhere given expression to presumptions or theories resting on an arrangement of the facts. I have nowhere quoted newspaper articles of a more or less semi-official nature as evidence of facts or as the expression of the intentions of the Government. The history and the historical antecedents of the crime I have dealt with by reference to, and on the basis of documents, and I do not propose to follow my opponents on the slippery and uncertain field of newspaper extracts and journalistic arrangements of facts.

There is one exception to this rule which I shall be obliged to make in a later chapter intended to give a survey of German chauvinism before the war. In this case the newspaper extracts are, in fact, the documents. As the attempt is made to smuggle Bernhardi out of the way as an alleged "unique" concurrence, I am compelled to show that this "brav' général" is only one among many.

The method adopted by the saviours of German innocence is in itself sufficient to indicate the impurity of their intentions and the weakness of their position. While in my "An-

tededents" I support my statements by reference to figures, dates and documents, nailing down the German imperialists and their highly situated leader to their own words, statistically proving that Germany more than any other country already possessed the place in the sun alleged to have been denied to her, demonstrating the hollowness of the imperialistic efforts to expand by figures and dates dealing with the development of industry and population in Germany; while by reference to the minutes of the Hague Conference and the authentic account of Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding, I prove the resistance offered by Germany to every organisation resting on law and to every restriction of armaments, and as a consequence Germany's responsibility for the tension in the European situation, Schiemann and his comrades work all the time merely with snippets, snippets, snippets of paper. Whether they maintain the existence of suspicious diplomatic secret occurrences, or tax the other side with deceitfulness in what would appear to be conciliatory actions, they never support their arguments on documents, they constantly suppose, suggest or assort their material, relying on the help of a masterly arranged collection of snippets.

THE AGGRESSIVE CONSPIRACY OF REVAL (1908) AND THE METHOD OF SNIPPETS

To take one example, Herr Schiemann naturally attaches the utmost importance to King Edward's visit to the Tsar in June, 1908, in the roadstead at Reval, and does so, starting from his preconceived thesis, on the ground that this visit was intended to bring about a further extension of the war-conspiracy. To prove the evil intentions against Germany pursued by King Edward in his visit—or at least to furnish what Herr Schiemann understands by proof—he quotes the article appearing in a Russian paper *Golos Moskwy* of May 31st, 1908, which "as the organ of Gutschkof reflected at that time the opinion of very influential circles," and without more ado he adopts the assertion of this paper that the royal visit

represented the introduction of an Anglo-Russian alliance directed against Germany. "Pressed back on the west and the east by the armies of Russia and France, cut off from the sea by the English fleet, Germany would fall into a position of embarrassment from which there would scarcely be any way of escape" (*A Slanderer*, page 28).

To the article taken from this paper Schiemann adds the observation: "Even then war was desired in Russia." The object of the war so far as Russia was concerned is said to have been the possession of Constantinople and the Dardanelles; for France the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine, and for England the surrender of the German Fleet.¹ According to Schiemann the leading politicians of the three Powers knew that these aims were not to be achieved without a struggle. It is in this way that he introduces the royal visit in the roadstead at Reval, supported by an unsigned article in an irresponsible Russian newspaper.

Herr Schiemann is sufficiently modest not to affect a knowledge of what the Tsar and the King discussed with each

¹ My attitude (distinctly one of disapproval) towards the intention proclaimed by the Russian authorities at the end of 1916 to conquer Constantinople and the Dardanelles is more closely discussed in the chapter on "War-Aims." Now that the Government of the Tsar has been swept away, these intentions have rapidly fallen into the background and will completely disappear with the advance of the Revolutionary movement; they will make way for the demand for the "internationalisation of the straits"—a demand which can only be approved and supported by every friend of a pacific international organisation. At the same time, in view of the former designs of the Russian Authorities on Constantinople, which even now find support in many quarters, I should like to point out how entirely different are the two propositions (1) that a belligerent State, attacked by Germany and already robbed by the formal dismemberment of Russian Poland and by the dismemberment of the Baltic provinces for which preparations had been made, should herself make known annexational intentions in order to gain the long desired free outlet to the Mediterranean Sea as a reward for her military exertions, and (2) that the same State in the midst of peace (1908) should hatch with other States a conspiracy against Germany, in order to pursue her territorial expansion by means of a world war. This latter charge is the one that has been brought by the Schiemanns against Russia, and no evidence has ever been produced in support of it.

other. On the other hand, he is completely informed of the way in which Sir Charles Hardinge and Isvolsky came to an understanding with regard to their future plans. Herr Schiemann knows all this, although the understanding that was arrived at was merely an oral one; he maintains that it came "to our knowledge later in a roundabout way." To what did this understanding amount?

Isvolsky declared that he was ready to proceed with England against Germany when Russia should have sufficiently increased her military strength. As the latest point in time for this event, six to eight years were contemplated, that is to say from 1914-1916. . . . A fairly lengthy period of military preparation was as a matter of course contemplated for the three Powers. (*A Slanderer*, page 29.)

This is the basis of all Schiemann's further assertions of the danger of war by which the German people were menaced. Herr Schiemann knows that the resolution to make war was arrived at in the roadstead of Reval in June, 1908. The outbreak of war was only a question of time and of the completion of the military preparations of the Entente Powers.

"Where is the evidence on which your assertion rests?" I ask the professor of history. If anyone were to assert that the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had, in the course of their continual meetings, decided on the provocation of the "inevitable European war," and had determined all the details of the "when" and the "how," what would your comment be, Herr Professor? Would you, or would you not, ask for evidence? And would you be content with evidence similar to that which you are bold enough to produce as evidence of the decisions for war taken at Reval (pages 29 and 30 of your pamphlet), namely, that in England "immediately after the Reval days . . . the agitation for the concentration of the Channel Fleet in the North Sea" began; that in England Hislam's well-known book appeared, that the Russian imperial council approved the construction of armoured cruisers, that England and Russia intervened

for reforms in Macedonia, and that manœuvres of the English fleet took place in the North Sea; that President Fallières also made a visit to Reval, and King Edward met the Austrian Emperor in Ischl, and Clemenceau and Isvolsky in Marienbad? All these world-shaking facts are for Herr Schiemann parts of a great "machination"—a war-machination which was to make an end of Germany, and even to divert Austria from her ally.

I have intentionally selected this point, because the method of the German falsifiers of history must be illustrated by examples, if it is to be made comprehensible. The decisive fact, the resolution of Russia and England to make war, arrived at, as is suggested, merely in an oral manner, is supported by absolutely no evidence whatever. A Russian newspaper article by way of introducing the Reval meeting, a series of events in themselves entirely insignificant compiled with German professorial thoroughness—I am repeatedly constrained to congratulate the professor on his incomparable collection of snippets and would be glad to learn how it is done—the book of a private English writer, English naval manœuvres, presidential and royal visits, etc., all these come in useful to the German professor of history in creating the suspicion that the fact asserted by him may be true. He attempts by the most miserable methods to produce circumstantial proof, which is absolutely insufficient, and of which the individual links, even if they are true, in no way prove Schiemann's assertion of the existence of an offensive alliance. Nothing that Schiemann produces gives the slightest support to the contention that England and Russia intended to make war against Germany. Hislam's book? And what about our chauvinist and Pan-German literature of which I propose to give elsewhere some edifying examples? Naval manœuvres in the North Sea? And what about our annual manœuvres on sea and land towards the east, west, and the north? Presidential and royal visits? Is it not the fact that a year before, in August, 1907, the Tsar and the King of England paid a visit in Swinemünde and Wilhelmshöhe? Is it not the case that the Emperor was at Windsor in November, 1907, and

was accorded a brilliant reception in the Guildhall at London? In August, 1908, King Edward, as is known, also visited the German Emperor accompanied by the same Sir Charles Hardinge, whose presence at Reval appears so extremely suspicious to Herr Schiemann. And it was precisely on this occasion that the English Under-Secretary, acting on Grey's instructions, submitted to the German Emperor and the German Government proposals with regard to an agreement as to naval armaments on both sides—proposals which the Emperor William is known to have rejected from the outset.¹ King Edward's visit to the German Emperor in August, 1908, which Herr Schiemann naturally passes over in silence, and the contents of the negotiations conducted by the English Under-Secretary with the German Government, are in themselves sufficient to reveal the worthlessness of Schiemann's circumstantial evidence. But quite apart from such considerations, this evidence is entirely insubstantial in its character, in view of the fact that it is based on a tendencious compilation of completely insignificant facts.

It is thus that history is made by us in Germany! Everything that took place after 1908, if it does not fit in with the theory of the Reval resolution to make war, is either passed over in silence, or falsified, or represented as an intentional cozening and misleading of Germany. Schiemann and his comrades proceed exactly on the same prescription as Herr Helfferich. According to Helfferich, the resolution of the three Entente Powers to strike was taken on July 29th, 1914. Previously, contemporaneously, and subsequently, these Powers took action in countless ways which flatly contradict Helfferich's assertion. These actions and proposals are either passed over in silence, or falsified, or represented as insincere. Helfferich and Schiemann—*par nobile fratrum!*

THE BOSNIAN CRISIS, 1908-9

As Herr Helfferich deals with the immediate historical antecedents of the war, so Herr Schiemann deals with the

¹ See Cook: *How Britain strove for Peace*, page 14.

more remote, more particularly the historical facts which reduce to an absurdity his assertion of the conspiracy of Reval. He cannot conceal the fact that, after long negotiations between Aehrenthal and Isvolsky, Russia recognised in March, 1909, that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Hapsburg monarchy, and also persuaded Serbia to recognise the same fact; he does not, however, observe that this historically established fact overthrows his whole invention of the Reval conspiracy. He is of course silent on the fact that the chief credit for the peaceful settlement of the annexation crisis was due to the English Government and to Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace. Herr Schiemann is proud that he is able to say: "It was not he (Grey) but Kiderlen who carried his point"—in other words: It was Germany's mailed fist, threateningly raised behind Austria, that compelled the other European States, with England at their head, to give way. He does not, however, possess the sense of justice to recognise, as a merit of the English Government, the fact that this disposition to yield was exercised in the interests of European peace and that this course was recommended to Russia, but he adds to his account of the incident the further unproved insinuation that Sir Edward Grey expressed his annoyance, and directed against the Petrograd Cabinet very emphatic reproaches on account of their pacific attitude. Where does Herr Schiemann get this information? Where is the evidence in support of it? I, the insignificant author of *J'accuse*, can boast of no highly placed connections on either side of the German frontier. All that I know are the publicly known facts which are documentarily supported: in 1909, as in 1913, the English Government laboured with unwearying zeal for the maintenance of European peace, on both occasions by their moderating influence on Russia and on both occasions against the stiff-necked, unyielding resistance of Austria.

It was only natural that Germany's attitude in the annexation crisis, which appears to Herr Schiemann to have been "loyal and correct in every point," was somewhat differently viewed in England and Russia. Herr Schiemann speaks of

the "hatred" against Germany, which expressed itself in England "in the form of a panic." Hitherto I have only heard that it is fear that can degenerate into a panic, whereas hatred can at most rise to bitterness. In any case, the dissatisfaction in England and Russia was easily explicable, since Germany by her resolute support of Austria's act of violence could not fail to provoke feelings of passion in other countries, especially in Slavonic countries, and in this way she materially contributed to inflame the Great Serbian movement, and in the last analysis to provoke the present war. Here again Herr Schiemann inevitably confuses cause and effect. Certain utterances of English politicians and journalists, which were only the reaction of the attitude adopted by Austria and Germany, giving expression to the bitterness of feeling caused by the criminal endangering of European peace by such a policy of the mailed fist, are for Herr Schiemann so many facts in evidence of England's intentions to crush Germany.¹

Then, however, according to Schiemann, a sudden change of feeling took place in England. English clergymen visited Berlin; in June, 1909, the Tsar met the Emperor William and the speeches at the banquets which were then exchanged "permitted the inference that Russia would allow herself to become the ally neither of French revenge nor of the English policy of panic."² I was under the impression that a year previously war against Germany had been decided on at Reval! King Edward's new meeting with Clemenceau in Marienbad in the summer of 1909 produces, according to Schiemann, "almost an elegiac impression." How does Herr Schiemann know this? At the end of 1909 Isvolsky was nominated as a member of the Imperial Council, and in October, 1910, was translated to Paris. In the English and Russian Press voices were heard which pleaded for the maintenance of European peace. Indeed, Herr Schiemann assures us that he was informed by political friends in France

¹ I shall return later in detail to the Bosnian crisis and to the attitude of Germany and England on that occasion.

² *Slanderer*, page 33.

(1910) "that the public opinion of the country desires to maintain peace and is resolved not to act with England." I thought that the conspiracy of the Triple Entente was decided upon in 1908 in the roadstead at Reval as something that was fixed for 1914-1916! How are all these indications of peace to be reconciled with the existence of the conspiracy?

The Emperor William travels to London to attend King Edward's obsequies. The Tsar Nicholas comes to Potsdam accompanied by his Minister Sazonof. In consequence of the common efforts for peace made by all the Great Powers, the Moroccan crisis of 1911 is happily solved. The Balkan crisis begins. Under Grey's leadership the London Conference of Ambassadors succeeds in overcoming once again apparently insuperable difficulties, and in maintaining the peace of Europe. Meanwhile, from 1909 to 1912 the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding are under consideration; in the beginning of 1912 Haldane's visit to Berlin takes place—events to which I will return in a separate chapter;—in the first half of 1914 the Anglo-German agreement with regard to Asia Minor and the Baghdad line is concluded and the delimitation of spheres of interest in East and West Africa prepared by Lichnowsky and Grey; in the spring of 1913 the monarchs of England, Russia and Germany meet in Berlin for the celebration of the marriage of the Emperor's daughter—in short, a series of political incidents and Court events of incisive importance takes place. For Schiemann and his fellows, however, all these occurrences have no significance whatever, since they do not adapt themselves into their theory of a conspiracy. They are silent as to these incidents, or depreciate their value, or, acting on the well-known prescription, they represent them as malicious tricks on the part of the adversary:

Parliament was also ignorant that war against Germany had been resolved on in principle since 1909, and that since that time it was only a question of seeking the occasion of bringing it about with the greatest possible assurance of a prospect of success. In 1905, 1908 and 1911 it was believed in England that they were

near their goal, and it is not due to England that it was congresses and conferences, and not the sword, that decided the conflicts in these years. Thereafter, however, English policy took the new direction of postponing the outbreak of the struggle, the magnitude of which was rightly foreseen, until the Russian preparations as well as their own had proceeded as far as was required to give an assurance of success. At the earliest the year 1915 was kept in view; until then every conflict must be avoided, and by negotiations on the problems then pending (the proportion of naval construction, the "naval holiday," African Colonies and the Baghdad line) Germany had to be persuaded to retain the view that she had little to fear from England. As is well known, we retained this view until the latest moment. Sir Edward Grey's game had been played with success. Now his cards are lying open before us, and we see that they are the cards of a professional card-sharper. (*A Slanderer*, pages 64-65.)

This is the fundamental idea on which the whole European history of the last ten years is treated. Everything that contradicts this fundamental idea is passed over in silence, or else it was done "for the sake of appearances" to deceive Germany, or else it took place against the desire and the intention of the English Government.

THE TACTICS OF FALSIFICATION OF SCHIEMANN AND CO.

It is indeed monstrous to observe with how brazen a forehead Schiemann and Company treat all events in this manner, particularly all events since 1905. Those incidents which cannot be suppressed or falsified and which it is impossible to deprive of their unmistakably pacific tendency are frigidly and derisively explained away on the ground that the Russian, French and English military preparations had not yet proceeded far enough, and that it was therefore necessary to await the determined point in time before provoking the war that had long been resolved upon. On this plan, of course, the German falsifiers of history escape from their difficulties on every occasion. Whenever it is possible to ascribe a bellicose character to a political incident, to a royal

visit, a ministerial conference, or a newspaper polemic, this course is inevitably adopted. Where this is absolutely impossible the pacific character of the incident is admitted, but it is based on the motive: to postpone is not to give up; we must now *appear* pacific, because we are not yet ready; but as soon as we are ready, the great blow will be struck. Anyone who reads Schiemann's pamphlets *A Slanderer* and *How England Prevented an Understanding with Germany*, will find that on every occasion without exception when mention is made of a European peace-action under England's participation or leadership (where possible it is suppressed) there is added the observation that it took place only "for the sake of appearances," only to deceive Germany, only in order that the preparations of the Entente Powers might be continued undisturbed.

As has already been pointed out above, the Potsdam interview "had as a consequence merely the appearance of an improvement in the relations between Germany and Russia" (*A Slanderer*, page 36). The plan of an Anglo-French naval demonstration before Agadir, which was discussed as a counter-stroke to the dispatch of the *Panther*, encountered Caillaux's resistance and also miscarried in the English Cabinet—a decision which doubtless served the cause of peace, but which Herr Schiemann reports, adding that Sir Edward Grey was much "embittered" at the course of events (page 43). Here again, as on so many other occasions, I ask: How does Herr Schiemann know this? Of course he does *not* know; he invents it out of nothing because it fits in with his arraignment that Grey should have been embittered at the pacific decision. Everywhere in Schiemann's pamphlets we come across phrases similar to the following: "the war towards which English statesmen were working"; England's resolution "under all circumstances to maintain her high policy on lines which must lead to a breach with Germany"; "his (Grey's) system of political preparation for a war against Germany"; "it was a policy of war, and the task was to demand everything that could be serviceable to the three Powers which had conspired against Russia at the moment of the

prospective conflict"; "the great conspiracy of the Entente Powers, directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary"; "chess moves in preparation of that struggle for existence."

In accordance with this theory, every peace action taken by England and the other Entente Powers is a "two-faced move." When peace was maintained by conferences, congresses and diplomatic negotiations, "it was in no way due to England." In the negotiations for a political understanding and for a simultaneous restriction of naval armaments the question was merely one of a "deceptive show." Lord Haldane was sent to Berlin "ostensibly to pave the way to an understanding; in reality to reconnoitre, and to procure new arguments for the policy of the Cabinet, which was already firmly established" (*A Slanderer*, page 47). In his other pamphlet mentioned above (page 24) Schiemann the historian expresses himself to the same effect regarding Haldane's mission which, according to his account, was not seriously intended by the English Government, but "had no other object than to pacify the sentiment in England which continued to press more loudly for an understanding with Germany."

The conclusion of the Anglo-German agreement with regard to Asia Minor and the Baghdad line is suppressed by Schiemann, because he cannot represent as a mere pretence a real settlement of real questions of national interests. On this subject, under the general heading "Double-dealing in England," he writes as follows:

The long dormant negotiations with Germany on a settlement of mutual interests in the territory of the Baghdad railway and in Africa at the cost of Portugal were again resumed, and with apparent sincerity were brought quite near a conclusion, so that in September, 1913, an agreement appeared to be quite imminent. That in this case, as in the negotiations with regard to a naval agreement which were also continued, the whole thing was merely a deceptive show, we know from Haldane's confession of July 5th, 1915, quoted above. They were chess-moves in preparation of that struggle for existence which Haldane on his return from Berlin in February, 1912, had represented to his colleagues in the Cabinet as inevitable. (*A Slanderer*, page 59.)

As a matter of fact, the agreement with regard to Asia Minor and the Baghdad Railway was not merely "quite imminent in September, 1913"; it was actually concluded in the spring of 1914. Further, the negotiations with regard to the spheres of interest of the two Powers in Africa were not, as Schiemann dishonestly says, a "deceptive show"; they had proceeded so far that on the outbreak of war their conclusion was near at hand. In both pamphlets Schiemann is silent as to the actual conclusion of the treaty with regard to Asia Minor—a fact which clearly reveals his *mala fides*. In so far as the agreement with regard to East and West Africa was not actually completed, it is better adapted to the lying insinuation of English insincerity; of this he asserts in the *Understanding*-pamphlet (page 26) that Grey had refused to give this treaty the definite form of a proposal to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, because here again Grey was throughout concerned "merely with the appearance of conciliatoriness." This also is a deliberately lying insinuation intended to represent the whole English policy as having been for years a continuous system of specious manoeuvres. The agreement was indeed not yet complete in all points when the war broke out, and for special reasons a publication was impracticable, since the question involved was the delimitation of spheres of interest, not with regard to African savages, but with regard to a European State, Portugal.

Thus, in order to tune the English actions, which in reality served peace, into conformity with the war-conspiracy which is later to be produced, Schiemann is compelled at every stage either to suppress or to falsify the facts, or to ascribe to the English actions motives which are contradicted in the most unambiguous manner by the actions themselves. Or, if this is not possible, he is at least compelled to point out that the maintenance of peace was "not due to England," and took place entirely against the personal wish of the "inner circle of the Cabinet," in which he arbitrarily includes Asquith, Grey, Haldane and Churchill.

* * * * *

Another example of the perfidious policy of falsification may be taken. In his pamphlet on the *Slanderer* he entirely ignores the fruitful activity of the London Conference of Ambassadors, although otherwise he speaks at length of the Balkan War, of the London negotiations of the Balkan States with Turkey, of the failure of these negotiations, of the renewal of the war, of the intestinal struggle of the allies, of the peace of Bucharest, and of the final conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and Turkey (page 54). He leaves entirely aside the activity in the cause of peace undertaken in common by Germany and England, an activity which was honourable to both parties, rich in result, and full of the most auspicious promise for the future peace of Europe, although it was to this activity that the maintenance of peace was exclusively to be attributed, and he concludes the paragraph on the subject with an observation which deliberately and completely reverses the then political situation: "All this created an entirely new political situation, the various stages of which were of decisive influence on the great conspiracy of the Entente Powers directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary."

In the *Understanding*-pamphlet (page 26) Herr Schiemann is so good as to make mention of the activity of England, in common with Germany, at the London Conference of Ambassadors, but he introduces the few sentences bearing on the subject with the base insinuation:

He (Grey) and France also were resolved to defer the action prepared against Germany until Russia, who was eagerly arming, had completed her preparations, which had been critically reviewed by General Joffre in August, 1913; among these were included, *inter alia*, the construction of railways, intended to lead in Poland to the Prussian and Austrian frontier. This consideration also explains the attitude of England during the Balkan imbroglios of 1912 and 1913.

Thus Grey's activity for the maintenance of peace at the London Conference was also merely a specious manoeuvre with the object of postponing the outbreak of the intended

European war until the Entente Powers had finished their military preparations. A military visit paid by General Joffre to Russia is thrown in by the way and represented as a link in the chain of the preparations for the offensive war. As if the Austrian and German rulers and generalissimos never visited each other and never reviewed each other's troops! It is in this way that the German Déroulède, from the beginning to the end of his war and jingoistic pamphlets, pursues his task of poisoning the political springs. He falsifies the facts or their motives; but one fact he forgets, namely, that in so doing he is constantly placing himself in opposition to the official declarations of the German Government. Grey's policy during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 not only received unstinted recognition and praise in Europe and the whole world, but was also eulogised by Herr von Jagow himself in the Reichstag on February 7th, 1913, in the following words:

One of the last statements—unless I am mistaken, quite the last—made by my late predecessor in the Reichstag dealt with our relations with England. He stated on that occasion that throughout the recent crisis (in the Near East) our relations with England had been specially trustful. He pointed out the good service rendered to the cause of an understanding among all the Powers by the frank conversation conducted in entire confidence between London and Berlin during all the phases of this crisis, and he expressed the expectation that they would continue to render this service. It affords me special satisfaction that on the first occasion which has presented itself for me to speak in this place I can affirm that this expectation has been absolutely and entirely fulfilled. The intimate exchange of view which we are maintaining with the British Government has very materially contributed to the removal of difficulties of various kinds which have arisen during the last few months. We have now seen that we have not only points of contact with England of a sentimental nature, but that similar interests also exist. I am not a prophet, but I entertain the hope that on the ground of common interests, which in politics is the most fertile ground, we can continue to work with England and perhaps to reap the fruits of our labours. (Quoted from Cook, page 35.)

This recognition on the part of the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, and his predecessor completely disposes of the whole of Schiemann's lying account, and this applies not merely to his account of English activity at the London Conference, but to everything else which he has the audacity to produce with regard to the Anglo-Franco-Russian conspiracy since 1909. If it is true "that war with Germany had been resolved upon in principle since 1909" (*A Slanderer*, page 64) it would have been impossible for Grey during the Balkan crisis to have co-operated with Germany in the cause of peace in the sincere, open, honourable, and trustful manner for which he is praised by Jagow, who expressly appeals on the subject to his predecessor Kiderlen. The one possibility excludes the other. Herr Schiemann may therefore be left to settle matters with Herr von Jagow and with the *Manes* of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter.

If the motive which Herr Schiemann ascribes to the English Government in explanation of their earlier attitude were correct, they could not have laboured for the maintenance of peace during the critical days from July 23rd to August 4th, 1914, so indefatigably, so devotedly and so energetically as is indicated in the praises which Herr von Bethmann bestows upon them in the White Book. I have compiled in my book (pages 245-246) the list of the eulogies which Bethmann devotes to the English Government; it concludes with the solemn recognition, contained in the declaration of war against Russia, of the English efforts for peace. How does Herr Schiemann explain the Chancellor's hymn of praise, if the damning judgment is correct, which he, the professor of history, dares to pass on English policy since 1908? "The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was conducted is unexampled," exclaims Schiemann in indignation. There were thus six years of the game of intrigue! A whole series of positive peace-actions, crowned by the peace-efforts in the critical July days of 1914, which unfortunately remained fruitless; the amicable settlement of three Moroccan crises in 1905, 1909 and 1911—the prevention of an Austro-Russian war on account of the annexation of Bosnia in 1908-9—

the prevention of an Austro-Russian war and its inevitable sequel of a European war during the Balkan crisis in 1912-13—added to this the comprehensive, exhausting, leading activity for the prevention of the present war,¹—all this is but trickery and hypocrisy, the action of a “professional card-sharper” continued throughout six long years.

And yet all this was unnoticed in the Wilhelmstrasse! They continued to work with Grey; up till August 4th, 1914, they showered their praises upon him, and now Herr Schiemann comes along and disowns, not Sir Edward Grey as might be imagined, but Herr von Bethmann, Herr von Jagow and their friends, and depicts them as the deceived and misguided victims of the slim Englishman, whose devices are now at last unveiled by the great Schiemann. One is in fact at a loss to know whether in these falsifiers of history one should most admire the brazen forehead with which they execute their falsifications, or the shameless contempt for the German intelligence to which they have the temerity to dish up their fables as historical facts.

“The aggressive tendency of England is proved by the agreements with France and Russia, which we have noticed above, and which are to-day *publici juris*” (*How England*, etc., page 21). These agreements, as I have already explained above, were alleged to have been arrived at in the roadstead at Reval in June, 1908, between Hardinge and Isvolsky, “not officially but in an oral negotiation.” Herr Schiemann is possessed of full knowledge of the contents of these oral agreements, the point of time at which they were to take effect, the aggressive tendency against Germany, the positive intention to make war; on these alleged agreements he builds his whole arraignment, but at no time has he ever produced the least shadow of proof for his assertions. With this phantom of a war-conspiracy of 1908 he disposes of all proved historical facts, just as Helfferich does with his war-conspiracy of July 29th, 1914; or else he seeks to falsify them to fit his thesis, and represents the leading German diplo-

¹ See *L'accuse*, page 242 *et seq.*, and the relevant sections in Volume I of this work.

matists, whom I am certainly not called upon to defend, as such short-sighted dupes that they would really be justified in suing him for libel. Indeed, he goes so far as to cast on his personal friends in England aspersions which are unworthy of a gentleman. Let anyone read in the concluding pages of his *Understanding*-pamphlet his conversations with Charles Trevelyan in February, 1913, and with Lord Haldane in the spring of 1914, both members of Asquith's Government. Trevelyan assured him in the most definite manner that under no circumstances would England go to war; a Government which made preparations for a war would be at once turned out. As is well known, Trevelyan, with Burns and Lord Morley, resigned on the outbreak of war; not however because they considered that the slightest blame for the outbreak of war attached to Sir Edward Grey, or because they denied his sincere efforts for peace, but because, notwithstanding the outbreak of war, they considered it preferable that England should remain neutral.

Lord Haldane's conversation "at a political supper *à deux*," a few months before the outbreak of war, also confirmed Schiemann's impression that the inclination to an understanding with Germany prevailed in all the industrial circles of England. Haldane considered that the existing grouping of Powers furnished the best guarantee of peace, since Grey could curb Russia, and Germany could do the same with Austria-Hungary. The conversation turned on the injury done to English and German interests by "the present siege on both sides of the North Sea." In a letter from Haldane to Schiemann, the former assured his correspondent that "my ambition is to bring Germany and Great Britain into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. . . . The less the nations and the groups treat political questions from a purely egotistical standpoint, the more will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence between the

two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."¹ This letter, which is inspired by an honourable and sincere friendship, is given by Schiemann with the commentary: "It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the views here expressed, when it is reflected that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and must, therefore, have been acquainted with the secret moves of Grey's policy" (*How England*, etc., page 28.)

Thus not only did Grey lie consistently throughout the years, but Trevelyan and Haldane also lied. Schiemann's personal impressions in England were deceptive. Albion's perfidy extended, not only to the nation as such, but also to all the various individuals with whom Schiemann, the unsullied knight of truth, came into friendly relations. The Englishmen lied, and the good honest Germans were taken in by their lies.

Immediately after narrating Haldane's utterances, Schiemann once more gathers together all Grey's lies. On August 4th, 1914, it had clearly emerged that the "conversations" of the diplomatists and of the military representatives of the Entente had become treaties, the Ententes had become Alliances, which previously had passed current only under false names. Six weeks after Grey had denied the existence of binding war obligations, "England placed us before the accomplished fact of a struggle for life and death."

This is not one of Grey's lies, but one of Schiemann's! We are now acquainted with the correspondence between Grey and Cambon of November 22nd/23rd, 1912, to which it is unnecessary that I should again return here (see *J'accuse*, page 85). In these letters there is no trace of an alliance; on the contrary, complete freedom is reserved for both the countries concerned to determine what their attitude would be in the event of an outbreak of war. On the outbreak of the European war England made full use of this freedom. She allowed the war between Germany and Russia to break out without participating in it; she gave the French no un-

¹ [As given in the original English in Schiemann, except one sentence which is clearly misquoted.]

dertaking to participate in the war in the event of France becoming involved, but merely the conditional and restricted promise of naval support (August 2nd, Blue Book, No. 148). England did not intervene in the war until she did so on account of the Belgian question, which directly affected English interests, and this step, moreover, was only taken after the failure on August 4th of all the attempts to secure a withdrawal from the violation of Belgian neutrality (Blue Book, No. 160). Grey therefore did not "deliberately tell Parliament an untruth," as he is accused by Schiemann of having done. He spoke the truth, and acted accordingly. The "accomplished fact of a struggle for life and death" was therefore not the consequence of secret alliances, but the consequence of Germany's action towards Belgium, of which England vainly endeavoured to secure the cancellation.

* * * * *

Schiemann takes the liberty of telling a further lie, while accusing Grey of lying. I have already observed elsewhere that I do not have at my disposal the connections of the *Kreuzzeitung* professor which enable him to bring forward, and represent as proved, facts which are not known from public documents. Therefore I cannot say whether it is true, "as is known from Russian sources" (as Schiemann asserts without proof), that Grey had already accepted the Russian proposal for the conclusion of a naval agreement and had approved the working out of the relevant details by the naval staff on both sides. That may or may not be so. In any case it affords not the slightest evidence in support of Schiemann's aggressive conspiracy. Military and naval agreements of a much more intimate character have existed time out of mind between Germany and Austria, and yet Schiemann and his friends assert that these agreements served defensive purposes only. Why then should Anglo-Russian naval conventions, if, indeed, they already existed or were contemplated, have unconditionally served offensive intentions?

In my book I have already dealt in detail with the grounds

out of which there arose the deep and constantly increasing feeling of distrust towards Germany and her ally Austria-Hungary, not only among the Entente Powers, but also among the neutrals throughout the whole world, and I cannot here return to the question. The demeanour of the Central Powers at the Hague Conferences, the blunt refusal of any suggestion to assure peace by an organisation resting on law, of any restriction of armaments by international or partial agreements, the crassly egotistical policy adopted by Austria in the Balkans in ruthless pursuance of her own interests, the blind support given to this policy by Germany's "mailed fist" and "her shining armour," the criminal intrigues of the Pan-Germans, Prussian militarism which raised its head with increasing shamelessness—these and other circumstances which are narrated in my first and in this my second book had brought the Entente Powers together and had cemented them more and more closely to each other. There would therefore have been no occasion for surprise if in addition to the Anglo-French military discussions, discussions between England and Russia should also have taken place. This fact, however, does not furnish the slightest evidence of the existence of an aggressive war-plan on the part of the "conspiring" Powers; it merely proves that a European war was considered as possible, and that the discussion of the military measures to be adopted in such a contingency was considered expedient.

The whole train of thought, that military measures and agreements on the other side are aggressive whereas the same actions on this side are defensive, constantly recurs in the German literature of incitement to war; it might be designated as entirely fatuous if it were not devised with such devilish ingenuity, and planned with a view to its effect on the psychology of the German people as it existed then and now. The essence of the European balance of power was to be found in the idea that the military forces on both sides were to be so strengthened and linked together that the two groups of Powers should mutually balance. The strengthening of one

side was necessarily bound to provoke that of the other, in order that the scale on the one side should not sink to the disadvantage of the other. How, then, can it be made a charge against England that she sought to increase her insufficient land power by contingent agreements with France and Russia in order thus to hold the balance to some extent against the forces of Germany which were equally strong by land and by sea, although to these there had also to be added the forces of her ally Austria and, as had to be assumed, of Italy as well? How can it be made a charge against France that she answered the German Military law of 1913 by introducing a three years' period of service, since in view of her considerably smaller population it was only by prolonging the period of service that she could find something to adjust the gigantic increase of German troops?

THE GERMAN MILITARY LAW AND THE FRENCH THREE YEARS LAW

Here again Schiemann and his fellows lie in representing France as having taken the lead with her three years period of service and in depicting the German Military Law as merely the consequence of the increase of the French army. The reverse of this is the truth. The German Military Law was introduced earlier, and was voted earlier (April, 1913) than the French measure relating to the three years period of service (August, 1913). It was not in any way explained by reference to an imminent increase in the French forces through a prolongation of the period of service, but rather by the new political constellation in the Balkans, which might in certain circumstances create for the Austrian Empire a dangerous opposition in the South, and might thus make necessary an increase of German forces to compensate for a diversion of a part of the Austrian forces. There was no mention of the introduction of the three years period of service in France when the great German Military Law was introduced and elaborated. The idea of the three years period of service did not appear until after the German measures had

been made known in France, and effect was not given to it until the increase of German troops had been approved.

The Schiemanns cannot of course abolish these facts, of which the chronological order is clear, and to which I propose to return later. What then do they do in order to represent the French as "the bloke what begun it"? They maintain—that is to say they imagine—that Poincaré, on the occasion of the tour to Petrograd which he undertook as Premier in 1912, had already pledged himself to introduce the three years period of military service in France after his election as President of the Republic (*A Slanderer*, page 51). Where is the evidence in support of this? Who could tell in the summer of 1912 that Poincaré would be chosen as President of the French Republic in the beginning of 1913? Is it not the case that his election depended on all kinds of chances? Was it not imperilled in the gravest manner by strong and intriguing political opponents, as for example by Clemenceau? And are we to suppose that Russia was so stupid as to give, in return for this bill drawn on the future, definite promises to the French Government such as Schiemann would have us believe? The fact is that the last gigantic increases in the army which—as we Pacifists and Socialists rightly foretold—were bound to strain the condition of Europe to the breaking point, were also begun by Germany, and that her example was merely followed by France. The assertion that France would have been willing to make the beginning is entirely unsubstantial and void of all proof. The Belgian ambassadorial reports, to which we know the German Government attaches so much evidential value, also place it beyond doubt that the relation between the German and the French increases in the army was that of cause and effect (as I shall prove in the special study of the Belgian documents).

Thus constantly and everywhere we find the same policy pursued by the arraigners of the Entente; even facts, the chronological order of which is firmly established, they seek to remodel by baseless assertions and insinuations.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN NAVAL CONSULTATIONS

But let us return to Schiemann's record of lies against Grey. He seeks to represent the contemplated naval consultations between English and Russian experts as a symptom of the aggressive conspiracy, and in doing so he gives us the following sentence (*How England*, etc., page 28): "A war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was thereby expressly contemplated, and the full alliance of England was the presupposition." This manner of expression is intentionally selected with so much ambiguity to induce in the reader the belief—again without the shadow of evidence—that war against Germany and her allies was positively intended and that England's support was completely assured. This again is a perfidious insinuation, to which from the outset it is difficult to give credence in view of the fact that Herr Schiemann, who, after all, was not consulted by the Anglo-Russian experts, cannot know what these experts "contemplated," or how far English support was guaranteed to the Russians. But let us assume that Herr Schiemann was an eavesdropper at the door of the council chamber, if indeed it ever got so far as a consultation. Is it not entirely natural that the discussions of the naval experts were bound to contemplate the contingency of a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and to presuppose the participation of England in such a war? What purpose could the consultations have had, if not to consider joint Anglo-Russian naval operations in the event of a European war? Did the consultations of the military experts of the States of the Triple Alliance, Germany, Austria, and Italy, not contemplate a European war and the participation of all three States? It was only to meet the contingency of a war that the two groups stood opposed to each other in arms. Agreement as to their operations was as much a part of their military preparations as troops, cannon and ships. Why need it occasion surprise, and why should it be regarded as suspicious, that Anglo-Russian experts should have based their deliberations on the

same presupposition of the possibility of a European war, as did the Austro-German experts in the same circumstances?

This entirely natural basis and presupposition of the deliberations is transformed by Herr Schiemann by means of an intentionally ambiguous phraseology into a tendency to aggression. The war against the Triple Alliance was according to him "expressly contemplated," that is to say, it was intended. The complete alliance of England was a "presupposition," that is to say, it was guaranteed. And it is with this deceitful manœuvre that Herr Schiemann here again trickles into the credulous souls of his German readers the poisonous slander that the aggressive conspiracy was already resolved upon and that agreement had been reached as to all its details. I have intentionally dwelt at somewhat greater length on this example, because it is characteristic of all the demonstrations given by Schiemann and his friends. They do not proceed inductively by collecting and bringing forward evidence in support of their thesis, but they proceed deductively, placing their thesis without any proof at the head of their dissertations like a mathematical or geometrical proposition, and then every individual occurrence, even the most insignificant and the most harmless, is brought forward in the light of their thesis. How long will they continue to have any success with the German people by resorting to these juggling devices? When will Truth finally dawn? When will Clio discard her pencil, and with broom in hand drive her faithless disciples from the temple of knowledge?

THE ENTENTE CONSPIRACY INVENTED BY SCHIEMANN

It is extraordinarily significant to observe how these historical inquirers hasten, with the fear of detected criminals, past facts which they are unable to falsify or remodel. It is possible to arrive at any desired result by means of newspaper articles, unproved reports regarding oral negotiations, etc. I will undertake to give a picture of the sentiment prevailing in any country, at any time that may be chosen, which will agree exactly with my wishes in the matter, if it is suffi-

cient to quote the speech of a politician (from which, of course, I would leave out what did not suit my purpose) or an article by a journalist, which exactly supports my opinion and the objects I have in view. In every country there are parties and diversities of opinion, to which expression is given in speech and in writing. It is only necessary that I should choose those which correspond to the picture I wish to draw, and I shall have proved that France, England or Russia at any given moment thought as it suits me to portray.

This is Schiemann's system. The more we read him (an arduous task for anyone who honourably seeks the truth!) the more we see behind his tricks. This "Schiemann" is the "snippet-man" *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. All the newspapers in the world are represented in his snippet-box. Mention is made of a political event in Russia; he draws out, as suits his purpose, an English, French, Roumanian or Belgian newspaper-cutting and by means of it refutes what has been asserted. The subject in question is, let us say, the settlement of the Moroccan conflict in 1911, and the successful co-operation of England in preventing the outbreak of war. Herr Schiemann opens his snippet-box and draws out—(guess, Reader, what he draws out!)—a number of the *Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung* of December, 1911, in which the position of the English and German fleets in the summer months of 1911 is graphically represented (*A Slanderer*, page 43). This graphic representation of course proves nothing at all. It gives, however, to Herr Schiemann, the student of history, the opportunity of adding these sentences:

These were the days in which consideration was given to the question of overwhelming our fleet by superior force. In September the English officers were already informed of their destination on the Continent.

This chart in the *Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung* is thus another convincing proof that the only thing that England desired and sought was the opportunity to attack and annihilate us.

On November 27th, 1911, Sir Edward Grey delivered his

famous speech in the English Parliament (see *J'accuse*, page 106), in which he expressed England's strong desire for the establishment of improved relations with Germany; Great Britain had facilitated a friendly settlement of the Moroccan crisis between Germany and France; it was to be hoped that this settlement "had also cleaned the slate in respect of German relations with England." England's existing friendships did not constitute a hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. He, Grey, would gladly welcome any wish on the part of Germany to improve their mutual relations, and there would be nothing of a grudging attitude in England's policy.¹ What does Herr Schiemann make of this sincere and honourable peace-speech of Grey? England was resolved, said Grey, as interpreted by Schiemann (*A Slanderer*, page 45), to maintain the form of her relations with France and Russia which, as Schiemann adds, "merely meant that Grey would continue his system of political preparation for a war against Germany." Was there ever a more preposterous and impudent falsification?

But now the snippet comes to his aid. The relevant portfolio is opened, and—consider what is drawn out—a telegram from Paris to the *Journal de Genève*, in which the writer points out that the non-existence of a military convention between England and France, which Grey had correctly denied, did not justify the "inference that England and France had never contemplated the possibility of combining their forces." What evidence in favour of Schiemann's perversion of Grey's peace-parley into a fanfare of war is furnished by this insignificant tattle wired to a Swiss newspaper by an unknown Parisian, of whose standing we are entirely ignorant? No matter; a newspaper snippet has to be worked off. In this case, indeed, Herr Schiemann appears to have got hold of the wrong one in the portfolio, for the snippet from the *Journal de Genève* has as much to do with Grey's speech as Herr Schiemann with the service of Truth.

* * * * *

¹ See Cook, p. 29.

Take another example, this time a ludicrous one, of the great historian's method of using snippets. At the conclusion of his pamphlet on the *Slanderer* (pages 65-67) he flatters himself that he has given the accuser a fatal blow in publishing, of all things in the world, the letter of an Englishman to a Chilian, which is said to have appeared in Santiago in the *Gazeta militar* there, and which consitutes for the historian "an important document in contemporary history." Thus, be it observed, we do not know who wrote the letter; we do not know whether he really exists; we are further not in a position to check whether the letter was written in English or in Spanish, or whether it appeared in Chile in the *Gazeta militar* in the words in which it is reproduced by the historian. We have to rely on its reproduction by Schiemann, who again takes it from the *Kölnische Zeitung*, and with this momentous document in his hand he triumphantly exclaims to the accuser:

There at last is a voice which openly acknowledges the motives of the men who made the war; after all the official hypocrisy here is a sincere word. We recommend it to the "accuser," for the correction of the appreciation he bestows on the unselfish love of peace of his English heroes. He has now obtained a picture of the real historical antecedents of the war, a fragment of the truth, so far as it can be established to-day.

I pass over what the alleged English letter-writer communicates to his Chilian correspondent, because I am reluctant to stoop to the low level of a historian who produces such anonymous stuff as a historical document, and actually makes use of it as the final volley for the pulverisation of the accuser. To what a pass must the defenders of German innocence have come, when they debase themselves to such a method of proof! It is, of course, unveiled to the Chilian people that it was England's commercial envy that caused the war, that the idea of a league to crush Germany had arisen in Belgium earlier even than in England (this is printed by Herr Schiemann in emphatic type), that the English manufacturers and commercial magnates aimed at the devastation of the

Continent—including the “areas of France and Russia which were industrially the wealthiest”—for the more the Continent was devastated “the greater and more positive will be the resulting advantages for England.”

With this newspaper snippet, Herr Schiemann, you have certainly broken the record, and you have not only broken the record but have also broken me, the accuser. I feel myself crushed. Now the “cards of the professional card-sharper” Grey are really uncovered. Now we have authentic information to show what criminals and rogues the English are. Illumination has come to us from Chile, and it is to you, Herr Professor, that we owe it.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S CONSTANT DISAPPOINTMENT

Herr Schiemann is obliged to have recourse to the most outrageous devices in order to adapt to his war-conspiracy all the facts which proclaim the pacific intention of the Entente Powers. For this purpose he applies various methods. Either he represents the attitude of the Entente Powers, which was obviously directed to the maintenance of peace, as having been merely specious, and proves this by reference to any particular interests or situations which the Power in question had to take into account at a given moment. From this deceitful standpoint the maintenance of peace is never an end in itself, but merely the consequence imposed by a passing necessity. The second method adopted by Schiemann, and at the same time the one that is most convenient, is to suppress the incident altogether. The third method is this: according as he wishes in the passage in question to represent England or France or Russia as the leader of the war conspiracy, he maintains that the two others for quite special reasons could not at the critical moment allow war to break out, but that the third, the leader and the instigator, “grievously disappointed” or “embittered,” was forced to be a spectator of the peaceful issue of the crisis.

/ This grievous disappointment and embitterment is represented at every stage as the state of mind of the English

statesmen, especially of Sir Edward Grey. It is something of a miracle that this hapless wight has not ere now done away with himself out of sheer disappointment. The reader may be interested to hear what an accumulation of grievous disappointments are credited to Grey on page 19 of the *Understanding*-pamphlet alone.

It was a grievous disappointment for the English statesmen that in spite of the enormous din made by the Serbians and the emphatically bellicose attitude of Russia, Nicholas II. nevertheless recognised the annexation of March 25th, 1909. The disappointment was all the greater inasmuch as shortly before this the Moroccan difficulties between Germany and France were also settled, notwithstanding the Casablanca conflict which was still pending. On the day on which King Edward made his first visit to Berlin, on February 9th, 1909, a Franco-German agreement with regard to Morocco was signed, and in the end of May the Casablanca conflict was also settled by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both parties.

Then the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 was happily overcome by the compliant disposition shown by Russia towards the Austrian breach of law, the second Moroccan agreement between Germany and France was brought to a safe conclusion, and the Casablanca conflict was also settled by arbitration. In arriving at these results the chief merit was to be ascribed to England, as the intermediary with Russia and with France. The peace of Europe had once again been maintained. Yet Herr Schiemann has the audacity to speak of a "grievous disappointment for the English statesman," and to add the sentence: "It is not too much to say that King Edward did what lay in his power to arrive at another issue. . . ." (The *Understanding*-pamphlet, page 19.)

I have already spoken of another of Grey's embitterments; he was "embittered" (*A Slanderer*, page 43) because the dispatch of the *Panther* was not answered by an Anglo-French naval demonstration; in this case he was embittered by the double resistance which it encountered from the French Gov-

ernment and in his own Cabinet—all, of course, pure inventions on the part of Schiemann.

The worst "disappointments," however, naturally befell the English war-politicians, Grey, Asquith and their partners, when the third Moroccan agreement of November, 1911, took form, a result to which, as is well known, they had largely contributed. The English naval measures during the prolonged crisis, which brought Europe to the brink of a war are, of course, represented as implying aggressive intentions. As early as 1905—that is to say, after the fall of Delcassé—"England considered in all seriousness the question of making an attack" (*How England*, etc., page 12), that is to say, three years before the agreements of Reval, which, as Schiemann elsewhere maintains, first laid the foundation of the conspiracy. The merit of England in having brought about the third Moroccan agreement is naturally completely inverted. "It was not due to Asquith and Grey that peace was notwithstanding finally maintained" (*A Slanderer*, page 44)—so we read immediately after mention is made of the agreement. And in exactly the same way, with the object of at once effacing in the reader the impression produced by the fact that the dispute ended peacefully, mention is made in the same breath of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance, which was effected "clearly with the intention of assuring for herself an ally in the East against Germany, in the event of the war, for which the English statesmen were working, not breaking out until after August, 1915, or in the event of its not yet being finished by that time" (*A Slanderer*, page 43).

Anyone who so far suppresses his nausea as to follow for a time Schiemann's system of falsification will be seized by a kind of admiration for this man, like the tribute of recognition one is compelled to pay to the burglar who successfully breaks open even the strongest Milner safe. The criminal skill is the same in both, but the latter in the end produces gold, whereas Schiemann only brings forth lead.

THE MOROCCAN AGREEMENT OF 1911

The Moroccan settlement of 1911 is an inconvenient obstacle to Schiemann. In the first place he falsely says that the English statesmen, who materially contributed to bring it about, would have prevented it had they had their way. Thus on this occasion it is the Englishmen, on other occasions the leaders and the instigators of the trio of criminals, who are overruled. Then, however, in order to produce evidence (in the Schiemann manner) in support of his assertion of English opposition to the peaceful settlement, he has the assurance to represent the prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an act taken in preparation for war against Germany, although, as everyone knows, this treaty was concluded merely to afford Japan support against Russia. The use made of the Japanese Alliance against German possessions in East Asia, which was only a consequence of the outbreak of the European war, is thus represented as an intention entertained by England as far back as 1911, and this invention is again used to prove that in the summer of 1911, when England laboured for a settlement of the Franco-German conflict, she was in truth devoting her efforts not to the peace of Europe, but to war against Germany. What expression plays on the features of Herr Schiemann when he transcribes such falsifications, the true character of which is of course quite known to him? What contempt must his eyes reveal for the German reader, whom he seeks to humbug with such fairy tales; for he himself knows that in all the rest of the world there is no one who believes his inventions.

Herr Schiemann, indeed, is so bold as to express his indignation that Sir Edward Cook should assert that Great Britain facilitated the conclusion of the Franco-German Moroccan agreement. The indignation, Herr Schiemann, is on our side. Cook correctly quotes Grey's speech of November 27th, 1911, mentioned above (Cook, page 22; *J'accuse*, page 106), in which Grey not merely truthfully emphasised England's activity in the cause of peace in the Moroccan question, but also

gave expression to England's strong desire for friendly relations with Germany. The activity in the cause of peace displayed by England, who no doubt gave diplomatic support to France, in accordance with the Anglo-French Moroccan agreement, but who nevertheless sought by every possible means to prevent a European war, is a historical fact which Herr Schiemann, in his approved method, seeks to get rid of by producing newspaper-snippets. In the spring of 1911 an English naval paper gave an illustration of the German High Sea Fleet with the inscription: "The Enemy!" This is a proof of the bellicose intentions of the English Government! After the crisis was over, an open letter was addressed by Morel and Hirst to the members of the English Parliament, in which England's foreign policy during the last seven years was sharply criticised, and a protest entered against any alliance or political agreement which might force England to measures at variance with her own national interests (*How England*, etc., page 23; *A Slanderer*, page 45). Does this critical letter written by politicians of the opposition contain the slightest shadow of a charge that the English Government was intentionally pursuing a warlike policy? Is it not rather the case, on Schiemann's own quotations, that the writers merely point out the danger that England might be involved in a war *against* her will, as the result of certain agreements with Continental Powers? Is the standpoint here assumed by Morel and Hirst not exactly the same as their attitude to the present war, the standpoint, that is to say, that the Liberal English Government desired and laboured for peace, but that it would have been a better policy for England in the past to have abstained from any Entente with Continental Powers? How little this criticism of English policy before the war has to do with the present war is confirmed by the following sentence which Morel wrote in an article in *The New Statesman* of February 13th, 1915:

I am not concerned with the first point about Belgium, because on the inevitableness of an Anglo-German war arising out of a German invasion in 1914 of Belgian territory, I imagine there can be no difference of opinion in this country.

This recognition of the fact that Belgium was the cause of the Anglo-German war, and was necessarily bound to be so, is all the more important when expressed by Morel, inasmuch as in other matters he accuses English foreign policy of a long catalogue of errors. In any case Schieman's snippet affords not the slightest proof in support of his assertion that the English Government worked against the Moroccan agreement, and, like the whole of the snippet collection, it is merely dust to throw in the eyes of the uncritical reader.

The last device of the historian is this: If all other means are unavailing to transform the peace action of the Entente Powers into a preparation for war there always remains a last way of escape. He can always say that they were not yet ready; their military preparations were not yet completed; it was not until somewhere about 1915 that the blow was to be struck, and until then the German Michel had to be kept in the dark regarding the evil designs of his enemies. I have already referred to these tactics and to their practical application.

With the aid of these four methods Herr Schieman is always safe. Grey and Asquith may pursue what line of action they chose. Either it never happened at all, or it was not seriously intended and only ostensibly served the cause of peace, being in reality dictated by their own interests; or else it was the product of the necessity of the moment, or finally it was designed for the deception of Germany and for the preparation in safety for a later attack.

* * * * *

We may take a pleasing example of the way in which this professor of history, the model historian, who accuses me of "the unscientific nature of my method of investigation," "the superficiality of historical knowledge," "the tendentious compilation of fragments of documents," etc., deals with the same facts according to the end he is pursuing at one place or another. It may be regarded as a historically incontrovertible fact, that the crisis in connection with the annexation of Bosnia would in all probability have led to a European

war through the fault of Austria and of Germany which stood behind her, had not England and France exerted all their influence on Russia, with whom they were connected by an Entente and by an Alliance, and in the end induced the Russian as well as the Serbian Government to recognise the situation created by Austria. Schiemann also recognises the fact that there was a grave European crisis, which, as is well known, led to the Austrian and the Russian mobilisation, and which in March, 1909, had reached its culminating point. He further speaks of "a diplomatic campaign which was almost on the point of developing into a European war," of a "Press campaign of almost unexampled violence," of the protest of the Entente Powers against the annexation, and of the final surrender of Russia and Serbia after a Russo-Austrian war had appeared inevitable (*A Slanderer*, pages 30-32; *How England*, etc., page 19). I have already pointed out that on this occasion also Schiemann ascribes to the English Government the intention of driving matters to war. At the moment I am only concerned to make it clear that Russia, supported by the Entente Powers, protested against the Austrian annexation, that Austria and Russia mobilised, and that a European war was imminent.

At another place in his *Slanderer* the state of affairs so determined does not suit Herr Schiemann's purpose. He is displeased that in my book I should represent the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a challenge addressed to Russia and Serbia, as one of the many systematically accomplished Austrian actions which for the sake of purely selfish interests constantly imperilled the peace of Europe and in the end provoked this terrible war. What, then, does Herr Schiemann do? He calls the Austrian action of 1908 (*A Slanderer*, page 22) "the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was carried out in agreement with Russia and with her previous concurrence." This outsoars all that has ever been achieved in reshaping facts according to the momentary purpose of the narrative. The grave European crisis, the diplomatic campaign which was almost on the point of developing into a European war (*A Slanderer*, pages 31-32), the resolute

militant attitude of Russia (*How England*, etc., page 19), these dangerous facts are transformed in the skilful hands of the historical juggler into an "annexation carried out in agreement with Russia and with her previous concurrence"; and this is done merely because on one occasion the one assertion, on another the other, is better suited to the juggler's purpose. I have already quoted in my book the English proverb that a liar should have a good memory. Herr Schiemann has already forgotten on page 31 what he wrote on page 22.

THE VENEZUELA CONFLICT

I should like to illustrate by a further example Schiemann's system of hunting out such newspaper snippets as may be required in order to throw into prominence feelings and tendencies in the English people which suit his argument at the moment. This example is all the more striking because here I can refute Schiemann by Schiemann himself. In his *Slanderer* pamphlet one point on which he makes a great fuss and accuses me of having suppressed important facts is that in the interval between the first and the second Hague Conferences I failed to mention—who would guess it?—the Venezuela incident (1902-3)!

Now I must confess to my shame that even now, notwithstanding Schiemann's explanations, I have been unable to grasp the connection between the Venezuela conflict and the ideals of the Hague Conference (establishment of arbitration for international disputes, limitation of armaments, etc.). It is well known that the English and German Fleets co-operated in the winter of 1902-3 to compel Castro, the Venezuelan tyrant, to observe his international obligations. This co-operation was inevitably received with great sympathy by all sections disposed to peace in both countries and was interpreted as a favourable sign for the future. Of course there always have been, and there still are, in England as well as in Germany, elements which direct their efforts against the peaceful co-operation of the nations, and which find their bread and their profit in the incitement of one pacific people

against others. These bands of intriguers and conspirators, from the lowest selfish or class interests, make a trade of poisoning public opinion; they seek by subterranean channels to conduct their unclean water to authoritative places and when at last after years of boring, after years of intrigue and of agitation, the world-conflagration breaks out and the devastating fire consumes all the nations, they then stand forth and point with their finger across the frontier, exclaiming: "There stands the incendiary!"

Herr Schiemann, the German Déroulède, knows better than anyone else this criminal circle in Germany. To him, as to all his fellows on both sides of the German frontier, one may properly apply the words which at the conclusion of the *Slanderer* he addresses to those in England, France and Russia alleged to have been guilty of the war:

"The blood which has been shed in this war, and all the misery which has accompanied it, cries aloud to Heaven for retribution. It will recoil on the heads of those who have instigated the war."

In this hope I participate. This is one of the few points in which I am in agreement with the *Kreuzzeitung* professor. *To the lamp-post with the guilty!* will, it is to be hoped, be the battle-cry of all nations after this insensate carnage. To the lamp-post with all Déroulèdes, those on this side as well as on that!

I should, however, like to guard against a misunderstanding which might arise from the conjunction of the German and the French Déroulèdes. It was not I, but a Frenchman, who linked his countryman, the enthusiastic patriot who no doubt wrought much harm in his honourable excess of zeal, with a German falsifier of history who is destitute of honour and of true patriotism (he was not even born a German!), who possesses not a spark of enthusiasm for an ideal cause; on the contrary, he sits and sneers in cold blood in his study and twists and moulds dates and facts until they produce the picture desired by those in high places. The true Déroulède

was an honourable enthusiast inspired for a great cause, the false is a dishonest manufacturer of history who pursues base ends by petty means. The two Déroulèdes have nothing in common with each other, apart from their success in rendering national divergencies more acute. The Frenchman courageously drew his sword, and called upon his countrymen in glowing songs to regain their lost provinces. The German, on the other hand, created dangerous poisons in his secret laboratory, and by night privily infected the public springs. Paul Déroulède did not deserve to give his name to a Theodor Schiemann. I owe this testimony to the *Manes* of the French patriot.

* * * * *

Let us return to Venezuela. In his construction of the conspiracy which he attributes to King Edward from the beginning of his reign (1901) Herr Schiemann is embarrassed by the common action for peace taken by England and Germany which, notwithstanding the failure of the first Hague Conference, clearly proclaimed the existence, on the English side also, of a desire for action in common. According to Schiemann, it is a fact that "the one political idea which was firmly established so far as the King was concerned since the beginning of his reign was to make the central point of English policy the exploitation of the French idea of revenge which still survived" (*How England*, etc., page 11).

The exploitation of the idea of revenge, a conspiracy to make war against Germany and a pacific collaboration in Venezuela—these obviously do not fit into each other. The conjurer must therefore set to work without delay!

One, two, three! Hey, presto, hey!
The quickness of the hand deceives the eye!¹

The snippet-box is therefore opened, and a snippet produced which is alleged to come from the *National Review* (I am not in a position to check the existence and the contents

¹ [Hokus, Pokus, eins, zwei, drei!
Geschwindigkeit ist keine Hexerei!]

of this Press-utterance of which the text is not given). Immediately after chronicling the fact of co-operation in Venezuela it is asserted on the strength of the utterance in the *National Review* that a group of conspirators in England and Russia had taken as their watchword "a world-alliance against Germany," and that they had thus made use of the action of peace to evolve a war-cry. Here again we have the same system! an attempt to obliterate a historical fact by means of any sort of newspaper extract, which cannot be checked and is not even quoted verbatim, and which even if it really exists reflects the unauthoritative ideas of a band of intriguers, not, however, the ideas of the English people nor of their Government.

In the case before us—and it is for this reason that I devote some time to the present incident—it is possible to prove by means of Schiemann himself the untenability and the objectionable character of this method. While in the *Slanderer* (page 17) he bases his inference of a world-alliance against Germany on an utterance in the *National Review*, he imprudently quotes in his *Understanding*-pamphlet (page 11), since he apparently considers that his readers are even more uncritical than they really are, a speech delivered by Balfour, then Prime Minister, on February 13th, 1903, in which he combated with the greatest energy the incitement of English public opinion against Germany:

Let us remember—said Balfour, according to Schiemann's quotation—that the old ideal of Christendom should still be our ideal; and all those nations who are in the forefront of civilisation should learn to work together by practicable means for the common good, and that nothing militates against the realisation of that great ideal so conclusively as the encouragement of these international bitternesses, these international jealousies, these international dislikes. . . . So far as Venezuela is concerned, that will pass. . . . As regards the future, I am filled with disquietude when I think how easy it is to fan these international jealousies, how difficult it seems to me to be to allay them.¹

¹ [Speech delivered at Liverpool.]

This speech of the Prime Minister's, which is prudently concealed from the readers of the *Slanderer*, necessarily disposes altogether of the alleged utterances of the *National Review*. The responsible Government, the Conservative Government then in power, as well as the Liberal Government to-day, were, in fact, absolutely disposed to peace; they sought for an understanding with Germany and a cessation of the ruinous naval competition, and they entered into the Ententes, not to provoke a war, but for the maintenance of peace—for the maintenance of peace by means of the European balance of power, which was still considered to hold out a prospect of success.

How does the historical juggler escape from the difficulty involved in reconciling the words of the English Prime Minister, quoted by himself, with his fundamental thesis of a "war-conspiracy against Germany"? Nothing is easier. The magician here again works with the double devices of his art. Balfour expressed the views of the English Government, the *National Review* and its journalistic comrades expressed "the spiritual sentiments which, as was well known in these journalistic circles, animated King Edward" (*How England*, etc., page 10). It will be seen that the "new Prussian" historian of Russian Baltic origin is never in a difficulty. The intriguers agitate against Germany. The leader of the Cabinet attacks them with the greatest emphasis, but the King secretly stands behind the intriguers—against his own Ministers!—and so we are again furnished with the desired picture of the Royal English war conspiracy against Germany. It is specially worthy of remark in this juggling device that on every other occasion, when the Schiemanns find it convenient, King Edward is represented in his very own person as the instigator and the inciter of the devilish policy of "encirclement" and of war, and his Ministers are represented merely as his executive agents. Here, however, in the Venezuela incident, where the Minister unmistakably turned against the intriguers, it is necessary to construe a lack of harmony between the royal will, which on other occasions alone decided matters, and his Ministry—solely for the purpose of transforming the Vene-

zuelan action of peace into an element in the preparation for war.

ITALY'S RÔLE IN THE WAR

In his hopeless endeavour to refute my "Antecedents of the Crime," it is only natural that Herr Schiemann should scarcely consider the points discussed by me, which in all essential matters rest on historically established facts and documents. To this aspect of the matter I propose to return in a further section. On the other hand, by way of creating a diversion, he seeks to invoke the whole history of the world, everything that has anywhere happened on the globe, in Japan, South America or elsewhere, though it has not the slightest connection with my demonstration that Germany and Austria are primarily responsible for the state of tension in Europe; he seeks to introduce every possible remote incident, and finally concludes this compilation of insignificant or unproved facts with the proud words:

I think that these facts will suffice to illumine a page of the "Antecedents of the Crime," of which the "accuser," who claims to know the truth, has obviously had no knowledge. (*A Slenderer*, pages 21, 22.)

Evidence of the existence of the war-conspiracy is thus also discovered by the historian in the "Franco-Italian intrigue," as he chooses to designate the relations between France and her partners in the Entente towards Italy from 1902 down to the entrance of Italy into the war. I should here like to make it clear that I regard the attitude of Italy down to the declaration of neutrality as entirely correct and loyal, such an attitude as was demanded, not only by Italian interests, but also by political fidelity and honour—which for me are "no empty delusion." I have nothing to retract in the judgment which I have already passed in my book. On the other hand, I have no hesitation in condemning—as the most distinguished statesman of Italy, Giolitti, has condemned—the later action of the Ministry of Salandra during its negotiations with Austria and Germany, the higgling and bargaining on both sides, and the

final resolution for war against her former allies. The celebrated "parecchio" of the shrewd Piedmontese ("What Austria offers us is, after all, *something*"), and the conclusion he drew from this that a bird in the hand is preferable to two in the bush, I still consider to-day—indeed, more than ever to-day, after two years of war between Italy and Austria—the shrewdest word that could be spoken, the shrewdest advice that could be given to the Italian people. I am by no means certain that the King, the Government, and the people of Italy would not have been glad to-day if they had accepted the compensation offered in May, 1915, for their neutrality, which they could then have gained without any sacrifice of wealth or life, but which they rejected on the ground of its insufficiency. Perhaps the moment is no longer far distant when the man who, like so many other true patriots in other countries, was reviled and branded as a traitor on the outbreak of war, will return as the saviour of his country and will restore peace to Italy and to Europe also.

However this may be, those who regard Italy's military accession to the Entente as a crime have in no way any right to raise such a charge. Italy's accession was a consequence of the European war, as was also the participation of other Powers, of Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania. None of these declarations of participation in the war, on one side or the other, have anything to do with the origin of the war. They were occasioned by special national aspirations which made use of the European storm as a favourable opportunity to fish out of the general deluge the booty that had been so long desired. Had not the war been provoked by Germany and Austria, these special crusades for plunder would have been impossible. The great originators of the war have, therefore, no right to reproach for their behaviour the minor people who have endeavoured to turn it to their advantage.

* * * * *

This I say to make clear my standpoint with regard to the action of Italy. But now to return to Schiemann and his method of falsification. According to his account, Italy had al-

ready sold herself to France in 1902 and to Russia in 1909 in Racconigi. As always happens, Schiemann maintains that he is fully informed of the Franco-Italian and the Russo-Italian agreements, which, of course, like everything else that Schiemann produces, were directed against Germany and Austria. Although he must himself admit that Italy's agreements with France were kept strictly secret, he finds the proof of Italy's accession to the conspiracy in the fact "that the troops sent to Tripoli were taken, not from the neutral Swiss or from the Austrian frontiers, but from the French frontier, which Italy entirely denuded of troops" (*A Slenderer*, page 19).

This, again, is a favourite trick of the juggler. When he desires to prove diplomatic agreements and his collection of snippets does not render him the necessary service in the matter, he advances military measures in evidence: for example, English naval manœuvres in the North Sea or the Baltic, French Army manœuvres on the eastern frontier, Russian manœuvres on the western frontier. These are all supposed to prove bellicose intentions against Germany. As if the French could start manœuvres towards the Atlantic Ocean, Russia towards Kamchatka, England towards Iceland! As if it were not the fact that Germany also had chosen to carry out her manœuvres on the eastern or western frontiers towards Russia or France, but not towards Austria or Switzerland! In many passages in his war-pamphlets Schiemann makes use of such references to manœuvres in confirmation of warlike intentions, apparently with success so far as his credulous readers are concerned. At the conclusion of his *Understanding*-pamphlet, for example, we read:—

The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is unexampled. The palm is doubtless due to the friendly visit of the English squadron to Kiel under the leadership of Admiral Beatty. Two days after the murder of the Archduke it began its return journey through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, in order to join the concentrated forces of the entire English fleet, which was lying ready for battle before Spithead.

Thus the return of the English squadron from Kiel on June 30th, 1914, and its union with the rest of the fleet for the purpose of naval manœuvres—an event which took place twenty-three days before the Austrian Ultimatum, which evoked the danger of a European war, was sent to Serbia—the return of the English vessels to their home-ports and the institution of naval manœuvres on a large scale (not even on the North Sea or Baltic coasts of Germany, which elsewhere is represented as so incriminating a circumstance), this entirely inoffensive incident deserves, according to Schiemann, “the palm of hypocrisy,” and forthwith attaches to the English manœuvre-fleet the suspicion that it was “lying ready for battle before Spithead”!

The German patriot, Schiemann, does not appear to consider that his German readers are capable of realising what results must necessarily follow from this entirely idiotic system of transforming manœuvres incidents into bellicose intentions. Every conclusion that he has anywhere or at any time deduced from the land or sea manœuvres of the Entente Powers could be applied with the same logic to the Powers of the Triple Alliance. They also have manœuvred every year on sea and on land; they also have, as a matter of course, manœuvred only on the sides on which a possible war could take place. The tactical principles of German military science lay down that “the best defence is found in the attack,” and in accordance with this doctrine the German manœuvres were always offensive and not defensive; they always took place towards the east, the west or the north, and were thus directed towards the Entente Powers. On Schiemann’s logic this fact must furnish indisputable evidence to the Schiemanns of England, France, and Russia that Germany for forty-five years has devoted all her preparations to an offensive against the Entente Powers. But this in no way troubles the great mind of Schiemann, nor apparently his readers. In the general rise in prices in Germany, logic has clearly become an object which is beyond the reach of these people.

It need occasion no surprise that in creating the Franco-Italian intrigue, for which no other evidence was available,

Italian military measures should be called to his assistance. Because Italy took her troops for Tripoli from the French frontier and not from the Swiss or the Austrian frontier, the conclusion of the Franco-Italian plot is, so far as Schiemann is concerned, proved for a date as far back as 1911. There was no cause for apprehension from France—France had already become the “secret ally” of Italy. From Austria, however, everything was to be apprehended, although Italy was united with Austria in the Triple Alliance, and although the Treaty on which the Triple Alliance rested was renewed without modification in the following year, 1912, even before its expiration. What, however, was there to apprehend from Switzerland. If the fact that troops were left on the frontier facing Austria was an indication of the dissension which already existed between Austria and Italy, was the fact that troops were left on the Swiss frontier a sign of dissension or perhaps even of an aggressive conspiracy on the part of Italy and the Entente Powers against Switzerland? Ah, yes, the logic of it all! You are a bitter enemy of the truth, Herr Schiemann. But you fight it without understanding and without logic, and you allow yourself to be caught only too often in your own snares.

But there is something better to come:

In the circles of the Triple Alliance the conclusion was rightly drawn (from the denudation of the Franco-Italian frontier) that the question now must be to gain Italy for an active co-operation with the enemies of Germany and Austria. (*A Slanderer*, page 19.)

Thus the removal of troops from the French frontier, and exclusively from this frontier—which Schiemann asserts, without, however, producing a shadow of proof in support of his assertion, and which, even if true, may have happened for all sorts of strategical and not political reasons—this insignificant and unproved fact gave the Entente Powers the signal that poor Italy was now to be completely entangled, and drawn to their side against the Central Powers. Schiemann

needs and makes use of this fact, in order to prove once more by reference to this example the diabolical preparations for war pursued by the Entente Powers throughout many years.

In this arbitrarily devised inference he is nevertheless much inconvenienced by one fact, which, unfortunately, he cannot conjure out of the way, namely, the renewal of the Triple Alliance. What then does he do? He construes a further conspiracy, in which, "as it appears, Isvolsky had directly or indirectly a part" (without Isvolsky, Delcassé or Grey it is impossible to get along). As a result, the conspirators resolved no longer to direct their efforts to Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance; it was, on the contrary, considered preferable to continue as more advantageous "the existing relation in which Italy in fact paralysed the policy of the other side." Thus as far back as 1911-12, simultaneously with the formal renewal of the Triple Alliance, there was a kind of secret treaty between Italy and the Entente Powers, the effect of which was that Italy should only ostensibly remain a member of the Triple Alliance, whereas, in fact, she should be subservient to the interests of the Entente Powers. Has there ever been such a falsification of history? Is it not a notorious fact that it was only under the protection and with the support of her partners in the Triple Alliance that Italy was able to carry out with success her campaign in Tripoli? Is it not well known that it was just the policy of England and of France, of whom the former was apprehensive for Egypt and the latter for Tunis, which put all kinds of difficulties in the way of the Italians in their Libyan campaign? We may recall the very serious disputes which broke out between France and Italy on account of certain naval incidents in the Mediterranean Sea, and which might have involved grave consequences had it not been for the support given by the Central Powers. We may recall the French occupation of the hinterland of Tripoli, and the English claims on certain frontier territories between Egypt and Cyrenaica. It was exclusively the existing Triple Alliance that Italy had to thank for the success of her African campaign of plunder.

Herr Schiemann suppresses everything that contradicts his

assertion of the existence since 1912 of a Franco-Italian conspiracy, as well as of a general European conspiracy to make war against Germany and Austria. He is, for instance, entirely silent with regard to Giolitti's revelations, which constitute a decisive and essential part of my "Antecedents of the Crime."¹ In contradistinction to the snippets of the professor of history, these revelations however are documentarily proved, both in their date and their text; they have never at any time been disputed by Austria or Germany, and they prove beyond doubt that in the summer of 1913 Austria had already planned an aggressive war against Serbia, which was then put into execution in the summer of 1914. In connection with the point now under discussion (the secret agreement alleged to have existed for years between Italy and the Entente), Giolitti's revelations prove that such a secret agreement cannot possibly have existed: for had it existed, it could not have remained concealed from Austrian and German diplomacy until the summer of 1913, and before executing her aggressive intentions against Serbia, Austria would have taken care not to have asked Italy for her eventual support in any European war that might break out. That later, in the course of the present war at a given point in time, Italy began negotiations with the Entente Powers, and finally intervened on their side is another question, on which I have already expressed my opinion. That, however, is a step which was taken after the outbreak of the European War. On the other hand, Schiemann's construction of a conspiracy between Italy and the Entente Powers existing long years before the war (intended along with his other untenable proofs of guilt to confirm the bellicose intentions of the Triple Entente) is entirely nebulous in its character, and is in contradiction with all the firmly-established historical facts.

On this occasion Schiemann is guilty of a pleasing *lapsus*. He accuses the Italian Government of that time (1911-12) of a "*non plus ultra* in perfidy," and this perfidy is to be found more particularly in the fact that the Italian diplomatists stood in the most confidential relations with their Entente

¹ See *J'accuse*, p. 121.

friends, but that "simultaneously they allowed the Italian General Staff to consider military measures with ours to meet the event of a war." (*A Slanderer*, page 20.) Thus the Italian General Staff, and not merely the Austrian, in other words the whole Triple Alliance had down to 1912, and therefore in all preceding years as well, considered military measures to meet the event of a war! What else did the English, the Russian and the French naval and military staffs do? Did they not also consider military measures to meet the event of a war? Why is it that what they contemplated was on their side an offensive war, whereas on the side of the Triple Alliance it was merely a defensive war?

Thus Herr Schiemann disposes of his own argument. These are the "crushing proofs," with which he endeavours to slay the accuser. I should require to write volumes, if I desired to pursue in detail this ludicrous manner of demonstration, resting on newspaper snippets, on arbitrary constructions and insinuations, on the interpretation of similar incidents in one sense or another, according to the side from which they emanate. Schiemann's untenable and inconsequent pamphlets of intrigue are unworthy of so great pains. Nevertheless, it is worth while to show clearly on one point the method adopted by these writers, in order to prove to the German people by what means and by what malice—for Schiemann himself does not believe a word of his accusations—it has been deceived, incited, and no matter how the war ends, led to disaster. If in this place I consider in detail the machinations of Schiemann, what I say applies as emphatically to the other professor of history, Herr Hans F. Helmolt, whose book, *The Secret Antecedents of the World War*, teems with as many perversions of the truth as the war-pamphlets of his colleague, Schiemann. The proof of this fact I must reserve for another occasion. The *Esprit d'escalier* of the *World's History*¹ has ordered that Herr Helmolt should bring out a book under this title—a book which in its sub-title is described as a collection "of historical errors, perversions and inventions." The book is written by

¹ [Treppenwitz der Weltgeschichte.]

W. L. Hertslet, and in its eighth edition was prepared and edited by Herr Professor Helmolt. I may express the hope that the ninth edition may be considerably enlarged and enriched by the perversions and inventions of Herr Helmolt and Herr Schiemann.

LIES HAVE "SHORT LEGS"

It is throughout possible to determine how short are the legs with which Schiemann's lies are furnished. Ostensibly the war-conspiracy was hatched in the summer of 1908 in the roadstead at Reval. Nevertheless, Russia's climb-down in the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia took place in the spring of 1909; in the summer of 1909, as Schiemann himself relates, the Tsar and the Emperor William met, and the speeches which were then exchanged "permitted the inference that Russia would allow herself to become the ally neither of French revenge, nor of the English policy of panic." (*A Slanderer*, page 33.)

Isvolsky is removed from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sazonof appointed in his place (Autumn, 1910); English and Russian journalists point to the dangers of European tension and preach reconciliation; from France political friends of the professor write to him "that the public opinion of the country desires to maintain peace, and is resolved not to act with England" (*A Slanderer*, page 35). The Emperor William, who stands in the best personal relations to the new English King, George V., goes to London to the funeral of King Edward VII.; the Tsar comes to Potsdam accompanied by Sazonof. These are all facts which Schiemann himself relates in detail (*A Slanderer*, pages 34-36); but in so doing he completely forgets that a few pages previously he has given us a picture of the war-conspiracy, and a few pages later he again depicts it in his pages. In order to solve all these contradictions, mention is made of "contradictory political tendencies" in England, France and Russia, and, in passing, of the lack of independence of the rulers in relation to their bellicose Governments. In short,

that he may be able to continue to spin the red thread of the war-conspiracy, the historical scribbler plays ducks and drakes with historical facts, and fits in everything to the needs of the theories which he is construing.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ANGLO-GERMAN UNDERSTANDING IN THE LIGHT OF SCHIEMANN'S HISTORICAL INVESTIGATIONS. THE AGADIR INCIDENT

In the first half of 1911 the Emperor William went to London to the unveiling of the memorial to Queen Victoria, and was enthusiastically received by the population. Shortly afterwards, the German Crown Prince attended the coronation of King George, and was also most sympathetically received. In the same period there took place between the two Governments the extremely important negotiations with a view to a political understanding and a simultaneous limitation of naval armaments, which I have already discussed in *J'accuse* (pages 99-114), and to which I will return in detail in a special chapter.

These negotiations were also reflected in the meetings of Parliament in both countries. It may be sufficient to refer here to the meetings of the Reichstag of February 23rd and March 30th, 1911, in which violent charges—and these not merely from the side of the opposition—were directed against the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann, on account of the frigid attitude he had assumed towards the English proposals, and in a resolution couched in fairly sharp terms a request was directed to the Government to enter into negotiations with other Powers on the subject of a simultaneous and proportional limitation of armaments. I would also refer in this place to Grey's memorable speech of March 13th, 1911, in which he described the level of the English naval estimates of that time as the "high-water mark," and prophesied the breakdown of civilisation, if some way were not found of restricting the increase of expenditure on armaments, and of arriving at an agreement with Germany. Grey's words and proposals of peace should be compared with the answer of

the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, in the meeting of the Reichstag of March 30th, 1911, which merely repeated the wretched hackneyed argument on the other side, that it would be impossible to be sure that the other side was not secretly exceeding the agreed limits (although, as everyone knows, not a gaiter-button on the other side can be concealed from the wonderfully organised system of espionage of all countries, Germany being the most efficient) and that therefore the question of general disarmament "was insoluble so long as men are men and States are States." And in this argument the Chancellor, acting on the traditional policy of the Prussian opponents of every agreement as to armaments, produced in conscious perversion the bogey of general disarmament, although in reality in the English proposals of that time, and in all similar proposals, the question was in no way one of general disarmament, but in the first place of a suspension only of armaments on the basis of the *status quo*, and it was only as a possibility that a later proportional reduction of armaments was contemplated.

As I have said, I propose to enter more fully into this question in a special chapter devoted to the Anglo-German negotiations. For the moment, in settling accounts with the German *Déroulède* my only purpose is to place in the pillory his tactics of suppression and falsification as exemplified on this point also. Schiemann has not a word to say of all these epoch-making negotiations between the Governments in the first half of 1911, of their reaction on the parliamentary negotiations, of Grey's peace-utterances, and of their frigid rejection by the Chancellor. Of Haldane's mission he speaks only in passing. For the better instruction of the accuser he refers to his *Understanding*-pamphlet. Even in this pamphlet, however (pages 22-23), I seek in vain for anything bearing on the important events of 1911. It is true that Schiemann mentions Asquith's speech of July, 1910, and also the answer which Bethmann gave in December, 1910, although, of course, he is careful not to refer in closer detail to the contents, which implicate the German Government while exculpating that of England. He makes no men-

tion whatever of the speeches and negotiations of the first half of 1911, down to the occurrence of the Agadir incident; he suppresses also the Crown Prince's visit (although otherwise he attaches enormous importance to the visits of Princes) and instead of dwelling on this, he adds to his account of the Emperor's visit an observation, which it is impossible to verify, in the following words:

Immediately after his (the Emperor's) departure, the campaign was again renewed, and even while the Emperor William was in London, Grey had already stated to Metternich, our Ambassador, that the agreements concluded between England and France imposed on England the duty of supporting France even if they should remain in Fez for a lengthy period; this could only be understood as signifying that England had promised the French the right of gradually annexing Morocco, and that she was resolved to support them in the process by force of arms. (*A Slanderer*, page 41.)

Since Schiemann omits to quote his authority, I am unable to determine whether Grey made these observations to Metternich, and if so in what form. Having regard to the complete incredibility of this student of history I do not hesitate to tell him to his face that a statement by Grey in the sense that England promised the French the right to annex Morocco and that she would support her in this matter by force of arms, was not and cannot have been made. Produce your evidence, Herr Schiemann. Without evidence I believe nothing you say. Your own statement that the English Government had declined to concur in the suggestion of an Anglo-French naval demonstration against the dispatch of the *Panther*, above all the fact that the English efforts to reach agreement were crowned with success, prove that so prudent a diplomatist as Grey cannot possibly have given expression to such a brutal threat of war, especially while the Emperor was still in London. You *invented* it, Herr Professor, like nearly all your other similar stories, in order to reveal in that incident, which promoted and promised

peace, the cloven hoof of the war-conspiracy you yourself imagined.

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The further observations which Schiemann links to his account of the Emperor's visit and to the dispatch of the *Panther* are extraordinarily characteristic of his method:

Our general staff received from their agents information which indicated the gravity of the situation. They pointed to the intention of England to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen in the event of a war. Thus our military attaché in Berne on absolutely trustworthy information intimated that the landing of English troops in Belgium had been directly imminent in the course of the summer. It was also an extremely suspicious fact that the tours of the French General Staff at that time and the manœuvres of the third, fourth and fifth cavalry divisions took place exclusively on the Belgian frontier. (*A Slanderer*, page 42.)

Thus:

(1) The agents of our General Staff pointed to England's intention to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen. Our military attaché in Berne—Berne of all places! presumably because of its geographical proximity to Brussels and Copenhagen—was quite sure of this. A remarkable state of affairs! Why was it that English troops only appeared in Belgium eighteen days after the German invasion of August 4th, 1914,¹ although the Belgian Government had asked for military assistance on August 5th, and Belgium had, as is well known, "sold herself to England many years ago"? Further, why was it that the English in the summer of 1914 did not occupy Copenhagen, which in the summer of 1911 they had firmly intended to occupy? From the *Understanding*-pamphlet (page 24) we learn where Herr Schiemann and the German General Staff got this terrifying information with regard to England's intentions:

It has not become publicly known, but it has been determined on reliable authority that at that time the English naval attaché

¹ Waxweiler, page 191.

in Rome indicated that in the event of the war which he expected, England would be compelled to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen. This would certainly be a brutal action, but it would be demanded by historical precedent as well as by the circumstances of the case.

We thus have the whole intrigue before us. The English naval attaché in Rome (this is in Schiemann's view "determined on reliable authority") indicates that England would be compelled to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen. This strategical idea, the peculiar property of the English naval attaché in Rome, is communicated to the German military attaché in Berne, and by him conveyed to the German General Staff. On the way from Rome to Berlin *via* Berne, the strategical opinions of the English naval attaché are transformed into a firm intention on the part of the English Government and into the immediate imminence of the predatory act in question. It is thus that history is made by Herr Schiemann!

(2) The tours of the French General Staff and the manœuvres on the Belgian frontier constituted, according to Schiemann, "an extremely suspicious fact." I have already asked: Where, then, were the French to manœuvre, in order not to strike Herr Schiemann as suspicious? Towards the Pyrenees, perhaps, or the Atlantic Ocean? If Herr Schiemann were to be satisfied they would not even have been allowed to manœuvre towards the Italian frontier, for in that case he would at once have exclaimed: "Aha! another proof of the Franco-Italian intrigue; the French are manœuvring on the Italian frontier in secret agreement with Italy, in order to make it appear as if they considered it possible for a war to arise with the partner in the Triple Alliance; whereas in reality they are all tarred with the same brush." Once more, then, what manœuvres would really appear to you to be unsuspicious, Herr Schiemann? Clearly, only the Prussian manœuvres when directed towards Russia and France, and the Austrian when they took place on the Galician frontier. Here again we have the same picture of the student of his-

tory, as we find him in his book, before whom the accuser with his "unscientific method" must stand uncovered. The man omits the most important negotiations between Parliaments and Governments, and instead of these he carries on his operations by means of tours of the General Staff, manoeuvres and reports from a military attaché at Berne—all matters, be it observed, which are not merely insignificant but also unproved.

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Schiemann achieves a further preposterous falsification in his account of English sentiment after the settlement of the Moroccan conflict. In conscious contravention of the truth he construes a divergency between the tendencies of a section of Liberal public opinion in England and Asquith's Cabinet. This divergency is sheer imagination. All the members of Asquith's Cabinet stood, not in opposition to, but at the head of the movement for an understanding, which arose directly out of the dangerous Agadir conflict. The initiation of the campaign for an understanding is to be found in Grey's speech delivered in Parliament on November 27th, 1911, of which mention has already been made. The same honourable fundamental note of a sincere desire to improve the relations with Germany, and in this way to secure a rapprochement between the two groups of European Powers, runs through all the speeches and actions of the English Ministers at this time. It would take us too far to consider all these utterances here. I challenge the professor of history to point out a single utterance of Asquith, Haldane, Churchill, or Lloyd George, or of the other members of the English Cabinet in which they occupied a position which is inconsistent with the Liberal Press notices quoted by Schiemann himself, or in which they preached anything else than an understanding and a reconciliation with Germany. Grey's speech of November 27th, 1911, which has been mentioned on several occasions, is perverted by Schiemann, as I have already pointed out, into its direct contrary, both in its meaning and in its tendency (see Cook, page 29, *J'accuse*, pages 106, 107).

The speech is, in fact, the initiation of the resumption of the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding which had been interrupted by the Agadir conflict. Grey expressly emphasised the fact that the Franco-German settlement "cleaned the slate" with regard to Anglo-German relations as well.

Even Schiemann cannot avoid producing from his register of snippets significant English Press extracts in favour of an Anglo-German understanding. Further, he cannot conceal the fact that a real military convention between France and England did not exist, but that there was rather another condition of affairs which he depicts as follows:

On every occasion when a war appeared to be more or less threatening, the two Governments consulted together, and promised to afford each other mutual military support for a definite period of time. This was the case in the course of the summer of 1905, as well as at the time of the incident of Casablanca. In the course of this year, however, the Entente Cordiale had become so flexible an instrument, that whenever the circumstances appeared to demand it, a military agreement was orally concluded to remain in force for the duration of the crisis, and this led to the exchange of very precise views as to how the military forces of the two nations were to be used. (*A Slanderer*, page 45.)


Here again the Professor gives himself away by involuntarily revealing the character of the Entente as a defensive and not as an offensive union. Military agreements which were concluded only from case to case, when a war more or less "threatened," or "whenever the circumstances appeared to demand it," and then were only orally determined "for the duration of the crisis," cannot possibly have been agreements for an offensive war and for a military attack. The words used by Schiemann himself, "when a war appeared to be threatening," etc., clearly indicate that on all the occasions cited by him (1905, 1909, 1911) war was not intended by the Entente Powers, but was merely dreaded by them—a state of affairs which is diametrically opposed to an intentional provocation of war—and that their agreements were designed for defence, and not for aggression. So here again,


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I shall speak elsewhere of Haldane's mission of February, 1912—the immediate consequence of the approximation of the English and German Governments to each other. Here it is sufficient to point out Schiemann's perfidious insinuation, which is in agreement with his whole general system, that this mission also was not sincerely intended, but was merely designed "to pacify the sentiment in England, which continued to press more loudly for an understanding with Germany" (*How England*, etc., page 24), or as we find it expressed in the *Slanderer*, page 47, "ostensibly to pave the way to an understanding, in reality to reconnoitre and procure new arguments for the policy of the Cabinet which was already firmly established." It is always the same old song. The English Ministers may do what they like; they may make pacific speeches in Parliament—their speeches are suppressed or falsified; they may travel to Berlin to negotiate an understanding—deceitful and dishonest motives are ascribed to their journeys; they may make positive proposals for a political understanding and a restriction of armaments—these proposals are ascribed to the evil *arrière pensée*, that they are designed merely to lull Germany to sleep and to weaken her from a military point of view, in order that stupid Michel might be attacked with the greater security later on.

To the account of the failure of Haldane's mission and of Haldane's report (distorted by Schiemann), to which I return later, there is at once added the lying sentence, intended to obliterate in the credulous reader the impression of England's efforts for peace:

It was a policy of war, and the task was to promote everything that could be required by the three conspiring Powers against Germany at the moment of the contemplated conflict. That the breach was not provoked earlier was due to consideration for Russia, which was backward with her preparations for war and could appeal to the fact that a further period of time

had been granted to her in the negotiations of Reval. (*A Slanderer*, page 48.)

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In the further description of Anglo-German relations the system of falsification is gaily continued. Churchill's well-known proposals for a naval holiday, which were twice made by the English Minister (in 1912 and 1913) are quoted by the man of the scientific method of investigation, the defender of the truth, who has the audacity to accuse others of conscious slander. He refers to these proposals in the following sentence (*A Slanderer*, page 48): "Immediately after Haldane's return Churchill delivered his notorious speech, in which he declared that the German fleet was a luxury but the English fleet a necessity." Here again Schiemann's jugglery consists in selecting from Churchill's speech, though it is true he gives it in a falsified form, an idea which, in fact, occurred in many English ministerial speeches, and which was entirely justified,¹ yet he nevertheless entirely suppresses the essential substance of Churchill's statements. Certainly no one can dispute the justice of the idea expressed by English statesmen, that for England with her then insignificant land force, her insular position, and world-wide colonial possessions, the navy had a very different importance from what it had for Germany, which, after all, is primarily a Continental State, with relatively insignificant colonial possessions, and with land forces exceeding that of all other countries in efficiency and striking power. This was exclusively the idea to which English statesmen gave frequent expression, not with the object of hindering Germany in the development of her fleet, but of explaining their point of view, that England must always adhere to the principle that her naval forces should maintain a certain proportional superiority over those of Germany. The falsifier of history tears this correct idea from Churchill's speech in a garbled form, and he suppresses the sagacious and weighty proposals

¹ See also Grey's speech in Parliament, March 29th, 1909. Cook, page 8.

of the English First Lord for the introduction of a naval holiday between the two countries.

Anyone who reads the more detailed accounts of Churchill's proposal contained in Cook (page 33) and in my book, and compares with these the three lines which the *Slanderer* gives to Churchill's speech, will be able to form some idea of the love of truth which inspires this journalistic leader of the "true Prussian people." I have carefully examined both his pamphlets, and only once in an enumeration of all the English "specious manœuvres" of recent years have I found any indication of the naval holiday, and that is contained in a single word without any more detailed account of what it involved (*A Slanderer*, page 65). While he thus suppresses the essential contents of Churchill's statements, in the same passage as that in which he is guilty of this suppression he does not fail to quote as symptomatic of opinion in England English Opposition papers which write against the policy of bringing about an understanding pursued by the Liberal Government, and at the same time he quotes the epoch-making fact that Englishmen and Frenchmen took part in the Sokol celebration in Prague, "of which the anti-German character was then so clearly manifested" (*A Slanderer*, page 48). Over this historical hotch-potch some sauce is then poured from the *Temps*, and from a militaristic speech by Lord Roberts; the presence of Russian officers and later of the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch in France is emphasised, an indiscretion of *Gil Blas* is added, Poincaré's tour to Petrograd and the conspiracy in the Balkans are denounced, extracts from *Novoye Vremya* are introduced, the London peace negotiations and finally the Peace of Bucharest are mentioned, more or less in passing, and in the end there is given to this medley of suppression, falsification and suppression the title: "The great conspiracy of the Entente Powers directed against Austria-Hungary" (*A Slanderer*, page 54).

It is difficult, and indeed impossible without the quotation of whole pages, to give the reader a faithful picture of Schiemann's poisonous mixture. The reader, overcoming his

natural repugnance, should peruse pages 48-54 of the *Slanderer* in order to gain enlightenment as to the author and his methods. Lord Roberts, for example, who is well known to have been the most zealous protagonist of universal service in England, and who in his other views, which were purely militarist in character, showed much similarity to our Bernhardi, is quoted in the same breath as Churchill, Haldane and the other Liberal Ministers. And in doing so, the fact is intentionally overlooked that our Bernhardi, whom it is true many would now like to disown, gave classical expression to the views and the endeavours of our imperialists, militarists, Pan-Germans and Junkers, that is to say, of those who were in fact the dominant classes who controlled the Government, whereas Lord Roberts with his militaristic aims stood in sharp opposition to the views and the actions of the Liberal English Cabinet. The authoritative Liberal paper, *The Nation*, called the ideas of Lord Roberts a code of "morals fitter for a wolf-pack than for a society of Christian men."¹ It was such wolfish morality that directed German policy, but in England it was void of significance, nor had it any influence on public opinion, not to speak of the actions of the English Government. It was not until the war had lasted for more than a year that universal compulsory service, which had for years been demanded by Roberts, was introduced into England under the pressure of military necessity.

CONFESSION OF A PREVENTIVE WAR AND OTHER "DISCREPANCIES"

"The brave books of Bernhardi, rightly foreseeing how things were being prepared, pointed to the necessity of seizing the sword before the conspiracy which threatened Germany proceeded to action. To-day scarcely anyone will deny that Bernhardi rightly saw and recognised the position of affairs" (*A Slanderer*, pages 6 and 7).

[*The Nation*, October 26th, 1912.]

In these words Herr Schiemann defends the Roberts-Bernhardi code of wolfish morality, which he condemns for England, as a right and a necessity for Germany. This is a grateful confession, which involves the clear recognition of the fact that we are not waging a war of defence, but a preventive war. So here again Herr Schiemann has let himself in.

He does so, in fact, at every stage. Immediately after the great conspiracy which for him shines out from the Balkan occurrences, he tells of Poincaré's election as President and of Delcassé's appointment as Ambassador at Petrograd (beginning of 1913): "His (Delcassé's) task was to transform the Franco-Russian defensive alliance into a defensive and offensive alliance" (*A Slanderer*, page 54). So that up till then it was only a defensive alliance! I had thought that ever since the Entente of 1904 between England and France, ever since the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, and more particularly since the meeting in Reval in 1908, the war of the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance was a settled affair. And now suddenly, in 1913, the offensive alliance is not even yet concluded, but is only in course of preparation as a result of Delcassé's endeavours in Petrograd! Here again I would ask the professor for a friendly explanation of a contradiction which cannot be reconciled by my limited intelligence.

There then follows an account of alleged French and Russian intriguing manœuvres supported by a copious supply of newspaper extracts. The Slav banquets and the exchange of telegrams with the Tsar in the winter of 1913, reports from the *Temps* and from Russian papers which are not even mentioned by name (where does the snippet on page 56 come from?) are all represented as indications of bellicose sentiment. The essential point, however, is again ignored that at the London Conference of Ambassadors Russia, France and England gave way to all the Austrian demands without exception, that they politely turned the Montenegrins out of Skutari, which they had purchased with streams of

blood, that they pushed the Serbians back from the Adriatic coast, that they interposed what purported to be the principality of Albania in the way of Serbian efforts to expand, and did not even allow the Serbians their celebrated window on the Adriatic. In short, the Entente Powers accorded an unconditional victory along the whole diplomatic line to the insatiability of Austria, who in certain questions acted in agreement with Italy, her partner in the Triple Alliance. The professor of history suppresses all the facts which are essential and decisive and confines himself to subsidiary points, to banquets, to telegraphic correspondence (in our case also correspondence between Pan-Germans and reigning personalities might be voluminously quoted) and thus he perverts historical truth into its opposite.

* * * * *

A masterpiece of creative and inventive talent is achieved by Herr Schiemann in his narrative of the ministerial council, which the Tsar summoned to his Winter Palace at the beginning of March, 1913, in order, as Schiemann maintains, to decide on the question of war or peace. The Tsar himself is supposed to have communicated the result of the deliberations to the gentlemen in his immediate entourage in the following words: "We shall have no war. Suchomlinof, Sazonof and Kokofzef say that we require from five to six years in order to get ready" (page 56). I ask Herr Schiemann how he knows so exactly the words which the Tsar spoke to those who were in his immediate presence? How does he know, and how can he prove, that the Tsar indicated that the Russian army would in from five to six years be in a state of preparedness, in the sense which the historian ascribes to him, namely, that in five to six years the aggressive war against Austria and Germany was to begin?

I take the liberty of asserting that this narrative of Schiemann's is a pure invention. As he quotes no authorities, and mentions as witnesses only those who were in the immediate presence of the Tsar, I await his proofs. What is a fact is the compliant disposition shown by Russia in every question without exception which occupied the attention of the Lon-

don Conference of Ambassadors. It is further a fact—and this also is not denied by Schiemann—that after the settlement of the questions dealt with at the Conference the tension between Austria and Russia disappeared and an understanding as to demobilisation was arrived at between them. Finally, it is a fact that it was Austria, and not Russia, who refused to be satisfied with the results of the peace of Bucharest and in the summer of 1913 (see Giolitti's revelations) contemplated an attack upon Serbia, which had now become too strong for her plans. The historian seeks to get rid of these decisive facts, of which only the second is mentioned, by inventing the words used by the Tsar regarding the aggressive war intended for a later date. How long will the German people continue to give ear to such perverters of the truth and to follow their words?

It is clear that Herr Schiemann must fall into difficulties at every step when he seeks to bring his inventions into harmony with historically established facts which he is not always in a position to suppress. He then gets out of the difficulty by the evasion that the undeniable fact in question is "especially surprising," "very remarkable," etc. The existence of this element of surprise and remarkability depends entirely on Schiemann's inventions being true. Then, indeed, there would be a hitch. But if they are unmasked as inventions, the occurrences in question appear at once as entirely logical and reasonable, and are seen to be in complete harmony with the other facts. Herr Schiemann, for example, is inordinately surprised by the fact (for which he can find no explanation) that in the autumn of 1913 Russia acquiesced in Serbia yielding to an Austrian Ultimatum on the occasion of a grave new Austro-Serbian crisis which arose on account of Albania. To anyone who truthfully gives an account of Russia's attitude during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 and during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 there is nothing surprising in Russia's compliant attitude in the autumn of 1913. The fact is that Russia *always* gave way to the Austrian demands, and moved Serbia to compliance.

The furthest point to which Russia went in this direction is to be found in the Austro-Serbian conflict of July, 1914, when she induced the Serbian people, who were akin to her, to submit to a complete diplomatic subjection to the outrageous and unprecedented demands of Austrian pride. For Herr Schiemann, the inventor and the upholder of the Anglo-Franco-Russian conspiracy, all this is bound to be "remarkable" and "surprising." But to us who know Russia's love of peace and compliant disposition in all conflicts with Austria there is nothing in this which is in any way surprising; it is but the simple continuation of what had throughout been the attitude of the Russian rulers and of their Government towards the maintenance of European peace.

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Special importance is attached by Schiemann to a visit to Paris made by King George in April, 1914, accompanied by Grey. In order to show the importance of this visit, he quotes extensively the unsigned reports of German agents in foreign capitals, which are contained in the second German White Book, "*Documents relating to the Outbreak of War*" (pages 49-57). If the apologists of the German Government frequently deny the credibility of official papers published by the Entente Powers in their collections of documents, even when these papers are signed and confirmed by the complete connection existing between the diplomatic occurrences and the publications, we may well be allowed to add a large mark of interrogation to the anonymous reports which the second German White Book ventures to describe as "*Official documents relating to the Outbreak of War*," of which, however, we neither know the author nor the place of origin. From what shady sources these unconfirmed reports spring may be seen from No. X (White Book, page 56), where we are furnished with a copy of a letter, dated from Petrograd on July 12/25th, 1914, and addressed by his adjutant to a Russian Grand Duke who was at the time abroad. The letter "proves in my humble way of thinking"—so the agent who transmits it observes in his covering letter—"that since the 24th of the month war has been re-

solved on in Russia." How can the German agent have obtained the copy of such a private letter? What can have been the "confidential method" of which he made use for this purpose? For the rest these "official documents" furnish not the slightest proof for the assertion which Schiemann extracts from them "that the war against Germany had been resolved on in principle since 1909, and that since that time it was merely a question of seeking the opportunity of conducting it with the greatest possibility of an assured prospect of success" (*A Slanderer*, page 64).

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GREY AND CAMBON,
NOVEMBER, 1912

The "agreement" between England and France—if the correspondence of November 22nd and 23rd, 1912, between Grey and Paul Cambon (Blue Book, No. 105; Enclosures 1 and 2) can indeed be called an agreement—bore, as Schiemann himself is forced to admit, a conditional character "pour sauver la face." In reality it was neither an agreement, nor did it bear a conditional character, but on the contrary made it quite clear that each of the two Governments, notwithstanding the consultations which had taken place between naval and military experts, should retain full freedom to decide whether they would or would not afford military support to the other in the event of a future war. ("That such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.")

Even in the event of an unprovoked attack on France or England by a third Power, that is to say, in the event of a purely defensive war, the other Power was to be under no

obligation to give military assistance, but "it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them."

Anyone who desires to form an independent view of these Anglo-French negotiations, which in the discussions of the defenders of the German Government play a much greater part than they really deserve, is recommended to read carefully the correspondence between Grey and Paul Cambon (Blue Book, No. 105; Enclosures 1 and 2). He who undertakes the slight trouble involved in so doing will at once recognise that all the conclusions drawn from these documents by our German Governmental Press are entirely void of substance, and that in reality these documents do not impose on one Power or on the other the slightest obligation to afford military support. The external form of the correspondence—Grey writes, "My dear Ambassador," and Cambon answers, "Cher Sir Edward"¹—is in itself an indication that we are here concerned, not with treaties between States, but with a written confirmation of oral conversations, which it was desired to protect against misunderstandings or possible perversions in malicious quarters. Of course if all the utterances of the Entente diplomatists are represented as deliberate deception "pour sauver la face," as is systematically done by our "historians," and if some other concealed intention is sought behind every word, then here again it would be possible, as is, in fact, done by Helfferich, Schiemann, and their friends in the case of the letters exchanged in November, to describe the written confirmation of oral conversations as a specious manœuvre, and to seek behind the appearance a reality for which no evidence whatever exists.

¹ It is significant that the intimate form of address thus adopted by Cambon is omitted in the German White Book (page 51), whereas it is included in the second enclosure to No. 105 of the Blue Book.

Anyone who reads the words which Schiemann adds in mentioning the "agreement" of November, 1912, according to which "England, bound hand and foot, was, in fact, in a state of dependence on the decisions which it might please Russia or France to take" (page 64) and compares with this statement the strict emphasis which Grey laid on the fact that each Government was to reserve full freedom in arriving at a decision in the event of an unprovoked attack, will be able to appreciate the degree of brazen perversion to which these Prussian historians have advanced.

Moreover, not merely the frank manner in which the English Government made public the letters exchanged in November, 1912 (in the Blue Book and in Grey's speech of August 3rd, 1914), but also the actual behaviour of England after the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia and between Germany and France, proves that England was neither bound to France or Russia by her hands or her feet, nor even by her little finger, but rather that she remained complete mistress of her own decisions. If the letters in question had in fact constituted an obligation resting upon England to make war, which had been in existence for two years, the English Government would not have printed them in the Blue Book, and laid them before a public session of Parliament. Had England been bound to France since the end of 1912, it would be impossible to explain the conditional and restricted promise of naval support which Grey gave on August 2nd, 1914, and the feeling of satisfaction evoked in France in consequence. The promise of August 2nd, when contrasted with the agreement of November, 1912, would have been a diminution, and France ought in consequence to have been indignant instead of being satisfied and grateful. Had the letters exchanged in 1912 bound England hand and foot to make war, England would not have been in a position to send to Germany on the evening of August 4th, an Ultimatum which demanded exclusively the non-violation of Belgian neutrality, and thus in the event of compliance with this demand desisted from participation in the war. Had England been bound hand and foot for two years, she would in

any case have been obliged, with or without the violation of Belgian neutrality, to intervene as the ally of France when war broke out on the previous day between France and Germany.

Thus the text of the letters, the circumstances of their publication, and the actual behaviour of England prove beyond dispute that the documents of November, 1912, are to be understood in the sense in which they were written, that they represent, not an external show, but the substance itself, and that this substance is something entirely negative, the exclusion of any obligation to give assistance in a war.

Further, the manner in which Paul Cambon in his conversation with Grey on July 30th, 1914 (Blue Book, No. 105), referred to the correspondence of 1912 confirms the absolutely unbinding character of this correspondence. Cambon reminded the English Secretary of State of the letters exchanged, but expressly added that he did not wish to ask Grey to say directly that England would intervene, but he would like to hear from Grey what England would do if certain circumstances arose, "the particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France." Grey declined to enter into the questions raised by Cambon, and referred him to the meeting of the Cabinet next day. I have already shown elsewhere in detail that the result of the meeting of the Cabinet was a strict refusal to give any undertaking to intervene in any war that might arise (Blue Book, Nos. 106 and 119). Would it have been possible for the English Cabinet to assume this attitude if the correspondence of 1912 had constituted an obligation binding England hand and foot, a state of dependence on France and Russia, as Schiemann endeavours to delude his readers into believing?

At every stage we are presented with the same picture: the concealed intentions ascribed to the English Government are in contradiction with all the documentarily proved facts. On the other hand, if the actions and the statements of England, as of her partners in the Entente, are taken as what they pur-

port to be, as the honourable expression of their real intentions, they are found to be in complete agreement with all the proved facts and to form a complete chain of evidence—a fact which no doubt is highly inconvenient to our German historians. When Grey stated in Parliament on June 11th, 1914, as Asquith had done a year previously, that “there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war,” he was not, as Schiemann suggests, guilty of a Machiavellian statement intended to conceal the truth; on the contrary, he represented in the most correct manner the true situation of affairs. The naval discussions with Russia, the authenticity of which I am neither in a position to dispute nor to admit, could not possibly have a more extensive character than the discussions between English and French military officers initiated some years before. The significance or the latter, or rather their complete lack of significance in the sense of an alliance for war, may be seen in the correspondence of November, 1912. If similar discussions between English and Russian naval experts were proposed, or if they had already been initiated, the only purpose to which they could be directed would be that of technical consultations to meet the contingency of a war; they could in no way constitute the basis of an obligation resting on England to participate in war. When Grey denied not only the existence of any agreement as to an alliance, but also the fact that any such negotiations were in progress and finally even the likelihood that any such negotiations would ever be entered upon, I do not know how he could have expressed himself more comprehensively or more precisely. The German Government itself in its *Documents relating to the Outbreak of War* (pages 53, 54) cannot avoid quoting expressions from English papers and politicians which define the meaning of Grey’s speech in the following sense: “England is not in the leading-strings of any other country. She is not the vassal of Russia, nor the ally of France, and she is not the enemy of Germany.” Someone in intimate relations with

Grey—so reports the second German White Book—had most definitely given the assurance:

that no agreements of a military or naval nature existed between England and France, although the desire for such had repeatedly been made known on the French side. What the English Cabinet had refused to give to France it would not grant to Russia. No naval convention had been concluded with Russia, and none would be concluded.

The assertion that England before the outbreak of war had, at an earlier or later date, already undertaken an obligation towards Russia or France to participate in the war is thus not only unproved but is directly refuted. Even if we assume that such a promise of participation were proved (which is not the case), the further assertion that this participation in war was promised for an offensive, and not merely for a defensive war is quite unsubstantiated. This, however, is the cardinal point in the whole affair. Could an accusation rightly be brought against England even if she had in fact made herself the ally of France or Russia against an unprovoked attack on the part of Germany? Had not England the same right as Germany to conclude defensive alliances? An accusation could only be brought against England if she had allied herself with Russia and France for an aggressive war against Germany and Austria. This is the only point that matters. This is the object pursued by all the discussions of Schiemann and his friends. As they are, however, unable to produce even a vestige of proof in support of the assertion that England had made any kind of a promise to participate in war, still more do they fail to furnish any proof that she gave any such undertaking with regard to an offensive war. No attempt even is made by any of the defenders of Germany to prove this. They invent the alliance for war, and they add to this the further invention of an alliance for an offensive war. On a paper foundation they erect a structure of clay; it need surprise no one that their construction miserably collapses.

In these discussions on the agreements for a conspiracy alleged to have been made in Paris in the spring of 1914 Herr Schiemann has also, as so often happens, the misfortune of giving himself away and of forgetting the part he is playing. We all know that the conspiracy for war was concluded, according to Schiemann, at Reval in June, 1908. The war of the Entente against Germany and Austria was from that moment a settled affair, and henceforward it was merely a question of waiting for the most favourable opportunity of striking the blow. If this is correct, a naval agreement with Russia must have been in the highest degree welcome to the English Government. The English Government must also have endeavoured to prepare, as far as in them lay, the intended annihilation of Germany by entering into increasingly closer military relations with the two other Entente Powers. Nevertheless, the anonymous writer of a Report in the German White Book (page 52) tells us—and Schiemann inadvisedly repeats what he says—that “the satisfaction of the Russian and French diplomatists on the fact that the English politicians had again been taken by surprise was great.” The “surprise” consisted in the common decision of the Entente Powers to consider a naval agreement between England and Russia, and to conduct the negotiations on the matter between English and Russian naval officers in London. How, I ask, should this be a “surprise,” if England had already been since 1908 an ally of the two other robber States, and was eagerly awaiting the most favourable moment for the attack? You again contradict yourself, Herr Schiemann! Your “surprise” is inconsistent with the conspiracy of Reval.

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND THE HISTORY OF THE CRIME

As I have already pointed out, the author of the *Slanderer* does not enter into the essential contents, the central point of my book, that is to say, the inquiry into the immediate cause of the war and the responsibility for the war. He refers to certain books and writings, which are said to in-

investigate the question of guilt by reference to the official publications "with scientific thoroughness, exhaustively and impartially," and to leave "not a point standing in the assertions of the accuser" (page 67). For my part I decline to honour the draft which the historian Schiemann has drawn on other alleged investigators of history and to take up the cudgels with Herr Ludwig Bergsträsser whom Schiemann puts before him as a screen. I have chosen a more weighty and more highly-placed opponent, the Secretary for State, Dr. Helfferich; and I am conscious that in *J'accuse* and in this supplementary work I have annihilated the degree of guilt against the Entente Powers expressed, and presumed to have been proved, by him, and I am satisfied that I have proved more firmly and unshakably than before my own decree of guilt against the Central Powers. It is an impossible task which would demand half a lifetime, if after the chief opponent is out of the way, it should still be necessary to cross swords with all his seconds. The method of these gentlemen is everywhere the same. In refuting Helfferich, they are all refuted. I believe that I may rest content with having disposed of Helfferich's thesis of incendiarism.

Herr Schiemann, however, sets himself too easy a task. He discusses, in his own way, in sixty-seven pages the more remote antecedents of the war, but, relying on other inquirers, he declines any discussion of the immediate antecedents. This standpoint is in itself mistaken and illogical. It is suggestive of the action of a barrister who should restrict himself to an inquiry into the past life of the accused, without discussing the charge brought against him. Even if Schiemann's assertion that France, Russia and England had planned and intended an aggressive war against the Central Powers were as correct and as completely demonstrated as it is incorrect and undemonstrated, it would not by a long way follow that the *present* war was the aggressive war intended by the Entente Powers. This is all the less so, inasmuch as Schiemann himself postpones the aggressive intentions until a later period of time. If two persons, of whom one has a shady past and the other a spotless record, are

suspected of an action that has in fact taken place, it does not follow from the shady past of the one that he has committed the deed. Even if the suspected man were a previously convicted criminal, and not merely a man in whom there is ground "for suspecting the deed," his past life is in no way sufficient to justify his being regarded as convicted of the deed. His past life gives a reason for suspicion, and nothing more. The deed itself has to be proved against him.

It is exactly the same in passing a judgment on the responsibility for the present war. Even if France, England or Russia had been previously convicted criminals, that is to say (transferred into the sphere of politics) even if in the course of post-Napoleonic history since the rearrangement of Europe by the Congress of Vienna, they had carried out warlike attacks on European Great Powers—which in view of Bismarck's confessions with regard to the origin of the war of 1870, cannot as we know be asserted even of the France of the time of Napoleon III.—they would not, by virtue of this criminal past, be thereby convicted of the guilt of the present war. Even acts of war in the past would not suffice to prove guilt, still less would intentions to make war in the future.

Even if I were to take at their face value all that Schiemann and his friends bring forward with regard to the malicious and treacherous war conspiracy of the Entente Powers, even if I were to forget for the moment Bernhardt's assertion that the Entente Powers had no need to think of an aggressive war,¹ in short, if I were to take as immovable verities the brazen falsifications of the professor of history, there has still been produced not the slightest proof that *this* war of 1914 was provoked by France, Russia and England. The position is quite otherwise. The evil intentions of the other side would be proved, but not the execution of these intentions, to which indeed, if we accept the time given by Schiemann himself, effect was only to be given some

¹ See *J'accuse*, page 28.

years later. Just because of the evil intentions of the Entente Powers, which after all must have been known to the German Government as well as to Herr Schiemann, it would be reasonable to consider that there were grounds for the suspicion, indeed for considering it probable, that Germany had anticipated the aggressors, in order to avoid by a preventive war the attack which was alleged to be intended.

Thus all the arguments of Schiemann and his people tend to confirm the preventive war, but contradict, although involuntarily, the thesis of a war of defence.

In an earlier passage I have already pointed out an open admission on the part of Schiemann that this is a preventive war. Another admission of the same nature runs as follows:

"It is also historically an untenable view that a preventive war cannot in view of its character be a war of defence. What, then, was the war which for seven long years Frederick the Great waged for the maintenance of the Prussian State, if it were not a war of defence, a war in which he would have been lost, had he not chosen to anticipate events? The saying which was often applied in the 17th century, *Melius est praevenire quam praeveniri*, is an entirely fitting description of the decision before which Frederick stood, and corresponds to the facts with which we had to reckon in August, 1914" (*A Slanderer*, page 7).

In this passage the whole of official Germany, from the Emperor down to the last Governmental hack, are given the lie. Schiemann, the spokesman of the Prussian Junker party, the *habitué* and the confidant of the Wilhelmstrasse, the much read and, especially in the highest place of all, the much respected weekly reviewer of the *Kreuzzeitung*, the mouth-piece and frequently also the prompter of the Prussian authorities—Schiemann, who must know better than anyone else, admits that Germany was not attacked but provoked the war, in order to anticipate a future attack. It only remains to investigate the questions,

Firstly, whether a preventive war can, in fact, be defended on moral and political grounds; and

Secondly, in the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, whether the actual presuppositions of prevention existed in the summer of 1914.

We shall go into these questions in detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF THE PREVENTIVE WAR

WHEN in my book I spoke of the "gigantic lie" by means of which the German people has been enticed into this war, I intended primarily to give expression merely to the negative thought that the assertions that there had been a hostile attack and that this was a war of defence were deliberate untruths, designed for the deception of the German people. Of these untruths all have been guilty who knew that no such attack had been made, above all those who provoked the war by word and writing, and by the course of action which they in fact pursued. The motives which induced the various individuals or groups to act as they did are a matter of indifference so far as the moral judgment is concerned. The supporters of the view that this is a preventive war have lied equally with those who advocate a war of conquest. In the case of the former it is at the most possible to allow mitigating circumstances, if they earnestly and sincerely believed in the future attack and considered that anticipation was necessary. Mitigating circumstances, I say, may be allowed, but there can be no acquittal.

BISMARCK AND THE PREVENTIVE WAR

On the question of the moral justification of preventive wars much, and it must be admitted much that is contradictory, has been spoken and written. The strongest witness against preventive wars is Prince Bismarck. His observations against preventive wars contained in his *Gedanken und*

*Erinnerungen*¹ have frequently been quoted and have also been mentioned in my book (page 44). In his famous speech in the Reichstag on February 6th, 1888, he spoke as follows:

"If I were to come before you and say: We are seriously menaced by France and by Russia: it is to be foreseen that we shall be attacked; that is my conviction as a diplomatist, based also on military information; for our defence it is better to employ the anticipatory thrust of the attack and open hostilities at once; accordingly I ask the Reichstag for a credit of a milliard of marks in order to start the war against both our neighbours—well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you have sufficient confidence in me to vote such a grant. I hope not. . . . It is not fear which disposes us to peace, but the consciousness of our strength, the consciousness that even if we were attacked at an unfavourable moment, we shall be strong enough for our defence; and we shall keep the chance of peace, leaving it to Divine Providence to determine whether in the meantime the necessity of war may not disappear.

The attempt has been made to create a divergence between the Bismarck after 1870 and the Bismarck before 1870, and it has been asserted that his later aversion from preventive wars was a "mere trifle," after he himself, especially in the provocation of the Franco-German War, had successfully made use of the means of prevention with all the ruthlessness of genius. This attempt of our Imperialists and chauvinists to claim the great German statesman as an abettor in their instigations to war is baseless. Napoleon's attitude after the day of Sadowa, during the Luxemburg crisis of 1867 and throughout the following years down to the outbreak of war, proved conclusively that the impulse of the German people towards a new German Empire, an impulse justified from the historical and national point of view, found in the French Emperor an inexorable opponent, and that this hostility could be overcome only by blood and by iron. Napoleon's enmity to German unity was a fact, not an apprehen-

¹[English translation. *Bismarck: His Reflections and Reminiscences*. Smith Elder.]

sion or a supposition. The establishment of this unity was a national right, and the effort in this direction was a historical necessity for the German people. It was an effort towards a new formation within and towards consolidation, which was not aggressively directed against other European Powers and contained no expansive tendencies beyond the German frontier; it was in no way intended to injure the rights and the interests of third parties. To place obstacles in the way of this effort for national unity on the part of the German people was a crime. The watchword, "revanche pour Sadowa," was a nefarious cry, an act of presumption against which the national consciousness of the German people rightly revolted. The decision to free Germany from this Bonapartist tutelage was not a preventive act, but the shaking off of a political yoke which in fact existed; it was a struggle of the German people for freedom, for the right to control its destinies in its inner political development; it was a counterpart to the struggle for freedom of 1813, which had shaken off externally the yoke of foreign domination.

From all this it follows that the opposition on principle to preventive wars shown by the great German statesman was not merely the attitude of the sated beast of prey, which after the satisfaction of its appetites lies carelessly in the sun with no thought of further murder; on the contrary, it corresponded to Bismarck's deeply-rooted inner views, which rested on moral and religious grounds alike, as well as on grounds of practical statesmanship. As a matter of fact, the Prussian Junker, Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, had already spoken the following words in the Prussian Landtag in December, 1850.¹

It is easy for a statesman in his office or his chamber to blow the trumpet of war with the breath of popularity and all the time to sit warming himself by the fireside, or to deliver fiery speeches from the tribune, while he leaves it to the rifleman who lies bleed-

¹ I have taken the following quotations from Bismarck from the excellent little pamphlet published by the Society "Neues Vaterland," under the title "*What would Bismarck have done?*"

ing on the snow, whether his system attains victory and glory. Nothing is easier; but woe to the statesman who at such a time does not look about for a reason for the war which will be valid when the war is over.¹

The attitude which he took up against Moltke's desire for the provocation of war in 1867 on the occasion of the Luxemburg question is explained by Bismarck in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (Volume II, page 230) as follows:

At the time of the Luxemburg question (1867) I was an opponent on principle of preventive wars, that is to say of aggressive wars which we would conduct only because we presumed that we would later have to wage them against a better armed enemy.

The same point of view against "anticipatory wars" was adopted by an article in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, inspired by the old Chancellor (November 4th, 1892):

The conclusion has sometimes been drawn in military circles that the prospect of having probably to wage a war later furnishes sufficient grounds for beginning it earlier under more favourable circumstances; and one of the chief reasons for the dislike manifested by these classes towards the then Chancellor is to be found in the fact that at all times he very definitely opposed such anticipatory wars.

An article which appeared in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* (evening edition of May 3rd, 1890) a few weeks after Bismarck's resignation, breathing in every word the spirit and the style of the old Chancellor, attacks even more strongly the supporters of preventive wars.

The *Kreuzzeitung* recently published, with entire approval and laudatory recognition of its contents, extracts extending to columns from an anonymous pamphlet published by Kay in Cassel bearing the title: *Videant consules ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat*. The pamphlet, which is directed against the foreign and military policy pursued under Prince Bismarck, comes to the conclusion that Germany, while she was still the stronger party

* [See Headlam: *Life of Bismarck*, page 83.]

from the military point of view, should have again settled matters with France, and should then have turned her whole forces against Russia, the true enemy of the nation; but that Prince Bismarck prevented this, so that all the sacrifices imposed on the German people have been in vain. By its attitude towards a pamphlet which makes it a charge against Prince Bismarck that he prevented two bloody wars, the *Kreuzzeitung* confirms the existence of bellicose undercurrents which on other occasions it has zealously combated. . . . We leave it to the *Kreuzzeitung* to determine how it is to explain the situation in which it has thereby brought itself; but we are struck by the frankness with which the paper acknowledges the nefarious programme developed in the pamphlet.

On another occasion Bismarck coined the epigram which is so characteristic of his plastic method of expression, that the anticipation of a possible attack seemed to him like suicide in the expectation of death.

These and similar expressions of Bismarck are well known. Less well known, however, are the individual cases in which he had to exert all his authority in order to oppose military influences on the decision of questions relating to the beginning or the conclusion of wars.

STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY

In a short paper of much interest entitled, "*Military Strategy Versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and Afterwards*," Munroe Smith, Professor of Jurisprudence in Columbia University, shows by reference to Bismarck's memoirs and other similar German works the almost uninterrupted struggle which the old Chancellor had to carry on against the generals, with Count Moltke at their head—the struggle on the question whether wars which appear inevitable should or might be intentionally provoked at a moment when military superiority over the enemy is assured.

Even in 1864, in the war waged in common by Germany and Austria against Denmark, strong military influences were at work to persuade the King of Prussia to cross the Jut-

land frontier alone without Austria. The old Field-Marshal Wrangel could not refrain from sending to the King the most calumnious telegrams against Bismarck, and that not even in cipher, and he even went so far as to speak of diplomats who belonged to the gallows.¹

In 1866 the opposition of the military party to Bismarck's statecraft was shown not only before the beginning of the war, but still more at its conclusion. Although the war with Austria appeared inevitable, Bismarck did not at once precipitate matters, but allowed Austria to take the lead at every stage in the military preparations. In the middle of March Austria concentrated her troops in Bohemia. Prussia's answer to this was restricted to placing her active army in a state of readiness for war. In the course of April some of the German Federated States began to make military preparations. On April 8th Bismarck concluded a treaty with Italy. Austria and Italy mobilised. It was not until the first half of May that Prussia mobilised her reserves and began to concentrate troops on the Saxon frontier and in Silesia. Then Bismarck waited; Moltke, however, lost patience and wished military operations to begin forthwith since every day's delay would strengthen the enemy's forces which so far were imperfectly equipped and only partially concentrated. King William, however, supported Bismarck and kept the Prussian troops mobilised for almost a month without attacking. It was not until open aggression on the part of Austria took place that Bismarck authorised the beginning of hostilities.²

The same differences between the statesmen and the strategists as we find at the beginning of the war of 1866 are also shown on its conclusion in the formulation of the conditions of peace. Here again Bismarck put in practice the principles which in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* he defines in the statement that "the determination and the delimitation of the objects of a war are, both before and during the war, political and not strategical problems, and that the responsible states-

¹*Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, page 323.

²Sybel, *Begründung des deutschen Reiches*, vol. iv., page 421.

man, in order to find the right way to the attainment of these aims, dare not remain without influence on the conduct of the war itself." As is known, it was on these principles that he acted on the conclusion of peace with Austria. He waived the victorious entry into Vienna, the cession of Austrian territory, the imposition on Austria of a large war-indemnity, because even then he foresaw that he would need Austria as an ally in Europe, and that therefore he could not afford to incur her enduring enmity by the imposition of degrading and oppressive conditions of peace.

Special interest attaches to Munroe Smith's reference to the divergence of view which existed between Bismarck and Moltke a year after the war between Austria and Prussia on the possibility of a Franco-German war on the occasion of the Luxemburg question in 1867. As far back as 1867 Moltke desired the outbreak of war with France, which he considered absolutely inevitable. He desired an immediate breach, because he was of the opinion that the indubitable superiority which Germany then enjoyed from a military point of view might later be made good by France. Count Bethusy-Huc communicated Moltke's view to the Chancellor, who did not indeed disapprove of the military considerations advanced by Moltke, but refused to accept any responsibility for the provocation of a war. The personal conviction of a statesman that a war might ultimately break out, no matter how well founded it might be, could not in his opinion justify its provocation. Unforeseen events might alter the situation and avert what appeared inevitable.¹

* * * * *

After the Franco-German War Bismarck again resisted military influences and declined the confiscation of purely French territories which was desired and suggested by the military authorities. He contented himself with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and in this case it is true that alongside the national point of view he also allowed military

¹ See Moltke's *Memoiren*, Vol. II., 204 and Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, page 441.

considerations to have influence to a certain extent. This, perhaps the only, concession made by Bismarck to military considerations has had fatal consequences for Germany and for Europe. It is indeed, in the last analysis, the origin and the germ of the present war. Had France then received the treatment meted out to Austria after 1866 there would presumably have arisen from the first a more friendly relation between the two neighbouring countries, more particularly as the war had after all been begun only against the French Empire and not against the third Republic. It may be presumed that the frenzy of armaments would not have assumed the enormous proportions which in the end could not but lead to war. In place of the dangerous system of the balance of power, there would have arisen a European condition of peace, which would have guaranteed to each State its natural conditions of existence, and would have prepared a propitious soil for the pacific settlement of all extra-European questions. Bismarck's one concession to the generals was fatal for the whole of Europe's future.

This should have been a warning and an instructive example for our present-day statesmen. Had they not fallen in with "the purely military consideration of the question by the General Staffs" (Red Book, No. 28), had they followed during the critical days from July 29th to July 31st the Bismarckian principle that no explanation should be demanded from neighbouring States as to concentrations of troops, but that the answer in such cases should be restricted simply to military counter-measures (see Bismarck's speech on February 6th, 1888), had they been content with the threat expressed in the Ultimatum of July 31st, that mobilisation would be answered by mobilisation instead of changing it seventeen hours later into the formula, "The answer to mobilisation is war,"—had they so comported themselves, we would not have been to-day in the midst of a European war.

* * * * *

Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, like his predecessor, was also called upon to suffer from the craving for war of a

camarilla which on every occasion admitted the validity merely of the point of view of momentary military superiority, while attaching no importance to political, moral, or humane considerations. He also, in one of his speeches in the Reichstag, expressed himself with the utmost emphasis against the preventive war (November 23rd, 1892).

I have found the view put forward in the Press, and also advanced by well-meaning and highly patriotic men: "Yes, but think of the position that arises from the fact that armaments are so heavy as these we now have to bear, and that they are likely to become even heavier. Will such a position not in time become intolerable, and would we not be acting more wisely to put an end to it by grasping the sword ourselves, by seizing the favourable moment and then by making use of the victory which we may hope to achieve, once more secure peace for twenty or thirty years?" I believe that that is a view which the Governments, and the German people also, will never be disposed to accept. Apart from moral scruples which lie in the way, there are also grave material considerations which oppose the execution of such ideas. . . . I am firmly convinced that even after a happy issue of a prophylactic war the condition in which we would be placed would be much more unfavourable than that in which we are now situated. I repeat, then, not only as my own conviction but so far as is known to me as the view of the Governments, that such a preventive war will never be waged by Germany.

A. H. Fried rightly points out in mentioning the speech of Caprivi, how little cogency there is in the phrase about the "inevitability" of a war, which is constantly repeated by the inciters of strife. At that time, in 1892, "well-meaning and highly patriotic men" thought of securing peace for twenty or thirty years by a new Franco-German war, which would undoubtedly have been widened into a European war. Yet even without such a war, peace was secured for twenty-two years, and would have been continuing at this moment, had the Governments and the rulers of Germany and Austria resisted the suggestion of the militarists and war-inciters as Bismarck and Caprivi did. In any case, it has been shown

subsequently that the war alleged to be inevitable in 1892 was in fact avoided, and that notwithstanding this it was still possible that a peace of twenty or thirty years could result.

FREDERICK THE GREAT

The defenders of the preventive war show a predilection for relying on certain expressions used by Frederick the Great:

There are wars of prevention, and princes act wisely when they undertake these. They are really wars of aggression, but they are not therefore less just. When the excessive power of a State threatens to overflow its banks and inundate the world, it is prudent to place dams in its way and to stem the tearing stream while such a course is still possible. It is seen that the clouds are gathering, that the thunderstorm is drawing near and the lightning proclaims its approach. If a prince who is menaced by such a danger cannot avert the storm acting alone, he will, if he is wise, unite with all those to whom a common danger brings common interests. Had the Kings of Egypt, Syria and Macedonia united against the power of Rome, Rome would never have been in a position to overthrow these empires. A wisely concluded alliance and a war waged with decision would have annihilated those ambitious plans whose fulfilment forged fetters for the world. It is wise to prefer the lesser evil to the greater, and to choose the surest way to avoid what is uncertain. A prince therefore adopts the better course in undertaking an aggressive war, so long as it is still open to him to choose between the laurel-wreath and the olive branch, instead of waiting until the time of need when a declaration of war can only postpone for a short time his bondage and his downfall. It is a well-established principle that it is better to anticipate than to be anticipated; the great men have thus always acted well when they exercised their power before the enemy could take measures which might have bound their hands and robbed them of their strength.

These and similar expressions of the Great Prussian king are to be explained by reference to the conditions of his time. The political conformation of Europe at that time still re-

sembled a molten fiery mass which required many years before it could cool down to a relatively solid state. In particular the small State of Prussia, which had become a kingdom only within the last fifty years, was on the point of gaining a territorial position corresponding with her inner strength and efficiency, and the opposition that was put in the way of this development came pre-eminently from the old power of the Hapsburgs, who had allied themselves with the French and the Russians for the suppression of the new rival. The State of Prussia, at that time really "encircled" on all sides and compelled to make good the defects of her territorial, political and financial situation by military preparedness and extreme rapidity of action, was then struggling to rise, and in the time of Frederick the Great it might under certain circumstances find its only salvation in the anticipation of imminent attacks, and by peacefully waiting might find its destruction compassed. In addition, the danger of wanton wars, springing from dynastic considerations or from motives of power and conquest, is to-day quite different from what it was then, when dynasties fought out their battles almost exclusively with armies of mercenaries, without Parliamentary control or approval of war-expenditure, without any influence being exercised by the peoples on the provocation or the conclusion of the wars which had been decided upon by the absolute monarchs. At that time a small, struggling State, which was inconvenient to its great neighbours was indeed confronted by the danger of being surprised in a sense which is no longer true to-day, when, after all is said, notwithstanding all open or concealed absolutism, the nations are entitled to a share in counsel and in action. Or perhaps we should rather say: "In a sense which should no longer be true to-day," for, unfortunately, the history of the origin of this war, especially the attack on Belgium, has taught us that we have no occasion to boast pharisaically of our progress in civilisation as compared with past times.

In passing judgment on Frederick's preventive theories, it is further necessary to consider the enormous difference between the consequences of a war at that time, even of

one extending over seven years, and those of a world-war to-day. Seven days of the present world-war inflicts on the whole world, on belligerent countries, and on neutrals, a thousand-fold greater distress, a thousand-fold greater loss in life and in well-being and in the ruin of civilisation than seven years of the war which Prussia then waged against Austria and her allies. At that time in the age of stage-coaches and sailing vessels, there was yet no question of a world-trade, a world-intercourse, a world-exchange of spiritual and material goods. Who will compare the present age of wireless telegraphy, of electricity, or aeronautics, of telephonic intercourse over remote distances with the mercantile system of internal trade then existing, which indeed was not without the impulse to external development, but lacked the appropriate means of communication for settlement and delivery? If Frederick's idea of anticipating by an aggressive war an attack of which there was an assured menace, was at that time open to question, to-day, at any rate, in view of the improbability of the premises postulated and of the immeasurable consequences which are bound to ensue, it does not admit of discussion, and an attack which is carried out for such a reason can only be reckoned in the category of wars which Bismarck once branded as "a Bonapartist depravity."

WHEN IS WAR INEVITABLE?

The question whether a war is inevitable, whether it is in reality intended sooner or later by the other side, is one of the most difficult which can be presented to a statesman for solution. It is impossible that it should ever be answered with a definite yea or nay. The existence of warlike tendencies in neighbouring countries is not sufficient to prove that these tendencies have acquired or will acquire domination over the supreme heads and leaders of the State. Such tendencies are always, or at any rate most frequently, merely emanations of minorities, and in judging of their dangerousness the essential question to be considered is whether these

minorities have the power in their hands, or are in a position, to develop into majorities.

The success, however, of the incitement to war, even within these criminal strata, very frequently depends on the life or death of individual leading personalities. If the war-intriguers occupy positions in the Government itself, they may become innocuous if they are dismissed from their office, either by the peremptory decree of a monarch, or by the action of a majority in Parliament or among their colleagues in the Ministry. If the desire and the danger of war exist in the ruler himself, there are innumerable personal and material factors which may supervene and remove or weaken even this the greatest of all dangers. A ruler in sickness will not so lightly decide on war as a ruler in health. A rupture in the king may in certain circumstances prevent a rupture in diplomatic relations; an attack of gout in the Emperor may prevent a military attack on his neighbours; a gall-stone in the prince may be the stone of offence over which all the war-intriguers stumble, be they never so powerful. The king who is thirsting for war may die, and a peace-loving successor may mount the throne. Strong popular sentiments, movements in the nation or tendencies in Parliament which conflict with the bellicose intentions of the ruler, may convince him of the impossibility of executing his plans or of the danger to his monarchical position which might be evoked by the attempt to give them effect.

How strongly the influence of individuals on the maintenance of peace or the outbreak of war is assessed even by leading politicians is proved, apart from countless other examples, by the Delcassé incident of June, 1905. The view that the French Foreign Minister of that day was by his Moroccan policy unintentionally, no doubt, but unconsciously and involuntarily, creating a situation involving the danger of war for Europe was disseminated not merely on this side of the Vosges but on the other side as well, and was expressed in the historical meeting of the Cabinet of June 6th, 1905, when Rouvier, the Prime Minister, and his colleagues compelled the too temperamental Foreign Minister to resign.

(It is said to have been on this occasion that Rouvier coined the phrase that Delcassé, the little Don Juan, had not only ensnared England, Russia and Spain, but had ended by seducing Italy as well: "L'Allemagne vous reproche d'avoir débauché l'Italie.") It is incontestable that the period of most dangerous tension between Germany and France since the war of 1870 was the time of Boulangism. After the fall of the "brav' Général" and the removal of his most conspicuous adherents, a calmer relation between Germany and France supervened, which was again stirred to tempestuousness by the Dreyfus affair, but soon after the conclusion of this affair quieter waters were again entered. Our chauvinists attach importance to Poincaré's election as President of the French Republic as symptomatic of the re-awakening of French intentions of revenge, although they are wrong in so doing. On what chance, on what unforeseeable result of Parliamentary intrigue did it depend that M. Pams, the most harmless of all candidates for the presidency, was not called to the Elysée in place of the Lorrainer of alleged "nationalist" sympathies. The tour of the Austrian successor, Francis Ferdinand, to Serajevo furnished the external occasion on which the European War depended. It will be remembered that the old Emperor Francis Joseph was for months seriously ill in the year preceding this tour, and that at that time he was constantly hanging between life and death. Had the Emperor died then, Francis Ferdinand would presumably not have proceeded to the Bosnian capital, and the European conflagration would not have burst out, or at least not from *this* cause.

We have in Germany the comfort and the agreeable prospect of possessing a future Emperor who, as I have shown from many of his writings, speeches and actions, belongs to the worst category of "heroes of war." He is one of those who, exposed to no personal dangers, love war for war's sake, who still regard international peace as "a dream and not even a beautiful dream," who look upon the laceration and the dismemberment of millions of human bodies, upon the misery, hunger and destitution of countless millions of

unhappy men and women, of babes and of those stricken in years who have been driven from house and home, who look upon fire and devastation, upon economic and cultural destruction as a wholesome medicine, as a "steel-bath" to restore once more the relaxed nerves—not their own nerves, be it observed, but those of the labouring classes. It is clear that such views, if entertained on an imperial throne, represent the gravest danger for the world. But if by chance the eldest son of the German Emperor had been differently constituted, if he had shared the views of all nations and of all modern rulers of humane sensibilities that it is not in pulling down but in building up and in promoting further development that the lofty task of all Governments and rulers lies, that it is peace which is the highest possession of the nations, the only sure foundation of their well-being and prosperity—if by chance the eldest son, the successor to the throne, had been like his grandfather, a prince of peace, and if perhaps the military note of the Hohenzollerns had been transmitted to a harmless younger son, then the danger from above would at once have been avoided, and the maintenance of the peace of the world would have been rendered much more probable. Thus by this example we see how the destinies of countries and of nations may be determined by the accident of primogeniture—which, however, can be again eliminated, and as may be hoped will be eliminated, by a further accident in the disappearance of this first-born (by death, sickness or other "unforeseen" circumstance).

Everywhere in the fate of men and in fate of nations there is chance, nowhere is it possible to make a sure calculation in advance. Even within the unpretentious bounds of private life, who would venture to say that a certain development must inevitably and by predetermination happen in such or such a way? "Man proposes and God disposes." This true proverb, which is also popularly expressed in the words that "the unexpected always happens," should be well pondered by the pious and the faithful in the land. "Nothing is so constant as change"—these words should be borne in mind by those who are constantly speaking of the "inevi-

ability" of wars, and yet cannot themselves foretell whether in the evening they will sit round the table with their families, or will have fallen a victim to the reaper who is indeed inevitable. Chance, it is nothing but chance, which governs the destinies of individuals and of nations—so say the sceptics and the unbelievers. What is chance other than "the little finger on the hand of Almighty God"?—say, with Jean Paul, the faithful and the believers in God. Everywhere this fatalism is expressed. "Kismet" is what the Turks call it, *ωάγκη* is what it was called by the Greeks. We cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to our own calculations—so Bismarck spoke and acted. On this one ground alone, by reason of the impossibility of calculating human events in advance, the provocation of a war because it must come some day, that is to say the provocation of a war to anticipate an aggressive war, is a crime as grave as the impious misdeed of a war of pure aggression and conquest.

THE THREE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A PREVENTIVE WAR

The defenders of the aggressive war waged for the purpose of prevention must prove three points in order to justify their thesis, and the burden of proof lies on them, the aggressors, not on us who deny their right of aggression:

1. They are bound to answer in the affirmative the question of principle, whether an aggressive war, undertaken as an anticipatory war of defence, is justifiable on political and moral grounds as well as on grounds of humanity. That in modern political life and for modern statesmen this question is on principle to be answered in the negative I believe that I have proved elsewhere, and will turn to the question later.

2. If the question of principle is answered by them in the affirmative they are bound to prove that the actual premises of the war of prevention which they advance as permissible or even as imperative exist in the

particular case; in other words, that the aggressive war from the other side was beyond question intended, determined and imminent, and that therefore, so far as the State which is now attacking is concerned, the only question at issue is whether it will have to meet its opponent in battle at an earlier or a later date.

3. They must prove that the responsibility for the political and diplomatic situation which made the attack from the other side inevitable is also to be attributed to the other side, and is therefore not a product of the mistakes and the offences of the State which is now attacking; in other words, that the other side has not merely created a dangerous situation, without any blame resting on the State now attacking, but also that it was on the point of putting an end to this situation by the provocation of war.

All these questions, the question of principle relating to the justification of preventive wars in general as well as the two questions of fact indicated in the second and third paragraphs, must simultaneously be answered in the affirmative, if the preventionists wish to justify their point of view. If, for example, only the second question could be answered in the affirmative, the answer to the third being in the negative, the final link in the logical chain leading to the justification of the preventive war would at once be lacking. In that case the intention of the other side to provoke war at a later moment would no doubt be proved, but it would at the same time be made clear that this intention had its origin in a political situation of which the dangerousness was properly to be entered in the debit account of the present aggressor, and not in that of the possible later aggressor. If A by his provocations, his actions of violence, his disregard for B's honour and interests excites in B feelings of exasperation and the impulse to revenge, and then anticipates the prospective act of vengeance on the part of B by opening hostilities himself, he is doubly to be condemned, because he provoked B in the first place, and because in addition to this he then an-

anticipated, instead of awaiting, the natural consequence of this provocation. The situation is different when the provocation emanated from B, when B, apart from the provocation, has also manifested the demonstrable intention of forcibly proceeding against A, and when A, by his actual attack, anticipates the imminent act of violence of B, the provocator. In this case the second and third questions above are to be answered in A's favour, and his attack, always assuming the permissibility on principle of the preventive war, can be justified, or at least excused.

Although, on grounds of principle, I myself unconditionally reject the preventive war, I have in my book already investigated from this point of view the question whether Germany and Austria are in a position to justify, at any rate from their point of view, their aggressive war as a war of prevention. I have been obliged to answer this question in the negative. I undertook to prove:

First, that France, Russia and England did *not* intend to attack Germany and Austria, but rather that their alliances and ententes had only a defensive character.

Secondly, that even if the strained European situation was, in fact, pressing towards an "inevitable" war, the responsibility for this was not to be ascribed to the Entente Powers but, at any rate in an overwhelming degree, to the Central Powers.

The attempt of the Central Powers to put an end by a European war to a state of tension, which they themselves brought about, is thus criminal in a double sense.

* * * * *

The German preventionists are, as a rule, content to answer the second of the questions indicated above. From the antecedents of the war, from the attitude of the Entente Powers and the agreements which they made with each other, from King Edward's policy of "encirclement," from the

alleged revenge policy of Poincaré and Delcassé, from the Pan-Slav tendency in Russia, which had gradually become convinced "that the way to Constantinople lay through the Brandenburger Gate," from the commercial envy of the English huckster-people which throughout the course of history had always endeavoured by alliances with other continental States to secure the suppression of the strongest continental sea Power for the time being, from such facts as these the German chauvinists and preventionists seek, after the manner of Schiemann, to prove the existence of an offensive alliance directed to the destruction of the Central Powers. On the other hand, they pass in significant silence over the other question how far Germany and Austria are themselves responsible for the creation and the consolidation of this union.

I have already pointed out in my book and in the previous section of this work :

That in all the German writings which assert that the authorship of the war rests with the Entente Powers not a scrap of evidence is produced in support of the offensive intentions of these Powers;

That their initial union and the increasing closeness of the links between them are rather to be ascribed exclusively to the fear of the military imperialistic intentions of Germany, to her efforts to establish world-power and hegemony, to the immeasurable increase in the land and sea forces of the German Empire, to the military enthusiasm and the incitement to war of the "Pan-German Union," and its affiliated associations the "German Defence League" and the "German Navy League";

That all the military and naval agreements and discussions between France and England, and between France and Russia, as well as the prospective agreements between England and Russia, were intended merely for the purpose of defence against a possible German attack, but never contemplated a spontaneous attack on Germany.

I have explained fully the reasons which evoked an increasing feeling of distrust not only in France, England and Russia, but also in the whole of the neutral world, towards Germany's intentions and towards the sincerity and the honesty of her assurances of peace. Essentially these reasons were as follows:

The attitude of Germany and of her ally Austria-Hungary at the Hague Conferences, and the decisive resistance offered to compulsory arbitration and to any restriction of land and naval armaments;

Her ambiguous and suspicious behaviour during the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding in 1909-1912;

The doctrines of Bernhardi and Treitschke, these brutal theories of war and of world-power, which were more and more carried by apt pupils, in and out of uniform, amongst various classes of society, and which were more and more made use of cunningly to poison the soul of the German people;

The impulsive policy of fits and starts pursued by the Emperor, who in grave European situations preferred to strike on the table with the mailed fist rather than have recourse to diplomatic negotiations, who chose to appear in shining armour rather than in the diplomatist's garb, constantly speaking of the sharp gleaming sword and the dry powder, recalling with threatening mien in the midst of peace the battles of the past, the struggle for freedom of 1813, and the days of Wörth, Weissenburg and Sedan¹;

The provocative, nerve-wracking, theatrical policy which found appropriate expression in the Emperor's action in sending first of all the Kruger-telegram and then in despatching a South African plan of campaign to

¹ See, *inter alia*, the speeches of the Emperor William in the summer of 1904 at Karlsruhe and at Mainz, his address to Prince Henry before his departure for East Asia (1897) and his answer to the Burgomeister of Vienna in 1910.

his royal grandmother, in his private letter to Lord Tweedmouth, in the landing in Tangier and in the Agadir spring of the *Panther*,—a policy which in the internal life of Germany, especially in the Reichsland in the hard Prussian treatment meted out to the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, in the encroachments of the military power on civil authority, offered a true reflection of external policy.

All these facts increased the distrust felt towards the Prusso-German policy in Europe to such a degree that it was only by an increasingly firm and strong counter-alliance that the possibility of the maintenance of the peace of Europe appeared to be assured.

With the continuation of this electrically charged state of tension no surprise need have been occasioned even if the union of the Entente Powers were constantly to advance to closer agreements. If the outbreak of war had not intervened, the preliminary steps to the Anglo-Russian naval convention in the spring of 1914 would possibly have led to a conclusion of the negotiations, to a system of co-operation of the two fleets worked out in all its details. And yet, notwithstanding all this, it is possible to read through the whole of the war literature of Germany from beginning to end without finding any tangible evidence, or even any attempt to prove, that the approximation and the cohesion of the Entente Powers had for its object an attack on Germany or her allies. Their union was not the cause but the effect of the state of European tension. King Edward's policy, which has been called a policy of "encirclement," should more correctly be described as the policy of rendering innocuous the militant efforts of Germany to achieve world-power.

Two years before King Edward ascended the throne, the first Hague Conference had taken place without result, chiefly owing to the fault of Germany; compulsory arbitration, supported by England, had been declared by Germany; the discussion of a restriction of armaments, in accordance with treaty agreements, had been rejected by Germany but in-

stead of this, by the German Navy Law there was laid the beginning of a sea power which in the course of years threatened to approximate more and more closely to English supremacy on the sea, and was also bound to awake in the pacific English people, who had at their disposal no land forces of any importance, apprehensions for the security of the United Kingdom. Complete failure attended all the attempts undertaken in the first place by the Unionist and later in increased measure by the Liberal English Cabinet to bring to a stop by restrictions resting on treaty, the ruinous competition in armaments between the two countries. The Emperor William and his Grand Admiral, von Tirpitz, had taken their passionately adored child, the new-born German Navy, too much to their hearts to allow any hindrances and restrictions to be laid in the way of the growth of this offspring. A word may occasionally have fallen from the lips of the Grand Admiral, indicating that Germany might perhaps consider the idea of a certain proportion between the strengths of the two fleets. But no practical consequences followed any such statement; Germany wished to remain free, and did remain free in the development of her naval forces.

So far as the most important question which occupied it was concerned, the second Hague Conference passed off as ineffectively as the first. The crisis with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed Germany as the second standing behind her ally with mailed fist threateningly raised aloft; and it brought the danger of a European war so near at hand that it required all the compliance which Russia could muster and all the good counsel of England and France to prevent even at that date the outbreak of the world conflagration.

All these facts, and many others which would take too long to enumerate here, occasioned and promoted King Edward's policy of rendering the situation innocuous; it was not a policy of war, but a policy of peace; its tendency was directed, not to the disturbance, but to the maintenance of European peace. This maintenance, it was rightly believed,

could best be achieved by the creation of a Triple Entente as nearly as possible equal in value and in strength to the Triple Alliance. As the tendency of German naval preparation was expressly in the direction of securing the creation of a navy so strong, that even the strongest opponent could not oppose it in war without danger to her own sea power, so the tendency in the creation of the Entente was in the direction of opposing to the Triple Alliance with the super-powerful Germany at its head; a coalition which, it was true, was only in part linked together by a firm alliance but which on the approach of any dispute which threatened war was designed to constitute so strong an opposition that even the greatest military power in the world could not risk a war without danger to herself.

* * * * *

From this standpoint, from the point of view of the peaceful intentions of the Triple Entente—which as we shall see later cannot be transformed into an intention for war even by the revelations of the Belgian archives—the greater part of German war literature, in so far as it relates to the more remote antecedents of the war, appears at once as untenable and fatuous. The defenders of Germany are constantly referring to the discussions between English and French military officers, and between English and Belgian military officers, to the correspondence between Grey and Paul Cambon in November, 1912, to the intended Anglo-Russian naval convention, the foundations of which are said to have been laid by Isvolsky in the spring of 1914 on the occasion of the visit to Paris of the English King and Queen. All the details of these military agreements between the Entente Powers are dished up in a sensational form to the German public, who are informed of the landing of English troops in Denmark or Schleswig-Holstein, the transport of Russian troops to Pommern by English merchantmen, the dispatch of auxiliary English troops to Belgium and France, etc. Even if all these details were true, they do not furnish the slightest proof of the intention to carry out a predatory attack; they rather represent military measures which in themselves might just

as well serve a war of defence as a war of aggression. They thus furnish no circumstantial evidence to which appeal could be made as the basis for a preventive war.

Indeed one may go even further; even if it were proved—for which, however, there is in fact no evidence—that these actions of a military and naval character, which are alleged to have been concerted, were primary in character and that thus they were acts intended to anticipate a German attack, even this would not show that they were designed to serve a predatory war of aggression. Is it not the case that a Prussian has laid down the military principle that “the best defence lies in the attack”? Are we not told that Germany and Austria began the present “war of defence” by issuing the decisive declarations of war themselves, and by the invasion of foreign countries? How can the people who attacked Serbia, Belgium, Russia and France, the people who wage a war that has been “forced upon” them, dare to assert that an aggressive war cannot at the same time be a war of defence. Even if the military agreements between the general army and naval staffs of the Entente Powers had constituted an alliance of obligation—which is not the case—even if they had been contrived as military measures of aggression and were proved as such—which is still less the case—there would still be not the slightest evidence for the assertion that the Entente Powers contemplated a predatory attack on Germany and her allies; there would still remain the explanation, for which equal justification could be advanced, that these military actions were intended, on the Prussian model, as acts of aggression for the purpose of defence.

The burden of proving the intention to embark on purely spontaneous acts of aggression directed towards the annihilation and dismemberment of Germany lies on those who deduce from these aggressive intentions the fact that Germany had a right to adopt preventive measures. Such a proof, if it is to form the basis of so portentous a decision for war, must conform to strict standards and must not rest merely on probabilities and presumptions. The proof of this

has, however, been nowhere seriously embarked upon, much less furnished with success. In dealing with Schiemann I have sufficiently characterised the methods of proof adopted, and I need not return to the point here. The question has been put with sufficient precision by the preventionists; it is the question, already touched on above, of the "inevitable" war; but the answer which they give is distinguished by anything but precision.

What is the meaning of "inevitable"? We may describe a thing as inevitable when it can in no way be avoided, when its occurrence is absolutely certain, like the rising of the sun in the morning or its setting in the evening. What mortal man will presume so to penetrate into the mysteries of inscrutable destiny as to dare to predicate the inevitability of a future event? Who claims the gift of prophecy whereby he can foretell the future with such certainty as to build on a future event the most momentous resolutions in the present? Who possesses the Promethean presumption to speak of "inevitability" in matters of human decision which can always be averted and which, whether in agreement with or contrary to the will of the actors, may turn out for good or for evil? It is only the forces of Nature that are inevitable because they are not subject to the determination of the human will. Where man has to will and to act, everything can be averted except the consequences of his actions, and these follow his actions as a shadow follows the human figure, small or great, broad or narrow, according as they are illumined by the sun of a higher power of destiny. The rumble of an earthquake, the outburst of a thunderstorm are inevitable. The rumble of war, the outburst of a revolution can always be averted.

It is therefore something "beyond our power," indeed beyond the power of our nationalistic supermen, to prove the inevitability of a war even if they attempted to furnish this proof by better means than those on which in fact they rely. I have undertaken to prove the contrary proposition in opposition to their assertion that the Entente Powers intended a European war and that they meant in this way to annihilate Germany and Austria. This counter-proof may be

regarded as successful or unsuccessful, but the failure of the counter-proof in no way implies the success of the proof of the main proposition, the burden of which falls on my opponent. I have proved, and by means of further evidence I will later on support my assertion:

That the tendencies to war were stronger and more dangerous in Germany than anywhere else in the world;

That the military preparations of Germany exceeded those of all other countries in strength and extent;

That the collaboration for war between the German and the Austrian armies was more precisely and more carefully studied and prepared than in the case of the Entente Powers;

That the strategic plans of Germany (the attack on Belgium and France as the prelude, followed by the crushing of Russia) had an expressly aggressive character.

I have quoted from Bernhardi's famous book the sentence which pitilessly demolishes all the preventionists: "Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests." I shall quote later a series of utterances in the imperialistic Press, which, like Bernhardi, proclaim the imperialistic war of conquest without any rag to cover their shame in the form of talk about "prevention against hostile attack." These gentlemen might indeed be left to themselves: the imperialist completely disposes of the preventionist. Many who oscillate backwards and forwards between preventionism and imperialism, like Harden for example, at one time declare that it is a shameful thing to conceal the good German right to strive for world-power behind the cowardly bulwark of the "defence of the frontier," while at another time, when preventionism suits their purpose, they speak of the right and the duty of the anticipated defence against future attack.

Although the burden of proof does not lie upon me, I have produced sufficient proof and testimony from the German

imperialistic camp itself (and later will produce more) in support of my assertion that the Entente Powers did not intend the European War. The proof of the contrary assertion is still lacking. The basis of the theory of prevention thus fails; it is left hanging in mid-air, since its presupposition, the inevitability of a hostile attack, is, to say the least, unproved—in reality, for anyone who will follow what I have said, it is directly refuted.

THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE (TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

I said above that the military preparations of Germany had exceeded those of all other countries in strength and extent. In *J'accuse* (page 32) in a section entitled: "Have we been attacked or were we going to be attacked?" I have already pointed out the grounds which for years have been deceitfully advanced by the German War party to prove the aggressive attentions of the Entente Powers:

"What did they mean by their enormous preparations?" is what they most frequently say. And what about our preparations? I reply, which were certainly greater and more comprehensive than in any other country in the world. Did ever any country in time of peace act as we did in 1913 when we suddenly raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by 140,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of £50,000,000?"

This sentence has been attacked by various of my opponents and the contrary assertion has been advanced that the Entente Powers, Russia, England and France, were more strongly armed for war than Germany, Austria and Italy, the Powers of the Triple Alliance. Since the assertion also frequently recurs in the German literature of defence, I consider it expedient to enter more closely into this question of military statistics, although it is only very loosely connected with my sentences quoted above. Every unprejudiced reader will at once see that these sentences in my book did not pur-

port to give a statistical comparison of figures, but that the whole stress was laid on the sudden increase in the effective peace strength by 140,000 men and on the unprecedented German device of a war tax of £50,000,000 in times of peace. Such a sudden and entirely unexplained increase in the effective peace strength of the army never took place to the same extent in any other country and it evoked the alarm and the astonishment of the whole world and materially contributed to the baneful process of rendering more acute the tension in the European situation; it is for this unprovoked and provocative increase, taken in conjunction with the sudden war-tax of £50,000,000 and current over-expenditure of £10,000,000 that *J'accuse* reproaches the German Government and their war-intriguers, when these deceive the German people by representing the military preparations of the other side as indications of an aggressive intention. It is this fatal incident of the military law of 1913 which the defenders of Germany now endeavour, by giving falsely the sequence of events in time, to represent as the consequence of the prolongation of the period of service in France, whereas in fact it was its cause—it is this irresponsible attack on the quiet and peaceful development of Europe, which at that moment appeared to some extent to be secured as a result of the propitious efforts for peace in the Balkan crisis—it is this dangerous preparation for war and the awakening of bellicose instincts which the sentences in question were meant to denounce; it was not intended to furnish numerical statistics relating to the military strength of the various nations on a peace basis. Only a malicious misapprehension of the meaning and context of the relevant sentences could lead my opponents to display their statistical compilations in refutation of my alleged assertions. *Tant pis pour eux!* I will now prove that even on the ground of statistics, that is to say of correct and appropriate statistics, their assertion that the Entente Powers were more strongly armed is untenable, and that, on the contrary, there was a considerable preponderance in armaments on the part of the Powers of the Triple Alliance.

WHICH SIDE MADE GREATER MILITARY PREPARATIONS
BEFORE THE WAR, THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE OR THE
TRIPLE ENTENTE?

It is clear that in answering the question which of the two groups made greater military preparations it is necessary to ignore entirely the arrangements which have been produced in the course of this war. These arrangements could not be foreseen with certainty by either side and might, according to the formation assumed, strongly modify or indeed completely upset the proportional strength of the two groups. If, for example, England had remained neutral—a consummation which up to the last moment Germany sought to attain—the military preponderance would from the first moment have been on the side of the Central Powers, even if Italy had refrained from entering, or indeed even if she had supported the other side. While on the one side Italy and Roumania have increased the military forces of the Triple Entente, on the other side Bulgaria and Turkey have joined the group of the Central Powers. Further, the possibility of other groupings in the future is not excluded. It is impossible to base a comparison of the strength of the two parties on all these transpositions which have already taken place, or may yet take place, or to invoke them in answering the question which side had made greater military preparations before the war. This question can only be decided according to the state of the alliances or ententes as they then existed. The purpose of these groupings was the mutual keeping-in-check by means of the menace exerted by the instruments of force on both sides. The increase of these instruments of force on the one side, that is to say, the heightened menace had to be compensated by an increase of the instruments of force on the other side. This was the familiar endless screw. The investigation with which we are at the moment concerned is aimed at determining which group took the initiative in putting the screw on more tightly, and thereby rendered more acute the state of tension in Europe.

This question can be determined only on the basis of the formation of groups as they then existed, not on the basis of war-combinations which have supervened at a later date.

A further point of departure which is obvious for everyone of impartial judgment, and for this reason is almost universally ignored by my opponents is that the comparison of the armaments of the two groups of Powers cannot be established by reference to absolute numbers, but only in comparison to the figures for the population.

It is only a fool or a knave who could undertake the task of comparing together absolute figures with reference to military armaments, in order to deduce conclusions with regard to the greater or less "militarism" of the States in question. That militarism is not identical with military preparations is a point I have elsewhere sufficiently explained, and I need not return to it here. If the object is to institute a comparison between military figures, it is self-evident that absolute figures give no standard for the degree of these military preparations; in each State the important point is rather that of the proportion between the entire population and the strength of the army on a peace and a war basis. By means of absolute figures we arrive at entirely meaningless conclusions. Let us assume that a State of five million inhabitants supports 500,000 soldiers in time of peace, that is to say 10 per cent. of its population, and that another with thirty million inhabitants supports 1,000,000, that is to say 3 1-3 per cent. of its population. Which is more strongly armed, the former or the latter State? Without doubt the former, although taking the absolute figures it supports only half the soldiers of the latter. Those who are perpetually blind would, however, see in the State of thirty million inhabitants half a million more combatants on the field, and would at once triumphantly exclaim: "You see for yourself which side is making the stronger preparations."

The comparison of military figures is an extremely difficult operation since the statistics in the various countries are estimated from different points of view, and the various cate-

gories of troops are arranged in different ways. I confess that I am a layman in military matters and must be content to assure the reader that to the best of my knowledge and conscience I have made use of various sources which I have compared together, and that I have entered in my tables those figures which receive general confirmation. The books which I have consulted are: Hickmann, *Universal Pocket-Atlas* of 1915; Justus Perthes (Gotha), *Pocket Atlas* of 1916; *The Statistical Year-Book for the German Empire* of 1914, etc.

In order to overcome my defective knowledge of the special subject and to avoid any charge of tendencious compilation, in addition to my own compilations from the sources mentioned I have consulted a military expert belonging to a neutral country. The statements of this expert with regard to the war and the peace strength of the six European great States are, according to the assurance of this gentleman, "determined by a similar method of calculation, so far as this is possible having regard to the divergency in the organisations of the armies." All these difficulties in the comparison of military statistics have, of course, no existence for most of my opponents; as a rule they rely on any compilation which appears to be particularly favourable to their assertions, whether or not it can lay claim to any special authority. They omit any comparison with other estimates, any more detailed investigation of the system of calculation adopted by their authority, and by means of this most superficial of all methods of demonstration they seek to refute alleged assertions of the accuser which, in fact, he never advanced. In the first place I accused the Government and the rulers of Germany of having always taken the lead in turning still further with a dangerous suddenness the endless screw of armaments, and further that they and their allies were *relatively*—that is to say, in proportion to the figures of the population—more strongly armed than the other European Great States.

The former charge I have already proved elsewhere. The latter charge I will now prove.

I

EFFECTIVE PEACE STRENGTH OF ARMY AND NAVY

Germany ¹ ..	868,000 men	France ..	713,000 men
Austria ..	435,000 "	Russia ..	1,448,000 "
Italy ..	343,000 "	England ² ..	613,000 "
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1,646,000 men		2,774,000 men	

Accordingly, the proportion existing between the military preparations of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in times of peace is approximately 1:1.68; this, be it observed, is on the basis of the figures most favourable to the Triple Alliance.

If in place of the above figures I take those furnished to me by my military expert, the relation between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente is as follows:

Germany ..	870,000	France ..	750,000
Austria-Hungary	414,000	England ..	170,000
Italy ..	305,000	Russia ..	1,200,000
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1,589,000		2,120,000	

According to these figures, the ratio of the military preparations of the Triple Alliance to those of the Triple Entente in time of peace is approximately 1:1.33.

¹So far as the forces of the German Empire by sea and land are concerned the *Year Book* for 1914 gives a total strength in peace of approximately 880,000 men. In order to apply the same standard to Germany and to other countries, I have restricted myself to the compilation in Gotha, which gives for Germany 868,000 men, and thus falls short of the official figures.

²The total English strength is given by Hickmann at only 570,000 men, including the troops stationed in India. In order to avoid the charge of a prejudiced reduction of the figures, I have taken the higher figure from Gotha. One of my opponents indeed estimates the English army on a peace footing at only 285,000 men; although, it is true, he estimates the entire peace strength of the Entente at 3,035,000.

II

What now is the ratio between the figures for the population of the two groups? Here again I follow Gotha, and distinguish between the European population and the whole population.

European Population

Germany	..	68 millions	France	..	40 millions
Austria	..	53 "	Russia	..	140 "
Italy	..	36 "	England	..	46 "
<hr/>			<hr/>		
157 millions			226 millions		

The European populations of the two groups of Powers thus stand to each other in the ratio of approximately 1:1.44, so that the peace strength of the Entente Powers, measured on the basis of the European population:

(a) If I take the figures in Gotha, only exceeds that of the Triple Alliance by 0.24 (1.68—1.44);

(b) If I take the figures of my expert, it is indeed 0.11 (1.44 — 1.33) behind that of the Triple Alliance. Had I chosen to make use of statistics which give the figures for the Triple Alliance slightly higher and those of the Triple Entente slightly lower than those given in Gotha, the ratio between the number of troops and the population would have been almost identical in the two groups.

In the face of these facts one of my opponents ventures the assertion that in 1914 the peace-strength of the armies of the Triple Entente was more than double that of the Triple Alliance!

* * * * *

This is the situation if the calculation is based on the European population of all the States. This standard is, however, not appropriate; for not only are the armies partially composed of colonial troops, but, they are also intended to afford protection by sea and by land to the colonies outside

the Mother Country. The greater the extent of the colonial territory and the colonial population, the stronger will be the protection required for possessions abroad. In deciding the question which was more strongly armed in peace, it is thus impossible to leave aside the other question: Which side had a greater population to protect by its military forces within and without Europe?

Apart from this point of view consideration must also be given to the other point already indicated above. The ratio of the number of troops in each country to its own population becomes less the wider the circle of this population is drawn. If the English military forces are compared with the 46 million inhabitants of the United Kingdom, a very different result is obtained from that arrived at if the 377 million inhabitants outside the kingdom are included. In reality they must be included, for the English peace-army is not only partially recruited from English possessions in other quarters of the globe, but it also serves to protect these possessions and to maintain the English world-empire.

In the case of Russia the addition of the Asiatic possessions, etc., with approximately 36 million inhabitants to the 140 millions of European Russia is all the more imperative, inasmuch as the Russian Empire forms a connected territory complete in itself, and therefore its military forces cannot be divided into a European and an extra-European force. In order to arrive at a result in our calculation in correspondence with the actual relations, it is necessary to compare the entire Russian population (as well as the English and French) with their military forces by sea and by land.

From this point of view the following result is obtained:

Entire Population

Germany	..	80 millions	France	..	86 millions
Austria	..	53 "	Russia	..	176 "
Italy	..	38 "	England	..	423 "
<hr/>			<hr/>		
171 millions			685 millions		

The figures for the population of the two groups of Powers are thus almost in the ratio of 1:4. Their strength on a peace-basis, as we have seen above, is according to Gotha only 1:1.68. In other words in order to be armed to the same extent as the Triple Alliance the Entente Powers ought to have had four times as many soldiers in times of peace as those maintained by the Triple Alliance; instead of 2,774,000 men they ought to have had 6,600,000 men under arms. They were thus 4,000,000 men below the level of the military preparations of the Triple Alliance.

III

Even more surprising is the result if we investigate the
War-Strength

of the two groups of Powers by reference to the figures for the population.

The ratio of the European populations to each other, as I have shown above, is according to Gotha 1:1.44; the Triple Alliance comprises 157 million and the Triple Entente 226 million.

The ratio of the entire population in the two cases is, according to Gotha, almost the same as given by Hickmann, namely, 1:4=171 million:685 million.

(a) According to Hickmann we get the following figures for the war-strength for the army and navy:

Germany ..	3,000,000 men	France ..	2,350,000 men
Austria ..	1,800,000 "	Russia ..	4,600,000 "
Italy	1,100,000 "	England ..	1,080,000 "
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	5,900,000 men		8,030,000 men

The ratio is thus 1:1.36.

Since the European populations of the two groups of Powers are in the ratio of 1:1.44 there is a deficiency in the military preparations of the Entente Powers for war of

0.08. If, however, as I consider is necessary, we take as the standard the entire population of all States within and without Europe, the ratio of which is 1:4, there is a deficiency in military preparations on the part of the Triple Entente of 2.64 ($4 - 1.36$); in other words, the Triple Alliance could have increased its war-preparations to 23,600,000 men (four times the war-preparations of the Triple Alliance) and would only then have reached the level of preparation of the Triple Alliance.

(b) According to Gotha, the figures are as follows:

Germany..	5,077,000 men	France ..	4,120,000 men
Austria ..	1,920,000 "	Russia ..	4,048,000 "
Italy ..	1,220,000 "	England ..	1,281,000 "
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	8,217,000 men		9,449,000 men

The ratio is thus 1:1.15.

(c) According to the calculations of my military expert, the strength of the European Great Powers on a war basis is as follows:

Germany ..	5,800,000	France ..	4,200,000
Austria-Hungary	2,000,000	England ..	800,000
Italy ..	1,100,000	Russia ..	7,668,000
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	8,900,000		12,668,000

The ratio is thus 1:1.42.

Accordingly, on the basis of the figures in Gotha, it follows that if only the European population is taken into consideration, there is a deficiency in the military preparations of the Entente States compared with the Triple Alliance of $1.44 - 1.15 = 0.29$.

If the calculation is based on the figures of my military expert and the European population as given by Gotha, there is on the part of the Entente less preparation for war by 0.02 than in the case of the Triple Alliance ($1.44 - 1.42$).

If, however, as I consider necessary and right, the entire population is considered, we find on the figures given by Gotha the enormous deficiency in military preparation on the part of the Entente Powers of $4 - 1.15 = 2.85$; on the figure of my expert of $4 - 1.42 = 2.58$. In other words the Triple Alliance could have raised its war-preparation to 32,800,000 or to 35,600,000 men (four times the war-preparation of the Triple Alliance) and would only then have reached the level of preparation of the Triple Alliance.

The deficiency in the preparations of the Entente Powers appears most stupendous, if we accept as correct the war-strengths of the two groups of Powers as put forward by one of my opponents on the basis of his authorities, and if we are allowed to compare the strength on a war basis as so given with the entire populations. The writer in question gives the ratio of the war strength of the Triple Alliance to that of the Triple Entente as approximately 11 : 12, that is to say, 11 million to 12 million men. As the entire population of the Triple Alliance as shown above is to that of the Triple Alliance in the relation of 1 : 4, the war strength of the Entente Powers ought to have amounted to 44 million men in order to remain on the same level as that of the Triple Alliance. Since it only amounts to 12 million men it remains behind the war level of the Triple Alliance by the gigantic figure of 32 million.

This is the result of the comparison, if we occupy the same ground as my opponents—if, totally ignoring the essence and the kernel of the question in dispute, we entirely leave aside the priority and the suddenness of the increase in Germany's forces, and only rely on the figures giving the strength of the army, although no doubt on the basis of the number of the population. On their own ground my opponents are defeated, and they themselves deserve the charge of "superficiality," which here again they are unable to refrain from throwing in the face of the author of *J'accuse*.

THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ (JUNE, 1905)

After this military digression, rendered necessary by the citation of military statistics by my opponents, I return to my subject, to my assertion that never on any occasion has there been produced the slightest proof, resting either on military or on diplomatic facts, in support of the alleged aggressive intentions of the Entente Powers, nor has the attempt to furnish such a proof ever been seriously made. Although, as has already been observed, the burden of proving the contrary in no way devolves upon me, I will nevertheless here consider a question, already briefly touched on above, which the German preventionists habitually emphasise with special zeal as a sign of the bellicose intentions of England and France.

In June, 1905, as is well known, Delcassé, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the man who is always represented in Germany as the prototype of a French politician of revenge, fell as a consequence of the Moroccan conflict. In his defence Delcassé made in the *Paris Matin*, in October of the same year, certain revelations relating to his negotiations with the English Government and the events in the Cabinet which led to his fall. I intentionally quote these revelations according to the account given by Helmolt (*The Secret Antecedents of the War*) because this account of the literary leader of the preventionists is certainly beyond suspicion so far as concerns the foundation of the idea of prevention. According to this version Delcassé revealed in the *Matin* the "astonishing secret":

France had been informed by England that should France be attacked, England was ready to occupy the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal and to disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. If France wished, England would repeat this offer in writing (page 13).

In his speech of defence in the Cabinet Delcassé, according to Helmolt's account, also communicated to his colleagues in

the Ministry the fact "that England was ready to support France to the end and to stand by her should she be attacked in the near future." To the account thus given by Delcassé, Stephen Lauzanne, in the *Matin* of October 8th, 1905, added the following memorable words (which I also quote from Helmolt):

If Herr von Bülow complains of the desire to isolate Germany, he should much rather ask himself the question whether it is not Germany by her own action that is isolating herself from the rest of Europe. The creators of the distrust and suspicious hatred which every day more and more ensnare the German Empire are not Delcassé and Lansdowne, they are not Edward VII and Roosevelt; their names are Bismarck and Moltke, William II and Bülow. These are the men who have created and developed the bristling Empire, stiff with steel, irritating and irritated, the empire which for a quarter of a century has faced Europe with a look of challenge and at which Europe herself must in the end be compelled to look askance. It is these men who, by continuing increasingly to Prussianise it, rob Germany of that sympathy which was formerly assured to it by its activity in learning and by its sincere modesty. It is these men who in our time, which was once thought humane, have evoked barbaric threats and enkindled brutal passions. Europe is afraid of the fire which burns unceasingly in Berlin and is already prudently banding itself together (pages 17, 18).

Delcassé's revelations and Lauzanne's commentary which in Helmolt's view clearly reveal the "devilish league" for the suppression of Germany, prove to the unprejudiced reader exactly the opposite; they express in unambiguous terms the exclusively defensive intentions of the Anglo-French Entente. They aptly describe the reason and the origin of the European tension; they lay the finger on the wound in revealing that the cause of the chain of defence which was being more and more surely forged was to be found in the fear of the fire that was burning in Berlin, in the distrust felt towards the Empire stiff with steel, irritating and irritated. The revelations in the *Matin* became in the Press of Europe and more especially in that of England a subject of lively discussion.

The English Government (which was at the time still represented by Lord Lansdowne) as well as the inspired and non-inspired Press of England disputed certain details in Delcassé's revelation, particularly the military preparations alleged to have been planned, but they did not deny that England would be ready to extend military support to the French Republic in the event of an unprovoked attack on France. The *Times* then wrote (I quote according to Helmolt, page 19):

M. Delcassé, the *Matin* affirms, informed his colleagues in the Ministry that England was ready to support France, and that in the event of an unexpected act of aggression directed against France, England would side with the Republic. With that statement we have no fault to find. We do not at all doubt that in such a contingency the English Government would have supported France with the hearty approval of the nation.¹

No *agreement* on these lines was, as we know, concluded, but, as is shown by the correspondence between Grey and Cambon in November, 1912, even in the event of an unprovoked German attack it was still left free to England to decide whether she would or would not afford military support to the party attacked. This point is not, however, relevant to our present inquiry. It is sufficient for me to point out here that even this alleged portentous agreement which is supposed to reveal the "devilish intentions" of our opponents, even if it were true in all its details, had no offensive character but a clearly expressed defensive character. "Should France be attacked" England was ready to give military assistance—that is how the position is expressed in the revelations in the *Matin* and in the confirmation by the *Times*. It does not deal with the position, "should France attack." Europe was afraid of Berlin, and therefore it combined together—so runs the commentary of Stephen Lauzanne. Where is there any question here or elsewhere of intentions to annihilate or to attack Germany? Where is there

¹ [*Times*, October 9th, 1905.]

the slightest indication of aggressive war, the "inevitable" war, which it was necessary to anticipate by a preventive war? If Delcassé fell from office merely because of this defensive agreement, merely because France in her prudence and anxiety saw in it a provocation of her dangerous neighbour, what would have been the fate of a French Minister or of a President of the Republic who should have entertained the insensate idea of plunging the pacific and democratic commonwealth into sanguinary and war-like adventures to please a few irresponsible jingoes and intriguers. Poincaré would not have remained a day longer at the head of the Republic if he had ever entertained or announced such ideas of war. The completely pacific party of Radicals and Socialists of the Left who gained so brilliant an electoral victory in the spring of 1914 would not have tolerated for another day a Ministry which had endeavoured to ease the European tension by the sanguinary struggle of arms instead of by a pacific understanding. If even the creator of the defensive Entente of 1904 was regarded as a dangerous provocator and had to give way to threats from without and to his opponents within, what fate would have been in store for a President who was eager for aggression? No, all these alleged aggressive intentions are merely lies and inventions, inventions for which in the past there was no proof and which quite recently, in the days before the outbreak of war, were contradicted by the indefatigable efforts made by France for the maintenance of peace.

Delcassé's fall in 1905 proves exactly the opposite of what our chauvinists seek to infer from it. It proves:

Firstly, that even the Minister of the Republic who is denounced in Germany as the most pernicious instigator of war, never aimed at anything more than the protection of France against German attack; and

Secondly, that even this purely defensive policy cost him his office, because of the desire under all circumstances to prevent a provocation of distrust and suspicion on the part of Germany.

So even this argument which is regarded as specially cogent turns out solely to the disadvantage of the preventionists.

THE JURY COURT OF THE WORLD

If a world-jury were called upon to decide the question of guilt, there are two main questions and a number of subsidiary ones which would be submitted for an answer. The two main questions are:—

Are the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, waging an aggressive war? Or:
Are they waging a war of defence?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative then, in the unanimous judgment of the world, in which the accused themselves could not refuse their concurrence, sentence would be passed.

If the second question is answered in the affirmative the accused must be acquitted—and this judgment also would secure the approval of the whole world.

So far the decision is clear and simple. The difficulties in the question to be put and in the answer to be given only arise on the subsidiary questions which must be added to the main question first mentioned. These subsidiary questions relate to the preventive war, which is in itself an aggressive war, but is conducted under circumstances and for reasons which make it appear, at least in the sense of the preventionists, justifiable and therefore undeserving of punishment. In the event of the first-mentioned question being answered in the affirmative the counsel for the defence in the process before the jury of the world would therefore have to put the following secondary question:

“Is it true that the aggressive war begun by the accused was solely undertaken with the object of anticipating an aggressive war from the other side, which was certain and could not otherwise be avoided?”

Always assuming the permissibility on principle of the preventive war, this secondary question, if answered in the affirmative, would furnish a ground for not imposing a punishment, which notwithstanding that the main question of guilt was answered in the affirmative would necessarily lead to the acquittal of the accused.

But the matter would not be disposed of with this one secondary question. The public prosecutor would have to ask a further subsidiary question in the event of an affirmative answer being given to the first main question and the first subsidiary question. This question would be to the following effect:

“Is it true that the accused by their own action have produced a situation in Europe which has made possible or has occasioned the aggressive intention of the opposing party?”

This secondary subsidiary question, which is to be asked in the event of an affirmative answer being given to the first main question and the first subsidiary question, relates to the account (in my first book and in this work) which ends with the demonstration of the fact that it is not the Entente Powers but the Central Powers which bear the guilt (or at least the chief guilt) of the state of European tension, of the constant friction and danger of war, the guilt of the continued existence of international anarchy and of the competition of armaments. Assuming then that it were true—though, of course, it is untrue, and is here only regarded as a hypothesis—that the Entente Powers entertained aggressive intentions against the Central Powers, the existence of such warlike intentions, even if demonstrated, would not excuse the preventive war on the part of the Central Powers because they themselves, in the language of the above formula, “have produced a situation which has made possible or has occasioned the aggressive intention of the opposing party.” Even on the hypothesis most favourable to the accused, on the hypothesis of a preventive war provoked by the positive ag-

gressive intentions of the opposing party, the second subsidiary question would still have to be answered against the Central Powers, and sentence would accordingly have to be passed.

As the facts stand, however, this case, which is taken as the most favourable hypothesis, does not arise. For even the first subsidiary question relating to the preventive war must be answered in the negative, so that there is no occasion to answer the second subsidiary question.

Why must the question relating to the preventive war be answered in the negative?

Because without exception all the presuppositions which would justify prevention, even from the standpoint of the preventionists, are absent.

(a) There is a complete absence of any proof that an aggressive war was intended by the other side. On the contrary, this assertion is refuted.

(b) There is no proof—here again the contrary is rather proved—that the war was exclusively undertaken for the purpose of anticipating an aggressive war. The antecedents of the war at every stage and in every aspect show that the question was not one of an anticipatory war of defence, but of a carefully prepared and premeditated war of imperialistic extension.

(c) Above all, there is an absence of proof that the alleged aggressive war from the other side—assuming, indeed, that aggressive intentions on the other side existed and were proved—could not be avoided otherwise than by a war of prevention. Here also the contrary is proved; namely, that the war could have been avoided, had Germany and Austria lent a willing ear to the countless proposals for mediation and for arriving at an understanding, had they—to name only one point—gone so far as to accept merely the convocation of the Hague Tribunal. It was easier to avoid war than to provoke it. It could have been avoided by an honourable and sin-

cere desire for peace; it could only be provoked by subterfuges, ambiguities, procrastinations and, finally, brutality.

Altogether, then, even assuming the standpoint of principle adopted by the preventive politicians, there is a complete absence of all the actual presuppositions which might make prevention in the case before us appear justified, and therefore as undeserving of punishment. The first subsidiary question with regard to the war of prevention must therefore be answered in the negative on grounds of fact, so that no answer need be given to the second question relating to the responsibility for the state of tension and its explosions, a question which had only to be raised in the event of the first being answered in the affirmative. The world-jury must in any case arrive at a verdict against the Central Powers, whether it answers both the subsidiary questions or the first only. If it denies the existence of a preventive war, the purely aggressive war remains. If it affirms its existence on grounds of principle and of fact, this favourable verdict must be rescinded by the affirmative answer to the second subsidiary question, which lays on the Central Powers the burden of the guilt of the anarchical and nervous state of Europe, which was full of the promise of war.

* * * * *

In all these discussions which cannot but lead to a result unfavourable to the Central Powers, no matter how the question is viewed, I have entirely disregarded the fact that even if prevention is admitted in principle, on general grounds, nevertheless, prevention against an attack which in the calculation of our preventionists was planned to take place only in two or three years' time is opposed to all principles of right and of reason.

The example of the "state of defence" (*Notwehr*) admitted in criminal law may here be regarded as entirely in point. I do not see why the anticipatory right of defence (*Verteidigungsrecht*) of a State with its enormous world-shaking consequences should be more widely extended than

the right of defence of an individual whose act of self-defence (*Notwehrakt*) affects only the restricted circle of two or more persons. If the act of defence of the individual is immune from punishment only in so far as it is intended and is necessary to ward off a present attack which is contrary to law (Imperial Criminal Law Code, section 53), why should an indefinite extension be given to the right of defence of the most powerful, the most adaptable and the readiest for war of all the military States in the world as against a ponderous Colossus like the Russian Empire? Why should the state of defence (*Notwehr*), the anticipated self-defence (*Verteidigung*) against future attacks which are only intended after the lapse of years, be permitted to a State, while the individual is allowed in law only to defend himself against a present attack? Is it not possible that the idea might occur to a private citizen to penetrate into his neighbour's domain with loaded rifle on the plea that his neighbour contemplated similar action towards him at a later and still remote period of time and that his only desire had been to anticipate him? Would the most imbecile counsel for the defence venture to represent such an act of trespass as an action of defence and plead for immunity?

When the Chancellor in his speech of the 4th of August, 1914, explained the invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium by the state of defence ("Gentlemen, we are now in a state of defence, and necessity knows no law"), he could rely on no grounds of fact, but at any rate he could appeal to a certain measure of logic. For Herr von Bethmann, like his Imperial Master, does not belong to the preventionists; he is the leader and the herald of the party of defence. Both, master and servant, have from the beginning down to the present day, maintained the assertion of the "unscrupulous attack" against which we "are called upon to defend our holiest possession, our Fatherland, our very hearths." The upholders of the war of defence, in so far as their theories of the state of defence (*Notwehr*) and of the self-defence (*Verteidigung*) of the Fatherland are directed against a really present aggressor, and not against entirely disinterested and

innocent neutrals,¹ stand on ground which is incontestable in law, only in the present case there is an entire absence of any basis in fact on which to base their theories. On the other hand, the preventionists who assign the intended attack to 1916 or 1917, and thus explain a present state of defence by reference to a future attack, the materialisation of which is, moreover, dependent on a thousand contingencies, not only fail to furnish any proof in the question of fact, but they forfeit every support in law, and they are thus defeated in both directions on the ground which they have themselves chosen.

ANALOGY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The charge has been brought against me, and will no doubt be renewed with regard to this present work, that I treat these political questions too much from the juridical standpoint of guilt and punishment. This charge is unfounded. If in passing judgment on the question of guilt the issue turned on the interests of States, on territorial or commercial expansion, on the increase of power or similar questions, it is obvious that investigations as to the greater or less degree of responsibility of the individual Powers would not be in place. When our candid imperialists of the school of Bernhardi—whom I may be allowed to call the “shameless” as opposed

¹That even the justifiable state of defence can never justify the violation of the rights of a third State, and that moreover one whose neutrality has been guaranteed, is a point on which there is not the slightest doubt in the modern theory of international law. In *J'accuse* (page 217 *et seq.*) I have explained at length this universally recognised principle and summarised it in the words: “The state of defence never excuses the violation of the rights of a third party. The state of defence against France could not excuse the violation of the rights of Belgium.” The only deviation from this *communis opinio* of the teachers of international law in all countries is to be found in the most recent doctrines of international law in Germany which, arising out of the war, have, with a few honourable exceptions, undertaken the ignominious task of covering with the mantle of scientific support even the most shameful breaches of law by Germany. In so doing they in no way advance the German cause in the world, but rather deprive German learning of the last remnant of respect.

to the "shame-faced" who shroud themselves in a preventionist's mantle—proclaim Germany's right to world-power and to conquest within and without Europe, to maritime and commercial supremacy, and who have recommended and still recommend war as the means to this end, it is clear that they cannot be attacked by juridical investigations on the question of the responsibility for the war. They deride the investigator to his face and gladly and fearlessly take the responsibility on the shoulders of Germany, provided only that success attends the armies of Germany. For military imperialism there are no considerations of law and of guilt; if we wish to reveal to its eyes the perniciousness and the fatuity, the dangerousness and the repugnance to civilisation of its efforts, the only method by which it can be got at is on political, economic and military grounds.

It is quite otherwise with those who uphold the war of defence and prevention. They take their stand on grounds of law, and they must therefore concede that their opponent also has the right to occupy the same ground. They unanimously maintain that they are waging a war of defence; the former against a present, the latter against a future aggressive war. The question whether this assertion as to an aggressive war is true or untrue is a question of fact, which must be determined in the same way and by the same methods as all questions of fact in judicial investigations. Witnesses and documents constitute the instruments of proof: it is from these that the correctness or incorrectness of the assertion of the war of defence (immediate or anticipated) must be deduced. The guiding lines on which this examination of evidence has to be conducted are determined on principle, just as the judicial examination of evidence must be conducted according to the legal standpoint. The result of the admission of evidence must be either a verdict of guilty or an acquittal, exactly as in judicial investigations.

There is thus a complete analogy between civil criminal procedure and the criminal investigation into the guilt of the European war from the point of view of international law. The imperialists rightly decline this investigation, since

in their view the provocation of war is not a crime but a right, and indeed a duty towards the future of Germany. The upholders of the war of defence and prevention cannot, however, decline the investigation into the question of guilt, since they state that the war was not a spontaneous undertaking of the German and Austrian Governments, but was an act of defence forced upon them, occasioned by the criminal contrivance of war by their opponents. All the speeches and the writings of German rulers, of the members of the German Government and of their Press, move on the same lines. I also stand on the same ground, the only difference being that I (a fact which may displease them) arrive in my investigations at a result which is absolutely opposed to theirs. They reproach me for my system of accusation because it leads to highly unwelcome results; they, however, unremittingly apply the same system of accusation to their opponents in the war, because they are still foolish enough to believe that they will thereby obtain a favourable verdict from the world.

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS FURNISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR GERMANY'S WILL FOR WAR

When people like Schiemann in their demonstrations lay weight exclusively on the historical antecedents, they might at least be expected to enter fully into the essential points in the antecedents. From the entirety of the antecedents I drew the conclusion:

That before the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand there was a *prima facie* case against Germany and Austria of having worked for the European war, Germany in order to give effect to her plans of world-power, Austria in order to secure and improve her position in the Balkans.

The main arguments which led me to this conclusion may be summarised under six groups:

1. The tendencies of our Pan-Germans and Imperialists, which I have proved from their speeches, their writings and their agitation conducted with increasing success throughout many years, under the leadership of Bernhardi and other generals and with the energetic encouragement of the German Crown Prince. As the attempt is being made to disown Bernhardi as a solitary phenomenon and to preserve silence as to the emphatic leadership of the German Crown Prince, I propose, as already observed, to give in a special section of this work a more copious selection from other speeches and writings of Pan-German and Imperialist politicians, and in this way to designate the guilty in such a way that evasion will be impossible. The war-aims now proclaimed by these circles, including enormous annexations, confiscations of the rights of neighbouring nations, transference of territory and of power, are in exact agreement with the aims pursued by them for decades, and thus serve to confirm the tendencies which they have proclaimed before the war and with regard to the war.

2. The immovable opposition shown by Germany and Austria to any organisation of the European community of States resting on law, which was more particularly made manifest in opposition to the efforts of the Entente Powers at the two Hague Conferences.

3. The same unremitting opposition to any agreement between the European States in general, or between Germany and England in particular, with regard to the suspension or diminution of armaments on land and sea.

4. The progress made, in advance of 'all other European States, in the constant increase and perfection of armaments by land and sea.

5. The constant diplomatic endeavour to lead England to an obligation of neutrality in continental conflicts—an effort which was still manifest at the last moment, shortly before the outbreak of war, in Bethmann's famous proposal for neutrality.

6. The attempt of Austria, documentarily proved by the revelations of Giolitti, to carry out a military attack on Serbia,

in the summer of 1913, and thus to risk the outbreak of a European war.

These six groups of facts cannot but lead every unprejudiced student of history to the conclusions drawn by me, and they have in fact led to these conclusions, not only in Europe, but in the whole world. This is one of the chief grounds for the antipathy mingled with fear which Germany encountered in the world, even before the present enormous guilt of the war; yet of these groups of facts there is either no mention in Schieman's pamphlets and in similar writings, or else these matters are there intentionally treated in so superficial a manner that the endeavour to avoid them is manifest. The Hague Conferences, the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding, Giolitti's revelations, the unprecedented combination of a first-rate land Power with a maritime Power which more and more approximated to the strength of England, etc., etc., all these groups of facts cited above, which are of the utmost importance for the question of responsibility so far as the more remote antecedents are concerned, are either passed over in silence by the defenders of German innocence, or else they are falsified or treated as bagatelles. Their one endeavour is to place in the limelight the "tendencies to war" alleged to have existed in the Entente countries, in order thereby to arouse the suspicion that the intention to make war emanated from that side. But the proof designed to create this suspicion also completely fails when the tendencies to war on the two sides are compared together according to their strength and their influence.

THAT IS WAR AS WE LOVE IT

Such historians devote not a single word to the literature and the agitation of the Pan-Germans, to their protection in high quarters, to the writings and actions of their exalted protector, who even now in the midst of this murderous war cannot refrain from giving expression on every suitable or unsuitable occasion to his former sympathies and his passion for war for war's sake. In no other country in the

world has the successor to the Throne put himself at the head of the war-party in so provocative a manner as in Germany; nowhere has the heir formed so open an intrigue against his own father and his originally peace-loving Government. The German Crown Prince, who did not withhold his applause from the heroic deeds of Lieutenant von Forstner against the lame cobbler in Zabern, who encouraged Colonel Reuter, after he had locked up the judges and the prosecutors in the Panduren-keller, to other similar achievements in the notorious telegram "Stick to it," this heir to an Imperial Throne, at a time when millions of corpses manure the battlefields of Europe, when millions of the maimed trail their misery through the world, when earth has become a hell and a vale of lamentation, when destitution, affliction and penury cry to heaven, is still clearly destitute of any feeling for the responsibility which rests on the heads of the instigators of such wholesale carnage. His sympathies are still what they were before the war. To the fallen Lieutenant von Forstner he devoted—ostentatiously, as a special mark of distinction!—a telegram and a magnificent laurel wreath; on August 22nd, 1915, he issued an enthusiastic war-appeal to his armies which must be preserved and perused to attain a right comprehension of the tendencies which have plunged Europe into this wholesale massacre. He can scarcely await in patience until this "war of moles" in the West shall have again given place to the "joyful life of the proud onslaught of battle"; in the uninterrupted joy of struggle he awaits the "day when the Kaiser will summon us to a new attack; out of the trenches and the dug-outs, into war as we love it! God grant that the day may soon appear!"

War as we love it! There we have exactly the spirit which speaks from the Crown Prince's writings quoted in my book. There we have the "spirit of the attack" of those whose task it is to command the attack, but who are not personally called upon to carry it through at the risk of life and limb. What can have been the feelings of the men of the Landwehr and the Landsturm when they read this fiery appeal of their army leader? What can they think about the "joyful life of the

proud onslaught of battle"? What can be their feelings when they are compelled to leave the trenches and the dug-outs and throw themselves against the devastating fire of the enemies' machine-guns, the bursting grenades, the shrapnel and the poisonous gases? What can they feel when their limbs are mangled, their eyes blinded, their intelligence clouded, when their faces and their bodies, their arms and legs, are torn by the deadly lead and iron? Will they also exclaim with their distinguished leader: "That is war as we love it"? Will they also pray to God that the day of the advance, the day when they will leave their trenches, may soon appear? No, they have all left at home wives and children, mothers and fathers, who in anxious torment, hour by hour and day by day, think of their dear ones out in the field. For these men who fight in the trenches it is death that is waiting. It is glory, however, that is awaiting the King's son, in the security of Headquarters. Behind the front the young hero of war is already in anticipation binding the laurel about his forehead. "France must again make your acquaintance, you conquerors of Longwy"—so ends the Army Order. Already he is intoxicating himself with the successes of coming days, with new battles and new conquests which will not cost him a drop of his noble blood and will not even scratch his carefully tended skin. But these men in the trenches who already die in mud and in dirt, in hunger and in cold, in the agony and the torture of death—it is something else than war that they love; they love peace, they love their homes, they love their dear ones, in whose arms they would rest themselves, soon and for ever, from the horrible task of murder.

* * * * *

This enthusiasm for war for the sake of war in high places, in very high places, and in the highest places of all and in their retinue of soldiers and Junkers, this characteristic of Prussian militarism, this special mental tendency, which is easily to be explained by reference to Prussian and Hohenzollern history but is in the modern world a unique phenomenon, it is this that we must recognise and brand as one of

the chief causes of this war. Imperialistic efforts, desire of expansion, colonial fanaticism, the interests of the manufacturers of armaments exist in other countries also, as causes of intrigues to war, weaker and less influential than in Prussian Germany, but nevertheless they exist and have also in a certain measure contributed to the friction and the tension between the European Great Powers. But even if I were willing to assume (what, in fact, I dispute) that these efforts in other countries also contemplated a relaxation of the existing tension by resort to war (even Bernhardi, as we know, does not ascribe to the Entente Powers the intention of seeking a solution by war), there would still remain the special factor of the Prussian love of war for the sake of war (*l'art pour l'art*) and this grave factor brings the scale, on which the guilt of the various nations is to be measured, to sink to the disadvantage of Prussia and Germany.

If anyone will refer me to expressions, similar to those which I have quoted from the writings of the German Crown Prince, spoken or written by a ruler or an heir to the Throne or a responsible member of the Government or even by a general in any other country; if anyone will refer me to an outburst of the madness of war in an authoritative position in any other nation similar to that contained in the Crown Prince's Army Order of August 22nd, 1915, "Into war as we love it!" I will acknowledge that my judgment on the Prussian war-intriguers is unjust. I ask anyone to show me in any other country an heir to the Throne past the age of thirty, and therefore presumably responsible for his words and actions, who has put forward the assertion: "The sympathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in the battles of antiquity, with the sturdy and the bold fighting nations," who in the manoeuvres feels and says with his comrade "Donnerwetter! if that were only the real thing," who expresses the "ardent wish" to be allowed to experience "the supreme moment of a soldier's happiness," when the King calls him to battle. If anyone will show me such an heir to the Throne, I will confess with shame that Prussian militarism is to be found not only in Prussia but that it also exists elsewhere in

the world. But so long as this proof is not furnished, I shall infer from this and countless other phenomena that Prussian militarism is a true peculiarity of Prussianism and that this peculiarity, alongside all the other tendencies in the direction of war, turned the scale in favour of a decision for war.

The proof of the guilt for the war which Schiemann and his comrades endeavour to deduce from the existence of tendencies to war in the Entente Powers thus collapses. In Prussian Germany these tendencies were stronger than elsewhere; but above all they found in the Prussian military and war-spirit a broad river-bed which opened the way to a devastating inundation of the whole of Europe. They found a fostering soil which existed nowhere else in Europe, on which the bacillus of war could develop unhindered and finally infect the world. Thus even from this restricted point of view of tendencies to war, history will and must pronounce a verdict of guilt on Prussia, and on Germany, which has unfortunately been Prussianised.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES

THE defenders of Germany pass with intentional cursorness over the Hague Conferences and the later Anglo-German negotiations, because, in dealing with these subjects, account must be taken not of newspaper-articles, currents and tendencies, but of facts which are documentarily proved and recorded, and which therefore render impossible any attempt to obscure or to falsify the situation.

In my book (pages 78-106) I purposely considered in detail the Hague Conferences and the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding and in so doing made constant reference to my authorities. These represent the few points in the more remote antecedents of this war regarding which we are documentarily informed and which are therefore adapted to a scientific investigation and determination of the truth. At the same time these are the points which afford an explanation of the increasing state of tension in Europe, of the fear of Germany and consequently of the formation of the Entente for protection against Germany. In an essay entitled "The German Professors and the War," (*Forum*, April, 1915), Walter Schücking rightly says:

Nowhere has there been any recognition of the fact that all the practical love of peace manifested by Germany throughout 44 years has been powerless to cancel in the public opinion of foreign countries the harm caused by the attitude of Germany towards the theoretical movement of making preparations for peace instead of war. Which of all the professors who have signed manifestoes and written war-pamphlets in any way knows how much Germany in this very question offended foreign Powers at the Hague Conferences? Which of the more recent historians in Germany has considered that it is at all necessary to

become acquainted with the course of events at the Peace Conferences at The Hague?

In these sentences Schücking hits the nail on the head. The attitude of Germany at the Hague Conferences and, as I would add, throughout the later Anglo-German negotiations, taken in conjunction with many other phenomena which have already been indicated, evoked and constantly increased the feeling of distrust towards Germany and the fear of Germany's war-intentions and aspirations to world-power; it was this that led to counter-coalitions and finally to a state of tension which Germany then undertook to end in her favour by deciding on war. It was on Germany's resistance that compulsory arbitration came to grief, and it was also because of Germany's resistance that any real consideration of the question of the suspension and the possible later reduction of armaments was made impossible. It is to Germany's resistance that we must attribute the fact that Europe at that time continued to be denied the blessings of an organisation resting on law, which was imperiously demanded by the development of the nations of the Old World, and which must sooner or later be realised. It is Germany that is responsible for the fact that the rage of armaments assumed the most enormous dimensions, which even in times of peace led the nations to the verge of exhaustion, and which made it appear to many that war was to be preferred to such a peace.

THOSE GUILTY OF THE PAST. THOSE GUILTY OF THE FUTURE

The guilt of this condition of affairs in the past rests exclusively on Germany and Austria. But for their resistance we would have had compulsory arbitration to decide international disputes ever since the beginning of this century, we would have had treaty agreements relating to armaments by land and by sea. Had the war ended with the military superiority of the Central Powers, this guilt in the past would

have become a guilt in the future also. There is no country and no Government which is so far, so immeasurably far, removed as Germany and Austria from pacifist ideas, to which after all the future belongs. Nowhere in the official and semi-official, or even in the Liberal and democratic, Press of Germany and Austria up to the war, was there so much as any serious discussion of the idea of an organisation of the European community of nations resting on law, which was bound to have as a logical conclusion an agreement as to armaments.¹ All the authoritative circles, the Government, the Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Liberals, indeed, a part of the Social-Patriots still occupy the old ground of the assurance of power, of "real" guarantees, of the military and economic security of Germany. No one in these circles has even the remotest idea that in future the question

¹The most recent specious conversion of the Chancellor to pacifism (November, 1916) is discussed, as already observed, in a later chapter "Bethmann the Pacifist" (section "War-Aims"), where I show the true value to be attached to this sudden "illumination" of the German statesman, which is to be attributed to necessity and not to his own bent.

How far at the time when I am writing this footnote (beginning of 1917), the Liberals of the Left are in Germany still removed from pacifist ideas and are immured within the narrow horizon of the one-sided security of Germany's power, appears from the discussions and resolutions of the recent meeting of the Progressive Popular party (*fortschrittliche Volkspartei*) for Greater Berlin. In his speech Dr. Wiemer, the leader of this party which stands on the extreme left wing of German Liberalism, expressly appealed to the Chancellor's speech of December 9th, 1915, and emphasised anew that Germany must obtain "political, military and economic security" in order that "Belgium might not again be used by England and France as a territory for deploying against Germany." The resolution, unanimously adopted in the presence of the most eminent leaders of the party, demands a peace "which will afford the empire security for the future by military and economic measures as well as by the necessary extensions of territory." Neither in the proceedings nor in the resolutions of the meeting of the party was there so much as a word said of a guarantee of all nations by an organisation resting on law. It is in this form that German pacifism on the extreme Left appears. From this it is possible to imagine what ideas are still prevalent with regard to these "Utopias" in the minds of all the parties on the right, that is to say the great majority of German representatives.

will be not that of a German but of a European peace, and that such a peace cannot be created by rendering secure the position of Germany—by which the initiated naturally understand a policy of annexation—but only by securing all European nations against war, oppression and a preponderance of power. However the frontiers within and without Europe may be determined, however the countries and the nations may be partitioned by adding here and subtracting there, whatever may be the future grouping into Alliances and Ententes, Europe will be irretrievably lost, it will again be torn by dissension, by military preparations, and by wars, in civilisation and in industry it will be led to the brink of the precipice and become a slave of America destined to absorb all the wealth of the world, if out of the groups one great group is not formed, a whole resting on a basis of law with the absolute exclusion of any solution of a conflict by war, and the creation of the necessary guarantees for this order of law.

It would take us too far to enter more fully at this point into the subject of the future configuration of Europe. We shall return to this in a special section. Anyone who follows what has hitherto been the German custom and regards as utopian and impracticable these ideas as to the future should peruse the pacifist literature as to the law of nations, which has, even in the course of this war, been greatly enriched; he will then be convinced that it is a substantially easier task to create a structure resting on international law than it was in its time to create the reign of law within the State. The abolition of club-law and of the private right to make war in Germany and in other countries, which deprived countless cities and lords of the possibility of asserting by their own arms their so-called rights, was accompanied by greater difficulties and greater apparent sacrifices for individuals than would be to-day the creation of an organisation resting on law among the few States which have to be considered so far as conflicts in war are concerned, and which, as a result of the present war, the most terrible of all times, must all have been convinced that it is only in the organised guaran-

tee of all against future wars that the well-being of their peoples and of humanity is to be found.

These thoughts already fill the whole civilised world outside the German and Austrian frontier-posts, and after the conclusion of the war they will struggle with renewed energy to assume actual shape; had the Central Powers been in a position to dictate peace, they would, however, never have secured realisation. The guilt in the past would have become a guilt in the future as well, and only the occurrence of new and unforeseen events, of revolutionary movements among the masses would have compelled a lawfully ordered peace among the nations. The opposition of the Central Powers to the ordered peace of the nations in the past provoked the world-war; had they conquered, their opposition to an order of peace in the future would have involved the world-revolution as a consequence.

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All these questions as to the past and the future are of course of no interest to a Schiemann or to people like him. Over the Hague Conferences and the Anglo-German negotiations, the most important point in my Antecedents of the Crime, the "slanderer" passes lightly in a few lines. Regarding the first Hague Conference, he reports nothing more than the alleged "political antecedents of the Russian Conference proposal." For him it is, of course, proved that the Tsar Nicholas called a Conference, not with the object of giving Europe a protective organisation against war and of putting an end to the devastating competition in armaments," but solely in order "to avoid a war for which Russia knew she was not prepared"—as we are led to believe a war with England.¹ Here, again, we meet the familiar tactics of the "slanderer": the Russian proposal was not seriously intended, but was only a trick to serve Russian interests.

In view of this unexampled falsification no other course remains open to me than to refer to the actual occurrences at the first Hague Conference, to the records and the deci-

¹ *Slanderer*, page 10.

sions of that Conference, and to the comprehensive literature which has gathered round that event of world-historical importance. In my book I have referred to Fried's *Handbook of the Peace Movement* (Vol. I., page 204), and the attention of those who feel in these vital questions for the nations the interest which they merit, may be invited to the copious literature which is cited in Fried's *Handbook* (Vol. II., page 437 *et seq.*). My account of the events at this conference is in every word in agreement with the truth, and is everywhere confirmed by the literature bearing on the subject and the official minutes approved by all the States concerned. Amongst countless other books on the first Hague Conference there is a large work in two volumes by Christian Meurer. Anyone who is more interested in the accessories and the sidelights of the Conference than in the material contents of its deliberations should read the *Autobiography* of Andrew D. White, formerly American Ambassador in Berlin. He will there find very interesting disclosures, especially with regard to the attitude of Germany and her delegates on the stage and behind the scenes of the Conference. The most extensive account in the German language of the labours of the second Hague Conference is to be found in the distinguished work of Otfried Nippold: *The Second Hague Peace Conference*. I will also mention the work on a large scale written by Walter Schücking, *The Union of States (Staatenverband) of the Hague Conferences*, in which the services rendered by the pacifist movement in the development of international law is frankly recognised and the further enlargement of the basis of a Union of States created by the Hague Conferences is represented as the aim of European development.

THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

The following paragraphs contain only a few observations on certain points supplementary to the account which is given in *J'accuse* of the occurrences at The Hague; they serve to characterise with unusual lucidity the behaviour of the Cen-

tral Powers on the one side and of the Entente Powers on the other.

Many defenders of the German Government have endeavoured to excuse the behaviour of Germany at The Hague by asserting that the point at issue is rather one of "formal maladroitness" and of "purely theoretical scruples" on the part of Germany. It is stated that Germany's behaviour at The Hague was in substance entirely justified, and that it was only maladroit in form. To these apologists the attitude assumed by Germany, not only against international arbitration but also against the limitation of armaments, appears justified in substance. This is based on the familiar assertion, which is constantly advanced by all people of this kidney, that all such restrictions on the freedom of movement, of development, and of armaments can be advantageous only to the nations which are sated and which rest on great inherited possessions, but that they can only hinder young and aspiring nations in their future development. For these worshippers of force, freedom of development is equivalent to freedom to murder, submission to legal decisions is equivalent to the suppression of the personality of the State, restriction of armaments—which after all is equally in the interests of all and can damnify no party to the advantage of others—is equivalent to the renunciation of political and economic advancement. How extensively this narrow mode of thought entangles the intellectual classes of Germany is again proved by Prince Bülow's most recent volume *Imperial Germany*,¹ which, even at this date, accurately reflects the guiding lines along which Bülow's policy moved in so fatal a manner in relation to the aspirations of The Hague. With consummate stupidity this class of people ask the question: "Is it supposed that arbitration can decide the question whether one nation is ripe to withdraw from the stage of the world's history, and whether another should take its place?" What does this amount to but to declare war in perpetuity and to hand over all future competitive struggles

¹ *Deutsche Politik*. [English translation: *Imperial Germany*. Cassell & Co.]

between civilised nations in culture and economic life to the big guns, the poisonous gases, the mine-throwers and the submarine torpedoes? That the greater efficiency of a nation makes itself felt, not on the fields of battle, but in every domain of peaceful human activity and throws into the lap of the more efficient nation—whether it is from the military point of view the more powerful or not—the fruits of its industry and of its gifts, is an obvious truth, confirmed by the present position in the world of many small and powerless States, although, of course, it has not yet dawned on such German politicians of Powers. For them political and military power is still equivalent to industrial and cultural authority. They still adhere to views which may perhaps have been justified some hundreds of years ago, but have to-day been long outstripped by the world-wide interconnection of intellectual and economic interests. When those who on principle are fanatics for war produce such mediæval views, they have at least the advantage of being consistent; they enthuse for the cure of blood and iron in itself, and at the same time make use of it as a means to the attainment of their political aims of power. When, however, modern statesmen, profound philosophers, when even men who call themselves Liberals and the friends of peace decline arbitration and a restriction of armaments, because they hamper aspiring nations in their freedom of development and favour other nations which “are in a position to live on the rents from their inherited possessions”—then we reach the summit of narrow-mindedness and inconsistency. For the freedom of movement which these “friends of peace” preach means nothing else than freedom for war.

But let us return to the Hague Conferences. It is only the *form* of Germany's procedure which is censured by these forbearing German critics, not its substance. I must decline once again to explain for the sake of these people all that I have already expounded in my book and in this work with regard to the close connection which exists between the present war on the one hand and the Hague Conferences and the

subsequent Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding on the other. The question was not one of "formal maladroitness" or "purely theoretical scruples" when Germany offered the most stubborn resistance to the most important aims of the Hague Conferences, to the establishment of an international court of arbitration, to the compulsory obligation of all States that might be parties to the treaty to submit to this court at least certain restricted categories of disputes, and to the discussion of a general and proportional restriction of armaments, if only in the form of a temporary suspension, and when Germany by this resistance repeatedly came within an ace of imperilling the whole work of the Conference. The question involved was a divergence in principle between the views of the great majority of the States represented at The Hague and those of the small groups consisting of Germany and her allies—the same divergence between the Prussian-Hohenzollern ideas of power and the democratic West-European ideas of law which from time immemorial had emerged in an increasingly acute form in all discussions on the future configuration of the European community of nations. This antithesis which Choate, the representative of the United States at the second Hague Conference (and formerly American Ambassador in London), once described to Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein as "the antithesis between good faith and confidence in the relations between the nations and the application of force"—this antithesis between the Prussian-feudal-mediæval and the West-European-democratic-modern points of view was not made manifest merely at the Hague Conferences; it has existed for half a century, ever since the time when Bismarck translated into action his policy of blood and iron, and after three sanguinary wars concluded a peace resting on force which was bound to engender new wars. A genius like Bismarck was no doubt strong enough to prevent the logical consequences flowing from his political theories and actions, so long as these consequences appeared to him undesirable. He had the skill so to control the European game of chess that a dangerous combination of powerful opponents could not be formed or

could at any rate be postponed. His weak followers, on the other hand, could not exorcise the spirits which he had conjured up, the spirits of rising resistance, of a hostile union for defence, which any policy of force at home as well as abroad could not fail to provoke. What could not be dangerous to him and to the ship of State so long as he steered it, drove the vessel, under the unskilful pilotage of his untalented and supine followers, to the abyss and caused the stormy waves of a European deluge to break over the unfortunate passenger, the German people.

It is to Bismarck and his work that we must trace the ideas which even after his departure have controlled German policy and German political and historical science, which has degraded itself to be the handmaiden of this policy. The theoretical and practical defenders of the uncontrolled independence of Germany in her foreign policy, in the choice and the limitation of the military means for its execution, who in every international regulation resting on law, even in its mildest form, in every restriction of armaments, see an invasion of sovereignty and of the freedom of development of the German Empire aspiring to a position of world-power—these defenders who sit on imperial and royal thrones, in professorial chairs, in pulpits and in the club-rooms are all followers and descendants of the seed of Bismarck, even if no faint reflection of his spirit has ever fallen upon their souls.

* * * * *

The "theoretical scruples" of the German Government with regard to the aspirations of The Hague had the very tangible practical basis that Germany desired to retain an absolutely free hand as to the line of action to be adopted in all international disputes and so to extend and increase her armaments as seemed good to her, in order that she might at any time be in a position to attain her political aims by force of arms. She did not desire to be bound in any way, either in a political or in a military sense. She desired to be at liberty to provoke a war how, where, when, and on

what occasion might appear expedient to her. It was according to this prescription that Germany governed her behaviour at the Hague Conferences as well as on the later occasion of the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding. It was according to this prescription that she crowned her work by provoking the European War at the very moment that appeared most favourable to her. But even this action does not represent the final step in the execution of the system. If matters had gone according to Germany's desire, the peace which was to follow the war would have borne the same distinguishing features as the so-called state of peace which preceded the war. "Realpolitik," that is to say, the extension and the increase of Germany's power based on military force and political suppression, the selfish pursuit of selfish ends, the rejection, indeed the contempt, of these Utopias, which alone can guarantee an enduring state of peace and friendship between the European nations—these would have represented the guiding-line of Germany's policy as a conqueror, as they have been for a generation the guiding-line of Germany's "peace" policy.

These governing principles of Prussian-German policy are everywhere to be encountered, whenever a German writes to-day of German war-aims, if we except the few real Pacifists and Socialists, whose voices, however, resound in the German wilderness without an answering echo. These are the ideas which governed Germany's action at The Hague; indeed on that occasion, when the representatives of various points of view sat together around the council table, the deep inner antithesis which divides Prussianism and Hohenzollernism from West European democracy and the pacifist development of international law which West European democracy advocated, emerged more sharply than at any other time. It has hitherto occurred to no one, least of all to the Prussian-German spokesmen themselves, to deny this antithesis. On the contrary, they were and are proud that they had no part in this "chatter about peace and understanding among the nations," that they rely on their good

sword and that they leave "vapourers about humanity" to themselves and to their "Utopias."¹

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An extraordinarily characteristic example of German national psychology in this direction is furnished by an appeal of certain professors in the University of Berlin which has just appeared (end of July, 1916) in celebration of the second anniversary of the war, over the signature of seven distinguished names (including Giercke, Kahl, Meyer, Wagner, and Wilamowitz-Möllendorff). This appeal is worthy of being placed beside the celebrated manifesto of the intellectuals which appeared at the beginning of the war. The whole spectrum of German deceit about the war, or, if it is preferred, of German delusion about the war, radiates from these illumined minds. Neither on the question of the origin of the war nor on that of the aims of the war do these learned gentlemen produce any single thought which rises above the lowest Pan-German level. "It is the lust of revenge, the greed of land, the commercial envy nourished by their neighbours which have forced the German people to take up arms to save themselves from the mutilation and dismemberment that had been planned." No one who still dares to write in this manner can possibly have cast even a cursory glance into the diplomatic documents relating to the immediate antecedents of the war and must be in complete ignorance regarding the clear and unambiguous utterances of the Entente statesmen, who have rejected every idea of a dismemberment of Germany (as I shall show in more detail in the section on War-Aims):

We have not taken the sword in our hands—so we read in the most recent professorial appeal—for purposes of conquest. Now

¹ These sentences, written in the summer of 1916, are still in essential matters valid to-day. It is no doubt true that an increasing interest in a *European* peace is now making itself felt after the second year of war with the increasing conviction in Germany that they will not be in a position to dictate the desired *German* peace. This late and enforced birth of pacifism by *force majeure*, which I treat at length in a later chapter, in no way affects the correctness of the above observations.

that we have been compelled to draw the sword, we neither will, can, nor may return it to the sheath, until we have gained assurance of a peace which even the enemy will be compelled to observe. That, however, is not to be attained without an increase in our power, without an extension of the sphere within which our will is decisive with regard to war and peace. For this purpose we require unfailing pledges, real guarantees. On this point only one view is held among all Germans.

Here we have once more the typical expression of the peace resting on force and conquest, such as has always been present to the minds of all the great usurpers in history, but which has always been wrecked on the natural impulse of the nations to freedom and independence. Further comment on this professorial megalomania is superfluous. These most eminent teachers of politics, of international law, of history and economics have obviously never heard even from afar off the music of pacifist ideas. For them the only governing point of view for the future is still to be found in the increase of Germany's power for the purpose of obtaining "security against future attacks." It is consequently self-evident that the premise that we were in fact attacked in 1914 is and must be maintained. The fact that an enduring peace for all European nations, including Germany, can never be guaranteed by increasing the power of one at the expense of the others, but that on the contrary such an increase of power must be the sure source of new wars, is a truth which has long ago been familiar to every thinking workman but has hitherto failed to penetrate into the auditoria of the Universities of Germany.

GERMANY AGAINST ARBITRATION. WHITE'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

It is well known that at the first Hague Conference twenty-six States were represented and at the second forty-four, among which were included all the States of South America, several Asiatic States and, of course, all the European States.

The representatives of all these great and small States saw with their own eyes and heard with their own ears how Germany and Austria, followed by their faithful Turkey, stubbornly resisted every decisive step in the direction of the diminution of the dangers of war and the alleviation of the state of armed peace. In connection with this subject it is interesting to recall the memoranda already mentioned written by White, the leading American representative at the first Conference, who was at the time American Ambassador in Berlin. White always speaks of Germany, and particularly of the German Emperor, with great admiration and respect but, on the other hand, he was greatly grieved by the German resistance to the establishment of international arbitration—which was the darling child of the American diplomatist. He tells us in quite an affecting manner how he was obliged to combat, by all the means of persuasion, conviction and partial compliance, the deep disinclination entertained on principle by the Emperor William and his leading representative at The Hague, Count Münster, towards the whole idea of arbitration, in order that he might gain in the end Germany's concurrence at any rate in the establishment of the tribunal.

To my great regret—says White, speaking of a conversation with Count Münster—I found him entirely opposed to it, or, at least, entirely opposed to any well-developed plan (of arbitration). He did not say that he would oppose a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she can mobilise her army in ten days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany (White, *Autobiography*, Vol. II., page 265).

We were all glad to find, upon the arrival of the *London Times*, that our arbitration project seemed to be receiving extensive approval, and various telegrams from America during the day indicated the same thing. It looks more and more as if we

are to accomplish something. The only thing in sight calculated to throw a cloud over the future is the attitude of the German Press against the whole business here; the most virulent in its attacks being the high Lutheran conservative—and religious!—journal in Berlin, the *Kreuzzeitung* (Vol. II., page 286).

At six o'clock Dr. Holls, who represents us upon the sub-committee on arbitration, came in with most discouraging news. It now appears that the German Emperor is determined to oppose the whole scheme of arbitration, and will have nothing to do with any plan for a regular tribunal, whether as given in the British or the American scheme. This news comes from various sources, and is confirmed by the fact that, in the sub-committee, one of the German delegates, Professor Zorn of Königsberg, who had become very earnest in behalf of arbitration, now says that he may not be able to vote for it. There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies—the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey and Roumania—leading them to oppose it (Vol. II., pages 293, 294).

He (Münster) is more than ever opposed to arbitration, and declares that, in view of the original Russian programme . . . we have no right to take it up at all, since it was not mentioned. He was decidedly pessimistic regarding the continuance of the sessions. . . . He now came out, as he did the day before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, declaring it a "humbug," and that we had no right to consider it, since it was not mentioned in the first proposals from Russia, etc., etc. (Vol. II., pages 296, 297).

The American expresses his surprises on this occasion that Count Münster "had been selected by the Emperor to be chief of the German mission at The Hague just because of his common-sense"; he finds consolation, however, for Münster's unfavourable judgment regarding arbitration in the fact that the German Ambassador had at the same time declared that telegraphs and telephones, bacteria and microbes were also "all a modern humbug." White is of the opinion that this most eminent representative of German diplomacy of the time was "saturated with the ideas of fifty years ago."

In his diary of June 13th White again reports the arrival of disquieting news from Germany:—

There seems no longer any doubt that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration, and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference, and that he will insist on his main allies, Austria and Italy, going with him. . . . I had learned from a high imperial official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor considered arbitration as derogatory to his sovereignty, and I was also well aware, from his conversation, that he was by no means in love with the Conference idea. . . . There seems danger of a catastrophe. Those of us who are faithful to arbitration plans will go on and do the best we can; but there is no telling what stumbling-blocks Germany and her allies may put in our way. . . . Some days since I said to a leading diplomatist here, "The Ministers of the German Emperor ought to tell him that, should he oppose arbitration, there will be concentrated upon him an amount of hatred which no Minister ought to allow a sovereign to incur." To this he answered, "That is true; but there is not a Minister in Germany who dares tell him."

In his conversations with the American Ambassador, Count Münster was constantly parading his special hobby that international difficulties could be much better settled by "trained diplomatists" than by "entrusting them to arbitration by men inexperienced in international affairs, who really cannot be unprejudiced or uninfluenced" (page 302). The American on the other hand did not fail to impress seriously on the Ambassador that the counsellors of the German Emperor "ought never to allow their young sovereign to be exposed to the mass of hatred, obloquy and opposition which would converge upon him from all nations in case he became known to the whole world as the sovereign who had broken down the conference and brought to naught the plan of arbitration." In conversations lasting for hours the American Ambassador sought to convince the representative of Germany that the German Emperor would be regarded as "the enemy of all nations" if Germany refused to abandon her resistance to the establishment of a court of arbitration.

The American then "took up an argument, which, it is

understood, has had much influence with the Emperor—namely, that arbitration must be in derogation of his sovereignty—and asked, ‘How can any such derogation be possible? Your sovereign would submit only such questions to the arbitration tribunal as he thought best; and, more than all that you have already committed yourselves to the principle. You are aware that Bismarck submitted the question of the Caroline Islands for arbitration to the Pope.’” . . . (Vol. II., page 305.)

In spite of all the counter-efforts made by White, who had also moved other members of the Congress to exercise a favourable influence on the Berlin Cabinet, an official communication from the German Government was received by Count Münster in the middle of June, “in which, the German Government, which, of course, means the Emperor, had strongly and finally declared against everything like an arbitration tribunal” (page 308). This communication fell like a bomb in the Conference, and universally awakened the apprehension that the work of the Conference in its most important point, the question of arbitration, was doomed to failure. In consequence of renewed efforts addressed to Count Münster, the German delegate resolved to send Professor Zorn to Berlin to obtain new instructions. White sent another American delegate, Dr. Holls, to the German capital in Zorn’s company and entrusted to him a long private letter addressed to Herr von Bülow, who was then Foreign Secretary, extending to many pages, in which all the grave grounds against Germany’s negative attitude were once more adduced and it was clearly indicated that the bitterest hatred would break out against the German Empire throughout the whole civilised world, should Germany finally place herself in the way of this decisive step forward in the relations between the nations.

In any case, whether failure or success may come, the Emperor of Russia will be hailed in all parts of the world as a deliverer and, virtually, as a saint, while there will be a widespread outburst of hatred against the German Emperor. . . . Should his

advisers permit so noble and so gifted a sovereign to incur this political storm of obloquy, this convergence of hatred upon him? Should a ruler of such noble ambitions and such admirable powers be exposed to this? I fully believe that he should not, and that his advisers should beg him not to place himself before the world as the antagonist of a plan to which millions upon millions in all parts of the world are devoted. (White's letter to von Bülow of June 16th, 1899.)

White also refutes the familiar military objection against arbitration by advancing reasons which are not without interest for the question of guilt to-day: "It has also been said that arbitration proceedings would give the enemies of Germany time to put themselves in readiness for war; but if this be feared in any emergency the Emperor and his Government are always free to mobilise the German army at once." It will be seen that the same reasonable objection which the Tsar advanced in his last telegram of the afternoon of August 1st against an immediate declaration of war and in favour of further negotiations for an understanding, is in these words put forward against the military reasons which are generally adduced for striking at once without the delay of negotiations: namely, that there should be mobilisation without fighting. Had this principle, which must be recognised as correct by every reasonable man and by everyone who is conscious of his enormous responsibility, been followed on August 1st, and had the proposal made by the Tsar three days previously for a decision by the Hague Tribunal been simultaneously accepted, there would to-day have been no European War.

The excitement caused in The Hague in these days—in June, 1899—by reason of Germany's attitude was at the time so great that voices were heard suggesting that, if the German Government should refuse to assume the standpoint of the idea of arbitration, the negotiations should be continued without Germany, and that they should be brought to a conclusion at any rate among the Powers which concurred.

At last, in consequence of the personal intervention of Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Chancellor, and in conse-

quence of the report of Professor Zorn and the influence of the American delegate, Dr. Holls, the German Government condescended to place no obstacle in the way of the principle of establishing a permanent court of arbitration at The Hague, but they made their concurrence conditional on the deletion of Article 10 of the existing draft, which was intended to make the convocation of the Tribunal obligatory in a number of less important cases. The desire so expressed by Germany without doubt deprived the whole work of the Hague Conference of a part of its world-historical importance in principle—a point on which none of the other participants in the Conference were in any doubt, as can be read in White and in all the commentaries—yet nevertheless Germany's desire was acquiesced in, that at least the Tribunal itself might be safely brought into harbour.

At the official celebration of the conclusion of the Congress the unfortunate Count Münster, as president of the German delegation, had to deliver a speech which, according to White's humorous account, must have been pain and grief to him: "for he was obliged to speak respectfully, in the first place of the Conference, which for some weeks he had affected to despise; and, secondly, of arbitration and the other measures proposed, which, at least during all the first part of the Conference, he had denounced as a trick and a humbug; and, finally, he had to speak respectfully of M. de Staal (the President of the Conference) to whom he has steadily shown decided dislike!"

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY. "GOOD SERVICES" AND MEDIATION

In addition to the question of arbitration, the first Hague Conference had also, in accordance with the proposals laid before it, to devote its attention to the establishment of international commissions of inquiry for the determination of disputed facts, and further to the offer of good services or of mediation on the part of disinterested Powers. In these questions also the German Government—acting, of course,

throughout in concert with the Austrian Government, but without the support of the Italian Government which co-operated with the Western Powers—formed the constant obstacle to all progress. For example, in the draft relating to good services and mediation there appeared, in anticipation of the German disinclination to any mediatory activity, the attenuating words that resort was only to be had to the good services and the mediation of disinterested Powers in so far as circumstances should permit (*en tant que les circonstances l'admettraient*). Since this addition made the clause entirely illusory and frustrated its purpose of making the offer of good services possible in every case and of thus preventing wars, the delegates of Holland and Belgium, and Count Nigra, the delegate of Italy, with even greater emphasis, proposed in the meeting of the Committee dealing with this subject that this addition should be deleted. Professor Zorn, the German delegate, at once rose and demanded the retention of the original text, "in order to leave to the Powers concerned their full freedom of decision; the new version was unacceptable." After various attempts at mediation in the Committee, the Conference had finally to decide on approving the attenuating clause demanded by the German delegate.

The importance which such resolutions might have had for the destiny of the world, according as their scope was extended or restricted, has been shown in the summer of 1914 when Austria and Germany declined every mediatory action on the part of third Powers—presumably because they were of the opinion that "the circumstances did not permit of mediation." Had it then been confirmed in The Hague that a general obligation should be imposed on Powers in dispute to accept the mediation of third parties, Germany and Austria might no doubt have declared that this treaty also was a scrap of paper, but in so doing they would have placed themselves even more grossly and flagrantly in the wrong towards the contracting Powers of The Hague and towards the world than is already the case.

COUR PERMANENTE D'ARBITRAGE

In another important point connected with the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration there is similarly revealed the systematic resistance offered by Germany to all clauses, which would have rendered possible a really effective intervention of the new Institution on the emergence of the danger of war. Léon Bourgeois, the President of the French delegation, in a remarkable speech in the Committee of which he was President, proposed that the permanent bureau of the court of arbitration should be entrusted with the duty and the power of taking a certain initiative in cases of conflict and of reminding the Powers which were the parties to a dispute of the possibility of settling the dispute by the Hague Tribunal. Bourgeois rightly pointed out that very frequently there might be a failure to summon the tribunal because neither Power would be willing to be the first to take this step, owing to the fear of being taxed with weakness in their own country and throughout the world. These difficulties would be overcome if the right and the duty of taking such an initiative were conferred on the bureau of the Tribunal itself:

To put one of the mighty machines in motion—so said the French Minister—by which modern science transforms the world, it is sufficient to lay a finger on a point of contact; but there must nevertheless be some one whose task it is to carry out this simple motion. The French delegation is of the opinion that the institution, to which this international mandate would be entrusted, would be called upon to play a distinguished and beneficial *rôle* in history.

Other delegates also expressed themselves in the same sense. It was only Professor Zorn, the representative of Germany, who, it may be observed, at the time produced in the Conference the universal impression that he alone among the German delegates was favourably disposed to the tendencies of the Conference and was only compelled to

offer resistance on the instructions of his Government—it was only Dr. Zorn who spoke not only against the proposed initiative, but also against the establishment of a permanent tribunal, an attitude which as I have more fully explained above was revised by Germany at a later date. In this earlier stage Zorn endeavoured in every way to replace the “Cour d’Arbitrage permanente” by a “Cour d’Arbitrage occasionelle.” In spite of the most urgent persuasion, and indeed supplication on the part of Count Nigra, the Italian representative, the German delegate insisted that he must refuse in the name of his Government the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration, and the only concession to which he brought himself was that, notwithstanding this refusal on principle, he would not withdraw from the further work of the Committee.

Afterwards, when matters developed further, after Zorn’s journey to Berlin, and the consent of the German Government was given to the Institution as such, there began—it would be absurd if it were not so entirely miserable—a verbal dispute as to the designation of the Court of Arbitration. The proposed title “Tribunal permanent d’Arbitrage” appeared to the German delegation to savour too much of legal compulsion and of a binding decision; Dr. Zorn therefore proposed that “Cour” should be substituted for Tribunal and “des arbitres” for “d’arbitrage,” a proposal which would again, so to speak, have at once demolished the new institution, and falsified its meaning and purpose. In the end it was agreed that the designation should be “Cour permanente d’Arbitrage.”

THE “INITIATIVE” OF THE HAGUE BUREAU

Now, however, when the child of grief had at last after painful travail been brought into the world the question before the Conference was to procure for it at any rate as great a capacity for life as was possible. As we have seen, the compulsory obligation of the contracting Powers to summon the tribunal, if only in minor disputes, had been re-

moved on Germany's demand. It was therefore all the more important that on the menace of a conflict the permanent bureau of the Tribunal should be given at least the possibility of reminding the parties in dispute of its existence, and of relieving them of the "painful necessity" of taking the first step towards an amicable settlement—painful, I say, according to the prejudices which unfortunately still prevail with regard to political honour and prestige and other similar mediæval conceptions which may possess some authority in governing the habits of rowdy students, but ought not to be admitted in considering the interests of modern great States.

The Frenchmen, Léon Bourgeois and d'Estournelles de Constant, accordingly took up with renewed energy the earlier proposal that an initiative should be entrusted to the Hague Bureau, and in particular the latter delegate, the pacifist senator who is so honourably known, threw himself with special zeal into the idea of the initiative:

We require an automatic procedure which will oblige the Powers in dispute to declare themselves before public opinion and before their Parliaments either for or against a decision by arbitration; if we devise machinery of this nature, and indicate precisely the person whose duty it is to dispatch the letter of invitation, the situation will be fundamentally altered. It will then be as difficult for a Government to refuse a decision by arbitration as it has hitherto been to accept it in serious cases.

When Dr. Zorn pointed out the difficulties in the way of giving practical effect to such an initiative, d'Estournelles de Constant drafted a resolution of the Conference, which entrusted to the General Secretary of the Bureau of the Tribunal the duty of sending a communication in similar terms to the representatives at the Dutch Court of the parties to the dispute, in which he placed himself and the Bureau at their disposal with a view to further steps being taken. D'Estournelles even went so far as to draft the text of such a letter, and I think it might be of interest to reproduce here a translation of this draft in order to illustrate on the one

side the ingenious zeal of the Frenchmen and on the other the short-sighted opposition of the Germans:

"SIR,—Whereas the signatory Powers to the General Hague Convention expressly pledged themselves to leave nothing undone to bring about a pacific solution of conflicts which might break out between two or more of them, and whereas these Powers by Article 10 of the said Act entrusted to the general secretary of the international Bureau the duty of reminding the interested parties at a given moment of the above pledge, I have the honour to inform you that I am at your service for the purpose of convoking the permanent court of arbitration, should your Government consider it incumbent upon them to communicate to me their intentions in this respect, simultaneously with the names of the arbitrators selected."

This proposal of the French delegate which was practical, easy of execution and full of the promise of success, was received with great applause in the Committee. It was only the hapless Dr. Zorn, the man whose line of action was prescribed, who stated, after the manner of German statesmen in all progressive matters, that while in principle he was in favour of the initiative-proposal, he foresaw an insuperable difficulty in the selection of the proper person for the secretaryship, an office to which so great a moral authority was to be attached. The French proposal was wrecked on Germany's opposition, and thus it happened that in the summer of 1914 the Bureau of the Hague Tribunal, which had been in existence for fifteen years, could not move and was unable to give any sign of its existence, notwithstanding the Serbian and the Russian proposal for a decision by arbitration.

Characteristic incidents of a similar nature, fatal for the future development of Europe, took place at every stage during the first and second Hague Conferences. It would lead us too far to consider all these details here. I can only refer to the minutes of the Conferences and to the critical literature on the subject. The reader who desires a short compilation of the relevant facts bearing on our present dis-

cussion should refer to the excellent little volume by the Geneva Professor, Edgard Milhaud, *Du droit de la force à la force du droit* (Atar, Geneva, 1915) to which, as I desire gratefully to acknowledge, I am much indebted in this section of my work.

PROFESSOR ZORN AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE HAGUE

Professor Philipp Zorn, the German delegate at the first Hague Conference, published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of January 14th, 1917, a long reply to a Christmas letter of the French Senator d'Estournelles de Constant which is very interesting from the two points of view of the origin and of the aims of the war.

1. Herr Zorn still continues to adopt the official German attitude of the war of defence. He is in entire agreement with the French pacifist in repudiating the idea of the preventive war. The war of defence he bases on the thesis "that the Russian Tsar is the author of the war." To prove this, he gives the following summary of the facts which brought about the war—a summary which is so characteristic of the profundity of German professors in their investigations into the immediate origin of the war that I regard it as of sufficient interest to reproduce it textually here:

The Austrian successor and his consort were murdered in Serajevo by Serbian cut-throats with the previous knowledge of the Serbian Government. For this hideous crime, which represented the culminating point of a long-continued process of undermining the dignity of the Austro-Hungarian State on the part of Serbia, Austria-Hungary demanded satisfaction, which no doubt was far-reaching as the greatness of the crime demanded, but which violated neither the territorial existence nor the sovereignty of Serbia. Serbia was prepared to give this satisfaction but was prevented from doing so by Russia. Germany urged in Vienna for an immediate understanding with Russia by stating that she would not allow herself to be plunged in a world-war on account of Serbian affairs. While these negotiations were still pending, Russia mobilised her whole army, and

this mobilisation, as had already been announced to the army in a secret army-order in 1912,¹ meant war with Germany.

It is not necessary that I should submit to detailed criticism this historical résumé of the celebrated German teacher of international law. My various volumes furnish such a criticism at great length, and at the same time show the method by which independent inquirers who neither belong to the guild of Professors nor are otherwise blessed with titles of honour, must treat and explain the difficult and complicated historical material bearing on this subject. For a German professor the matter assumes so simple an aspect that he believes that he can dispose of it in twenty lines. His short summary which narrates almost in a telegraphic style of composition, certain events arbitrarily selected from the history of the origin of the war, which was brief in the length of time covered but infinitely long in its substance, reminds me of the parody of Goethe's Erl-King, which reproduces the famous poem in telegraphic abbreviation:

Father and child
Riding—(night wild)—
Erl-King's daughter's teasing
Boy finds unpleasing.
Boy keeps on crying:
"Father, be flying."
Got home—much distressed
Father living—boy at rest.²

With as much brevity and conciseness as marks this abbreviated Erl-King the indignant Professor Zorn represents

¹ I return later to this mysterious army-order in the chapter "Bethmann the Pacifist."

² [Vater und Kind
Reiten durch Nacht und Wind.
Töchter von Erbkönig
Necken Kind ein wenig.
Kind schreit:
"Vater, reit."
Kommen nach Haus in Not,
Vater lebendig, Kind tot.]

the shameful attack of the Entente Powers on the innocent Germany, and adds to reinforce his account:

In their judgment of these facts the whole German nation of seventy million souls is practically unanimous. . . . Never in my long life has the unity between the Government and the people in Germany, in judging the measures of the Government, been so complete and so firm as on the outbreak of the war and since then to the present day. . . . The German people and the Hohenzollerns are to-day indissolubly united for life and death as has never before been the case in the history of the world.¹ No, the German people did not desire war. And the Emperor desired it as little as did the nation; we alone of all the Great Powers, notwithstanding all the good occasions for war which have arisen, have kept the peace for forty years. But the Tsar desired war, and he knew that France and England would lend him the support of their armies, and that since 1906 Belgium had broken her neutrality and had bound herself to the Western Powers for anti-German purposes. That is our view of the causes of the war, and the whole German people with one accord shares this view.

As I have said, I am content merely to make plain Zorn's historical account which would demand for its refutation in detail that I should once more write my books. The reader of my works, even without special critical endowments or training, is in a position to show that every one of the above sentences is contrary to the truth and to recognise that this method of simplification which consists in tracing back historical occurrences to a few arbitrarily selected events is a record achievement which would justify its author in bearing the title of "Simplizissimus."

2. Zorn's views on German war-aims are as interesting as his observations on the origin of the war:

"In view of the declaration of the Chancellor (of November 9th, 1916) there can be no doubt that the

¹ Fortunately this is only professorial truth, as it may be hoped the future will prove. Should it be the real truth, so much the worse for the German people.

Central Powers, notwithstanding their attitude at the Conference of 1907, will be ready to refer to the Hague Tribunal all international disputes, in which the honour and the vital interests of the State are not concerned."

This, then, is the maximum in the direction of pacifist concessions which the German teacher of international law, the German delegate at the first Hague Conference, who certainly is in a better position than anyone else to know the intentions of the German Government, foresees for the future peace negotiations: he is prepared to concur in a decision by arbitration, but with the exclusion of all cases in which the honour and the vital interests of the States in question are concerned. Professor Zorn knows just as well as we do that the crucial point in all discussions concerning a pacifist organisation resting on law has always centred in the question whether *all* international disputes should be referred to the Hague Tribunal, or whether such as involved the honour and the vital interests of the States (in the words of the formula constantly advanced by the opponents of arbitration) should be excepted from decision by arbitration.

All theorists and practical men have long been in agreement that these exceptions would make the whole institution illusory. The leading American pacifists, who are known to be identical with the leading statesmen there—men like Taft, Bryan, Wilson, etc.—have long ago discarded this outworn formula which rests on exploded views as to prestige, and the treaties relating to arbitration concluded by them extend to *all* international disputes without any exception. It was only as a first instalment, as we shall see later, that the first Hague Conference, in the event of Germany being prepared to accept the principle of obligatory subjection to decision by arbitration, was ready to clog this important achievement with this exception, in the sure expectation that if the obligation, even in a restricted scope, once existed, the restriction would of itself disappear at a later date. If the exceptions permanently remained—on

this point there was no doubt felt in The Hague—the treaty as to arbitration would be deprived of a great part of its value. Even in the most important and dangerous cases it would then depend on the caprice of every State concerned to snap its fingers at the institution of arbitration by asserting that its honour or its vital interests were concerned. The door was opened wide to the arbitrary interpretation of this extensible clause. How far a malicious State which is eager for war may go in this direction is aptly proved by the example of Austria in the summer of 1914: the miserable formal differences between the Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian answer were alleged to affect the vital interests of the Hapsburg monarchy to such a degree that Austria and Germany did not consider that the proposal for a decision by the Hague Tribunal which was twice put forward (by Serbia and by Russia) was worthy of discussion, but instead passed it over in silence.

What was then in 1907 demanded as the minimum, as the first beginning in the practical accomplishment of the idea of arbitration—as a minimum, because any further demand appeared hopeless from the outset in view of the opposition of Germany—this is what Professor Zorn now offers after two and a half years of the most fearful war as the maximum German concession, and in doing so he proudly refers to the world-historical speech of the Chancellor of November 9th, 1916. What had long ago been recognised as worthless in the theory and practice of pacifism Herr Zorn brings us to-day as Germany's most priceless gift to the great nuptial feast of peace of the European nations. In fact, the Germans have "got up somewhat late," and in this matter as elsewhere they have missed the connection.

3. It is true that the German Professor adds:

"With this a great part of the difficult way is already overcome. But after the fearful catastrophe of the world-war this no longer contents the world; it demands that those disputes also in which the honour and the vital interests of the States are involved should be brought to

a pacific settlement, if this is in any way possible, and it demands that legal dispositions should be taken with this end in view."

Here again it is necessary to note the reservation, "if this is in any way possible," which leaves open exactly the same back-doors as the clause with regard to the honour and the vital interests of States. Speaking for himself Herr Zorn thus appears to go a step further than the German Government, so far as he foresees, will be prepared to go, but he also remains standing in the middle of the path and leaves open all manner of possibilities by which the sure operation of a machinery of law in international disputes can be made illusory. Either a system of law is created or it is not: a submission to legal forms and to legal decisions "if it is in any way possible" is in fact no submission; it is the negation of the institution itself, and leaves in existence in the future the anarchy which ostensibly it desires to remove.

In reality, notwithstanding the sympathy for international arbitration which he appeared to display at The Hague in 1899, Professor Zorn in the eighteen years which have since then elapsed has not yet personally arrived at the recognition of a real obligation, of a real exclusion of resort to war as a means of solving disputes. As he explains in his essay mentioned above, the most proper way still appears to him to be found in "the elaboration of the American idea that a Power should act as a second (Article 8 of the Convention as to arbitration of 1907) and that this should be a binding obligation on the States." In other words, the travelling European mountains are to bring forth the pacifist mouse represented by the substitution in the introduction of the article mentioned of a "binding obligation" in place of the "agreement" of the contracting Powers. According to Zorn's maximum-proposal the contracting Powers are to be under an obligation in serious disputes, which imperil the peace, each to select a Power to act as a "second" which will get into touch with the second of the other Power in order to avoid the breach of friendly relations. That is to say, there is to be an obligation to accept

mediation, which according to the circumstances or the goodwill of the parties concerned may be successful or unsuccessful, but there is to be no obligation to accept a decision resting on law. This more than modest amelioration of the previous position is the utmost that Professor Zorn personally puts forward as desirable, but he in no way advances it as a probable concession by the German Government. The standpoint of the latter, as we now authoritatively learn from Herr Zorn, is much more restricted than even that of their learned defender; it is a standpoint represented by the clause relating to honour and vital interests which has long since been outworn. That is the utmost limit of the concessions which may be expected from Germany.

This admission in so authoritative a quarter is of inestimable value in judging the most recent pacifist utterances of the Chancellor. We have here before us an authentic interpretation which again proves to us what we long ago knew: that we are not at liberty to expect from Germany any concurrence in an effective organisation of the nations resting on law for the prevention of war, or in the restriction of armaments which is the essential attribute of such an organisation. Such a concurrence on the part of Germany will only be given as a result of coercion, and it would be desirable in the interest of the peace of the world and in the interest of Germany itself that here also the threat of the King in Goethe's ballad should be realised: "And if thou refuse, I will make use of force."

THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

OBLIGATORY ARBITRATION, WORLD TREATY OR INDIVIDUAL TREATY?

In amplification of what I have said in *J'accuse* (page 88 *et seq.*) I should merely like to emphasise certain characteristic features from the second Hague Conference (July to October, 1907) in order to show at their true value the untenable attempts made by certain defenders of the German

Government to justify or at least to excuse Germany's action at The Hague.

At the second Conference, as at the first, the question of compulsory decision by arbitration, at any rate for certain less important matters, constituted one of the most important subjects of deliberation. Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, who was then the head of the German mission, had the thankless task of once more announcing and defending Germany's opposition to any form of compulsory arbitration. Confronted with the charge that in the interval Germany had herself concluded treaties of arbitration with restricted obligation, he sought to escape by the subtle distinction that while in this question Germany could accept the system *individuel* she could not accept the system *mondial*. In other words, Germany wished to seek out from one case to another the parties with whom she was prepared to enter into a contract, but for heaven's sake she would not at one stroke conclude an arbitration treaty with a number of other parties, and thus create a world-system. The latter, the world-system, was, however, precisely the point that mattered. Individual treaties of arbitration had frequently been concluded since 1899, and even at an earlier date. Historical experience, however, taught, and still daily teaches, that such individual treaties, as is indeed the case with most international treaties, are not observed in the decisive moment and are treated as scraps of paper by the deliberate breaker of the peace. The position is quite different in the case of a world-treaty which is signed by forty-four Governments, the representatives of the whole of civilised humanity, and which imposes on each individual signatory positive obligations towards forty-three other contracting parties. To break such a treaty according to the interest or the whim of the moment would be impossible to-day, or at any rate it would be extremely dangerous and disadvantageous for the party breaking the treaty, since he would be at once confronted by forty-three injured parties who, partly by resort to arms and partly by means of diplomatic and economic boycotting, might isolate him in the world and make his existence impossible. Germany, notwithstanding her power, nei-

ther could nor would expose herself to this danger and this explains her stubborn resistance to a world-treaty and her withdrawal to the individual treaty.

When many defenders of Germany see in the conclusion of the Anglo-German treaty of arbitration of 1904 a sign that Germany was in reality not so averse from the aspirations of The Hague as the malicious accuser endeavours to represent, these writers prove merely that their thoughts are not directed to the real issue, that they have not grasped the salient point of the discussion but blindly grope past it. The salient point of all discussions is the *international* treaty of arbitration, the *system* of arbitration which would thereby be inaugurated, even if at first on a narrow basis only, but which it might be hoped would gradually, under the logical compulsion of development, extend more and more and be fashioned into a system of general compulsion. A framework for a world-wide treaty of arbitration for all international disputes was in the first place to be created; the full completion of this was, however, to be left for later development. Individual treaties between States A and B could never furnish such a framework. On this rests the inanity of appealing to the Anglo-German individual treaty. This, however, also explains the logical consistency in the attitude of the German delegates towards the world-wide treaty. Since Germany did not wish an effective, serious and indissoluble union such as a world-treaty would have created, and since she desired still less a gradual extension of this union to cover the most important disputes, that is in other words to an elimination of war, it was necessary from the very outset to oppose the creation of such a frame, in which gradually a highly undesired picture might be sketched.

The German Government and the German Emperor, who were above all concerned in the maintenance of their freedom of movement, thus acted quite logically when they concluded individual treaties but opposed a world-treaty. The defenders of Germany, however, argue illogically when they endeavour to represent the individual treaty as evidence that Germany did not in essence entertain "Machiavellian inten-

tions" and had only "theoretical scruples" regarding the aspirations of The Hague. No, the scruples were anything but theoretical, they were of an eminently practical nature, as is proved by the negotiations at both Conferences, by all the commentaries and above all by White's *Autobiography* which has already been quoted; there was no desire to bind their hands with regard to forty-three States; there was no desire to incur the danger of being gradually carried from the restricted to the general obligation by the stream of public opinion throughout the world; there was no desire to attain a perpetual guaranteed state of peace; on the contrary they wished to retain the possibility of revealing the shining armour and of beating with the mailed fist at the appropriate moment. That is the hidden meaning of the whole matter. That is the inner ground of Germany's attitude at The Hague. That was even then fully recognised by all the nations in the world as the governing point of view of German politicians. This is the explanation of the hard struggles, the sharp divergencies at the Conference, of the apprehensions regarding the future of Europe which were entertained from the time of the first Conference. This also explains the impulse on the part of the great States that were not allied with Germany to unite together in order to meet the dangers which were seen to be coming from Germany.

The blindness of the objection that Germany had completed an arbitration treaty with England is shown by the fact that this treaty, which was completed in 1904, was well known to all the participants in the Hague Conference of 1907. If this individual treaty had served the ends and the purposes of a world-treaty, what was the purpose of these sharp and embittered negotiations conducted at the Congress with a view to obtaining Germany's consent to an obligatory world-treaty? This fact alone shows that two entirely different questions were involved which could be confused only by those who are completely ignorant. I had therefore not the slightest occasion to conceal in my book—"prudently" as one of my critics observes in accusation—the Anglo-German treaty of arbitration. This treaty had as much to do with

the Hague Conferences as certain new German sociologists have with questions of politics and international law.

If these facts required any confirmation, it would be furnished by the Hague negotiations themselves. The American delegate, Mr. Joseph Choate, at one time Ambassador of the United States in Great Britain (who recently wrote a preface to the excellent book by the American Attorney-General J. M. Beck on the question of guilt, *The Evidence in the Case*), humorously replied to Bieberstein's distinction between the individual and the world-treaty. The attitude of the German delegate, who was enthusiastic for arbitration in itself, but would concede it only to those contracting parties which suited him, appeared to him to be similar to that of someone who should see in a dream a heavenly apparition which aroused in him the most violent desire, but who should turn his back on the divine vision if on awakening he discovered it in his bed.

If a nation is ready to conclude a treaty of arbitration with one or several others—such is the substance of the American delegate's observations—why did it refuse to conclude such a treaty with all the forty-three nations represented, if this is the imperative desire of all peoples? This is a question to which Germany should furnish an answer, for the rest of us are all ready for a general convention, because we have absolute confidence in the other nations. We respect the equality of all other Powers on the basis on which they are here represented and exercise their right of voting at the Conference. We recognise that in their attitude they all represent in equal measure manliness, intelligence, independence and good faith. There are here in the last analysis two questions; on the one side good faith, on the other the appeal to force. (*Il y a ici au fond deux questions: l'une de bonne foi, l'autre de recours à la force.*)¹

Even more effective than the speech of the American delegate was the great appeal which Léon Bourgeois, the Presi-

¹[Quoted by Milhaud (pp. 72-73) from the proceedings of the Conference.]

dent of the Arbitration Committee, delivered on this occasion. With logical acumen and rhetorical energy the French statesman emphasised the symptomatic significance of the recognition of the obligatory principle in a world-treaty. Even if to begin with the so-called vital interests of the States remained excluded from compulsory arbitration, it would nevertheless be of inestimable importance for the peaceful development of humanity that the legal compulsion to submit to the decision of arbitration should in the first place be established and that in this way the basis of an international structure of law should be laid in correspondence with the views of the modern world. The elevation of this building would gradually and automatically take place. The objection that the conditions of power of each State were different and that therefore they could not all be treated on the same juridical pattern was untenable; for it had never been the intention of the Hague Conferences to intervene in the relations of the individual States in matters of power or to restrict their legitimate development and their political future. Each nation, he said, represented a sovereign body-politic, was the equal of all others in moral value, and whether small or great, whether weak or strong, had an equal claim to the respect of its rights, as also an equal obligation to fulfil its duties. Each one, under the governance of law, should be in a position to develop freely without injuring the corresponding rights of any other. All nations to-day were linked together by a narrow net of common interests. Every disturbance of the peace between two nations reacted immediately on all the others. Therefore, in the interests of all, there ought now to be created a mutual guarantee by a world-wide treaty relating to compulsory arbitration which in the first place should be restricted to questions of law, interpretation, liquidation and similar matters, but which would even in this restricted form represent a decisive step forward in the great question of arbitration; for it would give expression to the common respect for law, the common feeling for the solidarity of duties. This—so the French statesman concluded his speech amidst stormy ap-

plause—would be the highest moral lesson which could be given to humanity.¹

It is unnecessary to add anything to this significant speech of Léon Bourgeois. It raises the negotiations which then took place and the vote which ensued to the important position which they have occupied in the world's history and of which the influence is still felt.

The voting gave the following result: Article 16 (a) of the draft under consideration, which established compulsory arbitration for a series of less important disputes which were specially enumerated, and expressly excluded vital questions, questions of independence and of honour (*intérêts vitaux, indépendance, honneur*) was accepted by thirty-five votes to five, four abstaining from voting. France, England, Russia and Italy voted in its favour. Germany, Austria and Turkey voted against it.

A further Article 16 (c) submitted to this method of settlement without any restriction certain subjects which were specially appropriate for decision by arbitration. The above reservations with regard to vital questions, etc., did not here appear to be necessary, since such disputes in their very nature excluded the possibility of being exalted to "national" questions. This second paragraph was also accepted by thirty-three votes to eight, three refraining from voting. Once more France, England, Russia and Italy voted in favour of the proposal, whereas Germany, Austria and Turkey voted against it.

I have already recounted in my book (page 89) the further fate of these proposals. Since unanimity had not been secured, the resolutions fell through, and the proposal to de-

¹ *Second Hague Conference*, Vol. II., pages 72-73, 87-89; quoted by Milhaud, pages 72-76. It is interesting to observe that the attitude of the French and American Delegates towards those nominated by Germany was even then, seven years before the Franco-German War and ten years before the American-German War, dictated by the same principles which to-day serve as the guiding line of the leading statesmen of the two great republics in the declaration of their most important war-aims.

clare them binding on those States at any rate which had voted in their favour could not be made a resolution in view of the opposition of Freiherr von Marschall, who insisted on the principle of unanimity. Like the first, the second Conference also remained without result in this most important point owing to the action of Germany.

* * * * *

Another point in the negotiations at the second Conference, although apparently of less importance, may still be mentioned, as here again it is possible to recognise the fundamental tendencies of Germany, in opposition to other nations, to refuse any effective obligation. In the very important clauses with regard to the commissions of inquiry, the convocation of which in 1904 prevented an Anglo-Russian war on account of the Dogger Bank affair, the Russian delegation desired to substitute an obligation by treaty in place of the freedom of choice; the proposal was that the words "*les puissances contractantes jugent utile*" should be replaced by the words "*les puissances contractantes conviennent.*" Herr von Marschall at once declared against this *juris vinculum*, and it was found necessary to leave the convocation of the commissions of inquiry to the free decision of the Powers concerned.

Similar examples of German resistance to every legally effective operation of the Hague institutions could be cited in large numbers from the minutes. I must content myself with the examples quoted, and I believe that they are sufficient to give the reader an apt picture of the deep inner divergence in view between Germany and the rest of the civilised world which was manifested at the Hague Conferences. The account of these incidents and the judgment upon them which is contained in my book, can therefore be maintained intact in every point. The Germany of 1899 and of 1907 was the same Germany as that of 1914. It deliberately and intentionally represented the principle of force in the world, while all the other great and small nations—with the exception of Germany's allies, Austria and Turkey and a few insignificant States—desired to realise the principle of law in the life of the nations. Even then Germany was preparing the ground

which would make possible at the appropriate moment the execution of her efforts for power. As I have rightly emphasised in my book, the Hague Conferences constitute one of the most important signposts in the antecedents of the present war, a luminous point which at once clarifies the past and the present.

HAGUE CAUSE—TRIPLE ENTENTE EFFECT

The close connection which links Germany's action at The Hague to the union of the Entente Powers and to the generation of the state of European tension leading to the explosion of war, was recognised by German socialists and pacifists long before the explosion actually took place. Anyone who reads the commentaries of Fried, Nippold, etc., on the Hague Conferences will find this confirmed. Here I should like to refer to an article by Fried (*Friedenswarte* of November-December, 1915) which adopts exactly the same point of view as that contained in my book in describing the famous "encirclement" as a measure of defence provoked by the deep distrust and embitterment which was occasioned by Germany's hostile attitude towards peace at the Hague Conferences:

It requires courage to say now with regard to the so-called "encirclement" what we have said from the very beginning. The question involved was not that of an attack on Germany, but of what was considered as a necessary protection against Germany. There were certain measures taken by Germany, certain speeches, certain actions which engendered this fear and led to that action which has been expounded in Germany as an attempt at isolation. It was then the fear of the danger of isolation which evoked German counter-measures and these again appeared to the others as a menace. Thus we pacifists wrote ten years ago and more, that the question was less that of "encirclement" and more that of an "excirclement." This excirclement began at The Hague in 1899, when the civilised States of the world desired to establish in place of the old guarantee of power a new guarantee resting on law and agreement, and in so doing met with the most violent opposition from Germany.

Germany's complaint regarding the Delcassés and the Lans-

downes is unjustified. She has herself created the situation under which she suffers. In 1899 at The Hague she gave into the hands of her enemies the moral weapon of distrust, and thus neglected to seize the great moment and to gain for herself the respect paid to a Power which desires to secure peace by modern means. She remained unseasonably on the old lines. How mistaken was the attitude of Germany in 1899 appears from the reminiscences of Andrew D. White recently published. . . . As may be read in White, Count Münster, who received the title of Prince for his services at the Hague Conference, awakened by his attitude as German delegate at The Hague a feeling of bitterness and distrust towards Germany among all the other States. Germany still suffers under this distrust, and Delcassé would not have been possible without Münster. . . .

The isolation of Germany dates from the days of The Hague. As we have already so often emphasised it was in The Hague that the mistake was committed which gave Germany in the rest of the world the reputation of a Power which in its main features desired war.

GERMAN ANTI-PACIFISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

The "theoretical scruples" which, according to many who seek to exculpate Germany, are said to have been the only ground of the attitude assumed by Germany towards the main subjects of the Hague Congresses, the restriction of armaments by treaty and compulsory arbitration, were in reality, as I have already said, nothing more than the effort to maintain in practice that complete freedom of action and of movement which Germany required for her purposes. In fact Germany in the long years from the Hague Conferences down to the outbreak of war followed in practice exactly the same guiding lines which at the time she "theoretically" reserved for herself at the Hague Conferences—firstly in the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding (1909-12) which I have already dealt with in my book and to which I will return in detail at a later passage in this work, and then continuously down to the outbreak of war in 1914.

Between the attitude of Germany at the Hague Confer-

ences and the whole of her later action down to the criminal provocation of the present war there lies a straight uninterrupted line. The English proposals for a proportional restriction by treaty of naval armaments on both sides had to be declined for the same reasons which impelled Germany at the first and second Hague Congresses—and likewise before and after the two congresses in the utterances of the Emperor, the leading members of the Government, the party leaders and the Press which was friendly to the Government—to decline every agreement as to armaments and to claim absolute independence for Germany in determining her armaments by sea and by land.

The English assurance of 1912 that she entertained no aggressive intentions against Germany, and that she would never be a party to any aggressive coalition had also to be declined as insufficient, since Germany was not in reality apprehensive of such aggression, but on the contrary attached decisive weight to English neutrality, which would assure her the possibility of provoking, as appeared good to her, continental wars on the pretext that they had been "forced" upon her.

Churchill's proposal for a naval holiday had to be left disregarded by Germany for the same reasons which made her decline every other restriction of her armaments.

Grey's conference at the end of July, 1914, had also to be declined by Germany because, without doubt, it would have led to a peaceful understanding in a very short space of time—a result which was as little in accordance with the desires of the German authorities as was the creation of an international peace organisation in 1899 and 1907.

The reference of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, as was proposed firstly by Serbia and then by the Emperor of Russia, had to be declined by Germany for the same reasons which induced Germany to struggle hand and foot against the whole institution of the Hague Tribunal, which in the end she had only accepted unwillingly under the pressure of circumstances.

Germany had to decline all the English and Russian proposals for mediation from the same point of view as that on

which she had rejected as impracticable every initiative of the Hague Bureau in mediation.

In short, every diplomatic and warlike step taken by Germany from the Hague Conferences down to the outbreak of war in 1914 was the logical continuation of the attitude observed at The Hague, the practical execution of the theories of power there supported, although of course not openly acknowledged.

TAFT'S TREATIES OF ARBITRATION

But it is not merely what Germany did in these intervening years but also what she omitted to do that proves the deep divergence in the views which animated Germany and her allies on the one side and all other modern States on the other. After the second Conference the American Government under Presidents Taft and Wilson continued at the head of all other countries the pacifist endeavours which it had pursued with ideal zeal at the Hague Conferences. In 1910 President Taft laid before the other Powers a draft of a treaty elaborated in all its details which aimed at a diminution by treaty of the armaments of the individual States and the creation of an international military force for the maintenance of general peace. We must uncover before these admirable Americans who, although decried by Prussian junkers as coldly calculating "business-men," notwithstanding all European disillusions have not abandoned the path to their ideals, to peace and general well-being.¹ It is a peculiar irony of historical development that it should be just this new world

¹ Even a Hindenburg cannot refrain, in an interview just published by Wolff's bureau at the beginning of April, 1917, from ascribing the basest business motives to the American proclamation of war: "Wilson's motives and those of his friends are clear to me. The American governing and financial circles have entered into a corrupt transaction (the reference is to the supply of munitions and the loans to the Triple Alliance). Unless they are prepared to sacrifice the capital which they have invested, there is no other course open but to support the tottering undertaking with the whole of their means. The only question is whether the undertaking can be saved in this way."

of the United States of America, which has brought to its highest perfection human capacity in all material, technical, commercial and industrial matters, which should also more and more advance at the head of human progress in all ideal efforts. "*Marcher à la tête de la civilisation*"—this appears to be more and more the honourable distinction of the great transatlantic republic.

The culminating point in this development is seen in President Wilson's message, read in Congress on April 2nd, 1917, which formed the basis of the proclamation by the American representative body of the existence of a state of war between America and Germany. I will quote only the following sentences from this world-historical document:

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish autocratic power. . . . Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved, and the freedom of its peoples and the menace to that peace and freedom lie in the existence of autocratic Governments backed by organised force, which is controlled wholly by their will and not by the will of their people. . . . We have not quarrelled with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. . . .

We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and we shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its powers. . . . The world must be safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon trusted foundation of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquests and no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves and no material compensation for sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind, and shall be satisfied when those rights are as secure as fact and the freedom of nations can make them. Just because we fight without rancour and without selfish objects, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free people, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents

without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fair play we profess to be fighting for.¹

This explanation of a declaration of war, so intensely inspired by high idealism, is certainly unique in the history of mankind; it is, however, only a logical consequence of the earlier attitude of American statesmen towards pacifist problems, just as the occasion given by Germany to the adoption of this attitude on the part of America is a logical consequence of the previous German attitude towards these problems. That in certain circumstances, when all other means fail, the highest ends of peace are only to be attained by war, that the liberation of the world from military domination can in the extreme case only take place by battle, just as the liberation of a nation from autocratic domination can only be accomplished by revolution, is a fact which is copiously confirmed by the teaching of history. For such cases in place of the reprehensible *si vis pacem para bellum* a similarly sounding principle, though in essence entirely different, may become a necessity: *Si vis pacem, fac bellum*. It may be necessary to resort to homœopathic cures in which poison is only to be defeated by counter-poison, toxin only by anti-toxin. In a later passage we shall treat in detail of the permissibility, indeed the inevitability, of such homœopathic remedies against the European plague of war and its most dangerous bearers of infection in the past, in the present and, if a radical cure does not take place, in the future as well.

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I mentioned above the interesting fact that in the great transatlantic republic the ideal higher development keeps pace throughout with material development. The opposition between these two developments is indeed only apparent; in reality the one is the presupposition and the condition of the other. The enormous development of that "land of unlimited possibilities" was only possible on the sure basis of a long-enduring state of peace, guaranteed for the future as

¹ [The version in the German text is somewhat abbreviated, as given by the Havas Agency.]

well. Peace within the two American continents, apart from insignificant disturbances, has been guaranteed once for all by the Pan-American Union. If America is not the aggressor, peace with the States of Europe and Asia is assured by the geographically independent position of the two Americas and by the protection of the Fleet. This unassailable position and the disposition of the country, which is averse from the initiation of any aggressive action, has rendered possible the development of the incomparable economic prosperity which we observed with admiration before the war, and which will now assume further unimagined dimensions on the ruins of mangled Europe. The soberly astute Americans see and know to what fortunate circumstances they owe their prosperity, but on the other hand they are too much saturated with modern ideas of the world and of humanity not to be willing to desire and to procure for other civilised people the same advantages. For them the harmony of the interests of all civilised people, in spiritual as well as in economic matters, is no empty delusion, and if now for a time they draw profit from the ruin of Europe, they know quite well that an enduring advantage, an enduring economic prosperity can for them also arise only from the peace and the well-being of those countries, with which they are connected in the most intimate manner by a thousand spiritual and economic nervous links. This explains the fact that material and ideal efforts keep pace in the great transatlantic republic, and that America in both domains marches at the head of human progress.

The noble initiative of President Taft in the question of international disarmament on which I have touched above, offered from the outset little prospect of success, after the unfortunate experiences of the first and second Hague Conferences for which Germany bore the chief responsibility; for Russia had in fact placed the question of armaments as the chief subject of discussion at the head of the Hague negotiations. On the other hand complete success attended Taft's further initiative in the direction of concluding with other

nations unrestricted treaties of arbitration, that is to say, treaties comprising *all* disputes. Treaties of this nature, which accordingly submitted to arbitration the so-called vital questions and questions of honour, were concluded with France and England, and failed to become effective only because, although they obtained in the American Senate a large majority, they did not obtain the requisite two-thirds majority. England and France signed the treaties. Why was such a treaty not concluded with Germany? Because in the period which followed, down to the present day, Germany on principle continued to pursue the policy of refusal shown at The Hague.

THE BRYAN TREATIES

An even more striking instance of the self-isolation of Germany is furnished by the history of the so-called Bryan treaties of 1913. Bryan, the American Foreign Secretary, who had always been one of the most enthusiastic pacifists in the world, had along with Wilson, the President of the United States, outlined a so-called peace plan, according to which the United States were to propose to all Governments that disputes of every kind between America and them should be referred to a commission of inquiry composed according to definite principles, which should examine and determine the situation in every direction; the commission should, however, communicate the result to the Powers in question at the earliest after the expiration of a year. After the communication had taken place, it was left to each party to act according as it might consider expedient; if it desired, it could thus begin war. As will be seen, the suggested draft American treaty was directed not to decision by arbitration, but only to a determination of the state of affairs surrounded by every guarantee of impartiality, and left to the parties in dispute the unrestricted right, as they might see fit, to acquiesce or to refuse to acquiesce in the result of the investigation. The concluding sentence of the third article of the draft treaty approved by the American Senate on April 24th, 1913,

runs as follows: "The parties reserve to themselves the right to act as they consider proper with reference to the subject in dispute as soon as they have received the report of the commission of inquiry."

This ingenious and carefully devised treaty thus spared all the deep-rooted prejudices with regard to the right of sovereignty, of self-control, of war and peace, or whatever names may be given to these cherished idols of a long vanished past; it spared the mediæval phraseology to which every petty State and every marauding knight before the introduction of the "general peace of the land" had resorted in support of their own right of feud; it spared the threadbare trumpery with which the craft of diplomacy is still accustomed to drape its gloomy handiwork; it spared all the relics of the past, and so to speak by a back door, by the opening of a tiny hatchway, it admitted the living breath of modern views of the world and of law into the fusty and mouldy secret chamber of outworn diplomacy—a breath which, as on the opening of old Egyptian coffins, gives over to decomposition and decay the thousand-year old mummies that may be found within. "If time is won, all is won"—it is on this generally recognised principle, which more than elsewhere is applicable to national disputes that the Bryan treaties were based. Most wars, especially in recent times, could not have been provoked by the great criminals who consciously instigated them, if means had not been devised at the decisive moment to deceive the nations regarding the true state of affairs, regarding the true grounds, or rather pretexts, in most cases absurdly insignificant, if it had not been possible to inflame their passions, to inspire them for what were professed to be "holy" wars, for wars of God, while in reality they were only the devilish work of man.

In times of general compulsory service it is no longer possible to wage wars without or against the will of the nations. The great men of the world have known and know this quite well. Consequently if it is desired to arrive at the wars willed by the ruler, the nations must be deceived and taken unawares, they must be intoxicated and confused by the still potent phrases about the defence of house and hearth and of the

Fatherland. All this, however, is only possible in the "heat of the fight," in the urgency of precipitant events; it is only possible from one day to the next, scarcely until the day after the next, and in no event from to-day until a year hence. A few days' delay between the German Ultimatum and the declaration of war against Russia, and the German people, notwithstanding the censorship and the state of siege, would have convinced itself that neither the Russians nor the French had invaded Germany, that no one menaced the freedom and the independence of Germany. It was just because it was desired that the deluded people should not return to reflection and enlightenment, and at the same time because it was hoped to gain for their own side all the advantages of the rapid blow, that the declaration of war was precipitated so criminally, untroubled about the world conflagration which was thereby enkindled.

Bryan's draft treaty reckons in the subtlest manner on this psychological trait of the rulers and of the nations.¹ The war-game of the mighty ones will be grievously upset, indeed rendered impossible, if the trump card, represented by the gain of time, is in the hands of the friends of peace. A year is a long time and even assuming the greatest malevolence on the part of those in power, there is no possibility that for so long a period the fire of war can remain kindled in the nation. The flames become extinguished, the smoke disperses, the clear insight returns, and if then the sober impartial decision of the international commission of inquiry appears, it will be recognised by all sides, no matter what the verdict may be, as an objective determination of the state of affairs, and will be hailed as a welcome deliverer from the threatening danger of war.

What attitude was assumed by the progressive Powers of

¹ The League to Enforce Peace recently founded by Taft in June, 1915, proceeds from the same ideas. For the purpose of gaining time this league of peace also proposes to compel its members only to summon a tribunal or a mediatory council (according to the nature of the dispute); it does not propose to compel them to submit to the decisions of these authorities.

the Hague Conferences to the Bryan Treaty? And what attitude was assumed by the retrograde Powers? The answer is short and simple. Apart from the whole of the American Powers, the Bryan treaty was signed by the following European Powers: England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Sweden and Norway. It was not signed by Germany, Austria and Turkey.¹

I have nothing to add to the facts as thus determined. In their whole political attitude from 1899 until to-day Germany and Austria have shown an enviable consistency. Might instead of right—for God's sake, let us not be bound by any treaty which might take from us or injure our freedom in war! Treaties are after all only scraps of paper. What, then, is the good of concluding them? Our strength is the measure of our right. Long live the shining armour, the mailed fist, the sharp gleaming sword! All this, of course, is only meant "theoretically." In practice Germany is and always has been "a child, no angel is so pure." Dear, good, pacific Germany!

IDEALISM OR EGOTISM?

While German inquirers into the war as a rule scarcely touch even superficially on the Hague Conferences, they never fail in connection with this topic, following the most recent German custom, to raise, and of course to answer in the negative, the question whether England supported pacifist endeavours at the Hague Conferences "out of pure idealism, from love of peace," or only from egotistical reasons. I have already expressed my views at greater length elsewhere on these investigations into national psychology, the object of which is to dispose of the plain facts by ascribing to them such base motives as selfishness, the duping of others, etc. It is an extremely difficult, and indeed an almost impossible task, to inquire into the motives of a single individual per-

¹ See Milhaud, page 95.

son, let alone the motives of a whole nation, or of its Government which consists of many individuals. Such inquiries are useless and can lead to no result. In politics the only point that matters is whether good has been done; the motives which have occasioned the action in question are irrelevant. How many great actions, in politics as well as in other fields of human activity, have sprung from egotistic and not from altruistic motives. So long as man remains what he is, personal and general interests will alike make their influence felt in most of his actions and decisions.

When Luther affixed his theses to the church at Wittenberg, he certainly purposed dealing a fatal blow at Papal corruption. But there may also have been present in his mind the thought that *he* would be the man who would gain the glory of being the deliverer from the corruption of Rome, that he would himself enjoy the advantages of his new revolutionary doctrine which exchanged Catholic celibacy for Protestant marriage, that he would be able to lead his beloved Katharina Bora to the altar. When the Prussian Junker, Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, conceived his subversive plan of breaking up the German Union, and of forming by blood and iron a new German Empire under Prussian leadership, there were certainly present to his mind the black-red-golden ideals for which the German democrats had suffered and bled for half a century—men guilty of high treason and of treachery to their country, like those of us who are opponents of the Hohenzollerns to-day. But at the same time he was enough of a Prussian and a Junker to make not merely the union of the German Empire but also the increase of power of his Prussian Fatherland and of his hereditary royal master the target of his political marksmanship, to bear to new honour the black and white Prussian flag as well as the colours of the German Empire. As in the case of all the great deeds of mankind personal ambition also played a part in his soul—the ambition to render his name immortal and to make the despised Prussian Junkerdom—strange irony of history!—achieve the task of bringing to fulfilment the old democratic revolutionary demand for unity.

What a childish undertaking it is therefore to judge the political action of a whole nation by its alleged motives, when we cannot even penetrate with certainty into the motives of individual men with whom we are in daily intercourse. Are these subtle psychologists ignorant of the fact that the motives of human actions are like a mosaic which, being composed of innumerable small stones, furnishes a picture only when taken in its entirety, but signifies nothing in its component parts? This is the case in dealing with particular men; much more does it hold when we are dealing with whole nations.

In her consistent intervention on behalf of all pacifist endeavours from the first Hague Conference until to-day, until the statement of her present war-aims which are no more than the realisation of pacifist ideals, England has consistently and unwearingly followed the path of progress. This must be accounted to her as an indisputable merit; and this is what has gained for her and for her cause the sympathies of all neutrals in this struggle of the nations.

Germany, on the other hand, has consistently and inexorably served the cause of retrogression. This must be accounted as her indisputable offence; this is what has drawn to her and to her cause the antipathies of all neutrals in this struggle of the nations. These facts alone are what matter. The motives are a matter of indifference. Unfortunately, the facts are to-day exactly as they were at the time of the Hague Conferences. To-day progress in matters of international law is still represented by England; retrogression by Germany. All progressively-minded Europeans—no matter what their nationality—can hope only for the victory of the ideas of progress and their realisation in the conclusion of peace. May the third Hague Conference after the war complete the work which the first and the second could not achieve owing to the opposition of Germany. Only thus will the peace of Europe be permanently secured.

SCHIEMANN AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES

A man, who maintains that he is a historian, nevertheless dares to combat with the miserable expedients which are collected on pages 8-13 of his *Slanderer* the occurrences of the Hague Conferences, which are documentarily proved and confirmed by a voluminous literature dealing with the subject in its historical aspects and from the point of view of international law. It was, he says, on account of Anglo-Russian friction in East Asia, which threatened to lead to a war between the two States, that Russia, knowing she was not sufficiently prepared, resorted to the "Disarmament-Conference," as Schiemann prefers to call it, although erroneously. It is a familiar fact that the Russian proposal was not directed to disarmament, but was intended to secure that for a definite series of years there should be no increase in the armies on a peace basis, or in the military budgets for land and naval forces. It was intended that an agreement on a treaty basis should in the first place be arrived at with regard to a suspension of armaments; the gradual proportional diminution was to be left for later developments and for later decisions. Years before the Tsar's manifesto Salisbury, the English Prime Minister, had indicated the perniciousness of the constant increase of armaments and the necessity of an international agreement on the subject, and it is an indubitable fact that public opinion in England in agreement with the Government greeted the Tsar's manifesto with the greatest sympathy; yet the "slanderer," by means of an inaccurate and incomplete quotation of a speech from the English Throne of February, 1899, falsifies this fact into a "sceptical" attitude towards the Russian proposal. I ask you, Herr Professor, to read the whole literature with regard to the Hague Conferences, and then, if you can, venture to dispute my assertion that England, Russia and France were the leaders on the side of those States which desired to put an end by international agreement to the ruinous competition of armaments, but that Germany and Austria compassed the failure of every

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such endeavour, and compelled the Conference to restrict itself to a platonic resolution.

Exactly the same thing happened with regard to the Russian proposal for the introduction of international arbitration (see *J'accuse*, pages 90-92). The dangerously acute situation reached in the negotiations on the question of the compulsory convocation of the tribunal of arbitration, the interlude of Professor Zorn's journey to Berlin, the final submission of the Conference to the will of Germany in order that the whole matter might not be wrecked—these are all facts which are well known and familiar to everyone who is acquainted with the subject. Herr Schiemann, however, suppresses all this. Here again he works by means of snippets; he seeks to divert attention from the main points to insignificant subsidiary points; where he cannot entirely suppress the facts, he ascribes to the actors base egotistical motives—and then this unscrupulous falsifier has the effrontery to reproach the accuser for his "shameless" assertions.

What does Schiemann mention of the negotiations and the resolutions of the first Conference? Nothing whatever. Instead of this he draws from his snippet-box an extract from the *Standard*, which deals with the security of private property at sea; he speaks of the use of dum-dum bullets and of poisonous gases—without reflecting that the whole of his war-writings are nothing but dum-dum bullets and poisonous gases with which he seeks to lacerate the truth and to envelop the German people in a poisonous cloud. It would be incredible, if we did not see it before us in black and white: there is not a word regarding the negotiations and resolutions on the Russian proposal as to armaments, there is not a word regarding arbitration and the institution of the court of arbitration, there is not a word as to the attitude displayed by the Entente Powers at the Conference in furthering the cause of peace and as to the contrary attitude of Germany and Austria! In place of these we are merely furnished with incorrect assertions regarding the alleged one-sided reservation of England and America in the matter of

certain bullets and gases, and emphasis is also laid on the question of the security of private property at sea, which was then and has again quite recently been declared by England to be a subject which might very well be discussed as soon as security is afforded against new wars by means of compulsory arbitration, and against the financial ruin of the nations by agreements as to armaments.

THE "FREEDOM OF THE SEAS"

The well-sounding phrase: "We are struggling for the freedom of the seas," which is constantly being paraded by German politicians and newspaper-writers, is merely dust in the eyes of the uncritical crowd. The freedom of the seas exists—in peace. No one places the slightest obstacle in the way of the free passage of the ships of all nations on the seas of the world. In war, no doubt, it does not yet exist; private property at sea fares no better in war than does private property on land. On land towns, villages, fields and woods are mercilessly laid waste if the fury of war rages over them. According to the existing international law, enemy private property on sea is liable to seizure provided it is found on a neutral vessel. Neutral private property, even on an enemy vessel, is exempt from seizure. Contraband of war is always subject to confiscation, whether it is enemy or neutral property, whether it is on an enemy or a neutral vessel (Declaration of Paris, April 16th, 1856). In all this the only question is that of the seizure of enemy or of neutral private property. The *destruction* of private property at sea, the sinking of enemy or neutral ships—instead of their capture—the disregard of the circumstances of the property (whether enemy or neutral), of the quality of the goods (whether contraband or not), the destruction in blind rage of thousands of enemy and neutral vessels, accompanied by the sacrifice of many thousands of human lives—all this is not international law, but the imperial German law of nations. These are newly introduced principles of the Imperial German Navy which as a result alienates itself much

further from the freedom of the seas, which is so loudly proclaimed, than England and other sea Powers have ever done. The freedom of the seas, as understood by Germany, is a formula which is not intended to serve peace, but war: its object is to better the position of the leading continental State as against the leading sea-Power in war, in freeing from every hindrance the imports which are now prevented. The standpoint assumed by England in refusing this limitation of its weapons of war, so long as war is constantly threatening and is not excluded by any organisation of law, cannot be impugned by any one of unprejudiced judgment

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These, however, are all merely diversions from the main subject of the Hague Conferences—ineffective attempts on the part of Schiemann to obscure the fact that the attitude of Germany and Austria at the first and the second Hague Conferences is chiefly responsible for the later European tension and consequently for the war. Of the five pages which Schiemann devotes to the treatment of the first Hague Conference, two pages tell of the alleged political antecedents of the Conference (the egotistical intentions of Russia), one page deals with the subsidiary points mentioned above and two whole pages—(can the leopard change his spots?)—reproduce a newspaper-cutting, on this occasion an article printed verbatim from the *Journal des Débats* of July, 1899. After the Fashoda conflict, which took place in the preceding year, and the outbreak of the Boer War in which the sympathies of France as of Germany were rightly on the side of the Boers, the attitude of hostility towards England then assumed by the leading French paper need occasion no surprise. What, however, is proved by such a newspaper-article against the records and the minutes of the Hague Conference? If, as in fact was the case, there was at that time a certain political tension in the relations between England and France, is it not all the more significant that, notwithstanding this fact, both countries and both Governments supported at the Hague everything which could serve the security of European peace and the diminution of the burden of armaments? That the

two countries, which were then united neither by sympathy nor by an Entente, should have pursued the same path towards the one great aim of European peace is a fact which reveals the contrary attitude of Germany in a more fatal and criminal light. The article from the *Journal des Débats* proves one fact only: that never yet has a historian dared, by means of such miserable newspaper frumpery, to obscure or to get rid of historical facts, which are documented and proved by existing records.

BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES

In the section of *J'accuse* entitled "Between the First and Second Hague Conferences" (pages 92-96) I emphasised the unwearrying efforts of the Liberal English Government to continue the peace-work of The Hague, and more particularly to put an end to the insensate competition of armaments by means of an international agreement. These efforts were undertaken not only by the Liberal Government which has been in power since 1905, but also by the Unionist Government previously in power; in particular Chamberlain, who was then the all-powerful Colonial Minister, was favourable to the idea of an international regulation of the question of armaments. I may refer the reader to the facts collected in my book, which furnish only a feeble epitome of the activity of the English Ministers in this direction—those same Ministers who are to-day represented by our German falsifiers of history as criminal war-intriguers, and as the authors of the vast European carnage. Any one who desires to obtain more complete information regarding the efforts made by Grey, Asquith, Haldane, Lloyd George and the late Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal Prime Minister, for the attainment of an agreement as to armaments—efforts which were fully echoed in France and Russia and were pursued with equal zeal by men of the same mind in Parliament and in the Press—should read Fried's *Handbook of the Peace Movement* (Vol. II., pages 147-192): he will there find evidence to support Fried's general judgment that the Liberal English

Government "in a truly noble manner and without being deterred by their failures, repeatedly intervened openly and frankly in favour of a simultaneous restriction of armaments by treaty."

In Germany everyone, from the Emperor down to Herr Schiemann, retained an attitude of hostility or at least of scepticism towards the peace work of The Hague (apart, of course, from the social democratic party and the enlightened pacifists, who were both equally powerless) and the Emperor soon after the conclusion of the first Hague Conference said: "Many centuries will yet pass before the theories of perpetual peace will reach general application. The German Empire and its princes are meanwhile the surest protection of peace."¹ While this was the position in Germany, there developed on both sides of the channel, in England and in France, an increasingly active peace-movement within and without Parliament, which soon led to practical results, in the first place in the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of October 14th, 1903, and later to the Entente agreement of April 8th, 1904. These agreements, although concluded by Delcassé, the alleged war-intriguer, constituted a work of peace, and not a preparation for war, in which guise they are now falsely represented by Schiemann and his comrades. They were a result of the pacifist propaganda in both countries, which was conducted by the friends of peace and promoted and encouraged by the Governments.

The rapprochement between the two nations had begun as far back as the Paris Exhibition of 1900. English workmen, representing two million members of their unions, came to Paris to make a demonstration on behalf of peace with their French comrades in a great manifesto (October, 1900). French workmen returned this visit (June, 1901) and conveyed in the name of the organised French proletariat an appeal which concluded with the words: "War against war, long live peace, long live the international unity of nations." In July, 1903, the memorable Parliamentary meeting between

¹For this and the following facts, see Fried, Vol. II., page 150.

members of the French and English Parliaments took place, in which the leader of the French peace movement, Senator d'Estournelles de Constant, delivered his noble speech in favour of peace and arbitration, which was echoed in a sense equally friendly to peace by the English Ministers, Balfour and Chamberlain, as well as by Campbell-Bannerman who was then leader of the Liberal party. Balfour, who was then the Unionist Prime Minister, celebrated the conclusion of the Anglo-French treaty of arbitration, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, observing that it was to be hoped that there would be a constant increase in "that international spirit which makes every European Power feel that it is committing a crime against civilisation if it unnecessarily plunges the world into war, and that the only method by which that incalculable disaster is to be avoided is by either submitting the questions in dispute to some impartial tribunal, some tribunal whose arbitrament shall be taken as final, or by that frank and free interchange of view which, in public as in private life is the surest and most certain way of avoiding misunderstandings."

All these, be it observed, were utterances and actions of the Unionist Government which is accused by our imperialists of having brought into the world the idea of militant Imperialism. In so far as we understand by Imperialism the more rigid cohesion of the English world-empire, which, as we know, Chamberlain desired to attain not merely by a closer military union but also by an economic system of preferential treatment, to this extent the English Unionist party may be described as representative of imperialistic thought; in so far, however, as this phrase is intended to describe the criminal pursuit of a European war, the effort to achieve territorial expansion at the cost of other European nations by means of the most unparalleled shedding of blood in the history of the world, it is a deliberate lie and falsification to represent England or any party in that country as the originator of Imperialism. The credit of having brought *this* Imperialism into the world belongs exclusively to Germany, to its Pan-Ger-

mans, its militarists and its politicians of world-power, to all those to whom we are indebted for this war.

* * * * *

If the Unionist Government of England had already manifested such zeal in seeking the realisation of the peace ideas of The Hague, it is possible to imagine the activity in this direction of the Liberal Government which followed it. While our war literature depicts in the blackest colours King Edward VII. as the devilish instigator of the world-war, as the arranger of the "attack," the Liberal party which was in power during the last five years of his life devoted its whole energies—like its predecessor the Unionist Government—to preaching peace and understanding among the nations and the alleviation of the burden of armaments, and it did what lay in its power to set this work in train.

At the head of the great Committee for promoting an understanding between England and Germany stood the King's brother-in-law, the Duke of Argyll, and with him were associated several hundreds of the most distinguished names in the English nation. The formation of the English Committee had as a consequence the foundation of a corresponding German Committee. The activity of these societies found expression in the following years in the interchange of visits by journalists, mayors, workmen, and clergy. I have already quoted in my book a series of utterances of the Liberal English Ministers in favour of the peace-efforts of The Hague. In this place I should further like to refer to the words in which Haldane on the occasion of the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9th, 1906, explained the necessity of a limitation of armaments: "We would fain see a time such as, I believe, will come, when the nations will look back on such periods as ours as periods of barbarism, and wonder how men could spend millions to the prejudice of the problems that lay around them." These are the words then spoken by Haldane with reference to the mania for armaments. What words would be in place to-day with reference to the mania for murder, which has seized the most highly civilized peoples of the world!

In France, Italy, and America as well, leading men in responsible positions spoke in favour of the peace-efforts of The Hague. On June 12th, 1906, in the Chamber of Deputies, Léon Bourgeois, who was then Prime Minister, and who has now been recalled to the Ministry of Briand—a fact which it may be hoped is full of promise—welcomed most sympathetically any initiative in the direction of a diminution of armaments. Tittoni, who was then Italian Foreign Minister—another war-intriguer according to the assertions of the German falsifiers of history—in June, 1906, in answer to an inquiry in Parliament, also expressed himself to the effect “that it would be a crime against humanity not to co-operate sincerely in those undertakings which had for their aim a simultaneous diminution in the armaments of the great nations.” The inclusion of the problem of armaments in the programme of the second Hague Conference was, as I have pointed out in my book, due to England, since the Russian Government, having regard to the evil experiences of the first Hague Conference and the whole attitude of the German Government and governmental Press in the intervening period of time, were impelled to the view that a new discussion of this problem would be useless and might indeed imperil the pacific course of the Conference. Even then our Yellow Press were masters of the art of falsifying every good work for the promotion of an understanding between the nations by ascribing it to malicious intentions against Germany and in this way securing its failure. Let any one compare the attitude of the German Press—always excepting the social democratic papers and a few representing the Liberals on the Left—the attitude of our leading politicians and of our Government, as represented by Prince Bülow’s speech in the Reichstag on April 30th, 1907, towards this question which is of equal interest to all nations, with the attitude of the English Parliament, the English Press and the English Government as I have represented it in my book (pages 92-96). On the one side there will be found, not merely sympathy, but enthusiastic intervention on behalf of the peace-work of The Hague, whereas on the other side there will be found not

merely scepticism but scoffing and mockery, contempt and threats.

A month before Prince Bülow discharged in the Reichstag his stream of cold water to the effect that Germany would not participate in the discussion of the question of armaments, but would only later on "conscientiously inquire whether it (the result of the discussion) corresponds to the protection of our peace, our national interests, and our particular situation"—a month before this, Campbell-Bannerman, the English Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons, had described the bellicose attitude of the Powers to each other, as shown in the inordinate increase of armaments, as a "curse" to which a check must be put. Almost simultaneously with his speech he published a signed article in the *Nation* in which he urged that British naval power, while it must necessarily be predominant on account of the peculiar position of Great Britain, nevertheless possessed no aggressive character: he emphasised the readiness of the British Government, as in the previous year, 1906, so also in the following period, to set a good example to other countries by a voluntary reduction in the naval estimates in the hope that they would follow this lead: he emphatically pointed out the necessity that the question of armaments should not be excluded from the discussions of the second Hague Conference then pending. The wish thus entertained by the English Government was officially communicated to the leading naval powers¹; as is well known, effect was also given to it by the inclusion of the question of armaments in the programme of the second Conference, although in consequence of the emphatic opposition of Germany, discussion had to be omitted and the Conference had again to restrict itself to a platonic resolution (August 17th, 1907).

The personal antipathy of the Emperor William towards any restriction or even suspension of naval armaments by treaty is in full agreement with the views which were represented by the Government, the Parliament and the Press

¹ See Cook, page 10.

in Germany. The Emperor was in no way reticent on the subject of his aversion from any such idea: he expressed it clearly to the British Ambassador, to King Edward and to Haldane, who was then Minister for War (King Edward and Haldane visited the Emperor in the late summer and in the autumn). It is therefore an invention on the part of Schiemann, when he asserts that King Edward on the occasion of his visit to Cronberg had expressed himself "in a highly ironical manner with regard to the Hague Conference," and that Sir Charles Hardinge, who accompanied him, denied that the Conference had exercised any influence on English naval policy. As is the case with most of his assertions, Herr Schiemann cites no authority for these statements. The actual behaviour of the English Government and of all its members, Campbell-Bannerman, Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, etc., their speeches and writings, their successful intervention for the inclusion of the problem of armaments in the Hague programme—all these prove that Schiemann's assertion regarding the ironical or negative utterances of the King and his attendant is a deliberate invention and falsification, designed to hush up and to reveal in a milder light the crass German refusal of any discussion of the question of armaments before and during the Conference.

Schiemann has the temerity to write the following sentence:

In this matter (*i.e.*, the negative attitude towards the discussion of the problem of armaments), even if from different motives, the German and the English views coincided. (*How England*, etc., pages 13, 14.)

This is simply a lie. England proposed and secured the discussion of the problem of armaments at the second Hague Conference; Germany refused to participate in this discussion. In order to avoid a conflict which would have endangered the success of the whole Conference, a compromise was agreed upon, the substance of which was that the first representative of Great Britain delivered an address, in which

the problem was illuminated from all sides, and proposed a resolution agreed upon in advance, which recommended to the Governments the further serious examination of the question of armaments. The resolution was unanimously adopted, but in accordance with Germany's desire all discussion was excluded. This is the historical truth, whereas the contrary assertions of the German historian are the reverse of the truth.

Haldane's visit to the German Emperor in September, 1906, had the same negative result as the previous visit of the English King and his Under-Secretary of State, that is to say, it was met by a refusal on the part of the Emperor and his Government of any discussion regarding an agreement as to armaments. To Haldane's visit of 1906—as to his later visit of 1912—Schiemann endeavours to give the character of a trick by the addition of prejudiced observations, regardless of the relations of personal friendship already mentioned, which had existed between him and the English statesmen. These men, Schiemann and his comrades, are, in fact, complete gentlemen: the fear of seeing their deceitful house of cards collapse compels them to lay aside even every personal feeling of decency towards those who have been their friends, when the question at stake is the protection of their artificial construction from the dangerous breath of truth.

In order to deprive Haldane's visit in 1906 of its true significance as a friendly *rapprochement* to Germany and an auspicious preparation for the imminent Hague Conference, Schiemann after mentioning it immediately adds the false assertion "that about this time an Anglo-French military agreement was concluded with a view to future possibilities" (page 14). This "military agreement" is merely the non-committal discussion of military experts, dealt with in the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912. As we have already seen, these discussions were anything but a military agreement, and above all—the only point which is relevant to Schiemann's thesis—they had anything but an offensive character. This, however, does not prevent the historian from transcribing the sentence: "These military conversations were regularly continued until the outbreak of the present

war, just as if a secret alliance existed." The reader should observe the method pursued: the true aim of Haldane's visit, and especially its relation to the imminent Hague Conference is effaced: by emphasising the Anglo-French military agreement, alleged to have been concluded about the same time, motives of direct deceit are ascribed to Haldane's visit, and then to crown the building of lies, a secret alliance is made out of the military agreement.

It is thus that the antecedents of the second Hague Conference are represented by the *Kreuzzeitung* Professor, who affects to adopt towards me the rôle of the moral preacher. He accuses me of suppression, because in dealing with the historical antecedents I failed to mention the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Venezuela incident, or the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. I do, in fact, speak of this Entente in numberless places in my book, where its discussion is relevant. The Venezuela incident and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are, however, so remotely connected with the Hague Conferences, that I would have had to relate the whole history of Europe or even the history of Europe and America during the last decades in order to avoid Schiemann's charge of intentional concealment.

The Venezuela dispute has no doubt a certain significance from my point of view also, since on the one hand it showed the possibility of peaceful co-operation between Germany and England for the attainment of common aims, and on the other hand it furnished an opportunity to the tribunal set up by the first Hague Conference to play its part, and to end the dispute by pronouncing a judgment (February 22nd, 1904). Between the first and the second Hague Conferences other international disputes also were brought before the tribunal, and were peacefully disposed of to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. All the graver is Germany's offence in having offered at the second Hague Conference the most bitter opposition to this institution for the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war, an institution so full of promise for the future, which had already proved its vitality during eight years, and in having by her resistance wrecked the com-

pulsory convocation of the tribunal and consequently the essential purpose of this institution.

* * * * *

The most preposterous aspect of Schiemann's attitude is, however, revealed in the fact that this man, who counts it as a crime in me not to have mentioned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Venezuela dispute, does not have a word to say in his two pamphlets of the course of events at the second Hague Conference and of its results. He completely suppresses this Conference, which, of course, constitutes for him a very inconvenient fact. To him more than to anyone else we may apply the charge which Walter Schücking has brought against all the Professors who have written war-pamphlets, namely, that they do not trouble about the Hague Peace Conferences, and that in consequence they do not know "how much Germany in this very question (the question of armaments) offended foreign Powers at the Hague Conferences." I must at any rate protect Herr Schiemann against the charge of ignorance. His crime is worse than ignorance. He knows what took place at The Hague; he also knows exactly the antecedents of the Hague Conferences, but he deliberately suppresses the truth, because it would bring down the whole of the house of cards which he has so laboriously pasted together. He intentionally omits the central point of my *Historical Antecedents of the Crime* in order to build in its place his snippet- and lie-factory with the object of deceiving the German people regarding the real responsibility for the European tension in the last years before the outbreak of the war.

It is a peculiar coincidence that almost immediately after the failure of the agreement as to a suspension and a later diminution of armaments, which England, Russia and France had endeavoured to secure, there followed the Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to their mutual spheres of interest in Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, which formed the basis and the beginning of the *rapprochement* between the

two Powers in European politics as well, and which is ordinarily described as the Anglo-Russian Entente. The platonic resolution on the question of armaments, to which the Conference was compelled to restrict itself in consequence of Germany's opposition to any material discussion and decision, was arrived at in The Hague on August 17th, 1907. The Anglo-Russian agreement was concluded on August 31st of the same year—a sequence of events in time which at any rate is interesting, even if no causal connection may have existed.

ONE "BLOCK," NOT "BLOCKS," IN EUROPE

As we have seen above, the overwhelming majority of the civilised world decided on October 5th, 1907, in favour of the introduction of a general, compulsory and world-wide system of arbitration. It was only Germany and Austria, followed by a few smaller States, who offered a most violent resistance to this epoch-making advance in the peaceful development of mankind. This fact, however, did not prevent the principle of compulsory arbitration from being accepted by thirty-two votes to nine, although no doubt with many exceptions which again were introduced by Germany. The proposal to make compulsion binding at least on those States which had voted for the proposal, also came to grief on the opposition of the German delegate, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein. Thus the resolution of the second Hague Conference also remained a torso—a moral victory for the pacifist views which had animated the States which voted in its favour, and a moral defeat for Germany, which by combating the proposal for arbitration and the agreement as to armaments bears the responsibility for the continuance of the anarchical condition between the nations, which has led to the world-wide war of to-day. Even now, after the outbreak of the devastating conflagration, the leading circles in Germany are still without comprehension of these endeavours which might then have prevented the conflagration, and which alone can prevent its renewed outbreak in

future.¹ Without an organisation of the nations and, connected with it, an agreement as to armaments there can be no enduring peace. A merely partial organisation of the European nations, a new segregation into groups, no matter out of what elements, under what leadership and in what form these groups may be formed, would not cure the evil, but would merely cause it to arise in an altered form. The new groups would stand opposed to each other with as much distrust and enmity as the old, they would arm against each other as before—probably even more intensively and ruinously, since the new state of force would give occasion to every possible kind of revenge and reparation, the after-throes of the world-war would engender new hatred and embitterment among the nations. In consequence of technical progress, armaments would rise to an intolerable height more rapidly even than before, and for the same reasons as in the summer of 1914 would lead, intentionally or unintentionally, to new and even more violent explosions. Only an undivided organisation of the nations, without the formation of groups, without alliances and ententes, can prevent the repetition of such world-catastrophes. Every person of comprehension, no matter to which country he may belong, must and does realise this fact. It is only in Germany, as is proved by all the views expressed in authoritative circles, that reason will once again fail to make her influence felt, it is only there that the pursuit of power and of dominion by the govern-

¹ I must here again point out that my book was almost completed, when Herr von Bethmann, to the surprise of the whole world, suddenly came forward on November 9th, 1916, with his avowal of pacifist ideas, an action in flagrant opposition to the attitude and the views of everyone in authority in Germany ever since a pacifist movement has existed. This pacifism of necessity, in the highest degree suspicious and incredible, which, on the one hand, strives for the security of Germany's power in every possible way, but, on the other, produces honey-sweet words concerning law and the freedom of the nations—this platonic pacifism of power, which is void of presupposition and of result—I have elsewhere, in the later section on War-Aims (Chapter, "Bethmann the Pacifist") denounced as it deserves. My characterisation of the past is in no way influenced or modified by this deceitful vision of the future.

ing classes and cliques is once again directed to securing only the interests of victorious Germany and of her allies. Even yet they have not got so far as to recognise the fact that the interests of all States, including Germany and her allies, if correctly understood, can be promoted only in a comprehensive organisation, but not in the formation of new groups, no matter of what nature they may be.

Whatever may be the appearance or the description of the newly-planned formation, whether it be conceived as a middle-European Union of States or as a block of the Central Powers (with the addition of Bulgaria and Turkey, and a zone of territory "from Ostend to Baghdad"), every grouping of Powers which presupposes various blocks instead of one undivided European block of States is from the outset exposed to the same dangers and the same catastrophes as the previous formation of groups under the European balance of Power. There must be one block, not various blocks, in Europe! That must be the watchword of all the true friends of peace. That is the idea which must determine the future of Europe. If the Governments of the Central Powers oppose the realisation of this idea after this war, they will act just as criminally as they did when they rejected and wrecked the peace-ideas of the Hague, which represented the unfailing means of preventing the present war.

CHAPTER IV

ENGLISH PACIFISM IN WORD AND DEED

THE pacifism of the Liberal English Government was manifested not merely in theory, but was also practically demonstrated on every possible occasion. I have dealt in detail in *J'accuse* (pages 99-114) with the efforts made by the English Government after the failure of the second Hague Conference with the object of arriving at a direct agreement with Germany on the question of a mutual restriction of naval armaments and simultaneously at a political understanding, and to these points I propose to return later. The "slanderer," of course, makes no mention of any of the facts which are relevant to this subject. For the Prussian historian the speeches and the actions of the friends of peace in the English Ministry—and this description may be applied to all its members without exception, to Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, Haldane, etc.—have simply no existence.

Quite apart from the unwearying intervention of the English Ministers with a view to securing a restriction of armaments and a political understanding with Germany, it is worth while considering how many European wars which threatened to break out in the years following the second Hague Conference—and indeed at an earlier date also—were prevented owing to the energetic participation, and in fact, in most cases under the leadership, of the English Government. There is complete harmony between the actions of the leading men of England and the views and aspirations expressed by them. I would merely recall the Moroccan confusions of 1909 and 1911 which on both occasions, with the help of England's mediation, led to a

treaty-agreement between Germany and France, as had already happened on a previous occasion in the Algeciras Treaty (1905-6). I would recall the crisis of 1908-9 in connection with the annexation of Bosnia in which England on March 25th, 1909, took the lead in recognising the situation created by Austria and Russia and Serbia followed the English example. I would recall the Crete conflict of 1908-9, in which war was prevented between Greece and Turkey by the mediatory intervention of the protecting Powers, including England; I would above all recall the leading part played by Sir Edward Grey during the Balkan conflict of 1912-13, which was prevented from developing into a European war only by the pacific co-operation of England and Germany. Finally, although it is unnecessary that I should again enumerate the points involved, I would recall—and this, of course, is the cardinal point of all my demonstrations—all that Grey, as Foreign Minister in Asquith's Cabinet, did to prevent the present war. These facts prove England's desire and love of peace, and furnish a striking refutation of the lying invention of Schiemann and his comrades to the effect that England for years had prepared and desired war.

ENGLAND'S ACTION DURING THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND THE BALKAN CONFLICT

(Duel between Grey and Bethmann, May—June, 1916.)

Inasmuch as German and Austrian writers have lately thrown doubt on the efforts for peace made by England during recent European crises, it is necessary that I should here enter somewhat more fully into this point. This doubt has been intentionally suggested with a view to questioning, by means of examples drawn from the past, the sincerity of the efforts in the cause of peace made by England in the summer of 1914. The discussion of the past is thus intimately connected with the present question of guilt. The question at issue is England's behaviour during the crisis in connection with the annexation of Bosnia in 1908-9 and during the Bal-

kan conflict of 1912-13. The discussions on this question were conducted with the utmost energy between the German and the English Governments and their semi-official writers in May and June, 1916.

In an interview with Bell, an American journalist, representing the *Chicago Daily News*, Grey gave a short summary of the points of the indictment which suffice to lay the responsibility for the war on the German and Austrian Governments. The points constituting the arraignment are in entire agreement with the considerations tending to incriminate the Central Powers which are emphasised by me in *J'accuse* and in this second book. Grey rightly attached special weight to his conference-proposal, and to its rejection by Germany and Austria:

If the Conference in London in the Balkan crisis in 1912-13 had been worked to the disadvantage of Germany or her allies the German reluctance for a conference in 1914 would have been intelligible, but no more convincing pledge of fair play and single-minded desire for fair settlement than the conduct of that Conference in London was ever given.

The ensuing discussion between the German and the English Governments hinged on this sentence of Grey's. Herr von Bethmann was likewise interviewed by an American journalist and advanced on this occasion those untenable reasons against Grey's conference-proposal which he has incessantly produced ever since the conference was refused (July 27th, 1914). I have elsewhere already sufficiently criticised these threadbare reasons which in reality were merely pretexts, and I need not return to the subject here. I shall in this place submit to investigation only the new excuses put forward by the German Chancellor.

BETHMANN'S REASONS FOR REFUSING THE CONFERENCE

The following are the new reasons which the Chancellor urges against Grey's conference, reasons which are suspect if only by reason of the fact that they did not occur to him

until so late in the day, after the lapse of almost two years' warfare:

1. "How could I accept this (Grey's) proposal in view of the comprehensive measures of mobilisation of the Russian Army which were then in full swing? Notwithstanding official Russian denials and the fact that the formal order of mobilisation was not issued until the evening of July 30th, we knew quite well (and the fact has since been confirmed) that the Russian Government, in accordance with a resolution taken on July 25th, had already begun to mobilise when Grey's conference-proposal was put forward. . . . With two frontiers to be defended, Germany could not enter into any discussions of which the outcome was highly problematical, while the enemy made use of the time to mobilise the armies with which it was intended he should fall upon us."

2. "In the critical days of July, 1914, Grey himself recognised that my counter-proposal of a direct discussion between the Cabinets of Vienna and Petrograd was more calculated to arrive at a settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict than a conference, and after overcoming many obstacles the discussion thus urged by Germany was making favourable progress when Russia made war inevitable by the sudden mobilisation of her entire forces, an action which took place against the express assurances given to us."

3. The Chancellor appeals to the behaviour of England during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 in order to confirm the suspicion that just as England on that occasion had done nothing for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, but on the contrary had expressed in Petrograd her discontent that a peaceful solution had been reached, so on this occasion (1914) also she had obviously not pursued peace with sincerity of purpose but had only sought to gain time with a view to being better prepared for the attack.

THE RUSSIAN MOBILISATION AS A REASON FOR REFUSING
THE CONFERENCE

Point 1. The reference to the Russian mobilisation in justification of the refusal of the conference is a complete novelty; it appears here for the first time after almost two years of war. Previously only two explanations had been advanced, one by Germany, the other by Austria. There was the familiar reason put forward by Germany, that they could not summon their ally before a European tribunal. There was the equally familiar reason advanced by Austria, that Grey's proposal had arrived too late, and had been "outstripped" by the declaration of war against Serbia which had already taken place. I have already explained in detail in many places in my first and in this my second book what view must be taken of these explanations.¹ In particular I have already pointed out in my first book the contradiction which exists between the reasons furnished by Berlin and by Vienna, and demonstrated the incredibility of the one as well as the other.

And now Herr von Bethmann comes along with an entirely new explanation, which is even more foolish and untenable than the previous ones. Now suddenly we are told that the Russian measures of mobilisation constituted the decisive factor in leading to the refusal of the Conference. Herr von Bethmann appears to have forgotten his own White Book and all his previous statements, which never cast any doubt on the fact that Russia's partial mobilisation took place on July 29th, and her general mobilisation on July 31st. On the other hand, as I have proved beyond dispute in my first and second books, Grey's conference-idea emerged as early as July 24th, immediately after the Austrian Ultimatum became known, and from that time it was never again lost sight of. It was formally declined by Germany on July 27th, and by Austria on July 28th, for reasons which have not the remotest connection with the Russian measures of mobilisation. As we know, these measures were, no doubt, resolved upon on July 25th

¹ See *J'accuse*, pages 148 *et seq.*, 327-331; *The Crime*, Vol. I., Chap. I.

when Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, but were only carried into effect in the form of a partial mobilisation on July 29th. This partial mobilisation was nothing more than the consequence of the intransigent diplomatic attitude of Austria and Germany. This consequence must now suddenly be falsified into the cause. Russia carried out the partial mobilisation on July 29th because the conference as well as the direct negotiations with Petrograd had been abruptly refused and no independent proposal for mediation had been made by the Central Powers, notwithstanding the urgent request of the Entente Powers. The Russian partial mobilisation was the consequence of the diplomatic attitude of the Central Powers (and at the same time of the military action of Austria against Serbia) and not conversely.

It is an obvious invention on the part of Herr von Bethmann when in the spring of 1916 he asserts for the first time that the Russian mobilisation had already begun when Grey's conference-proposal was put forward. No one who reads the exact determination of the time when Grey's proposal first appeared and the account of its further fate contained in *J'accuse* and in this work, and compares with these results my close investigation into the time at which the Russian mobilisation took place, no one who consults the passages cited by me from the diplomatic publications of all countries including the White and the Red Books will find anywhere the slightest hint that Russia had already begun her measures of mobilisation on July 27th when Germany declined the conference, or on July 24th when Grey first communicated his conference-idea to Prince Lichnowsky. The most recent excuse of the German Chancellor thus comes to nothing, like all its predecessors.

When Herr von Bethmann further points out that Germany could not have entered into problematical discussions, because the result of such a course of action would have been to give the enemy time for sufficient preparation for the attack, it appears to me to be superfluous to devote any closer attention to this illogical objection, which is void of any

foundation in fact. That Bethmann's objection has no foundation in fact has already been sufficiently explained elsewhere. It is also, however, illogical in the highest degree, inasmuch as it furnishes a classical example of a *petitio principii*. That the other countries meant to attack Germany is in fact the very proposition which is to be proved. Grey's conference-proposal is one of the many pieces of evidence which can be urged against the existence of aggressive intentions. If the existence of such intentions were proved, Herr von Bethmann would of course have been quite right not to allow his enemies time to put themselves in a better state of preparation. Since, however, the aggressive intention is first to be proved, and the whole discussion of the question of guilt is merely directed to this one aim, it is a violation of the fundamental laws of logic to represent as already demonstrated the proposition to be proved, and to draw further conclusions from it.

Point 2. Herr von Bethmann's further assertion that in the critical days of 1914 Grey himself recognised that the German counter-proposal of a direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd was preferable to the conference is one of those legends which I have already completely demolished elsewhere (see *The Crime*, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Grey's Proposal for a Conference, pages 77-82). I may refer the reader to what I have there said.

ENGLAND'S BEHAVIOUR DURING THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND THE BALKAN CONFLICTS

Point 3. It was more particularly Bethmann's revelations with regard to the Bosnian crisis that gave rise to the further discussions (in May and June, 1916) with regard to the rôle which England had played in the earlier Balkan conflicts. First of all Grey, in the sitting of the House of Commons of May 24th, sharply attacked the Chancellor's historical account which he described as entirely new and as "a first-class lie." He added the very significant words which are true not only of the more remote but above all of the immediate ante-

cedents of the war: "You cannot reason with the German people so long as they are fed with lies and know nothing of the truth." He also spoke of a "laboratory" in Germany which was constantly at work on behalf of the Government providing such falsified accounts of history as might be required. He did not mention the Manager of this laboratory. But we know that his name begins with *Sch* and ends with *nn*. And in saying this, I do not mean to commit any indiscretion. At any rate I find fully prepared in the writings of this Sch...nn all the dishes which the Chancellor and his Press are thereupon in the habit of serving piping hot to the German Reichstag and the German people. In a former passage we even found carefully prepared in the writings of the *Kreuzzeitung* professor the alleged "disappointment" and "embitterment" experienced by the English diplomatists on account of the pacific settlement of the Bosnian crisis, although, certainly, without any proof. I was therefore all the more interested to see the evidence which would now be produced by the German Government, after the outbreak of the official battle of the newspapers.

And now the evidence is before us. Two reports from Count Pourtalès of April 1st and April 5th, 1909, have been published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (May 27th, 1916). There is no more. These two reports are the foundation of Bethmann's assertion that England never laboured for peace but always for war, and that therefore the conference of 1914 also was not intended to serve the maintenance of peace.

What, then, is contained in these epoch-making reports of Count Pourtalès which, according to the most recent account of the Chancellor, justified an attitude of suspicion towards Grey's last conference-proposal? In the first place it is very interesting to observe the manner in which the attempt is made to confuse the real subject to be proved. Grey had pointed to England's attitude at the London Balkan Conference, 1912-13, as proof of the general pacific intentions of English policy; Herr von Bethmann, on the other hand, in order to throw suspicion on England's love of peace, quietly interposes the

Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 in place of the Balkan Conference. The Chancellor passes in silence over the real question at issue, England's attitude at the Balkan Conference, for the simple reason that in such a case where the point in dispute relates to an official conference of all the Ambassadors concerned assembled in London, a falsification of the position was impossible, whereas the events of 1908-09, which were enacted in the oldest forms of secret diplomacy, could at will be falsified, perverted and embellished with all sorts of gossiping and back-stair stories. Herr von Bethmann entirely passes over the London Conference of Ambassadors. His colleague, Herr von Burian, however, who at a later stage also intervened in this discussion of diplomatists, cannot avoid bearing witness to Grey's activity at the London Conference of Ambassadors in the words: "Grey showed good faith, in so far as he was sincerely anxious to promote the solution of the questions pending."

What, then, is the accusation which Count Pourtalès brings against English diplomacy in connection with the Bosnian crisis? I can only recommend the reader to peruse in the original the two reports which were printed in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in order that he may again realise by what kind of people and by what methods diplomatic business is conducted, on what absurd gossip the vital destinies of the nations are only too often made dependent. After a settlement had been arrived at with regard to Bosnia, that is to say, after the Russian and Serbian recognition of the Austrian annexation, Count Pourtalès heard "from Russian acquaintances and friendly diplomatists" that Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was then English Ambassador in Petrograd, had given expression to "inciting" views on the conflict which had then been settled between Russia and Austria. These observations were said to have been expressed in the salons of Petrograd, and also at a large dinner at the German Embassy in the presence of ladies. Nicolson is also said to have stated frigidly to the German Ambassador that it was by no means certain that his Government would express their concurrence

in this solution. At the Yacht Club members of the English Embassy had uttered words to the effect that "Germany had stamped with the cuirassier's boot," etc. It could be "plainly seen that Sir Arthur Nicolson was chagrined at the solution of the Bosnian crisis which resulted from our action, and is now most zealously endeavouring to propagate the legend of the German menace in order in this way to poison the relations between Russia and Germany." So much for the first report of Count Pourtalès.

The second report (of April 5th, 1909), which is based on "entirely confidential communications received from a well-informed source," speaks of grave reproaches which Nicolson had brought against M. Isvolsky, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, on account of his conciliatory attitude in the question of annexation. Isvolsky, we are told, declined the invitation of the English Ambassador to postpone the Russian answer until the English Government had decided on the attitude they would assume. (How is this to be reconciled with the *rôle* assigned to Isvolsky as the contriver of war and the worst of Germany's enemies, the man who only nine months before had completed the aggressive conspiracy in the roadstead at Reval?) Not only Nicolson, however, but Grey himself was also very much chagrined at the supineness of Russian policy, and had reproached the Russian Ambassador in London on the subject; indeed he had even gone so far as to state that public opinion in England would at that time have approved Great Britain's intervention in a war on the side of Russia.

These are the documents which are supposed to justify Bethmann's distrust of England's "alleged" peace policy in the summer of 1914. Since the defectiveness of this evidence was clearly perceived in Berlin and Vienna, Herr von Burian, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, now came forward with revelations in support of his ally. In the first place a semi-official article was launched in the *Pester Lloyd* which in many respects is of the greatest interest, and at a later date a report by Herr von Burian, which was intended to throw some more light on the incidents of 1908-9, was read in the

Hungarian House of Deputies. The article in the *Pester Lloyd* of May 27th which may without hesitation be regarded as an expression of the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government, establishes first of all the following decisive point in connection with the London Conference of Ambassadors: "The general impression gained at the conference was that English diplomacy was anxious to avoid war and maintain peace." When the further statement is added that this maintenance of peace took place at the cost of Austria and in favour of Serbia and her supporters, I need only refer in this connection to the historical facts which are familiar to every reader of the newspapers, as I have already done at great length in *J'accuse*. The completely egotistical insatiability, the blindly brutal selfishness of these Austrian statesmen, their unparalleled disregard of the interests of other peoples and of the peace of Europe are once more revealed in the assertion now made by the semi-official Hungarian organ that the decisions then reached by the London Conference took place at the expense of Austria. I need only recall the evacuation of Scutari, the foundation of the Albanian principality, the enforced removal of the Serbians from the Adriatic Coast which they had conquered—I need only refer to these and to all the other concessions made to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to demonstrate the emptiness of the complaint now raised that Austria was obliged to bear the cost of the settlement. But this additional observation is of minor importance. The essential point lies in the confession that on the occasion of the London Conference of Ambassadors English diplomacy honourably and sincerely desired to avoid war and to maintain peace. That is the salient point in the whole of this discussion. At the beginning of the discussion this was what Grey had pointed out as an auspicious prelude to the intended Conference of Ambassadors in 1914. This was what Bethmann in his reply passed over in silence, when he quietly substituted the question of the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 in place of the Conference of Ambassadors. This is now confirmed by the Austro-Hungarian Government in their semi-official organ, and this fact

completely disposes of Bethmann's objection to the conference of 1914. If in 1912-13, as Burian testifies personally as well as through his semi-official organ, Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he was certainly entitled to refer to this fact now and to prove by reference to it his love of peace in 1914.

AN ARTICLE IN THE *Pester Lloyd*—A NEW SELF-ACCUSATION OF AUSTRIA

The article in the *Pester Lloyd* of May 27th, 1916, is, however, also of great importance from other points of view. It contains, for example, the following sentence directed against Grey's conference idea:

His conference-proposal was intended to cement the concert of the Great Powers until a time which appeared to him to be better fitted for striking against Germany; it aimed at a renunciation by Austria-Hungary of her right to regulate, according to her own needs, the most important questions connected with the defence of her frontier, and it was consequently directed from the first against the basis of our existence. . . . In the question of the conference the monarchy had to decide, and it was the monarchy which arrived at a decision against the conference. . . . The refusal of the conference was nothing more than an obvious affirmation of the monarchy's will to live as a great Power. . . . For us his conference-proposal was and is one of the facts which prove that England was interested in weakening us and in keeping us in a perpetual state of insecurity by Serbian machinations, in depreciating for Germany our strength as allies, in deceiving Germany by diplomatic tricks and in postponing the settlement with Germany until the time when Russia should be completely prepared for war. Grey, the conference-politician, was no peace-politician. For this reason the monarchy did not accept his conference. It is neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany that is responsible for the failure of the conference-idea, but another: Sir Edward Grey.

These sentences of the semi-official organ of Budapest contain in the first place the unvarnished confession that Ger-

many and Austria were not attacked by their opponents in the summer of 1914, but that they provoked a so-called preventive war against a future attack. If Grey wished to choose "the time which appeared to him to be better fitted for striking against Germany," if he wished "to postpone the settlement with Germany until the time when Russia should be completely prepared for war," this can only mean that at any rate the English Secretary for State did not wish for war in the summer of 1914. And thus the hostile attack is semi-officially disowned by the Austro-Hungarian Government itself.

When the article further goes on to state that the monarchy declined the conference because it desired to decide on its vital interests according to its own standard, it proves that the reasons for refusal advanced by Count Berchtold to the effect that the proposal had arrived "too late," and that it was "outstripped" by the declaration of war against Serbia were merely pretexts. This is also in agreement with all the other facts and evidence. Austria in fact was no more desirous than Germany of accepting any form of mediation in the Austro-Serbo-Russian dispute. It was resolved, because it was instigated and protected by Germany, to choose the European war rather than accept any form of mediation. I need not again speak in this place of the vacillations of Austria at the last moment. Even if they had been dictated by the most sincere desire to promote an understanding, they were no longer adapted to preserve peace in view of the intransigence of the Central Powers in the earlier stages of the crisis, the stipulations contained in the last statements emanating from Vienna, and the unconditional will for war which was increasingly manifested by Germany. The criminal determination to refuse every European mediation, even in the friendly form of mere advice in Vienna and Petrograd such as Grey had proposed, is admitted in as many words in the semi-official statement in the *Pester Lloyd*. Herein is contained a new self-accusation of the Austrian Government, to be added to the many others of which I have already convicted her.

Most incriminating of all is the following sentence from the article in the *Pester Lloyd*. It is significant that I am unable to quote this sentence from German papers but am obliged to translate it from the *Humanité* of June 5th (correspondence of the Swiss representative Homo). It may be presumed that this sentence subsequently appeared so incriminating to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Viennese Correspondence Bureau and Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau have quite inadvertently "forgotten" to communicate it to the German Press—which is all the more reason why I should insert it here.

If Sir Edward Grey wishes to judge how profound and irrevocable was our desire to find a solution of the conflict with Serbia in a way which would once for all remove the criminal menace to peace which came from this side, he can form his conclusions from the fact which we assert in all sincerity, that even if the Russian Government had refrained from completing the mobilisation which it secretly continued notwithstanding all its hypocritical promises and assurances, indeed even if it had broken off the mobilisation which it had begun, Austria-Hungary would still have refused to agree to any conference, but would have insisted in settling her affair with Serbia in correspondence with the needs of her future security and without permitting herself to be prevented by a third party.

This is the most significant passage in the article in the *Pester Lloyd* of May 27th, which, as I say, I have found neither in the version reproduced by the Viennese Correspondence Bureau nor in that given by Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, but have had to translate from the *Humanité*. It is impossible to express more distinctly than in this passage the cynicism with which the authorities in Vienna, no doubt instigated and supported by Berlin, conjured up the European conflict on account of their rancour against Serbia, blind and deaf to the incalculable consequences. The semi-official Budapest paper in no way conceals the fact:

1. That all the objections put forward in the past and the present by Vienna and Berlin against Grey's confer-

ence-proposal were mere "bunkum": that they did not wish the conference for the simple reason that in fact they did not wish it. Austria's entry into the path of the Conference (Red Book No. 51, July 31st) was therefore only specious, it was intentionally couched in so indefinite expressions and veiled with so many stipulations and reservations in order to make the conference impossible or in any event fruitless.

2. That the Russian mobilisation had no bearing whatever on the decision of Austria-Hungary, but that the fact is rather that the Austrian Government would never have agreed to a conference, even if Russia had not mobilised or if she had broken off the mobilisation which had been begun.

This latter point is in flagrant and irreconcilable contradiction with the above mentioned reason for refusing the conference which is now advanced by Bethmann for the first time, the reason, namely, which attributes it to the Russian mobilisation. Herr von Bethmann says: The Russian mobilisation (which he suddenly dates back to July 25th) made it impossible for us to accept the conference. Herr von Burian says: Even if Russia had never mobilised, or had broken off her mobilisation, we should still have refused to agree to the conference. As in the case of so many other inconsistencies and self-accusations expressed by the two accused parties this irreconcilable contradiction also proves their guilt and their consciousness of guilt. Yet it remains astonishing how the two accomplices even in an action agreed upon in detail, as was that of May and June, 1916, are unable to achieve agreement. This is evidence not only of the badness of their cause, but also of the inferiority of their intelligence.

* * * * *

After this interesting digression on the incidents of 1914 we shall now return to the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9. In obvious pursuance of a plan of operation agreed upon with Berlin, Herr von Burian endeavours, with the aid of certain reports written by Austrian Ambassadors in Paris and Petro-

grad (dating from November, 1908, and March, 1909), to support Bethmann's assertion that England was "disappointed" by the pacific solution of the crisis then reached, and had done what she could to render the conflict more acute. These Austrian Ambassadorial reports speak of evil counsels inciting to war, which the English Government had imparted to the French authorities at the end of 1908. They further emphasise the support which Nicolson had accorded in Petrograd to Isvolsky's "policy of bluff," but they are nevertheless unable to conceal the fact that Isvolsky, without the consent of his British adviser, persuaded his ruler to express his "*adhésion sans réserve*" to the deletion of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty—thanks to the firm attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary and Germany, for the other Powers when confronted with this attitude "lost the courage to allow matters to proceed as far as a breach." After the settlement of the conflict had taken place, the evil Nicholas (or should we rather say the evil Nicolson?) is then said to have been at pains to exploit for his own purposes the dispute which had subsided:

Sir Arthur Nicolson, as well as his official and non-official State, now proceed to appeal to sentiment and thus endeavour to widen the breach which the development of events taking place in the near East has occasioned between the Central Powers and Russia.

This is all that the Viennese Government can produce against England by way of contribution to the Berlin Government's register of sins given in a preceding paragraph. In all there are four ambassadorial reports, two from Count Pourtalès, and one each from the Austrian Ambassadors in Paris and Petrograd. The reports of Count Pourtalès are said to be complete, as published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. The reports of the Austrian Ambassadors, on the other hand, I have only come across in the German Press in a fragmentary form as circulated by the Viennese Correspondence Bureau.

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What now is the reply of the English Government to the charge that in 1908-9 it was not a peaceful solution that they sought but strife. In an official statement published by Reuter on May 29th, the English Foreign Office denies all the charges brought against the English Government. Sir Arthur Nicolson states that the communications with regard to his conversation at table are "gossip" and "not true." The English Foreign Office publishes a report addressed by Nicolson to Grey on March 9th, 1909, in which the English Ambassador asserts the complete falseness of the reports which even then were in circulation to the effect that he had invited Isvolsky to assume an anti-German and anti-Austrian attitude: "I have never urged him to adopt a line which might widen the breach between him and Vienna."

With equal definiteness Grey denies that he had even in the remotest manner held out the prospect of a war in which England would participate on the side of Russia. On the contrary, in a review sent to Nicolson on February 27th, 1909, the leading English Minister expressly declares that at a meeting with M. Isvolsky in October, 1908, he had expressly given him to understand that England

would support Russia in getting what could be obtained by diplomatic support, but that we would not press things to the point of war. We are of opinion that to risk for Serbian territorial claims a war which might eventually involve the greater part of the Continent of Europe must be out of all proportion to the interests at stake.

This is the state of affairs: there is a charge brought by the Central Powers against England, and a defence submitted by England. The impression made by these documents on any unprejudiced reader must be that the German and Austrian statesmen make use of gossip and backstair stories, conversations at dinner in the presence of ladies, the tittle-tattle and the talk of the Yacht Club, whereas the English Government produces documents, positive statements from Nicolson, positive instructions from Grey—both dating from the time in question and consequently not fabricated *ad hoc*—which

completely dispose of the alleged English incitement to war in Paris and Petrograd. Let anyone compare the sober matter of fact statements of the English diplomatists with the grandmotherly gossiping stories which Count Pourtalès dishes up for Prince von Bülow—mere third-hand statements resting on hearsay—and then let him judge whether a leading German statesman is to-day entitled to deduce from these eight-year-old incidents in the salons of Petrograd the conclusion that England's intervention has always been directed to rendering European conflicts more acute and has never been aimed at their settlement, so that even in the summer of 1914 it was impossible to give credence to England's sincere desire for peace. This conclusion would be preposterous even if it rested on more weighty and better proved facts than those brought forward by Herr Bethmann and Herr Burian. It is refuted by the mere fact of England's attitude at the London Balkan Conference, an attitude which, according to Burian's express admission, was entirely designed to promote peace, and for this very reason Herr von Bethmann passes over it in silence. I have already pointed out above that the starting point of the whole discussion was England's attitude at the Balkan Conference, and that since Herr von Bethmann can allege nothing against the attitude then assumed, having regard to the historical facts and the express testimony given by his Secretaries of State, Kiderlen and Jagow, he unostentatiously alters the subject-matter and interposes the Bosnian crisis in place of the Balkan Conference. To his misfortune, this crisis also yields an absolutely negative result so far as his thesis of accusation is concerned.

But how can Herr von Bethmann answer to his conscience for his action in drawing from these long-forgotten events conclusions pointing to the malice of England—the very Herr von Bethmann who in many places in his White Book, and even in his declaration of war against Russia, conscientiously chronicles and mentions with praise the uninterrupted efforts made by Grey in the cause of peace at the end of July, 1914? In *J'accuse* (page 248) I collected together all the laudatory testimonies which the German Chancellor bore to the English

Secretary of State. In view of this, what are we to understand and what is proved by the fact that Herr von Bethmann now digs out old papers and wants to make us believe that in 1909 England gave expression in Petrograd to "her dissatisfaction with the pacific solution of the existing crisis"? This dissatisfaction, which is concocted in the laboratory of Herr Schiemann, evaporates at the first breath of documentary investigation. Yet even if the winter of 1908-9 had indeed been for the English Government a "winter of discontent," this attitude of mind would have been entirely explicable; for it can in fact have been no pleasure to the other European Powers to see in all the violent actions and demands of Austria the mailed fist of the German Emperor constantly raised behind his ally.

In any event the discontent which then existed proves nothing whatever in connection with the question of guilt to-day; for according to Germany's own acknowledgment on the occasion of the Balkan Conference, four years after the Bosnian crisis, England had co-operated with Germany in the maintenance of peace in the most honourable and successful manner. It is to this activity in the cause of peace that Sir Edward Grey appeals, and he rightly considers that it should have afforded a good omen for the success of the conference of 1914. That is the question around which the discussion turns. The German Chancellor will not succeed in diverting us from this subject by his red herring of 1908 and in making us suspicious now in the summer of 1916 of England's sincere desire for peace, to which he himself in the summer of 1914 paid as glowing a testimony in his White Book as did his predecessors in the years 1912 and 1913.

A FALSIFICATION OF THE *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*

What has been said above would be sufficient to dispose of the most recent charges against Grey's conference. I must still, however, devote a few words to a concluding article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of June 4th which, so

far as I know, represents the last statement of the German Government in this dispute. As a matter of course the semi-official organ seeks to defend the reports of Pourtalès against the English *démentis* and refers on this occasion to a statement made by Grey in his famous speech in the House of Commons on August 3rd, 1914, on the attitude assumed by England towards the French Republic during the Moroccan crisis of 1906. Grey considers the possibility which then existed of an outbreak of war between Germany and France and gives the following statement of the attitude which he then assumed :

I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

This statement of Grey's is quoted by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* which then adds the observation: "This statement is so much in agreement with Pourtalès' report on Grey's utterance that its authenticity is beyond dispute." This, be it observed, means that Grey promised Russia his military support during the Bosnian crisis. Grey energetically denies this and produces documents in support of his statements. Now, however, the probability of the German accusation is supposed to be proved by a statement which, by Grey's own admission, he gave to the French Government during the Moroccan conflict of 1906. This would all be very fine and very ingeniously contrived, if there were not a snag in the business. The snag is that Grey's statement, as given in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, is falsified in the most decisive point on which the whole matter depends. They have in fact, neither more nor less, omitted the interpolated clause quoted above "a question which had just been the subject of

agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides." It is on this interpolated clause that the whole matter turns. This is the salient point of Grey's statement. It should be remembered that during the critical days of 1914, in all his conversations with the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers, Grey had constantly emphasised the difference between the previous Franco-German Moroccan conflict and the existing Austro-Serbo-Russian dispute. The English Minister constantly emphasised the following point of view: The situation, he said in effect, was then entirely different, then the question was one of a conflict which directly affected France, a conflict on account of Morocco which by the Treaty of 1904 we had granted and guaranteed to the French Republic as a sphere of interest. At that time we were obliged, should the worst come to the worst, to support France by force of arms in the vindication of her interests in Morocco. That was the situation then. To-day, however, the question is one of a dispute in which France is primarily in no way interested, a dispute arising out of the rivalry between Russia and Austria in the Balkans in which France may ultimately be involved merely as the ally of Russia. In this dispute England at the outset does not feel called upon to take sides, much less to lend France her military support; England is free from any obligation, and in any decision she may take, she will be guided only by English interests. In various places in my first book and in this my second book I have elucidated the attitude thus adopted by Grey, and have cited many documents confirming it (see *J'accuse*, page 253 *et seq.*; *The Crime*, Volume I, Chapter II.; Blue Book, Nos. 87, 116, 119).

The same distinction between the Moroccan question and the Balkan question, which appeared in the conflicts of 1906 and 1914, holds, of course, for the conflicts of 1906 and 1908 as well. In 1906 there was a Moroccan conflict; in 1908 a Balkan conflict. It is therefore a deliberate falsification when the attempt is made to draw from Grey's attitude in 1906 conclusions as to his attitude in 1908, as Herr von Bethmann's semi-official organ endeavours to do. No one would

venture to make such an attempt unless, counting on uncritical readers, he suppressed the above decisive intervening sentence which definitely points to the special peculiarity of the case of Morocco, and unless he thus feigned an identity between the Moroccan and Balkan conflicts which Grey expressly rejected in all his statements. This suppression, beyond doubt deliberate and intentional, is now nailed down. And this suffices to dispose of the alleged demonstration that it is probably a true statement that in 1908 Grey promised Russia his military support. Indeed, the contrary proposition is rather proved, and Grey's assertion that in 1908-09 he promised Russia only his diplomatic support is fully confirmed by Bethmann's quotation—that is to say by the complete and not the mangled quotation. Looked at from the point of view of the true situation of affairs Grey's action appears entirely consistent from 1906 to 1914; in 1906 there was a Moroccan conflict, and therefore military support might ultimately be extended to France on account of the obligations imposed by the Treaty of 1904; in 1908 and 1914 there were Balkan conflicts, and therefore diplomatic support merely was extended to Russia and France, full freedom of action being reserved for England, and intervention, should it take place, would only be in accordance with the demands of English interests.

* * * * *

Prince Bülow in his most recent book, *Deutsche Politik*, also expressly points out (page 34) that "from the time of the Crimean war until the outbreak of the world-war, England entered into no alliance with any continental Power," and adds with reference to Grey's speech in the House of Commons on August 3rd, 1914 (which he erroneously assigns to August 4th) :

Even on the eve of this war English Ministers still declared that England must not make her position dependent on alliances which would fix definite obligations upon her. . . . The speech in which the English Minister sounded the tocsin of war is chiefly devoted to proving that up to the last England had kept a free hand. With such care and prudence did England up to the last

moment pursue a policy, even towards France, which rendered it possible for her to act in accordance with the logical consequences of her hitherto friendly relations with that country or not, as she thought expedient under the circumstances.¹

It is precisely to Sir Edward Grey's attitude in the Balkan crisis of 1908-09 that Bülow appeals in verification of this English system of pursuing a non-committal policy, especially in regard to military matters. He quotes Grey's words in the speech in the House of Commons above mentioned, which show that even at that time the English Minister assumed towards Isvolsky the same standpoint in Balkan affairs which he maintained in the last Balkan crisis down to the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia on August 1st, 1914: diplomatic support of the Entente Powers?—yes, certainly; military support?—unconditionally, no, because public opinion in England would never have approved Great Britain's participation in a war on account of Balkan interests.

By the classical testimony thus furnished by his predecessor in office, Herr von Bethmann's assertion that Grey even at that time (1908-09) pursued a "militaristic" policy directed to war is again most cogently refuted, as indeed it is by all the other proved facts of the case. At the same time the above sentences of the former Chancellor contain a confirmation of the interpretation which every one of impartial judgment must place upon the correspondence between Grey and Cambon in November, 1912, namely, that the consultations of French and English military experts were not in any way intended to alter the fundamental principle of English policy of maintaining entire freedom of action in any European conflict that might arise. This confirmation, coming from so authoritative a source, is of great significance. It completely takes the wind out of the sails of German apologetic literature, which unanimously insists on seeing in the correspondence of 1912 a proof of the Anglo-Franco-Russian aggressive conspiracy. Even Herr Helfferich devotes no fewer than three pages to this correspondence, and draws from it the

¹ [English translation: *Imperial Germany*, pages 32, 33. Cassel & Co.]

conclusion "that the British and French general and naval staffs had for years elaborated and agreed upon plans for common action by land and by sea. There can be no doubt against whom these common plans could alone have been directed."¹ As will be seen, Herr Helfferich quietly changes these military consultations into an intention to give effect ultimately to an offensive action, whereas Grey in reality, according to the sense and the text of his letter of November 22nd, 1912, did not even promise defensive assistance against an unprovoked attack by a third Power, but even in this case maintained freedom of decision:

It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise.

In this passage the view is clearly expressed that the consultation between the experts was not in any case to impose any obligation on the two Governments to any course of action. Nevertheless Herr von Helfferich, making use even of the same words, speaks of "a common action by land and by sea." Does the astute German Secretary of State consider that the equally astute English Secretary of State is really so foolish as to communicate verbatim to his parliamentary colleagues a document to prove that he had not committed himself, when in fact the document contains such a commitment? The mere fact that the correspondence was so communicated in that critical hour on August 3rd, and the fact that at the same time Grey observed that on the preceding day (August 2nd, Blue Book No. 148) a certain conditional and restricted obligation had for the first time been assumed by Great Britain, in themselves prove the erroneousness and the arbitrariness of the enlarged interpretation adopted by Helfferich and his comrades. Bülow's account

¹ Helfferich: *The Genesis of the Great War*, page 25.

gives the quietus to Helfferich's thesis. According to Bülow, England had to the last maintained a free hand. England therefore was not pledged to give any military support, either in 1914, or in 1912, or in 1908. She pursued, not a policy of war, but a policy of peace.

THE CHANCELLOR WITH THE IRON FOREHEAD

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has the temerity to conclude its falsifying article with a bombastic apostrophe to the English Minister, to brand "his policy which has been proved by the Chancellor to have been militaristic . . . as expressed in the whole policy pursued by the Entente against Germany during his ten years' conduct of the Foreign Office" and to attach to him the stigma:

"Thus Grey remains in history as one of those who are chiefly guilty of the war. No protestations of his love of peace and of his good intention can free him from this."

The man who ventures to write this by the instrumentality of his semi-official hacks is the man who, as the responsible leader of German policy, had personal experience of Grey's activity in the cause of peace during the London Conference of Ambassadors; he is the man whose Secretary of State, Jagow, emphasised in extremely cordial terms the Anglo-German action on behalf of peace, which was then carried through in complete agreement and mutual trust; he is the man who received the repeated attempts made by England to arrive at an understanding in political and naval matters, the man who was a witness of the desperate efforts of the English Minister in the summer of 1914 to maintain peace and recognised this in his own official publications. This man dares to accuse the English friend of peace of pursuing a militaristic policy, representing him as one of those chiefly guilty of the war.

Verily for this an iron forehead is required.

As we must before long take up the question of providing historical descriptions for the leading actors in this world drama—we have already got “the Victor of Longwy,” the “Conqueror of Warsaw”—I should like to propose for the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, on the pattern of Götz von Berlichingen of the Iron Hand, the honorary title of “the Chancellor of the Iron Forehead.”

CHAPTER V

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING. (1909-1912)

FROM the foregoing chapter we have seen the futility of the charge that in the European conflicts in the last stages of history before the war England did not sincerely labour on behalf of peace.

A similar charge has recently been brought by writers on the side of Germany with reference to the direct Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding which took place between 1909 and 1912 and, as is well known, ended in failure. I have already discussed this subject in detail in *J'accuse* (pages 99-114), but I am obliged to return to the question here, as new facts calling for renewed treatment have meanwhile become public.

I may claim for myself the credit of having been the first in the war-literature of Germany to emphasise the true significance of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1909-12 in connection with the answer to be given to the question of guilt and to subject them to a critical examination. While Asquith, the English Premier, had already touched upon these negotiations in his speech at Cardiff on October 2nd, 1914, and while Sir Edward Cook had discussed these matters in detail in his pamphlet *How Britain strove for Peace*,¹ a wilful silence was preserved on the subject in Germany. In no speech of the Chancellor, in no official or semi-official pamphlet written in justification of Germany's cause was there any mention of the Anglo-German negotiations, simply for the reason that they could not serve to justify but only to condemn Germany. The silence in the German newspaper

¹ London, 1914, Macmillan & Co.

world was only broken by the documentary treatment of the subject in my book, and this led to a lively campaign in the official and semi-official Press on both sides of the channel and to a series of official statements by the leading ministers. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg as well as Sir Edward Grey, the German and the English Foreign Offices, by means of their telegraphic agencies and their Press, fully discussed the subject and enlightened public opinion—which until then was completely ignorant in Germany—on this important part of the historical antecedents of the war. Even Herr Schiemann cannot avoid mentioning the Anglo-German negotiations in his pamphlet on the slanderer, in inviting the accuser to peruse the observations on the subject contained in his pamphlet on the understanding between England and Germany.¹ I have complied with this invitation, but without deriving from it any corresponding profit. Schiemann's observations on the prolonged negotiations for an understanding are alike superficial and tendencious, being written with the object of transforming the truth that England, in fruitless endeavours extending over many years, sought a political understanding and an agreement with Germany as to armaments into the untruth which constitutes the subject of Schiemann's pamphlet: *How England prevented an understanding with Germany*.

COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In my book (pages 90-98) I have fully dealt with the first part of the negotiations from Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's assumption of the office of Chancellor (summer, 1909) down to Haldane's mission (February, 1912), and I have scarcely anything to add to what I have there said. The object of the negotiations was the proportional restriction of naval armaments on both sides; the presupposition of this restriction was a political agreement, which would as far as possible exclude a war between the two countries and thus reveal as purposeless the preparations on both sides. As England, under the

¹ Schiemann: *How England Prevented an Understanding with Germany*, pages 20-25 (Berlin: George Reimer, 1915).

Unionist Ministry, and to a much greater extent under the Liberal Ministries of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, had already taken on every occasion the initiative towards a restriction by treaty of naval construction in England and Germany, but had always failed owing to the opposition of all those in authoritative positions in Germany (to Prince Bülow must be ascribed a large measure of the responsibility for the increasing naval competition), the primary point after the change in the occupancy of the Chancellorship was to ascertain what concessions Germany would be prepared to make on the subject of a restriction in naval construction.

Now these concessions were unfortunately of an exiguous character. It is clear from the material which so far has become public that Germany was at no time prepared to reduce by an agreement with England her naval programme which was fixed by law, and was constantly being increased in short stages. Nor was she even prepared to give the promise of a suspension, that is to say that there would not be a further increase in her naval power. This is asserted and proved with the utmost definiteness in Cook's pamphlet, which is compiled from official English material, and it has not been denied in any of the German official or semi-official statements, nor even in the Chancellor's speech of August 19th, 1915. The only offer which Germany made as an equivalent for an English obligation to maintain neutrality was a postponement in the building of new ships, that is to say a *temporary* retardation in construction, which, however, was to be compensated by a later acceleration, so that the total number of ships to be constructed under the naval law, as well as the length of time required for their construction, remained the same. In his speech in Parliament in July, 1910, Asquith summarised the existing position of the negotiations by stating that the German Government could not modify or repeal their Naval Law without a resolution of the Reichstag, and that a proposal to restrict the naval programme would, according to the assertion of the German Government, arouse the opposition of public opinion in Germany. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's reply to Asquith's speech (December.

1910) entirely confirmed its contents: the German Government could not restrict the construction of their fleet; at the most they could enter into a discussion with reference to a temporary retardation.

Even this entirely insufficient promise of a delay in naval construction, which after all in no way offered any alleviation of the enormous burden of armaments on both sides nor any security against the later increase in the state of the navy, was withdrawn later (in May, 1911) on the frivolous ground that the shipbuilding industry which had already arranged itself on the basis of a definite sequence of Government orders, must not be embarrassed by a cancellation or retardation of orders. The Emperor William at that time declared to the British Ambassador that he would on no account ever consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her programme.¹ In the spring of 1911 the German Government declared to the English Government its readiness to examine proposals for a mutual reduction of expenditure on armaments, but made the express reservation that these proposals should not involve any departure from the requirements of the Navy Law.

This offer of a retardation in naval construction was, as has been observed, also withdrawn. In the spring of 1911 there was therefore nothing left remaining of the subject of negotiations which constituted the immediate practical object of the Anglo-German discussions, namely, the general problem of armaments. There was no suspension, much less a reduction, in the German naval programme; there was not even a retardation in its execution. It is a self-evident fact that under these circumstances the efforts for a general political understanding were also void of content. The immediate practical object of the negotiations which the English Government had pursued for years was to procure for both countries an alleviation of the ruinous burdens of armaments. The political understanding was the natural presupposition

¹ Cook, page 25.

of the attainment of this end. At the moment when the end pursued by England (an end, however, equally in the interests of Germany) became unattainable owing to Germany's opposition, the political presupposition of the agreement as to armaments was also under consideration. It would indeed have been insane or absurd, as Haldane rightly pointed out in his later visit to Berlin, to establish by treaty a guarantee of peace between the two countries, and at the same time to continue the struggle of armaments with unabated energy, as if war were every moment at the door.

The negative attitude assumed by Germany in the question of armaments, though no doubt interrupted by many vacillations, is not merely confirmed by English sources, but was unreservedly admitted by the Chancellor in his speech of March 30th, 1911. While in a speech in Parliament on March 13th, 1911, Grey had rightly referred to the paradox that on the one hand assurances of friendship were exchanged, but on the other armaments were constantly being piled up against each other, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not hesitate to declare that the whole idea of a restriction of armaments was impracticable, since it would be impossible to control the observation of the agreement by the other party, and in consequence nothing but continued distrust and perpetual friction could arise from such a treaty.

Even Schiemann is so far in agreement with Cook's "tendencious pamphlet"—as the professionally tendencious historian dares to call the English book—that he describes as the utmost concession of the German Government their readiness "to retard the tempo of the construction of our war-ships." Thus even Schiemann does not maintain that we ever professed our readiness to agree to a suspension or a diminution of our armaments. He is silent, however, on a point which Cook asserts with the utmost definiteness, namely, that even the offer of a temporary retardation in naval construction was withdrawn in May, 1911.

"A COUPLE OF DREADNOUGHTS, MORE OR LESS"

In view of all that we know with regard to Anglo-German negotiations, of all the actions of the German Government and the statements of German statesmen in the course of these negotiations, it is not too much to assert that Germany never sincerely intended to submit to the least restriction in her naval armaments, and still less, of course, in her preparations by land, that it was thus merely the advantages of a political understanding with England, the neutralisation of Great Britain in all European conflicts that Germany endeavoured to secure, and that she never intended to concede the equivalent asked by England, the restriction of naval armaments. Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in his speech of August 19th, 1915, lets this be understood as distinctly as in the clear words used in his speech of March 30th, 1911, mentioned above:

"I asked him (Haldane)—so said the Chancellor—whether an open understanding with us, an understanding which would exclude not merely an Anglo-German war but every European war, was not of more value than a couple of German Dreadnoughts, more or less."

Superficially read, this sounds quite harmless, but in reality it quite turns things upside down. The suggestion for an agreement as to armaments which England continued to put forward for many years did indeed rest on the correct thought, that in fact the question at issue turned on "the couple of Dreadnoughts more or less" on both sides, with all that that involved; or to express it more plainly, that the question involved was the competition in naval armaments on both sides, that this competition from the English point of view was meaningless, since England did not intend to attack Germany, and that this meaninglessness must be recognised on the side of Germany as well, if the same pacific intentions existed there.

The purpose of the constant English suggestions was an

agreement on naval construction, under which England would maintain her actual superiority on the special grounds which are well known, and would leave the German Empire her position as the second greatest naval Power. England regarded the ratio of 16 : 10 as appropriate, and moreover as more or less in correspondence with the existing position of the two naval Powers. The German Government made the counter-proposal of a political understanding as the basis of an ultimate agreement as to armaments—in itself an entirely reasonable suggestion, and one calculated to serve the cause of general peace. Gradually, however, during the progress of the negotiations, the German Government showed itself so refractory and so much opposed to all positive proposals put forward by England for a restriction of armaments on both sides, so vacillating in her own proposals and decisions, and finally so definite an attitude of refusal was assumed that the purpose pursued by England in the negotiations completely receded into the background, and negotiations were really conducted only on the question of the German demand for an agreement as to neutrality. The essential original purpose of the negotiations was pushed into the background by the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse with juggling dexterity, and in its place was substituted another subject of negotiations, which had a powerful interest for Germany, but was of no interest whatever for England. What was the value for Great Britain of a German pledge of neutrality? If England were the aggressor, the agreement would not in any case be binding, since obviously the pledge of neutrality to be given by both parties only contemplated the contingency in which the other side was not the aggressor. The reverse case, that England should herself be attacked, was and is, in view of the existing constellation of European Powers and the geographical situation of Great Britain, so improbable that England had not the slightest motive to take special precautions to meet this contingency. England's interest in the treaty negotiations with Germany in fact centred exclusively in the "couple of Dreadnoughts more or less." Herr von Bethmann was therefore guilty of an egregious perversion

of the basis of the negotiations when he endeavoured to represent to Haldane, the English Minister, that this question of naval armaments was unimportant. The avoidance of a European war was certainly the final goal of English policy, as it was also the feigned end of German policy. England, however, desired at the same time to put an end in peace to the financial ruin of both States.

GERMANY'S LAST WORD: RETARDATION, BUT NOT REDUCTION OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

The negotiations were prolonged, with every conceivable oscillation on the part of Germany, from 1909 to the summer of 1911, and they were then abruptly interrupted by the renewed acute outbreak of the Moroccan conflict. Meanwhile King Edward had died, and the Liberal Government was confirmed in its peace policy by a new General Election. The Moroccan conflict had scarcely been definitely settled by the Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 1911, when Grey, in his well-known speech of November 27th, 1911, mentioned above, returned to the Anglo-German negotiations and gave expression to a lively hope for a friendly *rapprochement* between the two Powers. This *rapprochement* appeared to have the most favourable prospects of succeeding when Lord Haldane came to Berlin in February, 1912, not for the purpose, as Schiemann again falsely states, of pacifying the sentiment in England which was pressing for an understanding, though "in reality to reconnoitre," but with the honourable and sincere purpose of promoting as far as possible the prolonged efforts for an understanding made by the Liberal English Government.

I have already given in my book (pages 106-111) an account of the course of Haldane's visit. The efforts of the English Minister most amicably disposed to Germany had perforce to come to nothing, since once again the essential purpose of the English *rapprochement*, that of bringing about an agreement as to armaments, encountered in Berlin the same resistance as formerly. In view of recent experiences

on the outbreak of war and afterwards, it may be asserted with confidence that an Anglo-German agreement as to armaments found its chief opponents not in the office of the Chancellor but in the Admiralty. Just as the influence of the generals provoked the precipitous and portentous declaration of war against Russia, just as the Tirpitz party—withstanding the intervening inactivity of its leader—was finally in a position to give effect to the ruthless prosecution of the submarine war, exclusively on military grounds, regardless of the public opinion of the world and the probability of war with America,¹ just as in the whole manner of German warfare from great decisions down to the smallest incidents (see *e.g.*, the shooting of Miss Cavell, Captain Fryatt, and similar “*Lusitania*” incidents by land”) it is exclusively the military point of view that is decisive, and it is the statesman who must always give way to the generals—so we may venture to assert that then also, on the occasion of the Anglo-German negotiations, there may have existed in the civil government a sincere will to arrive at an agreement as to armaments, but that this will was shattered on the resistance offered by Herr von Tirpitz and his followers. It is only on this assumption that it is possible to explain the everlasting oscillations between concessions and withdrawals, between proposing and refusing the basis of an agreement as to armaments; only thus is it possible to explain the later watering down of what had already been positively promised at an earlier stage, only thus the difficulties and the contradictions in the attitude of the Chancellor, who on the one hand sincerely pursued a political understanding with England, but on the other hand, in consequence of the resistance of naval circles, was not in a position to make any kind of concession in the question of armaments.

The German offer of a temporary retardation in naval construction is characteristic of this everlasting oscillation. That any more far-reaching concession on the part of Germany was excluded is expressly admitted by Schiemann, who

¹ Which has meanwhile become a reality.

speaks of "the definite refusal of Germany to give up the naval programme approved by the Reichstag." I have already pointed out that the promise of the temporary retardation in naval construction was withdrawn in May, 1911. It was, however, renewed on the occasion of Haldane's visit and afterwards, although now with the further restrictive addition that in the first place the most recent naval law must be taken as the basis of the agreement, and secondly that there could be no question of a binding or a written agreement but only of an oral understanding.

From my knowledge of the diplomatic material (which is restricted to what has become public property, since I have no special information at my disposal) the last word which Germany spoke in the question of the restriction of armaments was the following offer of an oral agreement (with a refusal to give it in a written form) :

No reduction in the size of the German fleet as provided for by the most recent Naval Law of 1912.

No guarantee against this being increased at a later date. Adherence to the prescribed time for total completion and only a temporary retardation in the construction of new units.

ENGLAND'S NEUTRALITY AS AN EQUIVALENT

Proceeding from this basis, it is now necessary to consider the equivalent which Germany demanded from England with reference to her neutrality in European conflicts. The question of these equivalents has been so fully and extensively discussed in the official and semi-official Press in both countries as well as in the statements of leading statesmen that there can now scarcely be any doubt as to the state of affairs. Since, in contradistinction to Herr Schiemann, I am accustomed to the methods of scientific investigation, I cite herewith the sources on the basis of which the position must be determined.

1. Sir Edward Cook's pamphlet: *How Britain Strove for Peace* (Macmillan & Co.).
2. *J'accuse* (pages 106-111).
3. Lord Haldane's speech, July 5th, 1915.
4. Answer of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to this speech, July 18th, 1915.
5. Speech of the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, August 19th, 1915.
6. Sir Edward Grey's answer, published by Reuter's Bureau on August 26th, 1915.
7. Publication of the English Foreign Office of September 1st, 1915 (Reuter's Bureau).
8. Answer of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to this publication, September 8th, 1915.

The preceding summary shows that a considerable part of the publications bearing on this question had already taken place before the appearance of the *Slanderer* pamphlet. Nevertheless, the man of the "method of scientific investigation" in no way considers the crucial points of the dispute and its important details. He entirely ignores the real grounds which caused the failure of the negotiations, and is content, in his now familiar method of falsification, to tamper and remodel the text of the English proposal for an understanding, until he succeeds in producing the reverse of its true meaning.

The following is the position as revealed by the accounts of the two Governments concerned, which in this case are for once in agreement in essential matters.

I

The first proposal made by the Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg to Lord Haldane (beginning of February, 1912) was unrestrictedly to the effect that in every war in which one of the two contracting parties became entangled with one or more Powers, the other contracting party would ob-

serve at least a benevolent neutrality and would use its utmost endeavours for a localisation of the conflict.

This proposal was rejected by Lord Haldane in Berlin as too far-reaching, since it obliged the contracting parties to neutrality; and that, moreover, a benevolent neutrality, even if the other contracting party had *intentionally* provoked war. It does not require any further proof that by accepting this German proposal England would have delivered herself over to Germany with bound hands, and that merely by concluding such a treaty she would have repudiated France and Russia, her Entente friends. Germany, in alliance with Austria, would have been able to let loose on the Continent any war that served her purposes; she would have her back free on the north. Indeed, in a certain sense, within the limits of benevolent neutrality, England would even have had to side with Germany; she would have been politically isolated, excluded from the concert of European Great Powers, and she would have made it possible and even assisted Germany, her rival for world-power, to become in the first place all-powerful on the Continent, so that she might later undertake the famous decisive struggle with Great Britain, the "settlement of the account" with England, of which Treitschke and his disciples have dreamed and written for a generation. This was the reason which led Lord Haldane without consulting the London Government, to reject the first German proposal for neutrality.

II

In consequence of Haldane's refusal the Chancellor modified his formula for an understanding, and in this modified form it was submitted by Haldane to his colleagues in the Ministry in London. The modified German proposal was published verbatim by the English Foreign Office on September 1st, 1915, and discussed in detail by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on September 8th, although the English text was not in any way disputed or impugned.

The second German formula runs as follows:

1. "The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other Power directed to such an end, and declare not to be bound by any such engagement.

3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more Powers in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor,¹ the other party will at least observe towards the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. If either of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality towards the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the provisions in Article. 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising between either of them and other Powers."

This proposal also was refused by the English Government as too far-reaching, chiefly because paragraph 4 would

¹ [The German text gives here: "in which it is not the aggressor."]

have made it possible for the German Government, which was united with Austria and Italy by positive alliances, to refuse her neutrality on the ground of the obligations imposed by these alliances, whereas England on the other hand, which was not united to any European Power by an alliance, would have been compelled in all European conflicts to observe neutrality in favour of Germany. As the storm centre of Europe, from which the hurricane of war constantly threatened to break, was the south-east, more especially the Balkans, and as in all these questions it was Austria that was primarily interested, England had to reckon with the possibility, or indeed the probability, of an outbreak of war in which Austria would be involved and Germany would be pledged to give Austria military support. Any war of this nature would present the danger of European complications in which England—notwithstanding that her own interests might be affected—would be obliged to stand aside as an inactive spectator, if she had accepted the German proposal of neutrality.

III

The English Government now made the following counter-proposal (March 14th, 1912):

“England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.”

The German Government in their turn now found this proposal unacceptable, and for the remarkable reason, advanced by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and the Chancellor alike, that the English assurances represented “what was self-evident in the mutual relations of civilised States,” and that consequently “the promise to refrain from such attacks could not very well furnish the substance of a

solemn treaty." This is indeed a remarkable reason—a reason which, if true, designates the whole competition in armaments as an act of insanity, the whole of the German chauvinist literature as humbug, and, above all, shows that the explanation of the present war as a preventive or defensive war is a criminal invention. If in fact unprovoked attacks are neither customary nor conceivable among civilised States, why have the States of Europe, which surely must all be counted among the civilised States, been arming against each other for half a century on this enormous scale? Why did Germany break all records in these military preparations by land, besides being on the point of approaching English naval power on sea? I thought that Germany and her allies were entirely lovers of peace. If it is "self-evident" that this was also true of other civilised States, what was the meaning of the military preparations, of the financial ruin of all nations, of the everlasting friction and tension which in a large measure originated in these military preparations?

To pursue the argument, did not our Pan-German and militaristic Press—and similarly the corresponding Press in other countries—constantly make use of the danger of an attack from the opposing group of Powers? Is it not the fact that all the constantly increasing demands for the army and the navy were explained by reference to this danger? Is not the present war officially described as a defence against a present attack, although semi-officially and confidentially it is deceitfully presented to the unfortunate German people as a war of prevention against a future attack? How is all this to be reconciled with the present assertion of the Chancellor that an English guarantee against an attack given by treaty was of no value, because such an attack "was not customary among civilised States"? The naval preparations made on both sides by Germany and England would indeed have been meaningless if their purpose was not security against the contingency of war. If, then, the contingency of war were excluded by treaty, this would not have been something that was self-evident, but would have constituted the removal of the presupposition on which armaments

rested; it would have created the ground, on which alone an agreement as to armaments could be concluded, the tension between the two countries removed and a peaceful *rapprochement* made possible.

IV

Meanwhile the German Government had modified their first proposal and—as it appears (it is not possible on the existing material to arrive at an exact determination of the position on this point)—they omitted the clause providing for exceptions in the first German proposal, which had rightly caused offence in London. The new German proposal was as follows:

“Should one of the high contracting parties be entangled in a war with one or more Powers, in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other party will at least observe towards it a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. The high contracting parties pledge themselves to arrive mutually at an understanding as to their attitude should one of them be compelled to a declaration of war by the open provocation of a third party” (see the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 18th and the Chancellor’s speech of August 19th, 1915).

Observe the peculiar and surprising phraseology, produced in the same terms by the semi-official paper and the Chancellor: “A war in which it cannot be said that the other contracting party is the aggressor.” What does this mean? It means something negative, not positive: England is pledged to neutrality (and conversely Germany in the like case) in every war in which it cannot be definitely said that Germany *has* attacked, but in which with just as little certainty it can be stated that Germany has been attacked, in other words, in which the question, attack or defence, must be answered with a “*non liquet*.” While England wished to guarantee her neutrality in every unprovoked attack on Germany by other Powers, Germany’s efforts were directed

to extending this guarantee to the case in which the question whether Germany had been attacked or was herself the aggressor, remained unanswered or undecided.

The extension thus desired by Germany was of enormous importance. The question of responsibility in connection with the origin of a war, the question which of two belligerent parties is the aggressor and which is the party attacked, is not always so obvious and so easy to determine as it is in the present war, which Germany and Austria, without any provocation and without any compelling reason, intentionally and wantonly provoked by two declarations of war, the one against Serbia and the other against Russia. In most wars it is very difficult to decide who is the aggressor and who is the defender, since both parties are interested in appearing to the world as morally innocent; they consequently seek to obliterate the question of guilt so far as possible, acting on the celebrated recipe of "mixing the cards" which Bernhardi recommended so candidly and so naively to the German Government. It is not every Government that is so clumsy in deceit as the Berlin and the Viennese Governments have shown themselves to be. A man like Bismarck would have been hard to convict of the famous falsification of the Ems telegram if he had not himself, with the brutality of genius, made it known to the world. In short, the wars in which the question of guilt remains obscure and in doubt are more numerous than those in which it can be determined as clearly as in the present war. Germany would, however, have got the advantage of all these doubtful cases on Bethmann's formula: "a war in which it cannot be said." In all those cases in which it could not be definitely asserted and proved that Germany was the aggressor, in all doubtful cases, England was to observe a neutrality and, moreover, a benevolent neutrality; only in the few cases in which the question of guilt had to be decided clearly and unambiguously against Germany, would England have been justified in departing from her neutrality.

It need occasion no surprise that the astute English Government did not accept this proposal. It is, however, re-

markable that Herr von Bethmann endeavoured to entice them into this trap. This is an illuminating fact. If the only object, then, pursued by the Berlin Government was really to obtain protection against aggressive wars in which England might participate, the English formula of neutrality was bound to have satisfied them. But if they themselves had unconfessed aggressive designs and at the same time the intention "so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France,"¹ if the German Government were thus endeavouring to construe one of those obscure cases in which aggression and defence cannot very well be distinguished, they could not have adopted a better course than to propose the formula relating to the war "in which it cannot be said," etc. But, on the other hand, England also could pursue no better course than politely to decline this formula with thanks.

V

The negotiations thus returned to the English proposal cited above in Section III, which was merely amplified by an introduction corresponding to No. I of the second German proposal. This English formula, which represents the final point and the further step in English conciliation, I quoted in my book (page 109) verbatim as given by Cook in English, and in this case Schiemann also makes an honourable departure from his usual behaviour, inasmuch as he neither suppresses nor falsifies an official document but reproduces it textually. But here again the leopard cannot, of course, change his spots. The falsification comes later in the commentary which he adds to the text.

The following is the formula of the English proposal as it was given by Grey to Count Metternich in London:²

"The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England de-

¹ Bernhardt: *Germany and the Next War*, page 280.

² In the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 18th, 1915, the formula is inaccurately and incompletely quoted. The reproduction in

clares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

I have already explained in my book and in the preceding observations that Germany might well have been satisfied in every way with this English offer. The English formula contains a promise of non-aggression in the widest sense of the word. England promised that she would neither herself make an attack upon Germany nor would she take part in any such attack; she declared that she had concluded no treaty, agreement or understanding which aimed at or permitted an attack on Germany; she declared that she would never be a party to any combination of this character. The oral explanations which Sir Edward Grey gave to Count Metternich in handing him this document again expressly emphasised that British policy pursued no aggressive plans against Germany whatever, that France was fully conscious that in the event of any attack upon Germany she would receive no support from England, but that on the other hand England could not bind herself to be an unmoved spectator of a German attack upon France, and to promise in advance her neutrality in all cases, even in the event of the violation of countries whose neutrality was guaranteed.¹

Only those who themselves possess Schiemann's professional habits of falsification could speak of the Machiavellian

the speech of the Chancellor (*Berliner Tageblatt* of August 20th) is also incorrect and incomplete, although in such documents every word and every shade of meaning is important. If these German publications of decisive documents were tested by the standard applied by Helfferich and his companions to individual insignificant subsidiary points in large collections of diplomatic documents produced by the other side, we would everywhere—a course I refrain from following—presume the existence of malice and falsification, where in fact there is merely inaccuracy and carelessness.

¹ Cook, page 32.

phraseology of the carefully-conceived English formula, or maintain that the all-comprehensive words "treaty, understanding, or combination" and even the most general word that a language contains, "anything," that is to say, "anything whatever it may be," were intended still to leave open ways of escape for perfidious Albion. According to Schiemann the oral conversations of Reval, the discussions between experts on the English and French General Staffs, were not intended to fall under the above formula. It is self-evident that these oral discussions do fall under the formula, for they cannot be anything that does not come under the phrase a "treaty, understanding, combination or anything." The discussions of the General Staffs clearly do *not* fall under the formula, since they neither represented negotiations between the Governments, nor were they directed to an aggressive war against Germany, with which the English formula is exclusively concerned. If the Anglo-Russian conspiracy, which the German chauvinists have invented for their purposes, had been concluded at Reval, the English formula of neutrality would have been a lie. As, however, the alleged Reval agreements are a lie, the English formula was in correspondence with the truth. The discussions between the General Staffs, directed to meet the contingency of a defensive war, in no way committed the two Governments, as we have seen above, and they did not even impose an obligation to furnish support in the event of an attack by a third party; they had, therefore, obviously nothing whatever to do with the formula of neutrality proposed by England.

The English formula in its all-comprehensive generality excluded any possibility of a secret action, any possibility of an interpretation which would have afforded a loophole for aggressive intentions on the part of England. England is not a party, nor will she become a party, to anything that has for its object an attack upon Germany. I invite Messrs. Schiemann and Bethmann, who consider that a hidden interpretation of the English formula is possible, to suggest to me any phraseology which could better and more compre-

hensively than the English formula exclude every possibility of an attack by England or her participation in such an attack. When Herr von Bethmann says: "England considers it to be a mark of special friendship, worthy of being sealed by a solemn treaty, that she will not without reason attack us, but she reserves her freedom as to what she will do should her friends decide to do so," I can only characterise this observation of the leading German statesman in the words which he applies to Asquith's speech of October 2nd, 1914: "It is to me incomprehensible . . . how a high statesman . . . can give so incorrect an account of an incident which is accurately known to him, in order to draw from it conclusions which are opposed to the truth." Bethmann's interpretation of the English formula is flagrantly opposed to the truth; England did not reserve her freedom of action in those cases in which her friends determined to attack us. Even apart from the special statement given orally by Grey to Count Metternich in amplification of the proposed formula, it was clear from the unambiguous phraseology of the formula itself that England was pledged to neutrality in the event of France or Russia, or both together, attacking Germany.

VI

It is well known that the English formula did not satisfy the German Government. Count Metternich was commissioned to submit an additional clause to the English Secretary of State, which is given as follows by the Chancellor, in agreement with the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 18th:

"England will therefore, as a matter of course, observe a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany."

In the event of the English Government taking offence at the promise of *benevolent* neutrality, the Berlin Government appears to have suggested to Count Metternich that

he might be content with the promise of mere neutrality. The Chancellor does not mention this possible proposal; the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, however, in agreement with the London Foreign Office, also speaks of this contingent formula. This point, however, whether it should be benevolent or simple neutrality, is in this question of less importance. The cardinal point lies in the German demand that England should also remain neutral in the event of a war being forced on the German people. So far as the question of England's entering into a treaty was concerned, it was on this point that the negotiations failed. Even if the English Government had agreed to the enormous demand involved in the acceptance of the German additional clause, the negotiations would still have failed, as we have seen above, on the other aspect of the problem—on the question, that is to say, of what agreement as to armaments Germany would then have been prepared to approve as a return for English neutrality. The difficulties to be overcome were twofold in their nature: on the one hand Germany demanded from England enormous concessions in political matters, but on the other hand she was only prepared to make quite trivial concessions in the question of naval armaments.

What was the significance of the additional clause proposed by Metternich? It meant neither more nor less than that England would be obliged to remain neutral in every war in which Germany might be involved. By a circuitous path it led back to the first formula which had already been proposed to Lord Haldane in Berlin and flatly refused by him, to the effect that England should play the part of an unconcerned spectator in all European conflicts in which Germany participated, that she should give to German Imperialism *carte blanche* for the attainment of a position of hegemony on the Continent and for the later attack on England's position as a World Power.

What is the meaning of a war that is "forced upon" a country (*aufgezwungener Krieg*)? Such a war is an aggressive war to which the aggressor has been forced by cir-

cumstances which, in his personal view, laid upon him the necessity, the "compulsion" (*Zwang*) of beginning war. The view that such a necessity, such a compulsion, existed is, of course, entirely subjective. In view of the fact that the Hague Tribunal failed, in consequence of German opposition, to become a compulsory court of decision (even for less important disputes), there existed and exists no authority in the world which would be justified or competent to decide in a binding manner the question whether there existed for the attacking State a necessity, a compulsion, urging him to attack. The subjective decision of the aggressor that such a case exists may be based upon the most diverse motives or, since no one is in a position to examine these motives, on the most diverse pretences. The most fashionable of these motives, or pretences, is the assertion: The other party was going to attack me; in order to frustrate his attack I am bound to anticipate him. France was on the point of violating Belgian neutrality; in order to prevent the disadvantages which would ensue for Germany from such an action we were obliged to anticipate her. England, Russia and France had been for years resolved to attack us on a favourable opportunity; in order to anticipate this dangerous attack, we were obliged to strike at the moment most favourable to us. Serbia was on the point of making the Serbian parts of our territory disloyal by Pan-Serbian propaganda; in order to prevent the dismemberment of the monarchy we had to crush Serbia. Austria declares war against Serbia and Germany against Russia; both are formally the aggressors, and consequently the authors of the European war. This authorship, however—so runs the argument of those who contend that the war was "forced upon us"—was only a formal one, for in substance both States were compelled to play the rôle of an anticipator, Austria to avoid dismemberment, Germany to avoid an annihilating attack. The Austro-Serbian, like the Russo-German and consequently the European war, were thus wars which were "forced upon" the two Central Powers.

A much more effective reason for a war is of course to be found if it is represented not as a preventive war but

directly as a war of defence against an actual attack which has taken place. If we were dealing with a real, honest war of defence on the part of Germany, England, on the formula proposed by the English Government, would have been unconditionally pledged to neutrality. England had indeed given a promise that she would neither herself make an attack upon Germany, nor would she join in such an attack. As is well known, the German Government has succeeded in inducing in the German people the false belief which still prevails to-day, although it may be hoped that it will not prevail much longer, that the Imperialistic war of aggression is not merely a preventive war forced upon the country by the duty of anticipation, but a war of defence brought about by a predatory attack. From this example it will be seen of what an unscrupulous Government is capable when it despises the truth and the true interests of a nation, when it is misled by Junkers, reactionaries and militarists. If the Imperial German Government, with the personal assistance of the ruler, has been able to reveal dishonestly to the German people as a new war of liberation, after the pattern of 1813, the war that has been long planned and prepared, the war for world-power which has been pursued and openly preached for decades by the Pan-Germans, how much easier would it have been for them to bring any war, no matter from what cause it had arisen, under the formula of the war "forced upon" them which was to pledge England to neutrality. If it was found possible to falsify the present war of aggression into a war of defence, what war might not be baptised with the name of a war "forced upon" the nation—forced upon them by any strategic, political or economic necessity?

For, be it observed, the addition desired by Herr von Bethmann relating to the war "forced upon" a country was not restricted or specified in any direction. A war may be forced upon a country, not merely by the duty of anticipating a future attack (the war of prevention), but also by the necessity of a further national consolidation, of the development of new industrial markets, the acquisition of new har-

bours and approaches to the sea, of new colonies for settlement, of new territorial possessions in Europe for the strategical improvement of the frontier, and so on. It may also be "forced upon" a country by reasons for expansion of an idealistic nature, for example, by the "national duty" (described in Italy as *sacro egoismo*) of uniting unredeemed kindred provinces to the great community of speech and race (irredenta, Russian Baltic provinces, etc.). In short, there is no war arising from Imperialistic tendencies and serving Imperialistic ends which could not be brought under the formula of wars "forced upon" a country by strategic, economic, national or preventive reasons.

A classical example of this manner of giving reasons for a war is furnished by Bulgaria, the most recent ally of the Central Powers. Just as the characteristic qualities of an individual are best recognised by his caricature, so the nature of the German and Austrian reasons for war are reflected in quite a diverting manner in the Bulgarian caricature. As Rizoff, the Bulgarian Ambassador, openly stated in a long article,¹ the entry of Bulgaria into the European war took place with the object of realising the national and political unity of the Bulgarian people, of preventing Serbia from becoming greater than Bulgaria, and of keeping Russia away from Constantinople. Herr Rizoff does not shrink from stating openly that nothing is more natural "than the attitude of Bulgaria since the outbreak of the European war; she long remained neutral, because she had to make military preparations and could only intervene towards the end of the war." In the first place, the King and his Government therefore entered into negotiations with the quadruple alliance in order to obtain recognition of "Bulgaria's inalienable rights to Macedonia." As the quadruple alliance, however, had guaranteed the maintenance of the treaty of Bucharest, these negotiations failed and Bulgaria, for the same grounds as France, had taken up arms against Serbia in order to regain her Alsace-Lorraine, that is to say, Macedonia.

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, Nov. 2, 1915.

The language here used is, I should say, plain enough. Bulgaria began the war with the object of attaining national unity and the extension of her power, and she adhered to the party which offered her the greatest chance of attaining her ends. This is what is in reality called an Imperialistic war, exactly like that now waged by Germany, although in the case of Bulgaria it assumes a certain national aspect. When now King Ferdinand saw, by reference to the famous examples of Germany and Austria, that true popular enthusiasm could only be kindled for a "war of liberation," he thought to himself: Why should the Bulgarians be any better off than the Germans? Let us also quickly transform the war of conquest into a war of defence, and the matter will go on swimmingly. No sooner said than done. A royal manifesto was issued to the Bulgarian nation in which the nation and the army were summoned "to the defence of their native soil defiled by a malicious neighbour, to the liberation of their brothers who were groaning under the Serbian yoke." The manifesto recalls the efforts made by the King and the Government for the maintenance of peace, which, alas! had been in vain, since an attack by Serbian troops at Koestendil, Trn and Bjelogradschik on October 14th at eight o'clock in the morning had brought about a state of war between Bulgaria and Serbia (see the telegrams from Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau from Sofia and Berlin of October 14th, 1915).

There, then, we have the caricature. The puny one imitates the great, and by the maladroitness of his parrotry reveals to all the world the tricks and the wiles of his exemplars. The national-Imperialistic war of conquest, openly confessed by the Bulgarian Ambassador, after sufficient military preparation and wearisome barter on both sides, is overnight transformed into a war of defence against Serbian attack, because of the "defilement" of their native soil by a malicious neighbour. These hapless Serbs! It will be recalled that it was they also who began the war against Austria by a malicious attack. See the telegram of the German Ambassador in Vienna to the Chancellor, July 28th,

1914 (White Book Exhibit 16, Count Berchtold observes "that after the opening of hostilities by Serbia . . ."). Truly they are a base tribe. Firstly they opened hostilities against Austria, and thus provoked the European war, and now when Austria and Germany with their combined forces have invaded their impoverished and exhausted country, consumed by three wars, they have still the impudence to fall upon their Bulgarian neighbours and make war upon them! The thing is in fact monstrous! In such a case there is no remedy but extirpation! And the Austrians and Germans in their various invasions of the unfortunate country have not failed in this direction.

* * * * *

The case of Turkey is exactly similar to that of Bulgaria. Turkey also, which for years was united with Germany and Austria to meet the contingency of a European war, and in fact undertook the first act of war against Russia, maintained that she had been attacked by Russia and was waging a "war for the holiest rights of the nation."

From these examples, which could be indefinitely increased—from the other side as well—we see how the thing is done. There is nothing easier than to present an Imperialistic war of conquest to a deluded people under the guise of a war "forced upon" them, in the most various shades from the pure war of defence through the war of prevention to the war for national unity or for the liberation of unredeemed provinces. Austria and Bulgaria were both attacked by Serbia. There we have the most diverting comedy which interrupts the agonising cries of this gigantic tragedy. Germany is attacked by Russia and France, and menaced by a long-standing offensive conspiracy between England and Belgium! So here again there is a war of defence against aggression. This is indeed less diverting because it is much too tragic, but it is none the less a mask and an invention in order to cover their criminal plans of aggression in the eyes of their own people and of the world with the seemly mantle of the defence of the Fatherland.

And having regard to the possibility and the capacity to falsify which has been revealed in this war and in many historical precedents, was it to be expected that the English Government should give a promise of neutrality in the event of a war being "forced upon" the German Empire? The English Ministers would either have been fools or traitors to their country if they had complied with this German demand, which, in fact, amounted to a neutrality in every European Continental war. If the war of to-day can be given the imprint of a war of German defence, what war could not be made into a war "forced upon" Germany? Germany was united by Treaties of Alliance with Austria and Italy, in contradistinction to England which had concluded no alliances. The fourth paragraph of the second German proposal submitted to Lord Haldane, which excluded the duty of neutrality "in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements" (with other States) was no doubt not contained in the new additional formula submitted by Metternich, but it could conveniently be read into the formula. If Austria or Italy, or both at the same time, became involved in a war with one or more European Great Powers, and thus the *casus fœderis* contemplated in the treaties of alliance arose for Germany, this also would have been a *compulsion*, a necessity, a war *forced upon* the German Empire. If England had subscribed to Metternich's clause, she would also have had to remain neutral in such a war, regardless of its origin and its aims. The question whether the *casus fœderis* did or did not exist was withdrawn from the judgment and the decision of England. If Germany answered this question in the affirmative and gave military support to her allies, England would have been constrained to be an inactive spectator of such a war "forced upon" Germany, even if the interests of England or of her partners in the Entente were profoundly affected, even if one or both her partners in the Entente were themselves involved in the war, even if the war led to a violation or an injury to the small neutral States of Europe. England was thus eliminated from the European concert, for there would have been no war which Ger-

many could not describe directly or indirectly as forced upon her—directly if she were the party primarily entangled in the war, indirectly if she were secondarily involved by her obligations as an ally.

The meaning and the purpose of the whole of the negotiations between England and Germany for a political understanding were inverted by Metternich's additional clause. The purpose of the negotiations was to spare both States the insane continuation of armaments by the mutual assurance that neither would attack the other nor participate in such an attack. Grey's formula corresponded to this end in the fullest measure. Metternich's addition, however, was directed to obtaining for Germany security against English intervention, even when Germany was the aggressor under the guise of a war forced upon her. This England neither could nor dared accept—all the less so because the equivalent offered by Germany in the matter of naval armaments was, as we have seen above, entirely worthless.

WHY WAS GERMANY UNWILLING TO RESTRICT HER NAVAL ARMAMENTS?

When we survey in retrospect the course of these negotiations, it becomes clear why Germany could make no material concession in the matter of the restriction of armaments. On the one hand Germany desired to be protected against England in the event of wars "forced upon" her, that is to say, in the event of concealed wars of German aggression. On the other hand she neither would nor could restrict her naval armaments, since these aggressive wars on the Continent—as had been proclaimed a thousand times by our Pan-Germans and Imperialists—could in the last analysis have no other object than the subsequent great settlement with England. In the first place we desired to be lords of the Continent and then to become lords of the world-seas.

For the first step on this ladder to world-power we needed the neutrality of England; for the second step, the dispossession of England, we needed a powerful navy. Conse-

quently it had to be the task of our diplomacy to unite the immediate object with the more remote, that is to say, to obtain England's neutrality in all Continental wars, but on the other hand to submit to no restrictions in our naval preparations. I repeat what I have already said above, that I have nowhere found in the German publications and speeches on this question any readiness on the part of Germany to sacrifice even a single ship of those already approved by law or to renounce obtaining new legal sanction to others. According to the official documents before me, the maximum German concession in the matter of naval preparations was to be a certain retardation of completing the construction of the vessels already approved, which, however, was to be made good by an acceleration later on, and was not even to be committed to writing. The maximum, and at the same time the minimum, English concession in the political domain was, according to Bethmann's demand, to be an English pledge of neutrality, which in fact in a veiled form amounted to an attitude of complete and absolute passivity in all European conflicts.

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On the ground of the facts here expounded I can bring no reproach against Asquith, the English Prime Minister, for having briefly characterised the German demand in the following words: "They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war." This is not, as Herr von Bethmann accuses his English colleague, a misrepresentation of the situation, but in substance entirely corresponds to the German demand. In his pamphlet which has been mentioned several times, Cook also characterises the German proposal in exactly the same way as Asquith does. Both hit the nail on the head. There are three kinds of war which call for consideration in the present discussion:

Firstly, a pure war of defence;

Secondly, a pure war of aggression;

Thirdly, an aggressive war concealed under the description of a war "forced upon" the country in question.

In the event of a purely defensive war on the part of Germany England wished to remain neutral. In the event of a purely aggressive war she wished to retain a free hand. By the formula proposed Germany wished the war "forced upon" her to be treated in exactly the same way as a war of defence. But since, as I believe I have proved, every aggressive war can be brought under the formula of a war "forced upon" a State (and would, without doubt, be so brought by Germany by the same methods as are employed to-day), England declined to put on the same basis the war of defence and the war "forced upon" a country. Had the English Government complied with the German demand, England would have been pledged to neutrality in all German aggressive wars, and there would have been no case left in which she could have departed from the neutrality which she had undertaken by treaty. To this the English Government neither would nor could agree, and this is what the English Premier expressed in the words quoted above.

The contrary assertion of the Chancellor rests on the illusory distinction between a war of aggression and a war "forced upon" a country—a distinction which in practice is without any significance.

This is the true situation with regard to the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding. These are the reasons why they were bound to fail, and why this failure constitutes a new item of guilt in Germany's account.

AN ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WAR

The publications bearing on these negotiations are also of interest in another direction. They again prove how honourably and sincerely Sir Edward Grey at that time, as, indeed, he had always done before and afterwards, sought for an understanding with Germany, a removal of the tension existing between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance and a cessation of the pernicious competition in armaments. I will not reject the possibility that up to a cer-

tain date at least the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, was animated by similar ideas. The difference between the conditions in England and in Germany was unfortunately this, that in England there were no Pan-Englishmen, no military and war-party, no reactionaries and Junkers, who laid subterranean mines against those in authority and thus counteracted the efforts for peace and understanding made by the leading statesmen. Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had no tendencies and desires other than those entertained by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and all the other members of the Cabinet. In England there was no Prince of the Royal Household who stood at the head of the party that intrigued for war and celebrated in his words, his writings and his actions a gay and a jolly war as the goal of his innermost longing. There was no defence or navy league which directed its efforts in the direction of the "inevitable" war as a steel-bath for the relaxed nerves of the nation, who were supposed to have become effeminate in the comfort of life and in the acquisition of wealth. There was no leader among the authoritative parties who gave expression to an attitude of contemptuous refusal towards a political and naval understanding between the two kindred nations.¹ No high admiral had the

¹ Even in April, 1917, after the war has lasted for thirty-three months, after the entry into the struggle of America and other countries hitherto neutral, after the proclamation of Wilson's war-aims which primarily represents as the aim of American intervention the establishment of a community of States for the organisation and enforcement of an enduring peace and, corresponding to this, a diminution of the armaments of individual States—even now after the upheaval of all these great events Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberal Party, can still write the following sentences:

"I do not believe that the brotherhood of nations will come after the world-war. I believe the call will be: After the victory bind the helm faster. We shall have to support a heavy burden of armaments; a powerful army must protect us, and the completion of our fleet is a necessity. For these tasks a strong monarchy is, in my opinion, a surer means than a form of parliamentary Government which never rests from party struggle. . . . it was thus,

ear of the ruler or had at his disposal the influence of those surrounding the ruler to such an extent that he could constantly give priority to the further technical development of the costly mechanism of the navy as against all political and economic considerations.

All these counter-currents against any action aiming at an Anglo-German understanding existed in Germany, but not in England. The Chancellor may honourably have desired a political understanding, which of course was only to be achieved by complying with England's chief object, by an agreement as to armaments. His efforts may have been frustrated on the one hand by the war-intriguers who desired war as such, and to whom as reactionaries nothing was less desirable than an understanding with democratic England, and on the other hand by those connected with the navy, to whom the unhampered further development of their technical masterpiece was an object of passion and a necessary preparation for future naval world-power. Nevertheless, the charge must still be brought against Herr von Bethmann that he either did not attempt, or was unable, to overcome the inner resistance to his policy of an understanding, that he did not choose to demit his office rather than subordinate political to military interests.

in struggle against the power of Parliament, that the Prussian army was created, the glorious instrument of German unity. Inasmuch as we are a national party, do not let us overlook this important point of view." (*National-liberale Rundschau*, quoted from the *Berliner Tageblatt*, of April 17th, 1917.)

That is what is still written to-day by the leader of one of the most influential "liberal" parties! It is possible to imagine how matters appear to the politicians who stand further to the right. Even if the continuation of this so-called assurance of peace, which is entirely of a one-sided military character, were in itself desirable, the fact that the new creation of a powerful army, the further extension of our navy, would fail on the sheer impossibility of imposing anew such a burden of armaments on the exhausted nations has not even yet been grasped by a liberal politician in Germany, a man who in the event of imperial policy turning in any way to the left would be amongst the first candidates for the office of a Minister.

The pernicious results to which this unpardonable weakness in a statesman leads are seen in the present war. Had Herr von Bethmann in 1912 defeated the Pan-German and militaristic opposition to an agreement as to armaments which was of value for both parties, this internal victory would have made it possible for him to rest satisfied with the proffered English guarantee against any aggressive war, and to give up the reservation of a German aggressive war under the title of a war "forced upon" Germany. The victory of the statesman over the military party would have mitigated the zeal and the success of the inciters to war in depriving them of the possibility of constantly increasing and strengthening their arms of aggression. The victory of Bethmann, then, in 1912 would have prevented his defeat, now, in July, 1914. The Anglo-German agreement would have become a means of preventing the European war. The final conclusion of our observations is therefore that the German Chancellor remains responsible for the failure of the negotiations for an understanding in 1912, because, although originally perhaps animated by honourable intentions, he subordinated himself in the course of the negotiations to the views and the intentions of the military and the war party, exactly as he did in the critical days of July, 1914.

METTERNICH'S REPORTS OF FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1912

Metternich's reports of February and March, 1912, published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 8th, 1915, confirm in every respect Grey's attitude as I have explained it in my book, page 101, following Cook. According to Metternich's report Grey emphasised England's earnest desire to live in peace and amity with Germany and also to give a firm form to this friendship, by a political and naval agreement without thereby calling in question the friendly relation which united England to France and Russia:

His policy is directed to avoiding a renewed grouping of the Powers into two camps, and this will in time bear its fruits (Metternich's report of March 17th, 1912).

Grey rightly pointed out that an absolute pledge of neutrality—even with the addition relating to the war “forced upon” a State—had not ever been entered into by the English Government with regard to France and Russia. If Germany insisted on such an obligation, but on the other hand desired to maintain for herself more or less a free hand with regard to the construction of her fleet, Grey observed:

Any advance (by Germany) beyond the existing naval law would preclude the English Government at this moment from entering into a political agreement with us (Metternich's report of March 29th, 1912).

This report from our German Ambassador, immediately before negotiations were broken off, proves once more that the German Government was not prepared to make any sincere equivalent in the matter of naval construction, but reserved for themselves the right to advance further beyond the limits of the existing naval law. My assertion, for which I have endeavoured to adduce proof above, that the maximum that Germany offered was merely a temporary retardation in naval construction, is thus confirmed. Had any definite restriction, either in the extent of the naval preparation or in the expenditure involved, been offered by Germany, the German Government would not have failed to emphasise in plain words this important counter-offer. This, however, has never been done, not even in the Chancellor's speech of August 19th, 1915. From this it follows, as from all the other facts of the case, that Germany, under the pressure of its naval experts and the enthusiasts for sea-power who are concentrated in the German Navy League, desired to retain a free hand for the further development of her navy, and that thus she made any political and naval agreement with England impossible.

The negotiations thus remained without result. Both sides remained free to continue their fatal competition in armaments. But even this disappointment did not discourage Grey. He expressed to Metternich the hope that in spite of the failure of the present negotiations a further attempt

might be made to reach an understanding on colonial and territorial questions, and that when such an understanding had in time exercised its effect on public opinion in both countries the question of a political agreement and of an agreement as to armaments might again be approached (Metternich's report of March 29th, 1912).

Thus, notwithstanding their lack of success, the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding did not end on a dissonant note, but with a propitious outlook into the future, which later on became a reality in the common work in the cause of peace carried on during the Balkan crisis and in the conclusion of agreements with regard to Asia Minor, the Baghdad line, etc. Grey's action during the negotiations of 1912 and during the years that followed until the outbreak of the war proves in every particular phase that the English statesman sincerely sought, with all the means at his disposal, for peace and friendship with Germany, and that he is not responsible for the failure of his efforts.

HALDANE

Herr Schiemann, the man of the "scientific method of investigation," does not in fact consider the most important point at issue in the Anglo-German negotiations. He writes a pamphlet for the purpose of proving *How England Prevented an Understanding with Germany*, and does not devote so much as a word to the central point of the question, the German addition with regard to the war "forced upon" them. For him the matter is disposed of by mentioning the English proposal, which he states is deceitful and Machiavellian, and he further seeks more particularly to cast suspicion upon it by referring to Haldane's speech of July 5th, 1915, which he likewise garbles.¹

The sense of Haldane's speech, which I have before me only in the form of a report in a German newspaper, was unambiguously to the effect that on the occasion of his visit to Berlin in February, 1912, he gained the impression that

¹ *Slanderer*, page 47.

there was an influential war-party in Germany, who were themselves pressing for war on the pretext that Germany was menaced by an attack from England and her friends in the Entente. These war-intriguers had unfortunately obtained the upper hand over the great mass of the pacific German people, and as they had by their influence caused the failure of the negotiations then undertaken with a view to arriving at an understanding, so also they had brought about the outbreak of the present war. The experiences and the observations which he had made in February, 1912, and which had been confirmed in March by the failure of the negotiations for an understanding, had then induced him and his colleagues in the Ministry to continue further their preparations by land and by sea, since it was clear that Berlin was not to be moved to an effective restriction of her armaments.

This is what Schiemann calls an "extremely important confession on the part of Haldane," a confession of a "war-policy." In reality it was a confession of the hopelessness of arriving at an understanding with Germany on the question of armaments on the basis of a political agreement. That such an undertaking had no prospect of success was clear from all the negotiations which Haldane conducted with the Emperor, the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the Chancellor and other leading personalities. The Chancellor sought a political agreement which would guarantee him England's neutrality in the widest sense; the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and the Emperor William themselves declared with the utmost definiteness that "in return for an acceptable political agreement there could be no reduction in the increased naval programme, but that there might be some temporary retardation" (Cook, page 30). Need it cause surprise that after these experiences Lord Haldane returned with the resolution that the English Government must now also be left to make further military preparations? I have already pointed out in my book the curious fact that just two days before Haldane's arrival in Berlin a large new increase in the navy and the army had been announced on the occasion of the opening of the Reichstag.

Germany would not even allow herself to be moved from this new increase which was not yet definitely decided upon. Need it cause surprise that after his return Haldane energetically intervened for the extension of English preparations by land and by sea, notwithstanding the continuation of the negotiations between Grey and Metternich, the success of which must have appeared to Lord Haldane, of all men, to be more than doubtful after what he had observed in Berlin?

Thus the argument inferred from Haldane's speech of July 5th, 1915, for the existence of an English war-policy also falls to the ground.

VOLUNTARY REDUCTION OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION—NAVAL HOLIDAY

How much the English Government, even after the failure of the negotiations for an understanding, sought an agreement with Germany appears from their attempts to move Germany to enter into reasonable paths to the advantage of both peoples as seen in the course they actually pursued in the question of armaments. I refer to the method adopted in 1906 by the Government of Campbell-Bannerman of making a voluntary reduction in the construction of ships already approved in the hope of moving Germany to adopt a similar step. The attempt in 1906 failed. Germany not only did not follow the good example, but bluntly refused any discussion of the question of armaments at the Hague Conference which was then pending. This did not deter Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, from putting forward twice—in 1912 and in 1913—the well-known proposal of a naval holiday, in promising that any retardation or reduction in German construction should be followed by a proportional retardation or reduction in English construction. Churchill even went so far as to agree to a complete cessation in naval construction in any given year, if Germany pledged herself to a similar course.

As a matter of course Germany neither answered nor acquiesced in this proposal, and as the German Government

passed it over in silence, so to-day the German war-Press is also silent on the subject. In Schiemann's pamphlet on the understanding between England and Germany I am unable to find a single word on the naval holiday. In the *Slanderer* pamphlet I find it simply mentioned (page 65), but no detailed account or explanation is given. How does the disciple of the truth, who accuses me of slander, justify this unparalleled suppression? Whatever judgment he may pass on Churchill's proposal, however he may falsify or distort it, he is not in any case justified in passing it over in silence.

The proposal of the naval holiday represents the crowning act in the efforts of the English Government to put a stop to the competition in armaments. It rests on the acute statesmanlike idea that if two people cannot come to an agreement together, this is no reason why they should ruin each other. The English proposal did not require any negotiations, but merely the adoption of a corresponding course of action by the other side. It was elastic in every direction. It could be restricted to definite types of ship, to a greater or shorter period of time, to a diminution of naval expenditure, in short to every possible individual aspect of the question of armaments, and since the English Admiralty were ready for any *modus vivendi*, it depended merely on Germany to determine the nature and the scope of this *modus*. As so often happens, in this question of vital importance for the two nations, it was all a question of the first step. If this were taken, the favourable consequences for the future would have automatically followed. This first step Germany declined, in the same way as she had caused the failure of all the earlier negotiations for an understanding by her exorbitant demands and the worthless concessions she offered in return. This again is a heavy debit item in Germany's account. Because it is so, and because any perversion of English intentions in this question is impossible, the incident is either suppressed or, as happens in the case of Schiemann, it is passed over with the slanderous assertion that this proposal of a naval holiday, like so much more, was also intended merely to keep

alive in Germany the illusory idea that she had nothing to fear from England.

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I should like to conclude this section with the words which summarise in a leading thought the whole of Grey's policy of understanding from 1905 to 1914, a policy which obtained final expression in his celebrated peace proposal of July 30th, 1914 (Blue Book No. 101). I refer to the words of peace with which Grey in his speech in the House of Commons on July 10th, 1912, a few months after the failure of the negotiations for an understanding, opened a prospect into a better future for Europe:

"Whatever separate diplomatic groups there are, I do not think that ought to prevent frankness in the exchange of views when questions of mutual interest arise, and if that takes place separate diplomatic groups need not necessarily be in opposing diplomatic camps."

I would, however, recall to Herr Schiemann, the German Déroulède, the words which Jules Cambon shortly before his departure from Berlin on August 2nd, 1914, spoke to Paul Krause, the representative of the *Lokalanzeiger*, and which are applicable to no one better than to the *Kreuzzeitung* professor:

Quelle guerre stupide! Quelle guerre idiote! Do not speak to me of conferences; no conference can lead to anything unless we succeed in all countries in muzzling a certain section of the Press whose mischievous influence is responsible for all modern international conflicts. I only know of one kind of conference which might produce something that would be extremely useful, and that would be an international congress which would put an end to exaggeration and excitement in the discussion of international affairs. For the Governments always find means of arriving at an understanding so long as the Press does not poison public opinion. I am well aware that it is a difficult task to achieve this without violating the liberty of the Press; but the Hague Conference will not be able to create real guarantees of peace until it finds means of striking this evil at the root.

In these words a profound truth, worthy of being taken to heart, was uttered by the French statesman who, as the German newspaper reporter confirms, never wished for war, but always laboured honourably for the maintenance of peace. In these words he indicated and branded those who are really guilty of the murder of the nations. It is not we who have always placed our finger on this wound, who have always pointed to the fearful consequences of professional and habitual incitement, it is not we who are the traitors to our country. No, it is the *Déroulèdes*, the *Déroulèdes* on both sides. Amongst us it is primarily the man who, swimming in safety in the stream of public opinion, dares to deny the love of the Fatherland in those who at the greatest personal sacrifices and dangers, struggling against gigantic waves of mud and slander, have wished to tell the German people the truth—the truth whose mutilation and distortion has for years been the dishonourable pursuit of those who have intrigued for war. These true traitors to their country, who have nowhere raged more mischievously against the well-being of their own people than in Germany, must be made innocuous in future and handed over to the punishment they deserve. Only thus is an enduring peace and an understanding possible among the nations who all, without exception, are desirous of peace.

CHAPTER VI

THE SPOKESMEN OF MILITANT GERMANY

BERNHARDI

As I have already pointed out in an earlier passage, the attempt is now made in Germany to shake off General von Bernhardt in every possible way, inasmuch as he chattered much too indiscreetly out of school and too openly revealed the aggressive plans of the German Imperialists. Herr Schiemann twists and wriggles to get rid of the inconvenient General; on one page he maintains that Bernhardt's writings were inconvenient and unwelcome to the Government because they foresaw the misuse to which they might be put by malicious minds; on another page he confirms that the bold leader of the Imperialists had rightly seen and recognised the position of affairs, and that his brave books had rightly pointed to the necessity of "seizing the sword before the conspiracy which threatened Germany proceeded to action." Elsewhere again, he seeks to explain Bernhardt's writings by reference to the time in which they originated, the European situation in 1912 when "we would have to reckon sooner or later with a coalition of England, Russia and France, the aim of which would be at least the political humiliation which would be followed as a logical consequence by the destruction of Germany's power."

Herr Schiemann here commits an error which, like all his errors, is an intentional one; he confuses the Imperialism of Bernhardt with Preventionism. I recommended him to read no more than the quotations from Bernhardt given in my book (pages 26-32)—he might even content himself with the mere headings of the chapters—and he will find that there is nothing of which Bernhardt was less apprehensive than a coali-

tion of the Entente Powers for the "destruction of Germany's power," that on the contrary such a coalition would have been highly welcome to him, since it would have removed from Germany the necessity of herself acting as an *agent provocateur*, and of provoking the war for world-power which in his view was necessary for Germany's development. Bernhardt is an unadulterated Imperialist, an Imperialist without any figleaf. He has no fear of war; on the contrary, he longs for it as a necessary means for the fulfilment of Germany's historical mission. Herr Schiemann is also an Imperialist, and precisely in the foreign Press, as I have already pointed out, he is described as the journalistic leader of the German Imperialists. But, as distinguished from the honourable, plunging General, he is a shamefaced Imperialist, who nervously seeks to hide his shame under the figleaf of Preventionism. If we had to choose between the honourable and dishonourable Imperialists, I for my part should prefer the former. They at least show character; they say openly what they want, and in openly acknowledging their own aggressive intentions they disdain any deception of the German people as to the alleged aggressive intentions of the others.

THE FOUR GROUPS OF THE DEFENDERS OF GERMANY

The defenders of Germany might be divided into the following four categories:

UPHOLDERS OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEFENCE

1. At the head of these stand the Rulers, the Governments, the official and semi-official Press not only in the capital but also the provincial Press supplied from Berlin. In the train of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Dr. Helfferich, the leaders of this party, may be found the largest section of the so-called Liberals, of the Democratic Party (or what was so until the war), of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party who are now the Social Imperialists, and above all, unfortunately, until the present day the overwhelming majority of the German people. All these persons and groups

still maintain intact the thesis of the hostile attack and of the war of defence, in the truth of which, however, it is only the flock and not the shepherds who believe. The standpoint of this group is in principle incontestable, since every nation has the natural right and the duty to defend itself against aggression. The error here rests on the question of fact; the attack was carried out not against Germany, but by Germany.

IMPERIALISTS

2. The Imperialists. This group is organised in the "Pan-German Union," in the "German Defence League," the "German Navy League," and similar bodies. Its most conspicuous leaders and propagandists are generals and admirals, either retired or on half-pay; their groups count hundreds of thousands of organised members; apart from the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, their influence in the Press is less expressed in their own organs than in the influence which they exercise on an important and much-read section of German newspapers and magazines. Almost the whole of the Conservative, the free Conservative, the agrarian, and a large part of the National Liberal Press stood, and still stands, at the disposal of German Imperialism, which primarily, of course, comprises the military and Junker circles, but also makes its influence felt in the Liberal and Democratic and recently even in the Social Democratic strata of society.¹

That the Press connected with the manufacture of munitions in the provinces of the Rhine and in Westphalia should act in concert with the Imperialists is self-evident. It is the great manufacturers of armaments and their unions who have supplied the abundant means with which the Pan-German Imperialistic agitation has for years been conducted in word and in writing. Pan-Germanism and Imperialism have more

¹ For confirmation of this the reader should refer to the comprehensive collection of facts contained in the distinguished work of S. Grumbach, which only appeared after the completion of my work, *Annexionist Germany* (Payot & Co., Lausanne, 1917). [Abridged English Edition: *Germany's Annexionist Aims*: Murray.]

and more overleaped many of the former party barriers, and have united in a war-chorus the *Kreuzzeitung*, the *Post*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* and the *Tägliche Rundschau* with the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Lokalanzeiger*, the *Magdeburgische Zeitung*, the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, etc. I am not speaking here of the period of the war, which for reasons which are quite explicable has produced an unnatural field grey uniformity in the whole of public opinion, but of the prolonged development before the war. I shall in a later passage illustrate the progress of this development to an apparently complete national harmony during the war.

PREVENTIONISTS

3. The third category of the defenders of Germany is represented by the preventionists. I have already demonstrated above the reprehensibility in principle of their views as well as the absence in fact of any presupposition of prevention. There are certainly very few persons in Germany who are among the "Empire-Builders" and who yet believe in an intended attack by the Entente Powers on Germany. There are innumerable indisputable facts which speak too plainly against the thesis of aggression to make it possible to admit the good faith of those who advance it. In my book and in this work I have collected a large part of these facts, and therefore it is unnecessary that I should here return to the subject. The course of the war itself proves the untenability of the doctrine of aggression; in particular England, the alleged instigator of the conspiracy, was so little prepared for a war against the first military Power of the world that, as is well known, it was only after the war had lasted a year and a half that she began to think of a serious organisation and extension of her territorial army on the basis of compulsory service; that before the outbreak of the war she had not even prepared an effective protection against aerial and submarine attacks. To account for the military inferiority of the enemy (in the first period of the war) it is true that they

have now prepared in Germany the excuse that their opponents had not intended to strike until two years later, and that until then they wished to complete their preparations. That there is no evidence whatever in support of this assertion, that on the contrary the maintenance of peace was then, and later, the object most ardently pursued by those who are now the enemies of Germany, are facts which, I believe, I have sufficiently demonstrated in my book and in the course of this work.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that a large section of the German people have been taken in by the deceitful view: we were to be attacked later, and we were therefore bound to anticipate this attack at the right time. The great bulk of those in the lower and middle classes in Germany believe in the war of defence, which it was more easy to make comprehensible to them, and for which they could more successfully be stirred to enthusiasm than for a preventive war. The high classes, however, the upper middle classes, the intellectuals, professors, barristers, doctors, artists, etc., all those who could not be impressed by the crude artillery of the predatory attack, but were accessible to the subtler suggestion of a devilish plan in the future—these people believe in the evil intentions of their opponents and praise their foreseeing Government for having anticipated these dangers. People of this sort, who are ordinarily little concerned with politics, do not enter into a more detailed study of the more remote antecedents of the war; they remember that they have heard in the papers of King Edward's "encirclement," of Delcassé's revengeful designs, of the party of the Grand Dukes at the Russian Court whose delight was in war, of the intrigues of the Montenegrin women and other similar blood-curdling stories—and that is enough for their modest needs in the matter of political instruction.

Grey-headed men of learning, who have spent half a lifetime in deciphering a few monumental inscriptions in Latin, in order to obtain for themselves and others definite information regarding the life and the deeds of some Roman Consul or Egyptian Pharaoh who died thousands of years ago, never

think of devoting an odd hour to the study of the documents relating to the history of most recent times which intimately affects their vital interests—indeed, they would consider such an occupation as a waste of time and trouble. The greatest masters of the German world of culture are political illiterates. The most eminent mathematicians have not yet grasped the secrets of the political multiplication table. Pioneers in embryology have remained on the intellectual level of an embryo in the political history of their country. Only thus is it possible to explain the famous appeals of the “intellectuals” with their ignorance of the actual course of events and the consequent untenability of their conclusions. The reason for this divergency between scientific knowledge and political ignorance, which appears only in Germany, is to be found, apart from certain qualities inherent in the German Philistine of culture, in the lack of popular influence on the Government, in the exclusion of a parliamentary system.

Nearly all those professors who are constantly speaking of the war, of the question of guilt, of war-aims, etc.—acting on the motto “Everyone makes as great a fool of himself as he can”—nearly all these inquirers into origins have refrained from approaching the origins of this war with the zeal which usually marks their inquiries. The diplomatic material has for them remained completely, or almost completely, a book with seven seals. They read the foreign Press only as reproduced and elucidated in their daily paper; they only learn of what happens in other countries in the same prejudiced form. And thus it happens that it is precisely among the educated classes that a few catch-words influence public opinion, and that it is just in these circles that inventions like that of the war of prevention find the most credulous hearers. As anyone in Germany may convince himself, the belief in a preventive war is the special privilege of the most educated classes of the German people, whose members are accustomed to retort to the astonished questioner, without entering into any further discussion or proof: “It is, after all, better that we should now be in Russia, Belgium and France than that the Cossacks should be in Berlin in two years’ time.”

PREVENTIVE IMPERIALISTS

4. The fourth category of the defenders of Germany might be called the "half-and-half party"; they are half preventionists and half imperialists. They are not to be confused with the pure imperialists who assume a preventive covering only from a feeling of shame and expediency. The half-and-half politicians strive for a position of world-power for Germany, if possible by peaceful development, but if needs must be, by the violence of war. As they fear and foresee that their aim, like every Imperialistic effort, may provoke friction with competing Powers and may lead to warlike complications, they are not averse from exploiting, for the purpose of striking the blow, a particularly favourable moment, when Germany has the upper hand in a political and military sense. They are thus distinguished from the pure imperialists of the school of Bernhardi, inasmuch as they do not regard war as a beneficent "iron cure," but as a necessary evil, which is to be avoided as far as possible. They are distinguished from the preventionists, inasmuch as they do not believe in a future attack by hostile Powers directed to the annihilation of Germany, but only in a possible or probable hampering of Germany's Imperialistic development. This complicated variety is, of course, not represented in the people, either in the higher or in the lower strata; it is a species which only appears among the "Empire-Builders." Paul Rohrbach and his adherents appear to me as characteristic representatives of these preventive Imperialists.

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Of these four categories of Germans, it is only those who believe in the war of defence and the pure Imperialists who are honest. Among the upholders of the doctrine of defence this applies, of course, not to those who merely make use of the thesis of defence as the most appropriate instrument to the attainment of their ends (that is to say, the leaders and rulers), but only to those who really believe in it, that is

to say, the great bulk of the middle and lower classes of the people.

Among the preventionists those are honest who believe in an intended attack; those are dishonest who, against their better knowledge, have instilled this belief into their adherents.

The smallest measure of honesty is found among the preventive-imperialists, this small group of the initiated who stand in general on a lower moral level than the pure imperialists. These opportunists in popular deception adopt no uniformity in tactics; they are accustomed, as the occasion may require, to make use of the theory of defence or of the theory of prevention; at one moment they portray to the German people the fact of the present attack by the enemy, at another they represent the danger of future annihilation. But they are constantly silent as to their true aims, which in the last analysis are directed to war, because these imperialistic ideas of extension of power would appear to the great mass of the people incomprehensible and unworthy of any sacrifice in substance or in life. Of course the leaders of this preventive-imperialist movement are themselves quite aware of the fact that we were neither attacked nor threatened either with any attack or even with any economic restriction or restraint; they know that it is much truer to say that we were enjoying a period of uninterrupted economic prosperity, quite phenomenal in character, and that it was only their schemes for hegemony and world-dominion that provoked the resistance and the opposition of competing countries.

It is particularly when contrasted with these half-and-half politicians that there is something attractive in the brutal candour of the honesty of the pure imperialists, who are to a large extent drawn from the Prussian Junker and military classes. These East and West Prussian and Pomeranian soldiers and agrarians do not belie their origin and their history (it may be remarked, in passing, that they are wrong in affecting to be of ancient German extraction, since to a large extent they have Slavonic blood in their veins, as many of their names ending in "itz" and "ow" indicate). For them

there has always been only one object of pursuit: the enforcement of the privileges and the advantages of their caste in political and in economic matters. They were not always by any means the loyal vassals of the Margraves and the Electors of Brandenburg, those Hohenzollerns who, as South German Burgraves of Nürnberg, notwithstanding the imperial investiture, appeared only as parvenus and upstarts to the hereditary landed proprietors of Prussia. Everyone knows the difficulties which the rulers of Brandenburg experienced in subjecting this stubborn Junkerdom to their will and to political order, and how the Quitzows, the Rochows, and all the rest of them continued from their castles to devise revolutions against their new masters, and that it was only by siege artillery that they could be compelled to obedience.

This spirit of revolutionary independence is still alive in the Prussian Junkers, and it is to it that they are indebted for their success in the history of Prussia and of Germany. Any political and economic development was and is right in their eyes, if it proves to their advantage. Absolutism or parliamentary system, Prussianism or German Empire, it is all the same to them, if their thirst for profit is thereby satisfied.

May our monarch's will be done
If his will and ours are one.¹

As soon as a Brandenburg Margrave or Elector ventured to oppose the will and the interests of the Junkers there was evoked a violent opposition, which shrank from no weapon of resistance, not even from revolutionary force. As against this perverse Junker oligarchy even a Prussian King had to raise the sovereignty of the State as a *rocher de bronze*. Even a Bismarck was called upon to fight the most bitter struggles of his life against those of his own class, the Prussian Junkers. During the first ten years after the creation of the German Empire, when the great statesman appeared definitely to have departed from the reactionary conservative views of

¹ [Und der König absolut
Wenn er unsern Willen tut!]

his past, the *Kreuzzeitung* Party persecuted him as a renegade with the most poisonous weapons of insinuation and slander, resorting to the weapons of cunning in place of the earlier open and direct weapons of revolution. The German Empire was at first an abomination to the Prussian Junkers. They believed that the royal complaisance was still for a long time secured within the narrower bounds of the Prussian military monarchy with its Junker Parliament, and so long as their Prussian King did what they wished they had not the least desire to exchange him for a German Emperor who, as they well realised, must, in Uhland's well-known phrase, "be anointed with a drop of democratic oil." This explains their original aversion for the German Empire and their violent assault on the creator of the German Reichstag and of universal equal suffrage. At a later date they became reconciled to the new conditions and made themselves quite comfortable within the German Empire also. Bismarck's conversion to a policy of agricultural protection, the constant increase in the agrarian tariff under successive Chancellors, none of whom dared to kick against the pricks (even a Chancellor without an ear or a stalk of corn had to confess himself as a good agrarian), the unfettered position of power within the Empire which the Junkers derived from their predominance in Prussia, from the reactionary constitutional position of the leading confederate States, and from the personal union of high Prussian and Imperial offices—all these circumstances, which preserved their influence and their social position and constantly improved their economic situation, finally reconciled the Junkers to the Empire, according to the proverb: *ubi bene, ibi patria*.

Gradually, however, peace began to be too enduring for them. The authority of their class requires from time to time to be renewed by a "jolly war." It is in the soldier's profession that they chiefly excel, and it is there that they prove themselves to be the most meritorious class among the citizens. When the call of war resounds, the arts of peace are silent; then the merchant, the manufacturer, the exporter,

the man of learning, in fact every civil profession, becomes subordinate to the soldier, and not only do the old Junker families bind new wreaths of glory around their escutcheons, but new ingots find their way into their safes as a result of the gigantic increase in the price of all agrarian produce, which cannot be imported from abroad and must consequently be acquired at any price within the country.

What in the eyes of these imperialists is the *imperium*, the domination of the world? It is for them merely a means, merely an emblem, to bestow a new period of prosperity on their own *imperium*, that is to say, their domination in Prussian Germany and their social and economic authority. War as such, with its repression of all civil rights and interests, with the glorious distinction it confers on military ability, with the strict regulation and control of all the impulses of civil and human liberty, with the suppression of all guaranteed constitutional rights, accompanied by the economic encouragement of the agrarian class (to whom it is exclusively due that the nation is saved from starvation, and who must therefore be protected and encouraged in future, even more than in the past)—it is war as such, as an end in itself, as a means to train the nation in all that is good and fair, all that is lofty and worthy of pursuit, that constitutes the ideal of our Prussian Junkers. That is their Imperialism, which they openly confess under that name, but its inner motives they prudently conceal.

Nevertheless, among the inspirers of war this powerful group is still the most "sympathetic," because it is relatively the most honest. Only a few of this class conceal themselves behind the theories of defence or prevention. Most of them manifest undisguisedly their enthusiasm for war "for the sake of war," and are proud that at last they have reached the end of the path to war which for years, notwithstanding contempt and ridicule, notwithstanding opposition from above and from below, they have undeviatingly pursued.

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In all the other groups of the war-intriguers and of the chauvinists the tendencies and the methods adopted are much

less sharply marked than in the case of the Prussian Junkers and militarists. In the others the doctrines of defence, preventionism, and preventive-imperialism are constantly interwoven; even in the same speech or the same article of any of the spokesmen of these various classes all these keys are touched alike according to what at the moment is to be proved. The crudest contradictions are in this way to be found in the chauvinistic nationalistic literature. On the one page the war for world-power is advanced as the unconditional postulate for the internal and external development of the German people (Imperialism). On the next page we find depicted the conspiracy of the enemy to compass the speedy annihilation of Germany (Preventionism). On a third page the ascent to world-power is described as our historical mission; but as this mission cannot be fulfilled without war, war is declared to be necessary (Preventive-imperialism). And to all these motives there is, of course, added after the outbreak of war, as the mainspring and the *Leitmotiv* of the doctrine of defence, the duty and the necessity of "defending home and hearth against a predatory attack."

Our chauvinists have thus at their disposal a large selection of "modes," almost greater in number than the apprentice David could enumerate in the *Meistersinger*, for these four main methods permit of a wealth of permutations and combinations; they can, as occasion requires, be combined to form a *pot-pourri* from which the trumpets of war resound in every register. That the most appalling dissonances arise in the process, that the one theory completely disposes of the other, that more particularly the war of defence—the trumpet which is blown the hardest—completely excludes the possibility of the imperialistic and preventionist war, are facts which are quite within the range of observation of the wily shepherds, although they refrain from so informing the credulous flock. If the attack has *now* taken place (doctrine of defence), we had no occasion to anticipate it at a *later* date (preventionism). If we *have* been attacked, no more need be said to show that we were justified in undertaking the war. If, however, we were only *going to be* attacked, it has

still to be proved that we were justified in attacking. I have elsewhere shown that this cannot be proved, or at any rate that proof has not yet been produced. The two hypotheses—of the war of defence and of prevention—cannot be true at the same time, since they are mutually exclusive. Anyone therefore who advances the two assertions simultaneously contradicts himself and undermines both theories.

He who endeavours to couple or unite the war of defence or the war of prevention with the imperialistic war entangles himself in even greater contradictions. Whoever supports the theory of the war of imperialistic expansion, in other words, admits aggression. But whoever admits aggression cannot speak of defence or prevention. All these explanations are thus mutually contradictory, and form an unpalatable *ragoût*, by partaking of which every sound stomach is bound to be upset.

A

THE GERMAN CHAUVINISTS

In the following pages I propose to give a series of utterances from German chauvinistic speeches and writings, designed to show that the European war has for years been the goal to which our Pan-Germans, Chauvinists, Imperialists and Militarists have deliberately and intentionally directed their energies; that General von Bernhardi was only one among many, one among countless others, and that it is only as a typical example of a ruthless plunger that he merits special consideration. The utterances collected below all date from the period before the war; they move without exception on imperialist and preventionist lines, that is to say, the train of thought which they represent is that the war, no matter on what grounds, must be begun as an aggressive war by Germany and her allies. The influence of the circles from which these utterances emanate was, until the outbreak of war, underestimated in Germany, in contrast to foreign countries. And as German chauvinism was underestimated, so

that of foreign countries was overestimated. French chauvinism, which was a favourite subject of discussion in Germany, was practically powerless in France; the few nationalist and Bonapartist jingoes, who attracted attention on the far side of the French frontier by their speeches and writings, had in their own country no semblance of authoritative influence on the Government. The dominant parties, the Radicals, the Socialists and the Radical-Socialists, were absolutely pacific in sentiment, and more particularly on the outbreak of the present war they gave practical proof of their love of peace by the fact, as I have elsewhere shown, that they influenced and guided every individual step taken by the Government for the promotion of peace.

With us in Germany the reverse was the case. Here Chauvinism from the outside was perhaps less conspicuous, but it was for this reason all the more powerful within and beneath the surface. The activity of the "Pan-German Union" throughout a quarter of a century has borne rich fruit. To this Union there belonged a series of eminent men from the leading classes of the German people, not merely generals and admirals like Keim, Liebert, Breusing and others, but chief burgomasters, large manufacturers, university professors, territorial magnates, high judicial officials, parliamentarians and editors. A staff of capable orators and effective writers were at the disposal of the Pan-Germans. In all kinds of affiliated societies, in the "German Defence League" and the "German Navy League," in the "Young-German Union," and in the great number of German War Leagues, indeed even in the German gymnasia of black-red-golden memory, they had their leaders and their recruiting officers. A number of widely-read newspapers disseminated their ideas in the higher ranks of civil society as well as in the middle classes of the nation. Even semi-official organs of the Government opened their columns to them, when from time to time the Government were concerned to send a douche of cold water in one direction or another. But above all they had the ear of those in power; the Court and the military circles, the immediate *entourage* of the Emperor, were

permeated with those who were in open or concealed connection with the Pan-German Union and who acted as links between the Union and the Court. The chief of the Imperial Admiralty moved entirely in the paths of the Pan-Germans; this is the explanation of his temporary opposition to the Wilhelmstrasse, but it also explains the strong support which for eighteen years has made his position impregnable.¹

THE CROWN PRINCE

not The chief pillar of support of the Union and of its efforts was, as we know, the German Crown Prince. This young hero of war, who was haunted by the laurels of his ancestors, longed for war for his own glory and for the greater increase of the power of the Empire over which he is one day destined to rule as German Emperor. In my book I have endeavoured to show, by reference to his own writings, in what an ata-

¹ While this manuscript was in preparation the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has been relieved of his office. The reason for this is to be found in the opposition between the followers of Bethmann and of Tirpitz in the submarine question. Tirpitz has gone, but the Tirpitzians remain. When the "naval victory" over England became known, the enthusiastic cry of "Tirpitz! Tirpitz!" which resounded in the Reichstag from those on the right, from the National Liberals and the Centre, as well as other similar manifestations, prove that the spirit of the great "torpedist" continues to inspire his adherents and that his rôle is in no way exhausted. So long as the adherents of the Medici hastened through the streets of Florence exclaiming "Palle, palle!" the influence of the princely merchant family remained unbroken; it could still work its way back to power, until finally it became the mistress of Tuscany.

Meanwhile, in the beginning of 1917, the unrestricted submarine warfare has been decided upon, entirely in correspondence with the wishes and the aims of the Tirpitzians, with the result that Germany's moral and material isolation in the world has been completed. In view of the brutal violation of the assurances given her by the German Government, America has abandoned the rôle of the peace-maker, and has entered the ranks of Germany's enemies. Other neutral States have followed America's example, and it may be presumed that more will follow. The Tirpitz party can again boast of another glorious internal victory, namely, that the *absent* Grand Admiral has shown himself to be stronger than the *present* Chancellor.

vistic circle of ideas this young man moves. One wonders whether he still believes that "the sympathies of the world are with the sturdy and the bold fighting armies"; whether to-day, when millions of corpses fertilise the battlefields of Europe, the "real thing" is still the object of his deepest yearning? I believe it is, if I judge aright the psychology of our rulers. For them it appears a law of nature that the prince in uniform seated on a fiery steed—like naked "War" in Stuck's famous picture—should ride about over fields strewn with corpses. Their hearts do not appear to be moved, when the setting sun illumines in the redness of blood thousands and thousands of faces and of bodies contorted and disfigured in the struggle of death, when the trenches are filled to overflowing with the dead and the wounded, when the subterranean mines explode, and project into the air a jet of human limbs, heads, arms, legs and blood-stained rags, when thousands of innocent ones, praying women and moaning children, are swallowed up in the gurgling whirlpool through the "heroic act" of a U-boat commander, when millions of hapless beings are driven out of burning villages and towns on to the wintry highways. These things must be. It is for these things that we are what we are by the "grace of God." The same prince, whose eyes may grow moist when his wife at home writes to him of the feverish cold of one of his young progeny, remains cool and composed, his appetite and his slumber undisturbed, when a frontal attack which he has ordered in the morning, comfortably seated at the coffee-table lighting a cigarette, stretches low on the blood-stained battlefield thousands of sons, of brothers and of fathers. . . .

THE OTHER "AUGUST PERSONAGES"

In his acute book, *Germany Before the War*, of which I will speak at some length elsewhere, Baron Beyens, the last Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, observes with regard to the murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whom he depicts as an exemplary father: "He was one of those princes who

adore their own children, but, under the spur of political ambition, are very prone to send the children of others to the shambles.”¹ The Belgian diplomat also mentions of the German Empress that she is an admirable German mother, but unfortunately “more absorbed in her children than in her subjects.”²

X These words serve to characterise in the aptest manner the psychology of our princes. If the six sons of the Emperor, or only some of them, had to fight in the trenches, exposed every day and every hour to the drum-fire of the enemy, exposed to death or mutilation, we should have peace to-morrow. But since there is no danger of this, since all six sons occupy positions in the higher command where they are safe from bullets and far removed from the firing line, the work of murder may calmly pursue its course—until the “victory” of the Hohenzollern dynasty, or at any rate, if this time victory is not to be bought even by the sacrifice of millions of lads and of men in the flower of their years, then until the attainment of what is called an “honourable” peace, which will leave the path to new victories open to the future scions of the Hohenzollern race. There is nothing to indicate that the mother of the Imperial family uttered so much as a word or gave a gesture to restrain her husband from the appalling decision. On the contrary! We know, also on the authority of Beyens’ book, that on the occasion of the Morocco conflict of 1911 she was of the same mind as her eldest son and that she said in a tone of reproach to Herr von Kiderlen, whom she disliked: “Are we always going to retreat before the French and put up with their insolence?”³ For the august lady war, so long as it spares her house, her husband and her children, has nothing repulsive in it, and even her strict Christianity does not appear to rebel against the organised wholesale carnage. Only if her mother’s heart were to make her a fellow sufferer would she perhaps exert her considerable influence on the decisions of her imperial husband. The millions of broken-hearted mothers—other

¹ [English Trans., p. 272.]

² [P. 58.]

³ [P. 61.]

mothers!—do not appear to cause her to endure sleepless nights.

On the occasion of the birthday of the Empress—on October 22nd, 1916—the Emperor issued a decree from General Headquarters to the Minister of the Interior, in which we find the following words:

“This year I celebrate the birthday of Her Majesty the Empress and Queen, my Consort, with special gratitude to God the Lord, whose grace has preserved undiminished the prosperity of our House by preserving until now our sons who are in the field.”

The prosperity of our House! That is the thing that matters. Millions of other houses may miserably come to grief; whole families, whole generations, may be extirpated, but no sacrifice is too dear to purchase the prosperity of the House of Hohenzollern, the prosperity of the family and of the dynasty.

When the first news of victory rushed through the capital in August, 1914, one might with admiration have observed the august ladies, the Empress and the Crown Princess, on the balcony of the Imperial Palace in Berlin, as their radiant countenances received the homage of the crowd inflamed to patriotism, as in deep emotion they kissed one another and sank into each other's arms in the sight of all. Since then, since “William's first victory,” the ladies have become somewhat more reticent, when it was found that this victory was followed by many counter-strokes, and above all by the great failure of Verdun. Yet, notwithstanding this, they cannot refrain from trumpeting throughout the Press every visit to a hospital, every inspection of a soldiers' home, and if it is possible they convey their homely acts of heroism by photograph or by cinematograph to their contemporaries and to posterity. Go to the picture-palaces, open the illustrated papers, and observe how these august personages have always a pleased and contented air; see how the young heir to the throne in his coquettish Hussar uniform takes the arm of

General von Mudra before the assembled warriors, and by some droll phrase or other moves to laughter the whole of the surrounding company of soldiers and officers; observe how, in contradistinction to his father who generally looks grave, there is nothing to be read in the face of this Crown Prince but the most cheerful good humour, jest and high spirits, notwithstanding the human butchery which he must daily attend; see how the exalted ladies present themselves before the camera or the cinematograph operator in the hospitals and institutions for the blind, amidst the unfortunate wounded, the maimed, and the unseeing, arrayed in dazzling spring or summer toilets, frequently surrounded by their young sons, but always with radiant smiling countenances. It is just as if they were taking part in a light-hearted frolic, a bean-feast, or some society charitable entertainment, and not the darkest tragedy in the history of mankind. The august ladies have a predilection for being photographed close beside the sick-bed and in the hospital wards in order to convince the faithful people of their unwearying exertions in alleviating the horrors of war. The Austrian Archduchesses appear to be particularly addicted to these good-Samaritan photographs which present them to their admiring contemporaries in their effective costumes, models of *chic*, designed by the most eminent costumiers in Vienna, with their graceful toques and long streaming ribbons. What a novel, exciting, interesting emotion such a war is! What a wealth of new laurels thus shoots aloft in the garden of the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns already so richly blessed! What indelible impressions are received by the souls of the young princes, who still remain at home, impressions of heroism and of the imperishable glory of their fathers and grandfathers, impressions which will continue to exercise their influence on their young minds and will spur them on to greater and ever greater acts of heroism. . . .

How great a contempt for mankind—incomprehensible to ordinary mortals—must fill these great ones, who look upon these enormous hecatombs in human life and human happiness as a reasonable tribute approved by God (they are all

believing Christians!) for their greatness, their glory, the extension of their power. Tears spring to the eyes of us simple men, when, for example, we see in *Vorwärts* the enormous daily lists of obituary notices, in which the various trade unions intimate the deaths of their members, young and old mixed together, half of them boys, and half old men; when we read the moving notices which bereaved wives, children and parents, in halting but all the more touching verses, devote to their dear ones, tumbled into promiscuous graves in alien soil, no one knows where; when we receive memorial cards in which parents, brought down in sorrow to the grave, announce the departure of their second or their third son, who have followed the first, all of them, one after another, slaughtered for "higher" aims, which are no concern of theirs, which cannot increase their prosperity or well-being, which cannot alleviate the grief of those who are left behind,—for the ambition and the greed of power of their rulers.

MERCENARY ARMIES—UNIVERSAL SERVICE

This is indeed the appalling anachronism of the present war, which unfortunately has not yet dawned on the consciousness of the nations. In old days, in the Middle Ages and down to more recent times, the prince went out to battle in person, and in his own person staked life and limb. At the head of a mercenary army which he paid, it was at his own danger and expense, as was fit and proper, that he sought to gain glory and power for himself and his house. To-day the prince and his young sons remain far behind the front, in the security of Headquarters; they enjoy all their accustomed comforts, and leave others to fight and die for them—others who, unlike the mercenaries of earlier times, have not adopted the occupation of arms voluntarily and professionally, but are compelled to risk their lives in the interests of the power of the great. War in antiquity and in the Middle Ages was a barbarity as it is to-day, although of course to a much smaller degree, corresponding to the less perfect development of the means of destruction. But it was in itself logical, in

so far as it exposed to the greatest personal dangers those men or those groups of men who were most interested in the issue of the war, and it left it open to everyone else to decide whether in return for corresponding advantages he would or would not furnish them support. War to-day, with general compulsory service and the personal security of the dynasts and their adherents, is a thing void of meaning, since it leaves those who are really interested untouched and free from danger, but leads to the slaughter-house in their millions the unfortunate nations who can expect no manner of advantage even from a victorious issue of the war.

If the Emperors, the Kings, the Princes and the Dukes could be placed in the front line of the trenches, the war would at once come to an end—or rather it would never have broken out. Prestige and world-power, prestige and world-power! If the life of the great were at stake, if like the insignificant they had to fear death or dread that they might, throughout their whole life, crippled or maimed, blind or lame, helpless and pitiful, trail about with them the remembrance of the "great time"; if in addition to this they were further plagued by the anxiety, which in their case is in any event excluded, of having to leave behind in a state of beggarmdom their wives and children, robbed of their breadwinner—then indeed wars would soon be at an end, then the enduring peace, so ardently desired, would soon prevail among the nations.

POLICY OF BRAG

General compulsory service was introduced into Prussia by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at the time of the French foreign domination, as a measure of defence to shake off the Napoleonic yoke. It is for the purpose of defensive wars only that general compulsory service has any meaning, not for wars of aggression and conquest. "The German is not made for a policy of conquest or of brag, that is not the purpose of our militia, and of our heads of families; they would defend themselves like bears if attacked in their lair, but

they are as destitute of a desire to conquer as bears are." These are the words addressed in 1895 by Bismarck to German students who visited him in Friedrichsruhe. By "a policy of brag" he understood what on another occasion he called "working for prestige," or "viewing international disputes from the standpoint of Göttingen traditions or the honour involved in the student's duel."

In an article in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* in October, 1891, he violently attacked the nationalists and the expansionists who asked of Germany that "she should assume a challenging attitude in Europe, and play the part of a man who having suddenly come into money jostles against everyone as he jingles the dollars in his pocket." In expressing these and other similar views Bismarck constantly emphasised the distinguishing feature of the national war resting on universal compulsory service; that it can be waged only as a defensive war or for the attainment of justifiable national aims, but can never be waged for purposes of prestige or for the extension of power beyond the national frontiers. It amounts to a perversion of the meaning and significance of universal compulsory service, when it is made subservient to Pan-German, imperialistic and expansionist aims as has been done in this war. The last political step compatible with the idea of universal compulsory service was the union of Germany in the formation of the new German Empire. What our Pan-Germans and their executive organs, the rulers and governments of Germany (on the principle "We are the leaders and consequently we follow"), seek to attain beyond this point is something for which our sons, our brothers and our fathers, the men of our Landwehr and Landsturm, are too good. Their blood and their lives are too precious for such an undertaking. If there are any who wish to pursue these ends, let them seek to attain them at their own cost and danger. Let them engage mercenary armies, as was done by the Margraves and Electors of Brandenburg, a practice which was still followed by the first Kings of Prussia. Let them place themselves with their sons at the head of these troops, and then, so far as I am concerned, they may raise the cry

"To Teheran! To Baghdad! To India and the Suez Canal!" But let it be without the German Landwehr man; let him remain at home with his wife and children.

THE CHAUVINISTS AND THE GERMAN NATION

I spoke of the German chauvinists and their exalted protectors. I stated that for years they had willed and prepared this war, and explained in what way they had done so. It has been the misfortune of the German people that it had no idea of the existence, the power and the influence of chauvinism in Germany during the period before the outbreak of the war. The war-generals, the leaders of the Pan-Germans, men like Keim, Wrochem, Bernhardi, Eichhorn, and all the rest of them, the war-politicians like Reventlow, Bassermann, Schiemann, Rohrbach, Harden and all the nameless editors and collaborators of the widely-extended and well-organised Nationalist Press of Germany, were able by their skilful and effective demagoguery to represent to the German people French Chauvinism and Russian Panslavism as the bogey, but at the same time they were able to conceal the fact that the alarmists themselves in no way believed in the external dangers which they portrayed, but only exploited them as a pretext to instigate the German people to war.

For these intriguers the war was an end in itself; in the case of one group, the soldiers, as the result of a natural desire to test and set in motion the machinery of war which for half a century had been elaborated and brought to the highest pitch of perfection, and finally threatened to become rusty, if it were not at last provided with the work for which it was designed. In the case of others it was regarded as a necessary means of educating and strengthening a nation which had sunk in the slough of an unduly prolonged peace. In the case of a third section it was looked upon as the strongest and most striking expression of the development of the power of Germany, who could no longer allow herself to be satisfied with the peaceful conquest of the world's markets by her achievements in technical science, in trade and in industry,

but was called upon to subject foreign countries and peoples to her dominant will. All these motives led to the same end, to the decision to begin at the appropriate moment an aggressive, a predatory war, which at the cost of other Powers would procure for Germany new territories over which to exercise dominion, and would at the same time restore the old Germanic spirit of war in the place of "the vile worship of Mammon."

That these tendencies to war are violently opposed to all the dictates of modern civilised life and to all the demands of humanity, that the development of modern interchange in intellectual and material affairs, linking the nations together and bridging over all frontiers, unmistakably points to the pacific organisation of the civilised world, and not to the struggle of arms and to suppression by war, are facts which in the restricted circle of their professional ideas may not always have been present to the consciousness of these generals and admirals who dabbled in politics. On the other hand the politicians who dabbled in military matters, who allowed themselves to be taken in tow by the generals, can have been in no doubt that their war intrigues were opposed to the spirit of civilisation, and therefore it is they, the men like Bassermann and his companions, who are doubly and trebly responsible for the stupendous consequences which have now befallen the whole world.

OTFRIED NIPPOLD; "GERMAN CHAUVINISM"

The German people were in complete ignorance of the danger evoked by the chauvinistic intriguers. Under the systematically pursued suggestion of these reactionary demagogues it saw the dangers on the other side of the frontier, while in fact the dangers on this side, in their own country, continued to become darker and more threatening.

By their demagogic tactics, particularly in the Defence League, the political generals have to-day become a national danger. No one in Germany is playing so fatal a rôle as General Keim. . . .

The only thing that could really bring the German Empire in danger would be if the chauvinistic movement were to gain the upper hand. This and not the Triple Entente is the enemy of Germany. . . .

What else, indeed, is the "act" of which the chauvinistic papers are constantly writing but a "gay and jolly war," which is the same thing as a campaign of plunder.

So wrote Professor Otfried Nippold in his book which appeared in 1913 under the title *German Chauvinism*, the perusal of which cannot be too strongly recommended to everyone who desires to be informed regarding the true origin and the really guilty authors of the present war. Nippold gives an extremely copious selection from German chauvinistic literature and restricts himself to a short commentary, every word of which, however, hits the nail on the head. His pamphlet is all the more valuable, inasmuch as it does not emanate from a Revolutionary, nor even from a Social Democrat, but from a member of the Central Committee of the "League for Promoting International Understanding" (of which it is one of the official publications), and, further, it is the work of a neutral, a Swiss citizen.

It is highly interesting to read to-day the list of the Directors and Members of the Committee of this League. It consists entirely of famous and eminent names in the German intellectual, official, commercial and industrial world. There are twenty-seven Professors, ten Privy Councillors, a number of Bank Directors, ecclesiastical magnates, General Consuls, retired admirals, public prosecutors, and presidents of the upper district courts—in short an *élite* of German notabilities. Alongside political leaders like Payer, Spahn, Naumann, Bachem, Trimborn, we find men of learning like Lamprecht, Liszt, Meurer, Natorp, Laband, Amira, Martens, Mittermaier, Zorn, Fleischmann, etc. Alongside bank directors like Gwinner, Maier (Frankfurt-am-Main), we find retired admirals like Galster and Glatzel (Kiel), the syndics of the college of elders and of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce (Apt and Dove), bankers like Ladenburg and Dr. Paul Stern (Frankfurt-am-Main). All these excellent citizens must at that time

have occupied the same standpoint as Nippold's pamphlet, if they agreed to its publication in the name of the League which they represented. The fact that they did so, shows that they must have approved and considered as apt Nippold's pointed and well-founded accusations against our professional war-intriguers, men like Keim, Liebert, Bernhardi, and Class, the editors of the *Post*, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Magdeburgische* and the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the *Rheinisch-Westfälische* and the *Kreuzzeitung*.

What, however, are the accusations preferred by Nippold? Let us take only a few striking sentences:

These people do not merely incite to war from time to time, but they systematically train the German people to take pleasure in war. And this is done not merely in the sense that it ought to be efficient in war and equipped to meet all contingencies, but in the much wider sense that it *needs* war. War is represented not merely as a possibility which may come, but as a necessity which must come, and indeed the sooner it comes the better! In the eyes of these intriguers the German people *needs* a war; for them a long peace is regrettable in itself, whether or not a reason for war exists, and consequently, if need be, war must simply be provoked. These men, whose task is to bring happiness to the nations, are not wanting in motives which are held before the German people with this end in view. . . .

The quintessence of their teaching is always the same, namely that the European war is not merely a contingency against which it is necessary to arm, but a necessity, and indeed a necessity for which one must be grateful in the interests of the German people. . . .

And thus to begin with they have put forward the dogma that war must come. Of course they do not say that the only reason why war must come is that they wish it, and that it will come only if they are able to give effect to this wish. They merely put forward the dogma and assert its indisputability.

And from this dogma it requires only a small step to arrive at the next chauvinistic doctrine which is so much after the heart of the political generals whose delight is in war—to the proposition, that is to say, of the aggressive or the preventive

war. *If* war must come some day, then let it be at the moment that is most favourable to us; in other words, do not let us wait until a cause for war exists, but let us adopt the simple course of striking when it suits us best. . . .

What is international law? Mere bunkum! What is the significance of modern intercourse, of trade, industry, science and the technical arts? They merely render the German nation effeminate, and alienate it from war which is its true end. All other pursuits are fundamentally without value, unless they serve directly or indirectly as an education for war. No hesitation is felt in simply turning all ideas upside down. These people regard war not as a necessary evil, but as the highest good. . . .

It would certainly have been a preferable and also a more honest procedure if these war-generals, instead of putting the whole machinery of the Defence League into motion, had frankly admitted that the fact that the Army had had peace for forty years was distasteful to them, and that they wanted once more to have a war. But recourse to such an argument would have made it difficult to gain many adherents. Consequently it was necessary to pursue by other means the task of inciting to war. For the aim was only to be attained by first of all creating among the people the sentiment necessary to lead to war, and then by going to the Government and demonstrating to them: "The German people wants war." . . .

In chauvinistic circles they have already proceeded from the defensive war waged for a compelling reason, and with the utmost facility they have arrived at the aggressive war without any reason at all; and they flatter themselves that the German people has shared in this change from a pacific nation to a quarrelsome nation eager for war.

As a further consequence they quite frankly no longer trouble to maintain the correctness of the principle *si vis pacem, para bellum*, a principle which has long been outstripped in the eyes of these exalted politicians. For the chauvinists, as we have seen, the antecedent clause has long since lost its validity; they do not wish for peace, they wish for war, and with all the power at their disposal they work to secure it as speedy an arrival as possible. The equipment for war is not in their eyes meant to be subservient to the maintenance of peace; God forbid! The German people *needs* a war, and, moreover, one could not but be

sorry for the beautiful army so ready for battle, if it were not at last made use of once more. . . .

The fact that the Pan-German political phantasts direct their attention to the conquest of colonial territory is admirably suited to the purposes of the war-generals, but it is for them merely a means to the end. War itself is for them the essential matter. . . .

Among the arguments by means of which "mass suggestions" are pursued to-day special mention may be made of the parallel with 1813. The attempt is made to construe artificially a similarity with 1913, for which no real basis whatever exists. . . .

In the absence of *real* causes for war and of natural political antagonisms to the other States of Europe, they now find it necessary to seek to create artificial causes. This, however, can only be done by the creation of an artificial excitement in the population, by inflaming national feelings, and by systematically fostering a bellicose spirit—all tasks which are undertaken to-day to the best of their power by the war-generals in the Pan-German Union, in the Defence League, and in similar organisations. . . .

The chauvinists consequently do not shrink from attacks on the present Government, or on the present system in politics and diplomacy. We have, indeed, experience of the fact that they have even directly attacked the Emperor because of his peace policy. . . .¹

¹ This has again been shown during the war in connection with the question of submarine warfare, in connection with the struggle between the ultra-annexationists and the Chancellor who is merely annexationist, and in connection with the opposition now emerging on the part of the reactionaries against every democratic development in the Empire and in Prussia. Monarchy suits these people just so long as they can do good business with, and in, the monarchy. If the monarchy ventures to wish to pursue a path other than that which appears expedient to the Pan-Germans, the militarists and the Junkers, they also become, as the occasion may require, anti-monarchical and, indeed, revolutionary. Certain correspondence which took place in May, 1915, between the Pan-German leader, General von Gebsattel, and the Chancellor is specially characteristic of this revolutionary "monarchism." In this the monarchy was threatened with its downfall and with "Revolution (it is necessary to speak the word)," should the "certain German victory" not be "exploited" to secure the familiar gigantic annexations in every conceivable direction. (See *Vorwärts*, May 22nd, 1917.)

The story of the intended encirclement of Germany has for all innocent minds something that is so uncommonly plausible. And thus large sections of the nation are to-day really suffering from what in non-political life is ordinarily described as a "fear of apparitions," or let us say, from political nervousness, weakness of nerve or hysteria. As a result of this condition there is perhaps more talk about war in Germany to-day than there is among the people of any other country. Confronted with this everlasting gossiping about war in Germany one gets the feeling of living in an atmosphere pregnant with war. With those who have once been infected and who are under the influence of the suggestions emanating from this hysterical *milieu*, nothing would be achieved by saying that no occasion for a war existed. They refuse to give up the idea that Germany is in danger.

These striking sentences from Nippold confirm in every word the observations contained in *J'accuse* regarding the responsibility of German Chauvinism and Pan-Germanism for the war. Nippold's work was unknown to me when I wrote my book; it only came to my notice shortly before going to press.¹ Further, I did not have at my disposal the material collected by Nippold from newspapers and from journals, on which he bases his condemnatory judgment on German Chauvinism. Certainly I also was aware of the criminal intrigues of Pan-Germany; I knew where the criminals were to be found, in what places they had laid their dragon's eggs, out of which to hatch the changeling of war. But I was too much of an optimist, I believed too much in the calm blood and the unperturbed vision, in the sound judgment and the love of peace of the German people, to expect that this war-intrigue would attain success with those occupying authoritative places and with the great bulk of the people of Germany. I was guilty of the same error as numberless Germans in all ranks of the population, the error which was committed by the great majority of the German people: I underestimated the dangers of German Chauvinism: in spite of all intrigues I believed in the healthy understanding and the moral resisting power of the German people.

¹ See *J'accuse*, p. 132.

Like all the others, I was deceived. I did not realise that the ground of peace had for years been undermined in every direction by the sapping activities and by the underground galleries driven by the war-intriguers, and that it only required the laying of a match to lead to the most appalling explosion. I knew that "Keim"¹ was a poisonous germ, but I did not assume that he would be so appalling a germ of disaster as he has in fact become. Good old Father Keim! The father of the Fatherland! The father of this war for the Fatherland, who, nevertheless, after he has longed for it for years, prepared and finally provoked it, still appears to sit comfortably on some "rond de cuir" (as Governor of Limburg has recently reported), refraining from risking his bones in the trenches, but far behind the front, in a post secure from fire, gladdens his soldier's heart with the distant sound of the cannon. Nothing has yet been heard of any warlike deeds performed by any of these braggarts, whatever their names may be. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori!* How lovely it is—for others!—to die for the Fatherland. But how much more lovely it is to remain alive for the Fatherland. How glorious is the real thing, instead of the everlasting wearisome peace-manceuvres. More glorious, however, if it is left to the others to experience the real thing, while the braggarts and the heroes of the pen, instead of pouring out their blood, need only shed saliva and ink. . . .

I underestimated Keim and his followers; I did not consider it possible that a German Emperor with his Chancellor could capitulate to these uncultured, narrow-minded, and barbaric corrupters of the people, to his immature son, whom nothing will ever mature, and to his son's adherents, that he could criminally gamble with the labour and the success of half a century of peace. I considered that there was no possibility of a modern universal war with the unspeakable consequences for the whole world, of which we have now been for almost three years the horrified witnesses, with its barbarities, its terrors, and its devastations. Least of all did I

¹ ["Keim" in German means a germ or bud.]

consider that such a war was possible without any compelling reason, from frivolous pleasure in war, from greed of glory, honour, and power.

Because I considered that the possibility of Pan-Germany's success was excluded, I neglected to follow the tracks of the movement, which was well known to me in its general outlines although I did not consider that I was called upon to attach any particular importance to its individual expressions and actions. I had compiled no collection of newspaper extracts, after the manner of Schiemann, I had gathered together no pamphlet-literature. Consequently, when the outbreak of war with all its accompanying phenomena brought to light the unimagined success of the prolonged preparatory labour of the Pan-Germans, I could only refer to a few books to supply information on this point. From these the connection between the "war of liberation" which had stirred the nation to enthusiasm and the carefully prepared staging on the part of the Pan-German Union and its affiliated organisations could be plainly *recognised*, but only insufficiently *proved*. The copious wealth of material with which Nippold's highly meritorious work has supplied me has now afforded me the satisfaction of finding confirmation of all that I could then collect from the writings of Bernhardi, the German Crown Prince and a few other documents. It is now impossible to reproach me with a one-sided selection of "unauthoritative" phenomena—although I must repudiate the assertion that the statements of a Prussian General and of a German Crown Prince are unauthoritative as a crude expression of disrespect which outrages my Prussian-monarchical feelings. I am now in a position to produce so long and so complete a list of German chauvinist leaders and chauvinistic writings that the charge of partiality falls to the ground, and the picture, which was then drawn, though correctly, with a few lines only, is furnished with the most striking blood-red background.

In my own defence and for the edification of the German public, which is still sunk, and apparently sinks more deeply every day, in the delusion that its Pan-German war of con-

quest is a war of defence (see the consistent utterances repeated every hour and every day by the rulers, the Governments, the civil parties and the social patriots) for the enlightenment of the German people (the rest of the world no longer needs to be enlightened), I propose in the following paragraphs to produce a series of utterances from German chauvinistic literature, which deserve a wider circulation than they have hitherto obtained.

THE LEAGUE FOR PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

I recommend the perusal of these extracts to all those Germans who are earnestly concerned to recognise their true enemies, and to protect their people from catastrophes similar to that which we are now experiencing. Above all I recommend their renewed perusal to those German notabilities who in their capacity as presidents and members of the committee of the "League for Promoting International Understanding" (thus sharing, so to speak, the responsibility for the publication of Nippold's pamphlet) must have known the efforts made by the German chauvinists in the direction of war, their criminal insistence on an aggressive war, although they have now nearly all, with a few honourable exceptions, fallen victims to the lie of defence, proclaiming the defensive war against the shameful attack made upon Germany, and recommending the most fatal annexations and measures of violence as a protection against future attacks. In what camp must we look to-day for men like Payer, Spahn, Liszt, Natorp, Naumann, Zorn, Dove, Laband and Gwinner? They are in the camp of those who preach defence and annexation, which indeed is logically the same thing; for anyone who believes that an attack has taken place must necessarily direct his thoughts to the problem of protection in the future. Nearly all, with but few exceptions, have become perverts, and among these exceptions the most honourable is Professor Nippold, the author of this pamphlet.

* * * * *

The German chauvinists have desired and wanted war; this emerges from all their utterances dating from the period before the war, and it is a fact which neither can nor will be denied by any of these gentlemen belonging to the League for Promoting International Understanding. But it is the others, the chauvinists on the other side, who provoked the war—that is what has now become the battle-cry of the “patriots” with whom these men of the League for Promoting an Understanding have almost without exception allied themselves. German chauvinism, which at an earlier date was recognised and combated as the greatest national danger of Germany, has suddenly disappeared in the eyes of these gentlemen, and, as happens in the fairy tale, in place of the wolf which was submerged there has appeared on the surface a peaceful lambkin to which Neighbour Fox, the wily and ferocious beast, would gladly put an end. Neighbour Fox is represented by Delcassé, Poincaré, Grey and Sazonof, those dangerous highway robbers who have ambushed and attacked the poor innocent Germania as she wandered in the paths of peace. Do these men of experience really believe these fables and tales of robbers, which they have now for more than two and a half years endeavoured to induce the inexperienced people to believe? Are they not rather convinced from the history of the twelve critical days, from the collections of diplomatic documents (which cannot surely be a sealed book for these intellectuals), from the staging of the whole clap-trap about the “war of defence” with the indispensable popular enthusiasm, the speeches from the Palace balcony, the phrases about “forcing the sword in our hand,” the “treacherous attack,” “no longer any parties,” etc., etc.—are these gentlemen not convinced that all this is merely the enactment of a programme, outlined long ago, that every act and every actor were long ago determined in advance, and that the generals’ speeches during recent years were merely the general rehearsals for the real festal eve of battle?

I personally am convinced that scarcely one of these men, who at that time laboured to bring about an international understanding, believes in the attack of the enemy and the war

of defence. They are much too intelligent to do so; they are too well acquainted with the active forces who have worked in Germany in the direction of war, and who have been branded as war-intriguers by these men themselves in this publication of the League. All the greater, however, is their apostasy and their hypocrisy. They take their part in disseminating the great lie because they do not have the courage to swim against the stream, because they dare not resist the Pan-German train of thought which on the outbreak of war developed into a terrorising and overbearing force, because they are apprehensive of the resulting disadvantages in their civil life should they confess what they recognise to be the truth, and because, on the other hand, they have no desire to miss the advantages which a good patriotic sentiment yields, especially in these troubled times, in the form of the handful of silver and the ribbon to stick in the coat.

PAN-GERMANY—ALL GERMANY

The action of all these men and of the strata of society to which they belong is morally more reprehensible and has been accompanied by almost worse consequences than the year-long incitement to war carried on by the chauvinists. These intellectuals and notabilities belong in preponderating measure to the Liberal parties—from the left wing of the "Freisinnige Volkspartei" to the extreme right wing of the National Liberals; members of the Centre and of the Free Conservatives are also included. But not a single one of the directors or of the members of the committee of that League, which had taken for its object to pave the way to a peaceful understanding among the nations, stood before the war in any kind of connection, whether internal or external, with these Pan-German and chauvinistic circles whose task was the intellectual, the political, and the military preparation for a European war. Nippold rightly protests in his book against the inciting effects of the attitude assumed by Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, who by the insatia-

bility of his demands for armaments, by his constant insistence on an active policy, that is to say a policy of war, by his blunt refusal of the pacific endeavours of the Hague Conferences, by his rejection of an agreement with England as to armaments, which would have afforded relief to both parties—in short by his whole pernicious attitude—played into the hands of the war-generals and gave rise to the erroneous impression that in general the National Liberals were identical with the Pan-Germans and the members of the Defence League.

At that time (in 1913) this was in fact an error. With the beginning of war it became the truth. The Press belonging to the democratic, the freethinking (*freisinnige*), the National Liberal, the Free Conservative and the Centre parties, as well as the Press of the social patriots, was, apart from a few exceptions, scarcely distinguishable from the Pan-German and the Chauvinist Press. All the catch-phrases about the policy of encirclement, about the attack and the struggle for German freedom and independence—all the lying phrases coined long before the war, which, on the occasion of the memorial celebrations of 1913, had already inflamed the hollow enthusiasm for a new “war of liberation,” overflowed on August 1st, 1914, as at a stroke from the Pan-German to the whole of the German Press, and proceeded to inundate the soil of public opinion in so fertilising a manner that the most phenomenal cabbage-heads of national pride and infatuation have sprouted in abundance from the journalistic fields.¹

¹ The *Berliner Tageblatt* of April 30th, 1917, makes it clear that even at that date, that is to say, after thirty-three months of war, the Pan-German propaganda in the Press and on the platform, which *before* the outbreak of war had prejudiced and united the whole world against Germany, inspired *after* the outbreak of war with the “Pan-German nationalistic spirit” a large section of German journalists and politicians who had not previously belonged to the Pan-Germans:

“The majority of the Conservatives, the right wing of the National Liberals, with the “General-Secretary” group, even some of the Progressive party, and many persons who have no well-defined party connections, speak and write more or less in the tone which prevails in

To-day, when the war has continued for two and a half years without bringing victory, the enormous sacrifices in life and in wealth, and the troubled prospects for Germany's position in the world later on, have produced many disillusionments and much chastening of spirit. To-day, when the origin of the war, with regard to which the majority of Germans still linger in their former blindness, has somewhat receded into the background in public discussion and has made way for the consideration of the aims of the war and the internal development of Prussia and Germany, the old political antagonisms are again beginning gradually to emerge under the monotonous field-grey; the old varieties of colour are again becoming visible. But at that time, when war broke out, and in the whole of the first period of the war which was crowned with apparent success, all political distinctions were obliterated as at a stroke, and the Emperor, instead of saying, "I no longer know any parties, I know only Germans," might more appropriately have exclaimed, "I know only Pan-Germans."

All the ideas and the phraseology of the Pan-German generals and writers became the common property of German Liberalism, of the German intellectuals, of official German policy, the process being effected overnight, coming, so to speak, like an illumination at dawn. Laband and Liszt, Payer and Naumann, suddenly wrote and spoke in exactly the same way as Keim and Class, Bernhardt and Wrochem had writ-

the *Alldeutsche Blätter*. It would be unjust to deny that the guilt which lies on the Pan-Germans attaches to them all."

The *Berliner Tageblatt* of June 2nd, 1917, writes in the same strain:

"that the Pan-German spirit is to be found not merely in the real Pan-German Union and its supporters. It has confused many minds in circles which otherwise have no political colour affecting even the ranks of the Liberals on the left."

For the sake of completeness the *Berliner Tageblatt* might also have cited a series of social patriots who since August 4th, 1914, have likewise been scarcely distinguishable from the Pan-Germans in the spoken and the written word.

ten and spoken in the past. It may even be asserted that in part the new Pan-Germans surpassed the old in the violence of their speech and in the orthodoxy of their militaristic sentiments, as, indeed, apostates are as a rule worse than those whose faith is of longer standing. Men of learning, clergymen, and other sedentary livers, suddenly mounted the "harnessed steed" more keenly than the oldest troopers who had sat all their lives on horseback. What Naumann in the course of this war has accomplished in exaggerated chauvinism or in chauvinistic exaggeration—what Payer and Spahn, the South-German democrat and the ultra-montane member of the Centre (in the good old times the sharpest antipodes, now linked in a loyal comradeship of arms and in community of sentiment), have declaimed and expressed in their political actions on the subject of the "Fatherland in danger," the necessity of protection against future attacks, the unity of the German nation and the sanctity of the civil truce, in no way falls short of the train of thought and the demands of the Pan-German generals. (Among many other examples reference may be made to the declaration issued by Spahn on December 9th, 1915, in the name of all the civil parties, in favour of the acquisition of territories requisite for Germany's protection.) In particular it will always be remembered to Herr Dr. *von* Payer's credit that he discharged a glorious act of patriotism in acting as reporter to the Commission for the surrender of Liebknecht to the military authorities, that he moved in the matter of the charge of treason against his parliamentary colleague, that he was instrumental in carrying through the first violation of the principle of immunity. What has become of this former South-German democrat, the bitterest opponent of Prussia, of this Dr. Payer, once the democratic tribune of the people (without "excellency" and without "von"), in the enervating and emasculating atmosphere of the Court and the Government? . . .

The German people had in fact become one. Unfortunately so! Apart from a few honourable exceptions, the opponents of Pan-Germanism had gone over to the enemy with flying flags, intellect abased itself before the sabre,

democracy before autocracy, the civilian element before Junkerdom. The most disconcerting feature in this distressing, and one would have thought impossible, occurrence is that, notwithstanding the gradual re-emergence of slight shades of difference, it will not remain restricted to the period of the war, but will continue operative far on into the times of peace. It is easier to fall into slavery than to gain deliverance from such a condition. The state of intellectual bondage to the Pan-Germans, the Junkers and the Militarists, into which the educated classes, and unfortunately even a section of the working classes, have fallen will remain for many years to come as heavy fetters about their limbs; it will defer for many years yet the democratic and social liberation of the German people.

* * * * *

On the occasion of the recent celebration of its twenty-fifth anniversary the Pan-German Union could rightly and proudly make the following intimation through the instrumentality of the *Tägliche Rundschau*:

Twenty-five years ago to-day, on the invitation of Karl Peters, a Union was founded in Frankfurt-am-Main, which, though despised and attacked in every hour of its existence, has nevertheless developed into a powerful creative force in our political life, which has not merely imposed its ideas on its opponents, but has frequently prescribed to them the laws of their action. It has been ridiculed, reviled, persecuted; but its ideas were proved to be correct, and to-day in the midst of the world-wide hurricane, when it surveys in retrospect its twenty-five years of activity, it can address almost all its opponents as "Pan-Germans." For this war has taught the whole of our people to feel and to act as Pan-Germans.

The extracts which follow will confirm the accuracy of this sweet-smelling self-eulogy. They will prove that the manner of thinking, of speaking, and of writing in Germany after the outbreak of war corresponds almost without exception, down to the minutest details, to the train of thought,

indeed in many cases to the phraseology, of the Pan-German chauvinistic literature current in the years immediately preceding the war, and that in great measure it still conforms to that pattern to-day.

STAGES IN THE POLICY OF FORCE

Macaulay once said:

“Principles which the most hardened ruffian would scarcely hint to his most trusted accomplice, or avow without the disguise of some palliating sophism, even to his own mind, are professed without the slightest circumlocution, and assumed as the fundamental axioms of all political science.”¹

He who has once lent his support to such a robber-policy, which like all other policies can be carried out only by the means to which it owes its origin—he who has once lent his support to such a policy of blood and of violence as has led to this war, will continue, whether he wishes it or not, to be dragged still further down the slippery slope, until finally he ends in the mediæval stronghold where Prussian military autocracy dictates the law. He who says A, must also say B.—

Defensive war against attack—

Security against future attacks—

Annexation of the territories requisite to afford security—

Suppression and enslavement of the annexed populations—

Renewal of military armaments accompanied by an increase in their strength in order to maintain the condition of force—

A strengthened militarism within, and what amounts

¹ [From the Essay on Macchiavelli, to whose writings the passage in the text refers.]

to the same thing, a more vigorous struggle against Democracy and Socialism—

Increased encouragement of industries connected with munitions, which will have to supply us with arms in a future war, and of agriculture, which will be called upon to protect us against starvation—

These are the stages which the Pan-German chauvinists and the reactionaries have prescribed in internal and external politics to German democracy and, unfortunately, to the majority of social democracy as well. These represent the logical consequence of the first step on the downward path. *C'est le premier pas qui coûte.*

Deliverance from this fatal entanglement is only possible by a determined change of front. The *first* step on the downward path must be retraced, if we do not wish to be dragged down to the last halting place. The first step, however, is the recognition and admission of the facts:

that Germany is waging not a war of defence, but a war of aggression;

that this war, prepared long ago in all its details, was intended to serve the materialistic extension of power;

that consequently the intended acquisitions of territory are not measures of security, but pure acts of conquest;

that these acts of conquest must necessarily lead to new conflicts and to new military preparations;¹

that an enduring peace can be attained in Europe only by the renunciation of conquests on all sides, by the sharpest protective measures against the chauvinistic enemies of the people within the country, and by a pacific organisation of the European family of nations, without the formation of separate alliances.

¹ These sentences of course are also true of intentions of conquest on the other side. For more on this subject see the concluding section on War-aims.

To bring these truths home to the German people is the purpose I have had in view in writing my books. In the present situation in Germany no hope can be placed in any of the parties other than democracy and social democracy, but not until these are convinced of these truths, and have taken the first step away from the path they have hitherto followed, will there be a dawning of new hopes for the free development of Germany, and at the same time for the peace of Europe. If this is not done, the principle of force within and without will continue to triumph in the future, and the goddesses of reason and of freedom will for ever veil their heads. . . .

* * * * *

The preceding section was written long before the Imperial Easter Message of 1917—before that monarchical proclamation, which issued not from an unfettered act of volition directed to the happiness of the nation, but from a feeling of involuntary terror, born of the fear of the nation, the pale reflex of the flaming celestial sign in the East. Prussia has been promised a better electoral law—in the future. We know to satiety these messages in Prussian history: "The message I can hear; 'tis faith alone I lack."¹ They are the favourite drafts on the future drawn by Prussian kings. So far they have never been redeemed.

"It is bad enough for the German nation that the fear of its kings is its only hope, their terror is its only consolation"—so wrote Ludwig Börne, when a breath of freedom was wafted from Germany to France after the July Revolution, evoked by the western storms coming from France. The whispering of the zephyrs soon passed away in Germany when the fear of the French storm had been extinguished. And now when the hurricane has arisen in the East, the same thing will happen again to the long-suffering Michel, unless he at last awakes and dons the Phrygian cap in place of his white linen night cap, unless he proceeds with the necessary energy to immediate action, instead of allowing himself to

¹ [Faust.]

be deceived by distant promises. Those parties and sections of the people who have once bent their backs before the Hohenzollern system of government by bayonet, who have lent it their support in the perpetration of the greatest crime in the world's history, will at any rate be incapable of such an energetic rally.

"For all who scoff at fetters are not free."¹ But hardest of all is the task of deliverance in the case of those who have themselves forged and riveted their own fetters.

ANTHOLOGY FROM GERMAN CHAUVINISTIC LITERATURE BEFORE THE WAR

For the following compilation of utterances from Pan-German and chauvinist sources, I have made use of the following excellent works in addition to material of my own:—

1. *German Chauvinism (Der Deutsche Chauvinismus)*, by Professor Dr. Otfried Nippold (Stuttgart, 1913). To this work, to which I desire to express my deep obligations, I am indebted for a large number of valuable extracts, which, however, give a wholly insufficient idea of the general impression produced by Nippold's comprehensive collection (extending to 130 closely printed pages). I would again recommend the perusal of this extremely instructive pamphlet to everyone who prefers the study of documents to the repetition of empty catchwords.

2. *What would Bismarck have Done? (Was täte Bismarck?)*, by Count von Leyden (published by the *Neues Vaterland*, Berlin, Jannasch).

3. *Driving Forces (Treibende Kräfte)*, by Kurt Eisner (Vol. II of the 33rd year of issue of *Neue Zeit*).

4. *The Prophets (Die Propheten)*, by Wilhelm Herzog (*Forum*, July, 1915).

¹ [Schiller.]

I

THE PRESS

DIE POST¹

January 28th, 1912. Psychiatry and Politics, by Dr. W. Fuchs.

In Germany to-day no reasonable person any longer doubts that the Triple Entente is getting ready to annihilate us. We all know that blood will certainly be shed, and the longer we wait, the more blood will flow. But few venture to advise that the example of Frederick the Great should be followed. And the deed itself no one dares. . . .

And yet our people fail to make the practical application. Everyone knows, the whole nation feels, that only in the attack does safety beckon to us—and yet this cry for the attack is not heard. In a kind of whisper it passes round the card-table.

For Germans to act on the defensive is suicide. Peace means not only shame, but the end. That also is known to many, and perhaps felt by all. And yet! And yet! . . .

These men of genius were not swayed purely by cold calculation,—Frederick began the first Silesian war out of cavalier love of glory—but they never avoided a necessary deed, and they never committed the mistake, weak in nerves and weak in thought, of treating a war differently from any other move on the political chess-board. For these heaven-sent men the blood of war was exclusively a by-product, the by-product of a necessity, of a duty. . . .

What the writer says about the aggressive war for preventive purposes appears to us to be absolutely correct; for every war that is waged to anticipate a threatened and inevitable attack is, in the last analysis, a war of defence just as much as a struggle on which a nation enters only after there has been an open military attack. . . . When, speaking generally, we consider that

¹ The organ of the Free Conservative party, also called the "Ambassadors' party" because most of the diplomatists and many other high officials belong to it.

war, involving as it does the greatest exertion of national strength of which a people is capable, is in the interest of our nation, we are moved solely by the consideration that it represents the only means which to-day can still save us as a nation from the physical and psychical effeminacy and enervation which inevitably await us. . . . Whether, in the event of an undue prolongation of this situation, we should still be able to summon up enough strength to enable us to rise again is uncertain. The soul and the body of the German people are too nervously sensitive to be able to offer a permanent resistance to the destructive influences which are doubly operative during long periods of peace and repose.

January 1st, 1913. The turn of the year—the turn of Fate?

To-day at the end of the year it appears to be a plain duty to point out how the two Central European Empires, and the German element which is contained in them, are constantly being more strongly and deliberately cut off from the way to the south, and how at the same time the circle drawn round us by the Slavonic and Latin races, supported by our erstwhile cousins in England, becomes more and more stringent. . . .

The present turn of the year stands under the ensign of the proud memory of a hundred years ago. . . . Then also the thirteenth year of a new century brought deliverance from a heavy dead-weight of pressure, and we could not wish for anything better from the coming year. Should war be necessary for this purpose, as it was then a hundred years ago . . . the German nation will show that, as in the past, so now it is still capable of defying a world of enemies. The German people has not yet fulfilled its mission; the achievement of the last and greatest part of its historical task still lies in the future. . . . It is a hard school through which we are at present passing, but the quiet struggle for purification within . . . is a necessity for us which could in no way be spared. Once we are the victors here, we will bear in mind the saying that we must either rule or serve, that we must either be the hammer or the anvil,¹ and with the will for decisive action we will seize the hammer in order to fulfill the saying of another poet, that the world will one day find healing in the German mind.²

¹ [Goethe.]

² [Geibel.]

March 27th, 1913. *"They lisp in English."*¹

This proposal (restriction of naval armaments), which is primarily calculated to bring grist to the mill of those elements in Germany who vapour about peace, and to cause difficulty to the Government in the Reichstag as well as among the people, is as clumsily grotesque as it is absurd. . . . Who will give us a guarantee that England is not shamelessly deceiving us in the matter?

April 7th, 1913.

The longing for the times of a largely conceived Bismarckian policy, to which Herr Bassermann gave expression, extends far beyond National Liberal circles and is shared by almost the whole of the German nation; equally widespread is the view advanced by Bassermann with regard to the unfavourable nature of our present international position, and on the other hand with regard to the necessity for a national imperialistic world-policy, to which we are irresistibly impelled by the development of events.

April 15th, 1913.

Amongst those who know the French national psychology there has never been any doubt that, apart from a few superficial achievements in civilisation, deeper moral and cultural capacities were inherent in the French people only so long as it was covered and determined in its preponderant Celtic elements by a strong Germanic upper stratum. The weaker this upper stratum became, the more did the cultural capacities of the French nation recede.

April 21st, 1913. (*Referring to the incidents of Lunéville and Nancy.*)

A German paper recently described the French quite correctly as the worst-mannered people in Europe, and there is, indeed, in the whole of Europe no half-civilised nation which possesses so base, deceitful, contemptible and cowardly an attitude of mind as the French taken in their entirety. . . .

Certainly, there is no doubt that France has had times of

¹ [Adaptation of line in Faust: Sie lispeln englisch wenn sie lügen, "They lisp like angels when they lie".]

political greatness; but that is a thing of the past, and it has meanwhile sunk to such a depth in all the virtues which distinguish a strong and proud nation, that from the military point of view it can only be a very doubtful pleasure to have one day to fight with such a nation.

April 25th, 1913. The Army Law and the International Position.

Can such a position, however, remain permanently in force? Can a great and rapidly increasing people like the German permanently resign all claim to further development and to the extension of its political power? Can we be permanently satisfied with our present insufficient colonies and our endangered situation in Central Europe? Dare we run the risk that the increase in our population may, as in the past, be lost to our country, and that it should flow as a further addition of power to States that are inimical to us? Is not the duty imposed on us of opening up for the excess of intellectual power which exists in Germany, and which frequently seeks everywhere for employment in vain, fields of activity which will be serviceable to the interests of our Fatherland? . . .

From a policy of renunciation and abdication such as we have for years pursued we shall be compelled under the pressure of the national will to advance to such a policy as pursues positive aims: the strengthening of our position in Central Europe, the final settlement with France and England, the extension of our colonial possessions in order to provide new German homes for the excess of our population, the energetic protection of Germans abroad, the acquisition of points of support for our fleet, the further development of our active power in proportion to the increase of the enemy forces. These are the tasks which must be placed before the immediate future for attainment. . . .

It is therefore quite a mistaken idea when the increase in the strength of our army is, as constantly occurs, spoken of as an insurance-premium against war, when, as again and again happens, the maintenance of peace is emphasised as the most essential duty of the State, in the fulfillment of which no sacrifice can be regarded as too great; for that is not true, and is only calculated to poison the mind of the people with false and enervating ideas.

RHEINISCH-WESTFÄLISCHE ZEITUNG¹

January 12th, 1912. The coming war.

Yes, it is coming . . . not the war for Morocco, . . . but the war of revenge for 1870, the war for Alsace-Lorraine. It is nearer than ever to-day.

According to the moving sermon of the Chancellor, the Morocco-Congo treaty was to be a bond of peace. As a sign of the depth of degradation of which a German Government was capable after the heroic year of 1870, future historians will date the origin of a new Franco-German war from the day on which this baleful agreement was signed. . . .

The situation calls for immediate action. What is proposed with regard to the equipment of the navy and the army must as far as possible be prepared and executed at once.

March 12th, 1913.

General Keim has, however, been completely successful in his unwearying educational task. If the statements contained in the Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger* of two days ago, "based on special information," are true, the Government has adopted all the demands which the Defence League, in agreement with the General Staff, has for months been publicly fighting for in the most explicit manner.

BERLINER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN

December 24th, 1912. War as a factor in civilisation, as the creator and maintainer of States.

Under this promising title Dr. Schmidt has issued a pamphlet which it is earnestly to be hoped will have as wide a circulation as possible for the services it will render in combating the pacifism which, unfortunately, is already disseminated in our midst, and in promoting the military spirit of our people.

Here it is proved with unusual completeness and finality that war is not only a factor, but the main factor, that it is not merely the creator but the preserver of true genuine culture, that without it an ordered society, a powerful State, can neither arise nor be permanently maintained. . . .

¹ The organ of the Rhenish and Westphalian munitions industry.

He then points out the dangers of excess of culture on the one hand and of excess of civilisation on the other, and convincingly points out that these dangers are only to be avoided by the outbreak of war at the right time. . . .

While the author in this way recognises war as a link in the divine order of the world, he in no way denies the blessings of peace, as the other chief factor of true, genuine culture, peace being to a certain extent complementary to war. He understands, however, under peace only a real, honourable peace, not that doubtful intermediate condition which can neither be called a true war nor a just peace. True war and true peace in healthy alternation and duration of time are for the author the conditions indispensable for the genesis and the maintenance of all that is good, beautiful, great, and lofty, not only in nature, but in true, genuine culture.

March 29th. (From the weekly supplement "Deutsche Welt.") Germanism Abroad, by Karl Tolle.

An entirely peaceful acquisition of land has in the general struggle for the "places in the sun" no prospect of success or permanency; its reward has always been ingratitude; its fate has been to go under. The desperate position of the Germans in Slav and Magyar territories,—further, the slow, if certain, disappearance of the German elements in the Anglo-Saxon Empires, in North America, in South Africa and Australia, teach us the urgent lesson that such an acquisition cannot be accomplished by peaceful kultur-efforts alone. The harvest is merely one of misunderstanding and suppression, when the kultur-bringers neglect, through disingenuousness and indifference, to unite themselves at the right time in a national sense, and to carry through their objects politically, if need be, even by the development of warlike activity.

TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU¹

November 12th, 1912.

Every true friend of humanity, everyone who means well to humanity, could not but feel satisfied if there were something in

¹ An influential and much-read organ of a Pan-German Conservative, anti-semitic tendency.

the world to urge mankind and the nations forward, and thus prevent them from sinking in indolence and sloth. . . .

If there were not something of this sort, the true friend of humanity would have to invent it, and, cost what it might, place it at the service of mankind. But, in fact, there is something which answers this purpose. . . .

This something to which we refer is nothing else than war and the constant readiness for it. Woe to the nation which in this respect does not stand abreast of the time! Woe to the whole of humanity, if it ever believed that it could dispense with this, its greatest benefactor, this the only trustworthy searcher and guardian of the all-round efficiency of each individual and each nation.

Should the *Götterdämmerung* which has hung for so long over the European race and European civilisation at last be dispelled, and give place to the light of dawn, we Germans must no longer see in war our destroyer, . . . but we must recognise in it the redeemer, the physician which alone is in a position to save us from all the evils of body and of soul.

DER REICHSBOTE¹

January 7th, 1913. Germany and England.

Indifference and irresolution in our diplomatic circles as well as eager desire for peace at any price not only, as is inevitable, in financial circles, but also, unfortunately, throughout wide classes of the nation—that is what arouses the indignation of us old campaigners of 1866 and 1870-1. Yes, indeed, “bliss was it in that dawn to be alive.” To-day one could almost believe that we were back in the time before 1806. . . .

There can be no doubt that there is in England a war-party which systematically works for a struggle against Germany, and that the most authoritative men belong to it.

March 14th, 1913.

Above all it is an erroneous idea that the future will see eco-

¹ Christian Conservative newspaper, especially affected by ladies distinguished for piety and high social position, who constantly speak of Christianity, but by their actions and tolerances support the worst forms of anti-Christianity.

conomic wars only. As at present the Balkan Peninsula is witnessing a racial struggle, so every German war of the future will be a racial war, a struggle for national-racial might and independence, for ground for Slavonic or Germanic settlement. Germany, indeed, will not of her own will enter on such a war until the work of settlement in her own territory has come to a conclusion. But it is equally certain that in the event of a new victory over France there will be, merely on strategic grounds, an appropriation of parts of French territory; in the same way it may be prophesied that there will be imposed on France the duty of buying out and accepting all the inhabitants of these territories, who are unwilling to become German citizens on the ground of their historical German extraction.

May 8th, 1913. Oderint dum metuant.

The manly words which the Crown Prince utters in his new book, *Germany in Arms*, have in these times of the worship of Mammon the stimulating effect of a refreshing breeze in a sultry atmosphere. Stimulating, indeed, only for a German manly heart which with new life sees a better time drawing near, for, thank God, the thoughts of the Crown Prince are shared by the whole of the youth of Germany. A better time which will return to the old ideals is approaching after a quarter of a century of the "fiery pursuit of money" which suppressed them. Of this, of course, the Jews wish to know nothing; their Press continues to cry "Murder!" We, however, say with the Crown Prince: "Peace, peace at any price is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of money. And yet the study of history teaches us that all those States which in the decisive hour have been guided by purely commercial considerations have miserably come to grief." . . .

But where, as most frequently happens, it suits its case better, capitalism cultivates the other extreme, an enervating love of peace. This has for many years been the case in Germany. Unfortunately, under the influence of modern intercourse and the international nature of capital, there has developed in our country an international or cosmopolitan way of thinking which always puts business in the first place, and views unfavourably the emphasis of national considerations.

HAMBURGER NACHRICHTEN¹*March 8th, 1913.*

As far as can be humanly foreseen, we shall not escape the decisive struggle. The Imperial Government should, with the utmost candour, doubly and trebly underline this for the whole nation to see, and should at the same time emphasise the fact that in the end we shall have to rely upon ourselves, . . . that in the next war it will be a question of to be or not to be, and that, therefore, every exertion must be made to endure with honour and success the struggle forced upon us by our backbiters and our enemies.

April 11th, 1913. (Referring to International Conference at Berne.)

The mere suggestion that men belonging to the German Empire should undertake these well-meaning and friendly services, and should attend on foreign soil a discussion on Germany's military preparations, is so monstrous that we may be allowed to doubt not merely the sanity of those who have issued the invitations but also their good breeding. A German who should take part in this conference would insult his Fatherland.

DEUTSCHE TAGESZEITUNG²*April 28th, 1913.*

Can those in authority be surprised if throughout the nation a lamentable depression is felt because again and again it is seen that those who govern us are controlled by a disinclination to assume responsibility, or to face conflicts? It is long since anyone in the German Fatherland believed that the governing authorities would at last think of their duty, and turn to the policy which can alone lead to the goal. But if the guardians of the Em-

¹ Bismarck's favourite organ after his demission of office.

² Leading organ of Pan-German Agrarian Conservative tendency, specialising in hostility to England. Political leader: Count Reventlow.

pire fail, the people itself must become the guardian of its destiny, and the Gneisenaus and the Nettlebecks, the Arndts and the Blüchers, must arise

May 5th, 1913. (Referring to the Crown Prince's book.)

No one can escape the compelling logic of these sentences, and, indeed, their consequence is the Army Bill now before the Reichstag. The dangers of a purely material view of the world, directed merely to pleasure, are truly and admirably portrayed. Indeed, our whole development as a people preaches the same insistent lesson, that we must never neglect or grow weary in the task of seeing that our sword is sharp and our people fit for the battlefield.

May 19th, 1913. (Referring to Berne Conference.)

Had these men been endowed with a spark of that patriotism which, when all is said, they claim to possess, they would have rejected the invitation as egregiously lacking in tact. Whether Liberal or Conservative, whether Democratic or Monarchical, no German who loves honour can be in any doubt that in the question of our armaments by sea and by land the only body called upon to decide is the German nation acting through its ordained authorities, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. . . .

Yet this tendency did not become fatal until, as a result of the agitations of the effeminate Press after the resignation of Bismarck, that spirit of cowardly resignation and tremulous nerves which confuses a dull and miserable state of inactivity with a restful calm invaded a large section of our bureaucracy and our diplomacy as well.

DEUTSCHE WARTE

May 11th, 1913. Habitual Enemies.

The good will of a hundred parliamentarians is not by a long way the will of the nation, and actions to arrive at an understanding between those who are "habitual enemies," such as France and Germany still are, cannot be carried through by means of the fine phrases of those possessed of no authority.

DIE GERMANIA¹

March 8th, 1913.

When the great world-war comes, and all the Great Powers count on the inevitability of its coming, then the Triple Alliance will have not only Russia, France, and England but also the Balkan League against it. . . .

After the events of the last six months a settlement with Russia appears to be much more imminent and more threatening. The Eastern question has assumed another form, and now it is simply Germanism or Slavism.

DER ROLAND VON BERLIN

December 24th, 1912.

These distinguished men, who consult at the council table regarding the destiny of the nations, appear to have no glimmering of the fact that it would be preferable to endure a war rather than this constant fear of war. . . . To this there is added the oppressive feeling that Germany has on this occasion again professed the policy of the strong man who courageously withdraws, that she has not noisily thrown her good gleaming sword into the scales, but has once more protested from day to day and given assurances of her passion for peace which has long been the laughing-stock of all the Cabinets of Europe.

ALLGEMEINER BEOACHTER

June 1st, 1913.

England's present readiness for peace springs exclusively from the fear of having to sacrifice her miserable expeditionary force for France, and in this way being prevented from having troops in readiness to subdue revolts in India and Egypt. . . .

We are lacking in every capacity for an energetic policy of power for which the nation cries aloud. . . . As the diplomatists fail us, the army must help, and for long its equipment has been insufficient.

¹ The official organ of the (Catholic) Centre Party, the second largest party in the Reichstag.

LEIPZIGER TAGBLATT¹

January 24th, 1913. What about our World Policy? by Max Kuhn.

With all respect for the rights of foreign nations this further must be said: Germany has not yet got the colonies which it must have. The increase of population, the growth of the needs and the achievements of our population, compel us. The Empire can still maintain its 70 million inhabitants. But millions are already torn from the soil. The misery of the great towns is spreading. Whole tracts of the country are being transformed into the joyless sea of houses, cut off from nature, which you find in the great cities. Millions are divorced from the love of the soil— attracted by the phantom pleasures of city joys. Is there any thinking German who does not see in this the approach of the greatest danger to our future? What shall we do when we have over 100 million fellow-countrymen? And we must count on that in spite of the decline in the birth rate.

Our development demands recognition. This is a right of nature. This is no policy of prestige—no policy of adventure. . . .

The exclusive pursuit of the maxim of the open door has been shown to be the gravest error in our high politics: it is high time that we proceeded to demand territorial expansion—not, of course, in the sense of transference of territory in Europe. . . .

A passive attitude, drifting with the stream, is unworthy of us. We need an active policy.

DRESDNER NACHRICHTEN

April 17th, 1913. Our Foreign Policy and France.

For there is one thing for which every German patriot longs: to emerge at last from the state of groping and uncertainty, to see clearly where the path ought to lead, and then to pursue this path to the end, without interruption and in full knowledge of the meaning of our actions, as is the German manner. The incident at Nancy affords an opportunity of showing whether the Imperial Government is prepared resolutely to tread this path. . . .

¹Influential paper of Pan-German National Liberal tendency.

The "understanding between nation and nation" of which social democracy dreams and speaks is still as remote as the sky which for ever will remain unreachd. To import such a tendency in our foreign policy or even to hint at its possibility would indeed be the gravest of all the experiments in State Socialism which are prevalent in Germany to-day. That would mean the sacrifice of the power which we must have in order to establish ourselves and to make effective our claims to equal rights in the world.

KÖLNISCHE ZEITUNG¹

March 10th, 1913. The Disturber of the Peace.

The fair dream of the pacifists and the socialists that perpetual peace might be bestowed upon the world by means of arbitration and international fraternisation has vanished and dispersed with the smoke of the Balkan war. . . .

Thus the twentieth century also will not belie the teaching of world history, and it will still remain a fact that only the strong can make his influence felt in the world. . . .

Never has the relation to our western neighbours been one of such acute tension as to-day; never has the thought of revenge been thus manifested in so undisguised a form; never has it been so obvious that the Russian Alliance and the friendship of England have been claimed only for the purpose of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. . . .

We must not seek too far for the reasons of the increase of our army, but find them where they are obvious to everyone; we should plainly point to the west and with outstretched finger indicate where the disturber of the peace sits—in France.

MAGDEBURGISCHE ZEITUNG²

November 27th, 1912.

More dangerous, however, appear to me the increasingly articulate efforts and the agitation of those people, no doubt very well-meaning, who hang on the apron-strings of a well-known

¹ A leading paper of a National Liberal tendency; a semi-official organ of the Government.

² One of the most influential of provincial papers of National Liberal tendency, frequently inspired by the Government.

lady,¹ and who preach perpetual peace, forgetful of the fact that the whole of life is a struggle and that organic nature itself is constantly involved in struggle. These people with the utmost intolerance regard everyone as bound by base prejudice if he is unable to follow the Icarus flight of their thoughts and desires, and they would make us believe that we alone are responsible if mankind do not fall in each other's arms in a renewed spring-time of the nations.

March 21st, 1913. Days of Danger, by Paul Kastner.

Will it be our joyful experience that 1913 will be a year not merely of remembrance and of commemorative speeches, but also a year of national action? There is a fresh breath of the wind of springtime in the air.

II

ORGANISATIONS

A.—PAN-GERMAN UNION

Meeting in Hanover, 1912 (Die Post, April 15th, 1912).

In his opening address the chairman touched upon the political situation and mentioned in particular the French Protectorate over Morocco which sealed the defeat of the irresolute and incompetent foreign policy of the German Government. Amid the enthusiastic applause of the meeting, he expressed his conviction that the so-called Morocco question was not finally solved, but that it might any day again become a burning question in consequence of breaches of the treaty on the part of France. We continue to hold the view that West Morocco is to be a field for German colonisation in a future which we may hope is near at hand, and we are confident that the Pan-German labour of last summer was not in vain. Herr Class also mentioned the most recent failures of the policy of conciliation in the Reichsland, Alsace-Lorraine. . . .

The fourth speaker, Herr von Strantz, discussed the attitude of hostility to Germany shown in the policy of Belgium during

¹ [Berta von Suttner.]

the Anglo-Franco-German crisis of the preceding year, and spoke to the following effect:

. . . Belgium, in spite of the fact that the preponderating part of her population is of Flemish descent, has nevertheless in her foreign policy fallen completely into line with Anglo-French policy. . . . Confronted with a Belgium that is inimical to Germany, the Empire would have no interest in protecting the neutrality of the country, and a consequence of the suicidal policy of Belgium might be that the fate of this country will be sealed on the occasion of the next European conflict, if its foreign policy continues to be one of hostility to Germany.

Meeting of Pan-German Union in Erfurt, 1912 (Erfurter Allgemeiner Anzeiger of September 9th, 1912).

The President of the Local Division, Freiherr v. Vietinghoff-Scheel, in his address of welcome, reminded the members of the glorious time of forty-two years ago. Since then our people has grown enormously in number, wealth, knowledge, and capacity, but recently the respect in which it is held in foreign countries has declined, while internal discontent has been prevalent. The ground of this discontent is that our frontiers are too narrow. We must become land-hungry, we must acquire new territory for settlements, otherwise we shall become a declining people, a stunted race. From motives of pure love we must think of the future of our people and of their children, even if we are accused of taking pleasure in war and plunder. If the German people had been afraid of war, it would have died out. . . .

General Keim from Berlin emphasised the fact that Germany's path to unity and power was not adorned with ink-bottles, printers' ink, and parliamentary resolutions, but was marked with blood, wounds, and deeds of arms. States, however, are only maintained by the means by which they were created. . . .

The last speaker of the evening, Excellency von Wrochem, warned them to keep their weapons sharp, and to test the edge of the sword in peace. In the general prosperity which they had experienced gold had, unfortunately, become dearer to the Germans than iron. Sentimentality and empty vapourings about humanity and peace brought us face to face with the danger that a species of cosmopolitanism might overgrow our German characteristics, and that our Kaiser might even be offered the Nobel peace prize.

Berlin District. (Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, October 25th, 1912.)

In this local division of the Pan-German Union Dr. Schmidt delivered a lecture on "War as the creator and maintainer of States," which was most enthusiastically received.

It was proved beyond all doubt that regular warfare was not only, from the biological and truly cultural standpoint, the best and the noblest form of a struggle for existence, but that it was also from time to time absolutely necessary for the existence of the state of society. . . .

In the discussion which followed a number of writers on naval and military questions took part and described the dissertation of the lecturer as a masterpiece in the ethics of war, indicating that a wider dissemination among the people of this admirable train of thought was desirable.

Meeting of the Committee at Brunswick. (Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten of December 2nd, 1912.)

The chief speech was delivered by Dr. Graf du Moulin Eckart, Professor in Munich. The Pan-German Union had, he said, been called the German conscience. That was, in fact, what it aimed at. . . .

But few German Emperors have understood the German character. The German people has, we may say, grown great in spite of its Emperors. . . .

In the first place the President, Herr Class, discussed the political situation with special reference to the Balkan war. . . . It is our desire that the two Powers should not sacrifice international respect to the need for peace, that they should not give way to exorbitant Slavonic claims. There is little to be gained in avoiding a war now, when who knows how soon a war may be forced upon us, under much more unfavourable conditions?

Neueste Nachrichten (Braunschweig), December 3rd, 1912.

After a short interval Lieutenant-General Liebert addressed the meeting:

A miserable Philistine policy was being pursued in Germany. (Applause.) We must send three million soldiers to the West, and a million to the East. . . . When spring returns, matters may have got so far that the Great Powers will have come into

collision. Therefore the German people must hold together and be strong.

. . . There was a smell of blood in the air and no one could say when the torch of war might not blaze up.

Hamburg Division. (Hamburger Nachrichten, January 19th, 1913.)

General von Liebert spoke on foreign policy and the will to power. . . . The nations which increase desire economic expansion; they are compelled to an Imperialistic policy, and on the other hand, they are urged to pursue a policy of power which is directed to the extension of the territory over which they exercise power. . . .

A nation, which has increased so much as Germany has done, is compelled to follow an unremitting policy of expansion. It must honestly be confessed that since Bismarck retired from office the will to power has failed.

Meeting at Munich. (Tägliche Rundschau of April 21st, 1913.)

In the first place the President, Herr Class, discussed the political situation. . . .

If to-day we stand to a man behind the Government and thank it for its ample Army Bill, we will, nevertheless, venture to express the view that the German forces should be made use of, should jealous rivals or neighbours stand in the way of our needs as a nation. Our rapidly increasing people must enforce its right to existence; it must take care to provide itself with new land. . . .

The German Empire must be far-seeing in making its future secure, and this is only possible if it resolutely proceeds to an active policy. (Long-sustained and enthusiastic applause.)

General Keim discussed the Army Law. The speaker, who was received with much applause, said:

So far as the treatment of the Army Law in the Reichstag is concerned, effect had not been given to any new points of view. All the arguments that the Government and the speakers of the national parties had advanced in support of the Army Law had been urged both in word and in writing eighteen months ago by the Defence League and the Pan-German Union. Even the

speech of the Chancellor occupied the same ground as the Pan-German Union, in so far as he himself indirectly helped to destroy the legend of a reconciled France and a well-disposed Russia. . . .

The history of the world everywhere teaches that only those nations have maintained a position of strength in the world which have placed the will to power higher than the mere will to peace.

B.—DEFENCE LEAGUE

Casseler Allgemeine Zeitung, February 6th, 1913.

Lecture by General Keim in the Cassel local division of the German Defence League.

General Keim: Every good German ought to belong to the Defence League. The Defence League was a league which fought to maintain our nation's power of defence, and for those ideals which the German people must have. There was a smell of powder in the world, even where at the moment shots were not being exchanged. . . .

The Defence League had an educational duty to perform, for the sleepy-headed German did not always grasp the situation as it really was. He was too much under the influence of an exaggerated enthusiasm for justice against which Klopstock warned him long ago. We could certainly not rely on a similar intoxication for humanity in the case of our opponents. . . . People often asked about the why and the wherefore of wars. Kings did not want them, Governments did not want them, the people did not want them. Why, then, did they arise? War, however, did not depend on human will and desire; it was in most cases an inevitable elementary occurrence, a demoniac self-imposing power, on which all written agreements, all humanitarian efforts and peace conferences miserably came to grief. . . .

When all was said, what practical purpose was served by the Hague Conferences which had been so much vaunted? He was sorry for the five thousand pounds that the palace for the Conferences had cost; the money would have been better applied for the relief of indigent veterans.

Hessische Post of February 7th, 1913.

General Keim then spoke. The speaker discussed in the first place the present general political situation. Within a time that

could be foreseen a dangerously threatening war was inevitable, and we must be armed to meet it. The decision with regard to war and peace no longer depended on rulers and individual persons, but exclusively on the interests of the nations, and these interests pressed urgently for a settlement by war. . . .

The peace movements and the labours and speeches of peace conferences were all nonsense. The speaker uttered a word of warning against the enervation of the German youth.

Are we prepared? (Hannoverscher Courier, February 20th, 1913.)

General Wrochem endeavoured to answer this question which is so decisive for Germany's future.

This situation could not be permanently defended; it pressed for a decision. The longing for an everlasting peace could not be satisfied, and it exercised a weakening influence. A just war would be better than that; yes, it would even be better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all. They need not lack a great national aim; in the division of the world among the other Great Powers, Germany had come out almost empty. Germany, however, needed new ground for settlements for its constantly increasing, inexhaustible wealth of men.

Danziger Neueste Nachrichten, March 6th, 1913.

Professor Hillger welcomed the meeting, recalling the days of a hundred years ago when the nation, glad in arms, arose to settle matters with its oppressor, the days in which the idea of compulsory service arose.

General von Wrochem said our people longed after great national aims. Our present policy appeared to be restricted to the maintenance of our position, but a people which, like ours, is developing and striving forward, needs new territory for its energy, and if peace does not bring that, there remains only war. To awaken the recognition of this fact is the mission of the Defence League.

The appeal to arms remained a holy right of the people. The Defence League demanded from the Government military preparations which would enable us to gain the victory quickly and without an excessive sacrifice in life.

Tägliche Rundschau of March 13th, 1913.

Appeal of the German Defence League. The General Committee issues the following appeal:

The issue of the war signifies a perpetual serious menace to Austria. It may be that at first peace will be restored; but the Hapsburg monarchy will not be spared the struggle for existence. Our existence, however, depends on hers. . . .

Germany cannot be suspected of wishing war. A peace for forty-two years, entirely without precedent in the history of Europe, has shown that it means to make its power subservient to no other end than the maintenance of its independence and freedom of motion. It covets none of its neighbour's possessions. He who asserts otherwise is a slanderer. But there must also be no doubt that it is resolved to maintain what it has. . . .

Come then, all you Germans, who believe in the future of our people and wish to make its position secure, come and assist the Defence League in its good and great task. In devotion to the Fatherland let there be no distinction of party or of creed. The happiness and well-being of us all depend on it. It was only in virtue of this sentiment that our fathers a hundred years ago were able to free themselves from foreign pressure.

Darmstadter Tageblatt, April 23rd, 1913.

The President of the Darmstadt division, Dr. Bopp, spoke to the following effect:

Let us at last learn this lesson from history, that an enormous wave of prosperity follows war, and rests upon war, that without warlike capacity the golden age of a nation can never endure, and that when enervation sets in, even economic ruin follows. . . .

General Keim said that the fact that the Defence League was necessary, and on the right path, that it had only demanded what was absolutely necessary, was shown by the third Army Law, which demanded everything that the Defence League had considered necessary. . . .

The German people by its history and by the existence of its unprecedented culture has a well-founded claim to be heard in the world. With modesty we do not get very far. It is often necessary to give the answer with the sword.

III

INDIVIDUALS

A.—GENERAL KEIM

The Will to War. (Der Tag, October 16th, 1912.)

They had, in fact, the will to war, and when such a will had struck its roots into the soul of a people, all diplomatic acts were powerless permanently to root it out. . . .

With the will to war there must also be bound up the resolution to adopt a ruthless offensive, because it was only an offensive that guaranteed the victory. It is, and remains, the most effective method of transforming political will into military deeds. For this reason it is a phenomenon which brings little gratification when we observe that in Germany . . . it has become the official and parliamentary custom constantly to speak of the "defence" on the part of Germany for which it must be prepared. No, Germany must be armed for the attack just as in 1870, and in accordance with this her preparations must be strong enough to enable us with far superior forces to transform, as in 1870, the will to war into military action, should it be necessary to do so.

Der Tag, November 8th, 1912.

Manliness and a sense of duty, these are primarily the qualities which bring a nation to the front, and assure its success in the struggle for existence, and war is the most portentous struggle for existence. And for this reason the words of the great war philosopher v. Clausewitz should to-day receive more consideration than ever in Germany: "Only that nation which is full of a martial spirit will have an assured position in the world."

Der Tag, March 5th, 1913.

This protection can only be effectively secured by an offensive, should the temple of peace ever be closed, and it is thus entirely a mistaken view, and, indeed, a danger to peace, to speak continually of the "defence" of our country against foreign Powers.

There is here a public affectation arising from a feeble temperament, which refuses to look the seriousness of the situation in the face.

Der Tag, April 12th, 1913.

After all the last and decisive word will one day be spoken by war, and when that comes, no one will be able to plead in excuse previous peace considerations, be they what they may. . . .

Everything else, on the other hand, is evanescent, including talk about a good conscience, justice, humanity, world peace and the sacrifice of the German people. . . .

Der Tag, May 10th, 1913.

For we have already got so far—we might even say we have sunk so low—that national pride and a manly spirit, which regards efficiency in war as the most valuable basis of national life, are described as chauvinism, used almost as a term of abuse.

The French have never been a peaceful nation and they cannot be so, because it contradicts their innermost character, their thirst for glory, their national vanity, and, since 1870-1, their hatred of Germany.

B.—GENERAL BERNHARDI

"Our Future." (Die Post of December 23rd, 1912.)

His essential purpose was to bring home to the masses the idea that we shall be forced to fight within a measurable time, and that therefore we must labour, by every possible means and by every attainable exertion, to have all the decisive trumps in our hand for such a contingency.

As Excellency von Bernhardt has frequently expressed in the articles published by him in our paper, he is firmly convinced that the settlement with England can only take place by resort to war. . . .

England must accord us an absolutely free hand in European politics and must approve in advance any extension of Germany's power on the Continent, such as might obtain expression in a Central European Alliance or as a result of a war with France. It must no longer seek to prejudice us diplomatically in the de-

velopment of our colonial policy, so far as this is not designed to take place at the expense of England. It must consent to any modifications in the territorial possessions of Northern Africa that may be proposed in favour of Italy and Germany.

We must therefore make up our minds to recognise the fact that a treaty-understanding with England cannot be attained either in the sense of an enduring friendship or in that of a temporary agreement. . . .

This conclusion, however, signifies war, and war not only against England, but against the combined forces of the Triple Entente.

1813-1913, by *Bernhardi* (*Hannoversches Tageblatt* of December 28th, 1912).

The war which appears to be imminent will be decisive for our whole future. For us the question is whether we shall be able to maintain our present political position and develop into a world-Power, or whether we are to be thrust back into the position of a purely continental State of the second rank. May every German keep these alternatives in view; may our Government be in no doubt as to the great issues at stake! To-day everything else must be subordinated to the will to power and to victory. In every individual there must be a living determination to achieve this victory, even if its attainment should prove arduous; in that case our people will advance to a great future and will gain a political position of world-wide authority in correspondence to its importance as a Kultur-people and to its great achievements in every field of peaceful competition. Then we shall experience days as glorious as those which fell to our forefathers a hundred years ago. That is the hope and the faith which beckon me in the new year.

Bernhardi's "Present-day War" (*Konservative Monatschrift*, May 1st, 1913).

. . . Materialism and dogmatism, in which we are sunk to-day and which manifest themselves in the crudest forms, especially in the industrial and the internal political life of the nation, in the pursuit of gain, in our trivialities and our obstinacy, in our red tape and our pedantry, in political bickering and cosmopolitanism,

and in cowardly vapouring about peace which mocks at all the laws of nature.

Here there is only one remedy, and that lies in art and in war.

C.—GENERAL EICHHORN

Frankfurter Zeitung, November 26th, 1912.

General von Eichhorn, the newly-appointed Army Inspector of the 7th Army Corps, delivered an address at a "Bierabend" given by the town of Saarbrücken, in the course of which he emphasised the gravity of the time; he repeated that everything depended on being ready and he attacked pacifism. . . .

The effect of these doctrines was to deceive the people, to commit a crime against them, and to deprive them of their manliness. In Saarbrücken every step recalled a higher frame of mind, a nobler point of view.

* * * * *

With this "general" march I conclude the first part of the programme of the German chauvinistic concert, and I shall refrain for the present from any further criticism until I reach my general concluding observations. Any commentary would merely weaken the overwhelming impression of the music of kettledrums and of trumpets which I have presented to the hearer. It is sufficient to have presented plainly to the reader such productions of bloodthirsty warlike megalomania, of systematic unscrupulous incitement of the nations. It is to those who have so written and spoken that we are indebted for the European war.

Sapienti sat!

B

THE PAN-GERMAN UNION

BEFORE THE WAR

In 1912, notwithstanding all the signs that pointed to peace and a diminution of tension; notwithstanding the Potsdam agreements, the meeting between the Tsar and the Emperor William in Baltischport, the English readiness for an under-

standing which received expression in Haldane's mission to Berlin and the negotiations which thereafter ensued; notwithstanding the definitive settlement of the Moroccan question, the Pan-Germans were even then wholly engaged in pointing with increasing passion to the "inevitable" European war. They would clearly have preferred that the question of a Serbian harbour on the Adriatic which emerged towards the end of 1912 should have led to the desired war. The policy of accusing the Entente States of hostility towards Germany and of bellicose intentions was at that time—for the sake of variety—chiefly directed against Russia, and less against England and France. The whole register—Pan-Slav hatred of Germany, the misleading of German diplomacy, secret agreements for the purpose of a coming attack on Germany, dismemberment of Austria, struggle of Slavonic races against Germanism in Central Europe, the party of the Grand Dukes, etc.—in short, the whole litany which is now daily intoned to us in German war-literature, was even at that time the eternally repeated theme of Pan-German announcements. These generals, admirals, professors, presidents and attorneys may very well be proud to observe how skilfully and successfully they prepared for the whole German intellect, even for the Liberal and Social Democratic Press, the ideas and even the phraseology which since the beginning of the war have been devoutly repeated by the whole of Germany, which is now identical with Pan-Germany.

Even on July 27th, 1912, the *Alldeutsche Blätter* scoffs at the confidence of the German Press, as shown in the way in which it had received the Potsdam agreements and the meeting in Baltischport:

They speak of "rapprochement," of a continuation of the neighbourly policy, which was initiated two years ago in Potsdam, and show themselves highly satisfied with the result of the discussions in Baltischport; the summit of satisfaction is reached by the leader of our foreign policy—no doubt *in partibus infidelium*—when he innocently and honestly considers it expedient to talk to a deputation of the magistrates of Kissingen of the success of the Chancellor exceeding all expectation.

As against this spirit of confidence the *Alldeutsche Blätter* declares that "feeling in Russia was never so passionately hostile to Germany" as it is now:

Never have preparations for a war against the West been undertaken with so much zeal; never has opinion in the nation and in the army been so much occupied with this war; never has the Government been in greater agreement with the national inclinations in regard to war than at this very moment.

In the general meeting of the Pan-German Union in December, 1912, the President, Herr Class, openly confessed the theory of the preventive war: "There is little to be gained in avoiding a war now, when who knows how soon a war may be forced upon us under much more unfavourable conditions? The moral impression of diminished respect must not be disregarded."

The Committee of the Pan-German Union identified itself with the views of its President in the following resolution, which was passed unanimously:

The political events of the last weeks have revealed the gravity of the position of the whole of Germanism in Central Europe, and have made it clear that it will not be spared the struggle for its existence. . . . Proceeding from this conviction the General Committee of the Pan-German Union is of the opinion that the German Empire must not permit Austria-Hungary to be weakened or defeated; it sees in the Serbian attack against the Danube-monarchy the first step towards a comprehensive attack of Slavism on Germanism, and it is from this standpoint that it views the question of the endeavour to obtain a harbour on the Adriatic.

It is interesting to observe how the Pan-German Union in its criminal longing for war would have liked to make the petty question of a Serbian harbour on the Adriatic the starting point of a European war. This question of a Serbian harbour was also one of the "vital questions for Austria"—like the Skutari question, like the establishment of the Al-

banian principality, like countless other questions, on which, as was then alleged, the existence of the Austrian monarchy depended, but which later on in the course of the war, when matters were going badly for Austria, they would gladly have made the subject of a compromise, if they could have received in exchange a separate peace with the Serbs or a promise of neutrality from the Italians. The question of the Serbian harbour was also one of those concerns which the Viennese Government, in its egotism and narrow vision, pursued to such lengths that even then a European war was within an ace of breaking out on account of such a bagatelle. For the Pan-German Union this harbour question represented a "Serbian attack" directed to the overthrow of the Danube monarchy! In short, even at that time they gave expression to the same train of thought, and indeed even made use of the same phraseology advanced later in his White Book by the docile Chancellor (p. 406), when he depicted the "menace to the existence of Austria-Hungary," and the "position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe."

The real significance of this Austro-Serbian harbour dispute for the European nations, who were even then to be led to the slaughter-house on account of this trifle, was clearly enough expressed in the peace-manifesto of the International, agreed to at Basel on November 25th, 1912, that is to say a few days before the resolution of the Committee of the Pan-German Union:

The Balkan crisis, which has already produced such a terrible tale of horror, would, if extended still further, constitute the gravest danger for civilisation and for the proletariat. It would also be the greatest crime in history in view of the glaring contrast between the magnitude of the catastrophe and the insignificance of the interests involved. . . .

A war between the three great leading civilised nations on account of the dispute about a harbour between Serbia and Austria would be an act of criminal madness. The workmen of Germany and France cannot recognise that there is any obligation, resting on secret treaties, to intervene in the Balkan conflict.

In these two resolutions, that of the International at Basel and the National at Brunswick, there is expressed the whole antagonism between the general standpoint of the war-party and the peace-party. The war-intriguers show themselves as the representatives of a small minority, who place their power and the interests of their profits above the true well-being of the nations, who are resolved to pursue their egotistical ends through blood and murder, and would willingly exploit every insignificant incident for the welcome purpose of enkindling the world-conflagration. On the other hand, we see the representatives of the labouring people on both sides, full of a sense of the triviality of all these questions of territory and of power, placing the high end of the maintenance of peace before all other interests, defending as against the criminal madness of the war-intriguers the right of the nations to life and to peaceful labour. Who, however, gained their point? The Pan-Germans, of course. The greatest crime in the history of the world became a reality. The hurricane burst forth in the very storm-centre in which, according to the wishes of the Pan-Germans, it was even then, in 1912, meant to break.

With the incendiary instincts peculiarly their own, the Pan-Germans have since that time never desisted from accumulating new combustible material in the very place where the greatest amount of inflammatory matter was already heaped together. Since it was not possible easily to provoke a Franco-German or an Anglo-German conflict, they continually pointed *faute de mieux* to the antagonism between Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans.

At a meeting of the Committee in Munich on April 20th, 1913, Herr Class, the President of the Union, summarised the political situation of Europe to the following effect:

According to all the reports of trustworthy informants, we are convinced that a settlement between Russia and us will take place in the immediate future, whether it be in connection with the antagonism between Austria and Russia, or in the form of a direct collision.

In the *Alldeutsche Blätter* of January 31st, 1914, we read the following warning against the Russian danger:

And in view of this will people speak about the prospect of a peaceful development? This would show all the greater lack of consideration inasmuch as there is among the Great Powers one whose action indicates that in Eastern questions it will in no way shrink from an extremely active, not to say an aggressive, rôle. That Power is Russia. We have been able to trace her joy in action not merely in military matters; her love of action is thereby in no way exhausted. The concentration of troops on the Armenian frontier, the almost feverish accumulation of war material against our frontier and that of Austria, the systematic preparations against Sweden, gravely point to the fact that wide Russian circles once more appear to have succumbed to that desire for conquest which for a long time has been accustomed to break out in the Empire of the Tsar with great regularity every two or three decades.

In April, 1914, Admiral Breusing at the meeting of the Committee of the Union in Stuttgart delivered a speech to which I have already referred elsewhere: France, he said, had reached the summit of her hatred; Russia was heaping up one on another official unfriendly acts against Germany:

The military measures taken on the German and Austrian frontiers are extremely menacing; mobile masses of troops are directly before our doors. . . . In place of England, Russia has stepped into the first rank of our enemies, and France is at her disposal as unconditionally as she has followed England in the past.

It is enough for us to note Russia's threatening attitude, her military measures, her unconditional understanding with France, and France's desire and readiness for war.

In weighing these carefully calculated cries of alarm, destined for the gallery—which simulate the doctrine of defence, but are in reality emanations of an aggressive imperialism—it should be observed that in the preceding year the German Government had obtained approval of the greatest military proposals ever granted to a Government; that her navy, ad-

vancing with gigantic strides, emulated that of England; that Germany was in advance of all other nations in the construction of the heaviest siege artillery, of Zeppelins and of submarines, as has now been made clear; that the meetings between the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand constantly became more frequent, and took place at shorter intervals, the last meeting in Konopischt being held, in fact, in the startling presence of Admiral von Tirpitz; that the Austro-Serbian war which had long been contemplated by the Pan-Germans as the starting point of the European war would in all probability have been provoked in 1913, after the failure in 1912, if Italy had not refused her support, and if that refusal had not at the same time given rise to the danger of a revelation of Austria's frivolous aggressive intentions. (For this reason Italy was not consulted beforehand in 1914.) All these facts should be borne in mind in order to appreciate at its true value the ostensible anxiety of Pan-Germany with regard to Russian attack.

If Russia were, in fact, mobile, ready for war, and eager for the attack in 1913 and the beginning of 1914, it is and must remain a matter of astonishment that in the critical days of July, 1914, she advised the Serbs to adopt a spirit of compliance towards the Austrian Ultimatum, that she proposed a decision by the Hague Tribunal, accepted the London Conference, submitted all possible formulæ of understanding to the Central Powers, sought and conducted direct negotiations with the Viennese Government, and neither declared war nor embarked on any aggressive action. Why did Russia assume this pacific and conciliatory attitude just at that moment when her aggressive plans, so long nourished and prepared, could at last be realised? Perhaps Herr Attorney Class, the President of the Pan-German Union, who knows so much more than the modest writer of these lines, will be able to give an answer to this question also.

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On March 14th, 1914, the *Alldeutsche Blätter* announced the inevitability of a warlike settlement between the Central

Powers and their neighbours on the east and west in the following solemn words:

We held, and to-day we hold more than ever, that Germany and Austria-Hungary, even with the most sincere intention to preserve peace, will be unable to avoid a warlike settlement with their neighbours on the east and west, but that rather a fearful decisive struggle will be forced upon them. . . . Anyone who intentionally seeks to conceal the grave position of a not remote future because he thereby fears a "weakening of the conjuncture," commits an unspeakably grave sin against the German people; he stands convicted of high treason against the German nation.

In the same sense we find on April 4th:

Thus a not insignificant part of our people . . . are deceived with regard to the gravity of the situation, and are continually being led about in a political fool's paradise. If one day that which is drawing nearer to us from year to year, one might even say from month to month, becomes a reality, then we shall have a people that is as fitted to overcome hard times victoriously as a company of Berlin tea-æsthètes is for agricultural employment.

In the number of the *Alldeutsche Blätter* of April 11th, 1914, certain observations on our external enemies Russia, England, and France are submitted by General von Gebattel, from whose pen we shall later read some highly significant statements appearing in the periodical bearing the equally significant title the *Panther*. He fastens on to the saying coined by a writer inspired for "war for the sake of war" to the effect that the German people had overcome with comparative ease the consequences of the Thirty Years' War, but that it appeared questionable whether it would survive the consequences of a further forty or fifty years of peace. According to Gebattel, the German nation would run no danger of so enervating and effeminating a peace. England, Russia, and France with their hatred, their hunger for revenge, and their trade rivalry would at the right time provide the interruption of this "slothful time of peace."

Even at that time, that is to say before the murder of

the Archduke, Gebattel, in a discussion of the strategical situation in the imminent world-war, counted on the attack to be made by Austria against Serbia; though, for this indeed, no special gift of prophecy was required, since we know to-day (from Giolitti's revelation) what the omniscient Pan-Germans who managed affairs behind the curtain must certainly have known then, namely, that Austria in the summer of 1913 had already intended that "attack against Serbia," and that it was in no way to be counted as righteousness to the Viennese Government that the Austro-Serbian war did not on that occasion come off, and that the European war so long desired by the Pan-Germans was thus once again postponed.

In April, 1914, on the occasion of a meeting of the Committee of the Pan-German Union, the Munich professor, Graf du Moulin-Eckart, could no longer restrain his impatience: "The day of destiny draws near," he exclaimed, "and even if we should have hanging over us Ragnarök, veiling the end of the world, it would be better to plunge into the tumultuous battle than endure a lingering malady."

In his report on the foreign political situation Admiral Breusing of Berlin, ascribed the diminution of the Anglo-German tension, which he was so good as to confirm, not by any means to the friendly sentiments of England, but only to our constantly increasing naval power. England was still ready

to participate in the hostile machination of other States against our Fatherland . . . We have long been convinced that the unnatural conditions in Europe, the desire of our opponents to eliminate us in any large political activity of world-wide importance, must lead to a warlike settlement; that for us it is no longer a question of bending, but of breaking. The reproach which we bring against the responsible persons in our midst is that they are leaving to our opponents the decision as to when the settlement shall begin. We have characterised this position in the watchword that we have ceased to be the *subject* of high policy, that we have become the *object*, merely the object. We

demand that there shall be a break with this policy of the uncertain will and the faltering decision; we mean to be the masters of our decisions, and not to have them forced upon us from without.

The pugnacious Admiral refuses to know anything about colonial agreements, no matter in how conciliatory a manner they may be treated by England, France, or Russia. The delimitation of spheres of interest in Asiatic Turkey is for him "of no interest and must not mislead us. Our fate will be decided in Europe; we know how matters here are pressing for a decision, and we must not allow ourselves to be deceived as to the necessity of this decision by the fact that under compulsion negotiations may be conducted with us relating to matters outside Europe."

From this point of view, that it is not the pen but the sword that will be called upon to decide with regard to our interests within and without Europe, the Admiral rejects in advance any result that may follow from the Anglo-German negotiations which were pending with regard to the Portuguese possessions in Africa. The sea-hero hungers for land: "What we need are lands of our own on which to settle." Political influence and commercial exploitation are not sufficient. As if, notwithstanding our relatively small colonial possessions, we did not already have land in wealth and abundance outside our own frontier, more land than we shall be able to colonise in many generations, but above all much more land than we can make use of, according to the statistics of our population and emigration! I have already pointed out in my book that our emigration is exiguous; that we are on the point of becoming a country of immigrants; that we have indeed long ago already arrived at this position, if we include in our calculations as immigrants the hundreds of thousands of Polish and Russian agricultural labourers who are required for agriculture in our eastern territories. A calculation on such a basis would, in fact, be correct, since the need of foreign workers on the land is a constant recurring factor in our foreign statistics.

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As a matter of course, the Pan-German Union was not content with the gigantic provision for the army in 1913, but demanded new military preparations forthwith. In order to furnish grounds for these demands, resort was had to the familiar tactics of ascribing to the Entente Powers bellicose intentions against Germany and Austria, and of painting the European situation as black as, for their own purposes, they wished it to be, and as they had endeavoured to make it by all the means in their power. Anyone who by painstaking study has gradually penetrated into the train of thought and the tactics of our Pan-Germans, chauvinists, and imperialists will find everywhere, throughout all the speeches and writings before and during the war, the same method as that which I have already described in disposing of Schiemann—the method, that is to say, of taxing others with their own intentions, of laying at other people's doors the tension which they themselves have engendered and still keep on engendering, of representing the defensive alliance of others as an offensive conspiracy, of falsely representing the resistance offered by the other side to German efforts to achieve hegemony and world-power as an intention to compass Germany's annihilation. It is the subtle mixture of preventive, defensive, and imperialist-aggressive ideas—the latter the true ideas of the leaders, the former designed to deceive the great mass of the people—that we encounter everywhere in the announcements of the Pan-German Union.

The resolution adopted by the meeting at Stuttgart in April, 1914, also contains this twofold appeal:

The General Committee of the Pan-German Union records the fact that the diminution of tension in the foreign European political situation expected after the termination of the Balkan war has not taken place; that, on the contrary, the tension has been rendered more acute by the extraordinary military preparations of France and Russia, by the sentiment of hostility towards Germany prevailing in authoritative circles in both our neighbouring countries, and by unfriendly actions on the part of their Governments. From all these facts the Committee draws the conclusion that France and Russia are preparing for the decisive strug-

gle against the German Empire and against Austria-Hungary, and that both intend to strike as soon as they consider that a favourable opportunity has arisen. The Committee is further convinced that this struggle will for a long period to come, and perhaps for ever, be decisive regarding the fate of the German people, and that with it there is most intimately connected the destiny of the other Germanic nations in Europe. Recognising this fact, the Pan-German Union regards it as its duty to urge our people to go forward to meet the great time warily and resolutely.

On July 18th, 1914, a leading article in the *Alldeutsche Blätter* gives expression to the following views regarding France's alleged war intentions:

The nation (France) believes after forty years that she is at last reaching the goal of her desires and bears the uttermost in the sure hope of a speedy solution. The decision must come quickly; in 1915 and 1916 it is intended that the dice should be cast regarding the fate of Europe.

A weighty admission to make, fourteen days before the outbreak of war! It is an admission that France did not at any rate want *this* war of 1914. That is to say, it is a proof against the predatory attack and the war of defence.

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The tone against Serbia assumed by Pan-Germany after the murder of the Archduke,—the manner in which advantage was taken to exploit this favourable opportunity to strike the blow at last, when Germany enjoyed a significant military superiority and had also by the completion of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal secured her position at sea against all contingencies,—how the attempt was made to urge the Foreign Office, which was much too pacific to suit these intriguers, to remain firm on this occasion, more favourable than any that was likely to occur again, to refuse every advance, to render war inevitable, and how this attempt was attended with success—all this is familiar and does not require to be supported by many examples. Sheer jubilation thrilled through the *Alldeutsche Blätter* when Austria pulled herself together to the adoption of political measures “which were as coolly and

skilfully prepared as they were impressively, indeed gloriously and resolutely, executed." What a gorgeous prospect of world-conflagration and world-war was opened by the vigorous action of the Viennese Government! . . .

AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

And now, after the world-conflagration had really broken out:

We hear the tread of the world's history . . . It will be a struggle for life and death . . . It is a joy to be alive. . . .

This is the hour we have longed for . . . Now the holy hour has come . . . The Russians false and tricky up to the last moment—the French—confronted with the surprising reality—quaking and suddenly forgetting their thirst for revenge,—England coldly calculating and hesitating,—the German people, however, are jubilant.

Since Algeciras, but more especially since the months following the spring of the *Panther* at Agadir, we have known that the Powers of the Triple Entente have grudged us the air we breathe, that they have meant us to choke in our stifling confines while they divide the world among themselves. That was an indefensible position. . . . Now everything is at stake. The possibility of the German people's existence in Europe and across the sea must be made secure for all future time. Russia, deluded for her own destruction, forced the sword into our hand. Well for us that she did so! (*Alldeutsche Blätter*, August 3rd.)

It need occasion no surprise that after the outbreak of the war which they had accurately foreseen in all its details, in its origin and complications,—or rather which they had determined in advance—the Pan-Germans pointed with pride to their prophetic gifts. Thus the *Alldeutsche Blätter* writes on October 24th, 1914, with justifiable triumph:

The event to which we have for many years pointed with increasing definiteness as something which approached with the inevitability of a law of nature, and of which the time of occurrence was calculated with almost mathematical nicety by officers intimately connected with us, came like a thief in the night. All

the apostles of peace, all the lukewarm Laodiceans who could not sufficiently decry the "Pan-German war-intrigue" as the "offspring of an overheated imagination," have modestly stepped aside and concealed themselves in an embarrassed silence. The progress of their much vaunted civilisation, which in their view was bound even now to make any war between European nations an impossibility, has apparently not shown itself strong enough to prevent the attack on Germany, devised and executed on banditti principles.

We have never taken seriously these peculiar enthusiasts who in a world bristling with arms have wandered about botanising in search of the blue flower of world peace; for this reason also we have never chafed under their strangely "other-worldly" and unreal attacks, and nothing is further from our intention to-day than to contrast our position with these apostles of culture who have been so miserably disillusioned, and to bask in the glory of a policy of greater vision which has been justified by events. Here history has decided in our favour; they are weighed in the balance and found wanting.

Father Keim, the general and the leader of the Pan-Germans, sees in the war which has broken out the realisation of the ideal which for so long has been the object of his passion. He is glad that "the dogs which so far have only barked are now at last beginning to bite." (This refers to an alleged saying of King Edward with regard to the German Emperor and the German Government; before the war the phrase was hawked about by the Pan-Germans in order to spur on the "weak-kneed" Imperial Government to the "act of liberation," and to play off the "biting" son against the father who merely "barked.") In the *Tägliche Rundschau* of August 29th, 1914, the valiant general, in a free imitation of Nietzsche, sings the praise of the "men of force" who are now needed:

The minor key of recent German policy, which has so long helped to lull us in the security of peace, must give way to the major key of large and ruthless determination. . . . In these hours of destiny we need "men of force." Others cannot achieve the task; for them the hammer is too weighty.

Even now, after the outbreak of war, the unfortunate and only too docile Chancellor, and his Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, along with him, are ridiculed and attacked in the *Alldeutsche Blätter* because they did not accept soon enough the doctrines of Pan-Germany which alone possess the power to save, and because they believed too long in the pacific intentions of the Entente Powers, more especially of England. If it had not been for Father Keim, Germany would have been lost:

Without the last Army Law there would have been no German victory, and the Army Law itself would not have existed without Keim.

Father Blücher—Papa Wrangel—Father Keim: who will deny that it is in the very best company that the voice of the people, with a sure instinct for personal worth, has placed the indefatigable protagonist of Germany's new fighting forces? (*Alldeutsche Blätter*, April 24th, 1915.)

At one time it was customary to mention Goethe, Schiller, and Lessing as the three most precious stars in the German firmament. To-day Blücher, Wrangel, and Keim have taken their place. Beyond all question we are getting on. Wrangel especially as a German national hero—the man who no doubt victoriously knocked the haughty Danes on the head, but who was continuously engaged in an unsuccessful struggle with the German language—Wrangel as a national hero! I have never laughed so much in my life!

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HERR VON BETHMANN AND THE PAN-GERMANS

Pan-Germany has been extremely ungrateful towards the Chancellor. Instead of receiving and accepting his penitent conversion to Pan-German doctrines with marks of approval, they have added to their previous derision an embittered campaign—a campaign without pardon on the principle of “no prisoners taken.”

After prolonged hesitation and delay, the Chancellor in the

end not only allowed the main lines and the aims of his action to be dictated by the Pan-German Union, but in the perpetration of the deed, in the provocation of the war, in the reasons which he devised for it *pour la galerie*, above all in his treatment of England, he also acted on every point according to the procedure prescribed by this small but powerful party.

The Pan-Germans had always openly proclaimed that their main object was the final settlement with England, the shaking off of the "political tutelage of the Triple Alliance," as the paralysis of England's position as a world-Power was euphemistically called; they had always claimed for us the "German right" of "guiding the ascent of humanity as a perpetually enduring master-nation," and with this end they constantly sought to drive home to the German nation the harsh exhortation that "Britain must be destroyed." Yet now these same Pan-Germans during the critical days from the 1st to the 4th of August seized the hand of their English cousins with velvet gloves; they made appeal to the "common blood, the common conception of honour, the existence of common opponents in the form of Slavs," and they depicted the odious fraternal murder which would result, should England become the ally of Serbia, of Russia, and of France.

Pan-Germany did not yet wish for war with England. First the harvest on the Continent against France and Russia had to be garnered, and then they had to sow the seed of dissension against their English rivals; then the time would come to climb the last rung in the ladder to world-power. This was the watchword of the Pan-Germans, and the Chancellor (from July 29th in his bid for English neutrality) trod with docility the path that was thus pointed out to him.

Herr von Bethmann was not always so tractable a pupil of the Pan-Germans. Long embittered struggles and cunning laying of mines were required before the responsible Government were completely subjected to the word of command of the irresponsible intriguers for war. After the Kiderlen Treaty the intrigue which had already been conducted against the excessively pliable Imperial Government

and against the Emperor, who constantly rattled his sabre without ever striking a blow, proceeded at high pressure. The world-war was the constantly recurring theme in the speeches and writings of the Pan-German Union; the position of world-power was the lofty German aim which was to be attained by means of the world-war. The "driving forces" of our national life were contrasted with the pusillanimous unmanly methods adopted by the Government, which showed an excessive regard for industrial interests. Dr. Ritter, the leader of the Pan-German lecture and recruiting department, conducted the intrigue for war in wandering about the country, and could not sufficiently laud the moral purifying power of war and the enervating effect of too prolonged a period of peace.

Every trifling frontier incident, such as the affairs of Nancy and Lunéville, was eagerly seized by the Pan-German Press in the hope that by such sparks they might be able to enkindle the European conflagration. The French nationalistic movement of the protesting party in Alsace was, although wrongly so, attributed to French chauvinism, whereas in reality it was merely a reaction caused by the miserable Prussian Junker system of government in the Reichsland. The incidents at Zabern inevitably supplied grist to the mill of the German chauvinists. Lieutenant Forstner and Colonel Reuter were marked out as national heroes, and in numberless resolutions and telegrams they were congratulated on account of their heroic deeds against peaceful citizens. It was inevitable that in this case, as in all manifestations of the national spirit, his Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Prussia and of the German Empire should have been at the head of the movement. The more this exalted gentleman assumed an attitude of open conflict towards his father's Government, the greater was the jubilation with which he was answered by the chorus of his Pan-German retinue. "Let us rather creep into a mousehole than reel from one failure to another!"—exclaimed the *Alldeutsche Blätter* to the responsible leaders of foreign policy, when they still refused to turn right-about-wheel at the word of command of the pan-German generals.

PAN-GERMAN WAR-AIMS

At the beginning of August, 1914, they had at last arrived at the goal of their desires. War was resolved upon in Berlin. The civil power had finally capitulated to the military party and the Pan-Germans. According to the prescribed plan war against France and Russia, the national German war for world-power, had been provoked, and the attempt had been made, also according to plan, although unfortunately in vain, to keep England aside for the present. The violation of Belgian neutrality had brought in its train war with England as well. Now the whole issue was at stake. Now the mask had to fall. Now the question was to wage the war in such a way that we shall secure for ourselves peace from our neighbours for the purpose of settlement with England: France, Russia, and Belgium must be placed in a position of impotence so that they will be unable to disturb us in this task. It is, however, absolutely impossible to achieve this unless we impose on these opponents peace-conditions corresponding to the end we have in view; it cannot be done if we satisfy the wishes of the friends of the so-called "Kultur policy," and allow our enemies to get off with a moderate war-indemnity without loss of territory. (*Alldeutsche Blätter*, September 12th, 1914.)

It will be seen that this represents exactly the war-aims already described in my book in the words: "an attempt to establish a hegemony on the Continent and, as a later sequel, the acquisition of England's position of power in the world according to the principle *ôte-toi de là que je m'y mette!*" Will it be possible to shake off all these Pan-German writers, orators and agitators, above all their high protector and leader, in the way that is now attempted with General Bernhardt?

What our armies, our brothers and our sons are fighting for out there is the greater Germany which for a long time to come will assure a new generation of the possibility of settling and of working, and that implies frontiers which will promise us security against an attack by footpads such as we have just experienced.

This may be read in the *Alldeutsche Blätter* of November 21st, 1914. Such a *pêle-mêle* of defence and imperialism is indeed quite priceless. "My Fatherland must be greater"—that is the aim of the war. They would, however, never have taken steps to realise the aim thus constantly proclaimed—oh no! never! it had never been more than a pious wish—had not the "footpads" by their rapacious attack forced us to realise it in war. But now, instead of thanking our opponents on bended knee for thus providing the welcome opportunity—for, indeed, in their unselfishness they hold the ladder to facilitate our ascent—we revile them in every key, and transform our greatest benefactors into the most evil malefactors. It will again be seen in what a logical blind-alley these people fall who endeavour to combine the incompatible and contradictory doctrines of defence and imperialism. The two series of ideas cannot exist together, they are mutually destructive, and of the two one must necessarily retain possession of the ground.

An aggrandisement of Germany merely in Africa or in other remote quarters of the globe is violently rejected by the Pan-Germans on the ground of its insufficiency. France, Belgium and Russia must bleed in Europe, they must furnish territories and a war-indemnity, they must be permanently "placed in the position of impotence." The Foreign Office is protected against the suspicion that it could only have been thinking of compensation in Africa:

Does it not almost amount to an insult to the German Foreign Office to believe that for such aims as these it led the German nation into war?

Please observe: "led into war"! Here again the cat has been let out of the bag, as so often happens in the chauvinistic Press. This is again the involuntary admission of the imperialistic war of expansion.

The Pan-German Union may well look back with pride upon its successes in the past. It may say of itself with satisfaction that "in all its predictions, exhortations, and warn-

ings it has carried its point," that it has "in truth shown itself to be the conscience of the German nation." Lack of conscience struts about in the guise of conscience, just as falsehood so frequently assumes the mask of truth. Woe to the German people if it does not in the end tear the mask from these Tartuffes of patriotism, if it does not recognise behind the manliness of these braggarts, which simulates strength, the mocking, grinning skeleton of the most contemptible greed of profit and of power.

The Pan-Germans will endeavour to make their influence prevail on the conclusion of peace, just as they have mastered and misled the peace-loving German nation in the preparation and the provocation of this, the most terrible of all wars.

Vorwärts of May 22nd, 1917, published a very interesting and significant correspondence (to which I have already briefly referred) between the Chancellor and the general committee of the Pan-German Union, represented by General Freiherr von Gebsattel. The Pan-German Union submitted to the Chancellor a memorial dated May 5th, 1915, addressed to General Headquarters (where Bethmann was at the time), setting out the war aims of the Union, which we already know to satiety. It did so, however, in a form so threatening, and indeed so revolutionary, that the memorial deserves special consideration as a characteristic sign of the still undiminished power and ruthlessness of the Pan-Germans. The document contained an urgent warning against any renunciation of the forceful aims of the Union, which demanded the most gigantic extensions of territory on the east and west and in every quarter of the globe, and protested against any disclaimer of the "exploitation of our assured victory."

It would be the most fatal political mistake that could be committed and its immediate consequence would be revolution. It is necessary to speak the word. . . . An enormous disillusionment and embitterment will be the result; there will be no steadying influence, and the nation, deceived after having achieved so much, will rise. The monarchy will be imperilled and indeed overthrown. It is the monarchical basis of the Empire and of the Confederate States that is at stake.

Bethmann's answer to the preceding memorial (dated May 13th, 1915) is also of interest in many ways:

The demands put forward by the Pan-German Union as to the aims of the war will receive consideration after the complete defeat of all our enemies. For the moment the interests of foreign policy and of the defence of the country, which must take precedence of all other considerations, do not permit a discussion of the substance of these proposals. . . .

I recognise the merit to which the Pan-German Union may lay claim in having raised the national will to power and in having combated the idea of international brotherhood before the war.

It should not be concealed that Herr von Bethmann emphatically repudiates "the attempt of a minority to impose its will on those who are called by the Crown to conduct the Empire's affairs." He protests against the "threatening hints of revolution." But, nevertheless, he does not fail to emphasise once more that "the war and its experiences have made the national will to power, the elevation of which is the justification of the existence of the Pan-German Union, a common possession of the German people."

This interchange of correspondence makes the following points clear:

1. The hardy confidence, the consciousness of power, of the Pan-Germans who could dare to address a memorial of this sort to the Chancellor, threatening revolution and the downfall of the monarchy, more particularly during his presence at General Headquarters.

2. The extravagance of Pan-German war-aims, which is already sufficiently familiar.

3. The fact that the Chancellor did not on principle reject these war-aims, but merely postponed their discussion until the moment of "the complete defeat of all our enemies."

4. The recognition by the leading German statesman that the Pan-German Union had by its activity before the war made the national will to power the common possession of the German nation.

5. The confirmation, on the part of the Chancellor, of the

fact that one of the efforts of the Pan-German Union had been to combat the ideas of "international brotherhood," that is to say, to oppose all pacifist efforts in Germany, and that this effort was as meritorious as it had been successful.

These five facts are of extreme importance in arriving at a judgment on the situation in Germany, so far as war-aims are concerned, in recognising the inner streams and the relative strength of various forces and in determining their reaction on the policy of the responsible Government in connection with the aims of the war. The correspondence thus interchanged shows once more—as indeed we already know and as will be proved in detail in the last section of this book on War-aims—that the Chancellor, despite his pacifist paroxysm in November, 1916, was never in reality "Bethmann the Pacifist," but that on the contrary, during the whole of his career until the present day, he has been the most determined opponent of all pacifist efforts, of all ideas of the brotherhood of the nations. As he is on this point in complete agreement with the Pan-Germans, so also is he in principle entirely of their opinion on the question of the so-called "security of the future of Germany." "Bethmann the Annexationist" does not differ in kind, but only in degree, from his Pan-German assailants. This point also we shall find confirmed in the later section.

* * * * *

A peace according to the Pan-German prescription would be no peace, but merely an armed truce. It would be nothing more than the prologue to new tragedies. On this point also the wire-pullers of the Pan-German movement are entirely clear. But the idea does not alarm them; on the contrary it appeases them. It is to an iron age that we are to advance, one war is to follow another until the foundation-stone of German world-power is immovably laid and the saying is fulfilled:

"For the world will one day find
Healing in the German mind."

In an article in the *Alldeutsche Blätter* of June 5th, 1915, entitled, "*The Laying of the Foundation-stone of a Greater Germany*," the cheerful prospect of a further series of wars is opened in the following words:

So long as England exists as a world-Power, it will and must see its mortal enemy in a strong Germany, and it will in consequence constantly endeavour to scheme for the formation of a numerical superiority of opponents to accomplish its defeat. War between England and us does not turn on such narrow geographical aims as that between France and Germany; but the question is that of the predominant position at sea, and the incalculable value inherent in such a position. The existence together of the two States, of which many Utopians dream, is here as absolutely excluded as was the co-existence of Rome and Carthage.

The antagonism between England and Germany will therefore remain until one of them is finally forced to the ground, and whether we shall be able so to crush England in this war is a matter which may well be doubted.

In view of such claims as these, who will venture to dispute the accuracy of the thesis advanced in my book that this is a German imperialistic war for world-power? Such expressions are not by any means isolated; on the contrary, they represent the key-note to which for many years the whole of our "national" literature has been tuned. Cost what it may, we must fight our way through until we have succeeded in crushing England; until we have attained a position of predominance at sea. Why should the German people in the twentieth century fare more easily than other nations have done at other times? Was there not more than one Persian War between Greece and Persia—more than one Punic War between Rome and Carthage? Did not the European wars which followed the French Revolution last for twenty years? Did not the great war of the seventeenth century last for thirty years? Did not the struggles of the Great Prussian king against his adversaries continue for seven full years? "What care I for child or wife, if they lack for bread, let them beg through life?" What care we for the life and

well-being of the nations of Europe, our own included? What care we for the labour and the works of peace? What care we for humanity, culture and civilisation? "To the devil with all this talk about culture!" It is power we want—power! It is power resting on cannons and bayonets; it is the vigorous Prussian discipline with its calls of "Attention!" and "Fingers on the trouser seams!" We are born to be masters of the world, and masters of the world we mean to be.

These are the wonderful visions of the future which Pan-Germany opens to us,—unspeakably appalling to men of the twentieth century, gifted with thought and sensibility, but quite logical and consistent for brutal "men of force" whose heads have been turned by ancient and mediæval ideas of world-domination refurbished by the genius of Napoleon. These people believe that they are *Real*-politicians and they fail to observe that they of all people, suspended in the clouds of an unrealisable world of dreams, have completely lost touch with the real world of to-day. Befogged by hellish phantasies, they are blind and deaf to the signs of the times, to the first dawn of new centuries, to the bells that ring in a peaceful understanding between the nations, but, to their own undoing, they are also blind and deaf to the subterranean roar of those movements of rage among the people, which, like a devastating flood, will sweep away without discrimination and without mercy those who have criminally reawakened the barbarism of a long-gone age.

PAN-GERMANS, LIBERALS, SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

It would be superfluous to offer any further commentary on the outbursts of war-intrigue and of war-mania printed above. These extracts, drawn from newspaper articles, from pamphlets and from speeches, speak for themselves; they furnish a faithful picture of the mental state of the ruling classes and parties in Germany, as they existed before the war, and as they have still further developed in the course of the war. Apart from the powerful associations specially founded to prepare for war, such as the Pan-German Union, the Navy

League, the Defence League, the Union of Young Germany, etc., the speakers and writers quoted in the preceding paragraphs belong to *all* the political parties from the Extreme Right to the National Liberals, that is to say, they belong to those very groups which, when they act in concert, command a majority in the Reichstag. A much more important point, however, is that these groups occupy or control by their influence the places of authority in the Government of Prussia and of the German Empire.

The progressive popular party and the social democracy of blessed memory were the only groups which did not take part, or at any rate, did not take part to the same extent as the parties on the Right, in inciting to war, in pressing for an "active" policy, that is to say, a policy of war, and in combating the "cowardly vapouring about peace, which mocks at all the laws of nature." It was the Press of these parties alone, representing, however, both in number and influence a mere minority contrasted with the groups on the Right, which for a time pointed in grave words to the stupendous dangers which German chauvinism might bring upon Germany and Europe. Before the war German democracy was still endowed with clearness of vision; it still recognised the seat of the evil, it still pilloried the so-called national Press as "mixers of poison" and as enemies of the people. Then there were still democrats in Germany; there were still true and sincere friends of the people who are always at the same time friends of peace as well. To-day that time appears to lie a hundred years behind us.

"Pan-Germany here and everywhere!" was the call that resounded from the whole of the German Press at the beginning of the war. The blare of the national trumpet had deafened the most sensitive ears; the wine of national bombast had intoxicated the sanest minds; the "will-o'-the-wisp" of the lie of national liberation had blinded the clearest vision. Democracy had been caught in the snare of the Junkers and the militarists. They were enticed into the mouse-trap, cunningly set years before, in which in place of bacon-rind, the attack on Germany had been suspended as bait. Then the

trap-door was allowed to fall and now we may observe, sitting within, Herr Ludwig Thoma of *Simplicissimus*, in trusty companionship with his antipodes of *Kladderadatsch*, masticating those same true Prussian ideas and sentiments which he has lashed with biting satire throughout his whole life. Messrs. Ullstein and Scherl went arm in arm with Count Reventlow, while George Bernhard, the ex-Social democrat, blew the same war fanfaronade as Maximilian Harden. The *Freisinnige Zeitung*, the official organ of the Progressive Party, vied with every patriotic paper which sported the Prussian colours in falsifying the history of the origin of the war, in demanding better frontier defence against new "attacks," in defaming those who, true to their convictions, proclaimed the truth. It is scarcely necessary to speak of the great and once democratic weathercock in Frankfort-on-the-Main, which in the brave days of its youth, under its founder Sonnemann, was the leader in the struggle against Prussianism and Hohenzollernism; to-day, however, it draws its political wisdom, well cooked, from the Wilhelmstrasse and has even gone through thick and thin with Pan-Germany, so long as the war-makers in the Wilhelmstrasse enjoyed the goodwill and the support of the Pan-Germans.

Meanwhile the position of this journalistic "civil truce" has been temporarily modified. The sharp opposition offered by the reactionaries and the super-annexationists to Bethmann's government (on the occasion of the conflict with America on the question of submarine warfare, on the question of the "new orientation" in Prussia and Germany, on the determination of the degree of annexation necessary for Germany's "security" and the extravagant attitude of the parties of the Right on all these questions have once more produced certain differences of view, so that the Liberals of the Left and the Social Patriots occupy almost alone the thankless position of defenders of the Government. As, however, this Government is still sufficiently reactionary and annexationist, little is gained by this slight rearrangement, especially as we know from experiences which are familiar to all, that so far every Chancellor who has flirted with the Left has soon been brought

back into the "right" path, or else has been ousted from office by the "small but powerful party."¹

Among Liberal journalists on the Left an honourable exception both before and after the outbreak of war is furnished by Herr Theodor Wolff, the astute and sagacious editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. Surrounded by collaborators tinged with imperialism, fettered by the lynx-eyed censorship of the general who commands in the Marches of Brandenburg, at times even prevented from writing, he has nevertheless succeeded in skilfully steering his editorial bark between the Scylla of his own convictions and the Charybdis of those prescribed for him. Consequently, the attentive reader who is able to read between the lines may easily recognise his real views as to the origin of the war and where the responsibility for it rests. Like a white raven in the midst of the Liberal Press which has assumed the black and white colours of Prussia, he possessed the sense of journalistic propriety to refuse admission in his paper to any attacks on *J'accuse* and its author, simply because he was not in a position to accept any defence. This indicates a degree of steadfastness of character which is doubly gratifying at the present time, when inconstancy is epidemic in German countries, and as such it deserves to be honourably mentioned. The *Berliner Tageblatt* is one of the few Liberal organs which have resisted the pressure of new conditions—which, though they may have

¹ So far as submarine warfare is concerned, this enforced return into the "right" path has in fact already taken place, not long after I wrote the above prophecy. Here the opponents of Bethmann have been victorious along the whole line. So far as the question of war-aims is concerned they will be victorious in so far as the military course of events permits the execution of their aims. Potentially in this question also they have been victorious—whether they will be virtually so, depends on circumstances. In the question of the democratic "new orientation" Fabius Bethmannius Cunctator remains, as always happens, suspended between the two poles; he may be said to follow his practice of sitting between two stools. To the democratising parties on the Left he *promises* electoral reform; he allows the anti-democratic parties on the Right to hope that the promise will never be carried out. In the effort to satisfy all, he satisfies none.

had at times to bend, have never been broken. In the August upheaval of 1914, nearly all the other Liberal and democratic papers completely collapsed beyond salvation, losing their virile sentiments and their political traditions. Nearly all, including even the greater part of the Social Democratic Press, submitted to the poisonous, truth-killing *régime* of the civil truce, that is to say, to the system of falsification and hypocrisy prescribed by law. Nearly all have done so, with the exception of the small group of Radical Socialists, the present "Independent Social Democratic Party," which with a violent wrench has liberated itself from the bondage of the civil truce and has fought its way to the open confession of the truth.

THE LIBERAL PRESS BEFORE THE WAR AND THE CHAUVINISTS

In order to illustrate the contrast between then and now, between German democracy before the outbreak of war which severely condemned the heinous offence of the chauvinists and German democracy after the war which acted in concert with them, I produce in the following pages a few extracts from Liberal papers, dating from the spring of 1913, which appropriately characterise the campaign of the German chauvinists against France, which at that moment raged with peculiar violence.¹ Of the papers quoted the *Welt am Montag* and the *Berliner Tageblatt* have alone resisted the storm of war.

The *Vossische Zeitung* wrote on March 13th, 1913, under the title "The Alarmists":

But now look at the other side of the picture! If it is permissible to draw inferences with regard to the intentions of a Government and the plans of a State from the utterances of certain excited individuals, whether they be professional journalists or blustering generals,—what in that case are we to think of Germany? There are German papers which in the craziness of their Chauvinism are in no way behind the *Matin* and the *Echo de Paris* and which have surpassed all previous records in creat-

¹ For these extracts also I am indebted to Nippold's pamphlet.

ing dissension; there are also officers in plenty who in peaceful retirement regard it as a crime against the Fatherland to keep the peace, who regard it as their duty to portray day by day the existence of dangers that cry aloud to heaven, who accuse the Government of contemptible weakness, no matter how extreme its demands may be. These are the men who, as the Chancellor expressed it on another occasion, "carry their sword in their mouth." Certainly France has no monopoly of blusterers and of those who are in a state of arch-readiness.

BERLINER TAGEBLATT

April 16th, 1913. The incident of Nancy.

. . . . It is true that certain German newspapers, mostly of a low class, are exploiting the Nancy incident for the purpose of inciting to war. The *Tägliche Rundschau*, for example, which is not a whit better than the most shameless and unscrupulous French chauvinist organ, discusses the incident in an incredibly vulgar tone of rowdiness, and declares that "anyone coming to Europe must avoid France just as in crossing the street one avoids the gutter."

April 21st, 1913.

It is impossible to get over the difficulties involved in this action of the Pan-German clique by reflecting that the question concerns merely a small group of fanatical chauvinists, who are negligible when compared with the mass of the pacific people. For it has recently been made clear that there are numerous connecting threads leading in both directions from these jingoes to the reactionary parties as well as to those occupying official positions and to influential manufacturers of munitions. If the Government, the Reichstag and the people cannot muster up courage to make a clean slate between themselves and the Pan-Germans, the Empire must in the end be stifled in the slough of armaments; and when that happens, no official peace policy can help.

STRASSBURGER POST

March 13th, 1913. Germany, France and Alsace-Lorraine.

"An Old Alsatian" writes to us:

If it were possible to give France a guarantee that it would not

be attacked by Germany, a French Ministry would not be able to remain a single minute in office should it attempt to give effect to an increase in military burdens.

Ninety-five per cent. of all Frenchmen are extreme lovers of peace, and they do not want a war of revenge at any price . . .

If Germany desires an understanding among the nations, it will assuredly find the best support in France and England. As the stronger among the strong, it would in no way compromise itself, if it were willing to take the initiative towards an understanding which would lead to restrictions.

STRASSBURGER NEUE ZEITUNG

March 13th, 1913. Chauvinism, by F. Stehelin.

My opinion is that in France the chauvinists, whose views are almost identical with those of the Nationalists, are the enemies of the Government. Having regard to the character of their aims they are bound to be so, and indeed they cannot but be bitter and irreconcilable enemies. For the final goal of their desires is the restoration of the monarchy. . . .

The best proof of this fact is to be found in the nomination of Poincaré, who at the present moment personifies the idea of peace in France, and in the reception accorded to this nomination among the French people.

The fact that the inciters to war are on both sides recruited from the reactionaries has an entirely different significance in the two countries. In France it is for them an element of weakness, in Germany it is to their advantage. There they are the enemies of the Government; here they profess to be the defenders of the prerogative of the Government, the zealous guardians of the existing régime.

April 11th, 1913. Chauvinistic Sense of Responsibility, by F. Stehelin.

At the German Women's Congress held at Berlin in 1912 the Rector of the University of Berlin referred to France as the "hereditary enemy." . . . I have sought in vain for anything corresponding to this on the other side. The reason is quite simple. A writer like Barrès, any politician or man who has his own axe to grind, might indulge in such incitements. But this could never be done by those who occupy a responsible public position, such

as that of a clergyman or a university lecturer. They would have been certain to encounter the severest disapproval, and this prospect would have deterred them from their purpose, before they took the first step to its realisation.

July 12th, 1913. Pernicious Efforts, by F. Stehelin.

The chauvinistic Press in Germany is bent on widening the gulf which reasonable people in Alsace-Lorraine are seeking to bridge over. It brings the charge of treason against those members of the Government who show themselves conciliatory to the native population. It decries as enemies of Germany all who are not of one opinion, and it shrinks from no perversion in order to obscure the position as much as possible.

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG

April 18th, 1913. French Chauvinism, by F. Schotthöfer.

At the present moment there are in Germany people as well as a Press who are surpassed in no other country in the matter of national sensitiveness. . . .

Moreover, the historian of unprejudiced vision cannot conceal from himself the fact that in a certain period we have become accustomed in Germany to noisy and boastful announcements, such as were at one time regarded as characteristic of the second French Empire. . . .

Gradually, the only possible explanation was found in the secret German intention to provoke the French to the utmost by a continual series of pinpricks. After the appearance of the German warship before Agadir, this feeling became a firm conviction. . . .

Yet, on the other hand, the aversion from a world-war has increased. No success could be a sufficient reward for the sacrifices and the losses of war. This conviction has to-day become a living and fruitful force in the majority of the French people. It prevents any daring desire of aggression from arising and spreading. If any are resolved on war, this is merely due to the fact that they believe that war is forced upon them. It is resignation, and not a free and considered resolution. For this reason it may also be asserted that the pure idea of revenge is not sufficient to make any war in France popular.

MÄRZ

March 29th, 1913. Poison Mixers, by Ludwig Thoma.

No! Let us give to the chauvinistic Press what is due to the Press. . . .

Let us leave this honour to the Yellow Press! It is the petty work of 365 days in the year—a mosaic composed out of all manner of baseness, distortions and lies. It is the work, not of great minds but of puny people who flatter degraded instincts, who further criminal desires and who, nevertheless, reduce men of honour and of understanding to silence by the use of phrases and of nothing but phrases.

By constant repetition these people . . . have been able to transform empty words and lies into indisputable truths, they have insidiously poisoned public opinion until in an excess of unhealthy excitement it has lost the power of resistance.

This Press has conquered. Let us admit it ungrudgingly! . . .

In Germany also the constantly repeated intimation of the inevitable war produces a paralysing and a pernicious effect.

Braggarts who in the event of a war would not even run the risk of catching a cold are allowed to parade as patriots when they blow the trumpet.

Banquet speeches are now scarcely regarded as properly rounded off, unless they contain a reference to the coming day when "wealth and life" will be hazarded. . . .

It is all poisoned, and this we owe to the nationalist Press.

Honour to whom honour is due!¹

DIE WELT AM MONTAG

April 21st, 1913. Unreason on Both Sides, by H. v. Gerlach.

. . . . Psychological diseases are also infectious. The delirium had scarcely broken out among the chauvinistic madmen

¹ And people who in the spring of 1913 still characterised the chauvinistic mixers of poison in these terms, did not observe, and do not yet observe, that in the summer of 1914 they were themselves incurably poisoned, infected with lying "patriotitis," and from being bitter accusers transformed into supporting pillars of the crime of war. The most regrettable phenomenon in the general "perversion" of the intellectuals in

of Nancy, when the attacks of insanity began among the Pan-Germans. In the twinkling of an eye the lousy knaves of Nancy were identified with the French people. France was a barbaric State! Anyone travelling to France goes into the gutter! If the Frenchmen's hide is itching, we will tan it for them! The French nation has become a rabble sunk to the level of the negroes of Central Africa.

So the storm roared through the Pan-German Press. If any French chauvinist paper were to publish a compilation of the abuse of France published by the *Post*, the *Deutsche Zeitung*, the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, etc., it could copiously add new nourishment to the hatred against Germany which exists in certain quarters. . . .

The attitude of a number of German papers must be described as a disgrace to German culture.

In the most fair-minded manner the French Government has given the requisite satisfaction to German public opinion, and has thus shown that it is a fitting representative of a Kultur-nation. As soon as the French Press was convinced of the truly shameful nature of the events at Nancy, they drew in their authoritative organs, with the requisite emphasis, the line between the French people and the uncivilised rowdies. . . .

Every occasion is exploited with the object of feeding the flames of war, less perhaps in order to provoke war than to promote their own base party ends in the bellicose sentiments so engendered.

Every incident of this nature represents a certain danger of war. We have unfortunately no assurance that the reason of the majority will continue to keep the upper hand over the unreason of the minority. . . .

The unfortunate treatment of the Moroccan question by German diplomacy has again imperilled all that had been achieved. In practice we have scarcely gained anything in the matter, but we have brought grist to the mill of the French chauvinists. The spring of the *Panther* at Agadir was the crowning mistake. . . .

Germany is the violent change of colour of the blue-white Bavarians of *Simplicissimus*, formerly hostile to Prussia, into dutiful worshippers of the *Pickelhaube*, displaying the Prussian colours.

And now comes the enormous German military law. For years France has been unable to keep pace with German military preparations. She has simply not had the men to do so. Suddenly, without any sufficient explanation, it is proposed that the German army should be again increased by 130,000 men. In order in some measure to parry the German stroke, the French Government in its need snatches at the desperate measure of prolonging the period of service from two to three years. The French people are asked to make the enormous sacrifice involved in the withdrawal of all their sons from their civil callings for a year longer than formerly. And this is done merely because Germany, without any compelling occasion, has taken the lead in setting the bad example of an increase of armaments. Need we be surprised if the feeling against us in France is constantly becoming more bitter?

Jaurès has gained for himself immortal glory by the fact that he has devoted a great part of his life's work to fighting against the ideas of revenge. This man, one of the most brilliant orators in the world, has used his enormous influence on the workers and the intellectual classes of France entirely in the service of the idea of peace.

But when Jaurès comes to Berlin to speak in the sense of reconciliation, the Prussian police prevents him from appearing in public.

Hatred, by H. v. Gerlach (Die Welt am Montag of June 2nd, 1913).

. . . . It is after all known that the Defence League founded and conducted by him (Keim) is the inspirer of the enormous German Army Bill. In this case his appeal to the hatred of the nations can produce only the most baneful consequences.

Such speeches with the *leitmotiv* of hatred against other peoples constitute the gravest conceivable danger to the peace of the nations, and consequently, to the interests of Germany as well. All good and sane Germans would therefore do well to draw a distinct line of demarcation between themselves and elements of so doubtful a character.

In conclusion, I print a report from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* with regard to a meeting of the Central Committee

of the National Liberal Party with the object of indicating, by reference to the criticism of the newspaper which follows, the then standpoint of this organ, formerly democratic but now degenerated to nationalism.

Meeting of the Central Committee of the National Liberal Party. (Frankfurter Zeitung of February 10th, 1913.)

The meeting to-day of the Central Committee of the National Liberal Party was presided over by Bassermann, the Reichstag deputy. Bassermann spoke also on foreign policy and described the foreign situation as grave; he demanded new armaments and advocated an active policy. He described the factors which had led to a worsening in our situation, above all the dissolution of Bismarck's Treaty of Reinsurance with Russia as a result of the Franco-Russian alliance which afforded strong support to French policy and gave a new stimulus to ideas of revenge, further the grudging attitude of England which had reached its highest point in Edward VII's policy of encirclement. The present Balkan War concealed a whole complex of questions which require our most careful attention. The speaker touched upon the statement of von Tirpitz, the Secretary of State, according to which a ratio of 16:10 was to be considered for the naval construction between England and Germany, and pointed out that very grave difficulties stood in the way of an effective agreement as to armaments. The whole international situation compelled us to make powerful military exertions which were perhaps unique in history. The German people was sufficiently mature to claim that it should be allowed to examine independently whether the proposals of the Government were sufficient to maintain our readiness to strike in our defence . . .

In the discussion which followed, attention was gravely drawn on all sides to the feeling of dissatisfaction which prevailed throughout the nation on account of the lack of any initiative in foreign policy among those occupying responsible positions.

The Central Committee demands that effect shall be given to general compulsory service, and to all measures which may serve to accelerate our mobilisation and to secure an energetic offensive, and they welcome with satisfaction the decision of the Confederate Governments to submit to the Reichstag a proposal in agreement with these points of view. . . .

Leading Article of the Frankfurter Zeitung, February 11th, 1913.

A grave danger, to which serious attention must be drawn, is involved when a party leader of Bassermann's rank hawks up and down the country delivering bellicose speeches in which he demands an increase of armaments, and reproaches the responsible authorities for not pursuing an active policy. A correspondent drew our attention to this point some time ago, observing that speeches of this nature encourage the fear of war on the one hand and the pleasure in war on the other. . . .

. . . . It appears entirely otiose to continue to pour oil on the brightly burning fire. Equally objectionable, however, is the unremitting pressure for "action." The German people demands a firm and calm, but not an aggressive policy; it has no desire whatever for any warlike complications, and it is nothing short of monstrous to endeavour to persuade it to entertain desires in this direction by the use of the inconsidered catchword that a war is inevitable sooner or later, and that it would be better for Germany if it came sooner. . . .

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Such was the judgment which German democracy passed on German chauvinism before the war. To-day the two act in concert, in the harmony born of the civil truce. The chauvinists have undergone no change; they have not given up a single iota of their ideas and their aims. The democrats, however (with the few exceptions mentioned above), have promptly swung into line at the word of military command, they have obediently complied with the order "Eyes right"; and in future after this efficacious blood and iron cure it will be difficult for them once again to be "surrounded by the Left."

"SPIRITUAL REGENERATION"

The patient reader has turned over with me the pages of the criminal album in which are authentically recorded the finger-prints of all those miscreants who have willed, prepared, and finally provoked this wholesale European carnage.

Against these proofs there is no contrary evidence on the other side. The men of the Pan-German Union, of the Defence League, of the Navy League, and of all similar centres of incitement to war stand unveiled before us in their shameless nudity. Their own writings and speeches rise up against them as accusing witnesses to demonstrate that they considered that the desolation of corpses and ruins represented by Europe to-day was of all conditions that most worthy of pursuit, and that they longed for its realisation—that they considered it worthy of pursuit for the double purpose of the moral refreshment and the development of the material power of the German people.

What has become of the "moral regeneration" of the nation, which was expected to result, not from the exercise of moral forces, from peaceful labour and from the ascent in civilisation, but from blood and fire, from the habitual and professional pursuit of murder, from all the horrors and barbarities of a modern war of machines? On the contrary, is it not rather the case that the fact of having been accustomed for years to the work of annihilation and destruction, to hacking, striking, thrusting, shooting, stabbing and burning, to the slaughter of our innocent fellow men who only by chance speak a different language from us, or wear another uniform—must not this constant denial of every civilised custom and of all humanity coarsen the characters of these countless millions of combatants to such an extent that many years of discipline and of the restraint of law will be unable to repair the injury? What will be the good of all moral doctrine, of all religion, of police and of laws, when millions of men return to their homes, having been for years the daily spectators of death in a hundred guises, of the most appalling mutilations, of blood and wounds—having themselves inflicted all this agony on their fellow men? Can it be seriously demanded of all these psychically infected individuals that, having returned to their homes, they should now forthwith lead a life of law and of morality?

THE LAW OF ADAPTATION

We read with horror and pity how the unfortunate soldiers, who for two and a half years have now been wrenched from peace and home and thrust into war in foreign countries, have gradually undergone a kind of intellectual and spiritual adaptation to the new condition. The man who in peace was perhaps frozen with horror on seeing the body of a suicide lying by the side of the road can to-day see, unmoved, hundreds of bodies of the enemy lying before or entangled in the barbed wire; he can look on hundreds of his own comrades lying lacerated and mangled in the trenches beside him; he can hear without flinching the pitiful cries of the wounded who are still helplessly exposed to the inexorable shell fire; he can endure without nausea the pestilential smell arising from hundreds of bodies of men and of animals, unburied for days. It is the law of adaptation which has thus transformed the man of peace endowed with civilised sensibilities into the slave of war whose feelings are blunted. It is the iron weight of the thought: "I cannot alter it; like all the others, I too must play my part; as chance has struck these to-day, so it may strike me to-morrow"—it is the feeling, crippling all power of resistance, of a monstrous destiny, of a fearful higher Power which has pitilessly descended on humanity—it is this that in the end makes all concerned into inert tools in the hands of their superiors. A "transmutation of all values" takes place; men gifted with reason become automatically working machines; indeed, and this is the most remarkable of all, the cowardly and the timorous not infrequently become reckless heroes and knights of the Iron Cross.

HEROES

The psychology of the heroism of war is by no means so simple as it may appear to many simple critics. Alongside the ambitious impulse to attain eminence before others and to gain distinction, alongside the patriotic enthusiasm, which

has been kindled in unfortunately too many credulous souls by the gigantic lie of the defence of the Fatherland—alongside these, so to speak, sanguine grounds of military bravery, there is, it appears to me, also a phlegmatic ground, which springs from the feeling of "absolute indifference." It all comes to the same thing in the end, says the man of phlegmatic disposition; whether I remain in the rank and file, or whether I rush on to the attack before the others, it is always a pure accident whether I shall be hit sooner than they. The shells and the machine-guns make no distinction; on the contrary, it may be presumed that these machines, designed for wholesale carnage, will be turned on the dense masses rather than on the individual. If then it must be, so be it. Keep at it. These are they whose heroism springs from indifference, and of these, as appears from many soldiers' letters, there are not a few:

"There came a bullet whistling.
Which of us two should fall?"¹

He who has drawn death in the lottery, must die. He who has been destined to live, will live. This is the philosophy of bravery of the indifferent, the philosophy of those who have gradually become completely deadened by the unspeakable horrors of war. These also are heroes, like all others who give their lives a sacrifice for their Fatherland—for that Fatherland which is misused by the great only as a brilliant cloak for their base egotistic instincts, for their ambition, their lust for glory, their greed of power. They are heroes every one of them, the poor young lads of eighteen, like the bearded fathers of forty, who credulously and unquestioningly allow themselves to be slaughtered for the furtherance of the power of those in authority.

They only are no heroes on whom this title is by preference ordinarily conferred. The "heroes" of Longwy, of Liège, of Champagne, of the Masurian lakes, the princes and the

¹ ["Eine Kugel kam geflogen.
Gilt's mir oder gilt es dir."—UHLAND.]

leaders of the army, who bind the wreaths of glory about their foreheads, are, on the most favourable interpretation—assuming that they do not get others to do their work and their thinking for them—skilful military chess players, who adroitly move about the knights, the pawns and the rooks, with the object of checkmating the king on the other side. They are tacticians and strategists—their glory in this respect need not be depreciated—but they are not heroes. It is the others who are heroes, the men who have to execute the chess-moves which have been devised, who have to press forward in exhausting marches, in frost and in heat, despite hunger and thirst and deadly exhaustion, who having arrived at the point indicated in advance are called upon to expose themselves to the devastating fire, to the barbaric struggle at close quarters. It is for these men, for the unknown who are yet so great, that we will reserve the title of hero, which the rulers and leaders of the army, behind the front, have wrongly claimed for themselves.

In other and earlier times this title of honour may have been properly their due, when the great excelled the humble in personal courage and bravery. Arminius, the Cheruscan, was a hero. The old German dukes, who were the “duces” of their men, were heroes. To-day the position has changed. To-day those in high positions express their courage, not in deeds, but in words. In pompous appeals they exhort their unfortunate soldiers to the struggle, they urge them to hold out. Their secure Headquarters are most carefully guarded by troops, by squadrons of aeroplanes and by anti-aircraft guns lest any surprise attack on their precious lives should be made from the air—by land no such attack is possible. When they deliver their bombastic speeches in animation of their troops, who apart from this are already intoxicated by three years’ patriotic exuberance, the air is so filled with the whirl of the protecting aircraft—as is faithfully reported by the war correspondents in their stupidity—that it is often impossible to hear the truculent words of the august gentlemen.

For the princes, the field-m Marshals and the General Staff,

war is the final execution of a drama which has been long desired, a spectacular show—and not even a tragedy, but rather a comedy. For they shout aloud for joy that it has at last begun; now at last they are in their element, like the fish taken from dry sand and replaced in the water. The comedy would of course soon be changed into a tragedy, and the curtain would be rapidly dropped if these ingenious devisers of battles, instead of moving the uniformed chessmen to and fro, had themselves in their own persons to play the parts of pawns, knights or kings on the bloodstained chessboard, and had to risk their own valuable lives. Any poor peasant lad whose red blood dyes the white snow, whose body has been mangled, whose face has been torn by a jagged fragment of a shell, is more of a hero than all the Kaisers, the Crown Princes, the Hindenburgs and the Mackensens taken together.

Suum cuique! To each one his own part. To the kaisers, and the kings who have provoked the massacre the punishment which is due to such a misdeed. To the field-m Marshals, who exercise their craft, the recognition which is due to every efficient expert achievement. But it is admiration and the gratitude of the Fatherland which should be the meed of those millions of unnamed heroes whose courage in sacrifice is not rewarded by wreaths of glory or monetary grants, who, under the hypnotic suggestion that their Fatherland, their home, their house were in danger have cast aside the plane, the chisel, the pen, and have left the bench, the students' room, the workshop—who have first of all sacrificed to their Fatherland their civil existence, their calling, the source of their families' support, and then in a far country have given their life and their health. They do not reap glory in war like the "war-lords"; unlike the generals, they are not exercising their profession. They have been suddenly wrenched from all that makes up their life, from their occupation, their business, their intellectual and material pursuits, from all the bonds of peace; and even those who are fortunate enough to return home unscathed will need untold years to make good what has been lost, to cease to be the idlers of war and to

become once more peacefully labouring and industrious citizens.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FREE-LANCE

It is not merely the daily vision, year in year out, of blood and fire, of death and devastation, but also the habituation to a certain freedom, above all, to the element of unemployment in a soldier's life, to the sensation of adventure and of danger in the constant change of scene and of the way of living, the alternation of safety and of mortal peril, of the life of jovial comradeship and of the cruel work of slaughter—all this, the longer the war lasts, must gradually more and more engender in the soldiers a kind of "free-lance psychology," a feeling of unbridled joy in life, so long as things go well, and of fatalistic contempt of death when dangers menace. It is, however, a feeling which, the more firmly it becomes rooted, is less calculated to prepare people for their future peacefully ordered life, spent in devotion to duty within familiar restraints. The warrior who has half become a free-lance will later on have difficulty in transforming himself into a good husband and father, a disciplined worker in the workshop or the office. It will be hard for him to cast aside the habits of the free soldier's life; even in the workman's jacket he will often be tempted to display the wearer of uniform. The free life of the soldier is the worst conceivable preparation for the orderly civilian life which, after all, must come in the end. There will be little trace of a "moral revival" in the men who come back safe and sound; indeed, it will be easier to find in them a moral and physical coarsening, which implies no reproach for the individual concerned, but is merely the necessary consequence of years spent in a life of war. Criminal statistics, which show a considerable increase in crime after every great war; medical statistics, which confirm the introduction of contagious diseases by prisoners and returning warriors, bear testimony to the moral and physical regeneration for which, according to the theory of our Pan-German generals, we are supposed to be indebted to wars.

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HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN

GERMANY—THE ONLY SHIELD OF PEACE

What the war-enthusiasts and the inciters to war meant for Germany—how comprehensive and powerful was the organisation at their disposal, in the Press and in the various associations and leagues—with what perseverance and undeniable skill they made these auxiliary means subservient to the purposes of war—how, relying on the favour of their exalted protectors, they asserted themselves with increasing hardiness, and drew their snare more and more closely round the Emperor and his Government by means of their accomplices at the Court, among the generals and at the Admiralty—all these facts must be obvious even to the most incredulous reader after the perusal of the extracts printed above, which are merely samples from the overwhelming wealth of chauvinistic literature. He will therefore be in a position to appraise correctly the following sentences of Chamberlain:

And now after the fabrication that Germany wanted war, take the truth, which is that Germany is the only shield of peace. On this point the testimony of a foreigner may possess some value. For forty-five years nearly all my intercourse has been with German people, for thirty years I have constantly lived in German countries. Love of German ways, German thought, German learning, German art, made my vision keen without making me blind; my judgment remained entirely objective; . . . And my testimony is to the effect that in the whole of Germany in the last forty-three years there has not lived a single man who wanted war, not a single one. Anyone who asserts the contrary, lies—whether knowingly or unknowingly.

It has been my good fortune to have become thoroughly acquainted with Germans from every quarter and from all ranks in society, from his Majesty the Emperor down to honest workmen, with whom I had daily business. Never have I met anyone who was warlike or, to speak more accurately, anyone who was eager for war (*War Essays*, page 11).

· On page 76 we find:

Three great nations have been arming for years and have formed a criminal conspiracy to attack and to annihilate Germany, the peaceful, laborious country that threatens no one. Thanks to a kind Providence, so many secret documents have now come to light that no one of calm judgment can any longer be in doubt as to the fact that the so-called "policy of encirclement" simply signified a devilish attack, a plan of robbery and murder elaborated in all its details against an inconvenient competitor.

Chamberlain (*New War Essays*, page 7):

The dominant fundamental feeling in Germany was an immovable love of peace, a sincere friendship for England, and a lively desire to live openly with France in good relations. It can be proved beyond dispute that these sentiments animated all classes in the whole nation, so that no one until the last moment was willing to believe in the possibility of war.

In the same book (page 16) we find:

For years the annihilation of the German Empire, which is under the leadership of Prussia, has been the acknowledged or the unacknowledged desire and the increasingly fixed intention of all Englishmen who dabble in politics, and every educated Englishman dabbles in politics from morning till evening.

It is a characteristic fact that Chamberlain's writings have had by far the largest circulation in the whole of the war-literature of Germany and that they have been printed in editions running to many hundred thousand copies, and such violent views as those quoted above, the value of which is always in inverse ratio to the assurance with which they are expressed, are to be found at every step in this Englishman of German chauvinistic tendencies. The proofs furnished are, however, even more astonishing than the assertions themselves. The author of *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* prefers to take as the basis of his thesis what he calls "evidence from daily life," that is to say, conversations, alleged letters from private individuals, personal observations

in France and England, etc.—in short, evidence which it is utterly impossible to check, but from which this profound historian deduces the fundamental sentiments in the psychology of nations, the peculiarities of race, and finally, by a bold transition, the intentions of the various Governments.

It is impossible within the scope of this work to cite all the monstrous assertions of Chamberlain on the intentions to annihilate Germany entertained by England and France, or to illustrate his method of demonstration in the way which it merits. The above assertion, that every educated Englishman is haunted from morning to night by the *idée fixe* "Delenda est Germania" is, for example, proved by the letters of four ladies, one innkeeper and a "Maecenas of Art," all said to be correspondents of Chamberlain, who reproduce for him "the general sentiment of Englishmen . . . with a startling simplicity and a revolting cynicism"—the feeling, that is to say, which is expressed in the words: "we must cripple Germany . . . we must throttle Germany." The four ladies, as well as the Maecenas of art, are Germans who have made their observations in England. The innkeeper, however, whose testimony is of special value for the writer of the *War Essays*, is a Swiss "whose house enjoys a European reputation." In the hall of his hotel he was enabled to listen to the conversations of English men and women, and these in his capacity as a voluntary spy, he then reported piping hot to Herr Chamberlain in Germany. He testifies "that he never met a single German who was anxious for war, but that, on the other hand, for ten years and more he had heard every Englishman as well as every Englishwoman discussing day after day in the hall of his hotel the necessity and the inevitability of an English war against Germany, which was bound to lead to the complete annihilation of the German Empire."¹

This statement, taken with the four letters from the ladies and one from the gentleman, is sufficient to prove beyond dispute that Germany is innocent of the world-war of 1914,

¹ *New War Essays*, page 18.

and that England, in union with her partners in the Entente, is the incendiary. What is the signification of all the diplomatic volumes as against this overwhelming private testimony? "Is not such an underlying sentiment, and the consequence which with mathematical certainty developed out of it, incomparably more interesting than a Blue Book?" exclaims Herr Chamberlain in triumph at the close of his demonstration. The fundamental English sentiment is for him summed up in the application of brute forces, in the resolution "to crush, to annihilate, to cripple, to throttle." If the Englishman alone is not strong enough to achieve this, he calls other nations to his assistance, "Russians, French, Serbians, Portuguese, Canadians, Africans and Australians, Negroes, Arabians, Hindus and Japanese, and he urges them all on against the dreaded German."¹ The proof of this is furnished by four ladies, a Maecenas of art and an innkeeper. Thus the chain of evidence is completed whereby England is bound by her own son to the pillory of world-history.

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Do not let it be supposed that I have maliciously selected a solitary example. Anyone who reads through the whole of Chamberlain's war essays will everywhere be confronted with the same kind of demonstration. Indeed, he surpasses in this respect the apparently unsurpassable Schiemann. The latter at any rate operates by means of *printed* newspaper cuttings, the existence of which can be checked, however arbitrarily and unfairly they may have been selected. Chamberlain, however, prefers to work on the basis of letters, conversations and his own observations, which are incapable of being verified in any way, which must be believed to exist on his bare word, and which, even if their existence is granted, would prove nothing whatever on the matter in question. In the muddy waters of these unverifiable stories and anecdotes the dexterous Anglo-German plunges happily about like a lively fish; he knows that in the turbidity of the pool he runs no risk of being netted and caught. He intentionally avoids the limpid

waters of documentary evidence. On this aspect he leaves anything that has to be said to Helfferich and Helmholt, these irreproachable inquirers into the sources of history, who "with German thoroughness and impartiality" have sifted and appraised "the material which is already so difficult to survey." In combining facts, in imputing motives, in construing theories, of all men in the world Chamberlain is *the* man—the man to whom nothing human, from Christ to Richard Wagner, is unknown, the man who can write with as little comprehension about Goethe as about Kant. There Herr Chamberlain is in his own sphere, there he feels himself in his element. Where, however, the question calls for study, for the digging out of information or the documentation of facts, where it is necessary to determine and explain the actual occurrences by reference to authentic documents, then Herr Chamberlain leaves it to his partner, he withdraws behind the protective works which others have raised and leaves to them the task of defence.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR?

As I have elsewhere pointed out, the question of the responsibility for the war is for him also a "sacred and earnest question." "It is absolutely necessary that every thinking man should be fully and decisively clear on this point. Phrases may suffice elsewhere, in Germany they are not sufficient. He writes, in fact, an essay entitled: *Who is Responsible for the War?* but he prudently avoids—as also does Schiemann—entering with the requisite degree of thoroughness into the question of the immediate causes of the war, which he calls the "innermost circle." This he trustfully leaves to others. I have already mentioned elsewhere the few points in the "innermost circle" which he discusses, and have appraised as it deserves his method of treatment. His favourite fields of research are the "outer" and the "middle" circles of the causes of the war, that is to say, the incidents drawn from the more remote and the more immediate antecedents of the war, which, when one does not rely on authentic docu-

ments, as I did, can be capriciously grouped and used to elicit tendentious conclusions.

To show that in this last respect anything is possible, a few examples may be taken from the "outer circle." We know that for Chamberlain, who in this differs from Helfferich, it is not Russia but France that is "the oldest, the most stiff-necked sinner." France wished war, and for years France prepared for war. It was France that instigated the other two miscreants and gained them for her purposes of revenge:

A fact as certain as that the sun stands in the heavens is that the politically authoritative circles in France, Russia and England have for years planned and prepared for war against Germany.—(*New War Essays*, page 38).

It is in this tone and in this apodeictic style of making unproved assertions the starting-point of all discussions, instead of placing them, in accordance with the requirements of logic, at the conclusion of a demonstration, that we are conducted through the whole of Chamberlain's twaddle regarding the "outer" and the "middle" circle, mercilessly *ad infinitum*.

English policy, this "robber policy," is explained by reference to the English national character:

This policy is a necessary consequence of the fact that the whole of life is adjusted to the brutal pursuit of wealth, at the cost of the sacrifice of agriculture and the renunciation of all higher education and all ideal efforts, and added to this the renunciation of all morality and humanity, as soon as the interests of the money bag are in question (page 53).

This is said by an Englishman about the English people, who have at all times, and not least in the last century, produced pioneer minds in every field of human activity, in literature, in natural science, in technical arts and in philosophy, who in the development of constitutional order and freedom have been the model for all other European countries.

Similar judgments on the English people are to be found

at every step in Chamberlain's war-writings. What would the German patriots have said of the accuser if he had uttered a single word in this strain regarding the German people? What have they said of him? How have they abused and slandered him, merely because he dared to arouse his people against the liars and seducers, who exploited the innate good faith of the German for this unspeakable swindle of liberation? The accuser is placed in the pillory! Herr Chamberlain, however, who has beyond all measure and without any restraint, abused and slandered in the most disgusting manner not merely the Government of his native land, but also his own people, is permitted in Germany to enjoy the special favour of the Emperor, and, as the English saviour of the German Fatherland, is overwhelmed with honour and distinction.

England desires the downfall of Germany "because it recognises the incomparable efficiency of Germany; it is a case of envy of trade, of wealth, of arms, of learning and of the spirit; it is the envy of a brother." But the envious disturber of the peace will receive his reward: "May God give the victory"—such is Chamberlain's prayer—"to him who alone has wished for peace. May God show that he who best wishes peace can also be most efficient in war!" With this blasphemous raising of the eyes, which represents merely a variant of the blasphemous Prussian doctrine that God is always with the strongest battalions, Chamberlain pathetically concludes his investigation of guilt.

CHAMBERLAIN AS HISTORIAN

It may be imagined how this collector of anecdotes deals with the few historical facts which he considers worthy of any mention at all:

At the very beginning of the war the Government contrived to have Jules Jaurès shot by a hired assassin, for he was the only Frenchman who had the courage to say what thousands think.—(*New War Essays*, page 40).

In the first place, if you will allow me to say so, Herr Chamberlain, Jaurès did not answer to the name of Jules, but was called Jean, just as the famous French poet Rostand is not called Camille, as you name him on page 11, but Edmond. Even if you should, as suits your whim, falsify and reshape all other facts, the least that can well be asked of you is that you should at any rate take the trouble to write correctly the names of men of European reputation. So then the French Government had "Jules" Jaurès shot? How has this fact come to your knowledge? I have elsewhere proved, what was indeed familiar to all acquainted with the facts, that from the beginning of the crisis until his death Jaurès acted in concert with the French Government in endeavouring to secure a peaceful solution of the conflict, and that it was he who suggested the decisive steps for the maintenance of peace, not merely to the responsible Ministers, but even to the President of the Republic. We know how the Ministers and the President of the Republic were stunned by Jaurès' death on the evening of July 31st (the evening on which the German ultimatum was delivered in Paris)—how they mourned in the man who had been murdered the irreparable loss of the strongest helper towards peace; we know how moving were the words of the Prime Minister, Viviani, and his colleagues in honour of the memory of the "friend of the people" who had been so abruptly called away; we know how Jaures' work for peace, even after his death, was continued by his colleagues in full harmony with the Government, although, unfortunately, without success. All this we know. We also know, or at any rate it is easy to imagine, from what camp the half-insane assassin came who fired the fatal shot at the Socialist patriot—not to be confounded with our social patriots. He came from the camp of those Royalists and reactionaries who, in France as well as in Germany and everywhere else in the world, constitute the picked troops of the war-intriguers, because they hope to fry their own fish at the blazing international conflagration. Time will unveil the truth. But Herr Chamberlain knows it already, he knows

it in advance: the French Government murdered "Jules" Jaurès. The sage of Bayreuth says so—and that is enough.

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It is charming to observe how this conscientious historical investigator in one place advances an unproved assertion and in another place quotes himself in support of this assertion:

The statesmen of England have for years prepared for this war with unrelenting consistency, and in all those classes of society which were in any way near to those who controlled the country's policy, discussion has for long taken place on the "inevitable" war of annihilation against Germany.—See my Essay "*Underlying Feelings*" (*New War Essays*, page 55).

We turn up "*Underlying Feelings*" in the hope of finding at last evidence of the aggressive intentions of England. And what do we meet? Four ladies, an innkeeper and a Maecenas of art—the same witnesses for the Crown who have already been presented to us for the purpose of convicting perfidious Albion.

RUSSIA'S SPIRIT OF COMPLIANCE—A QUESTION OF DETAIL

The following sentence is interesting and very significant:

Whether in July, 1914, a Berchtold may perhaps have been maladroit, and a Sazonof may perhaps have inclined to compliance—these and all similar matters are questions of detail which concern our "innermost circle," but they in no way affect the great middle fact of the inevitability of the war (*New War Essays*, page 60).

Here we have presented to us in a nutshell the whole system of German defence against the accusation of guilt. All that happened in the days from July 23rd to August 1st in the way of "maladroitness" on the part of Austria (a mild word for the crassest criminal egotism that has ever exerted its influence on the history of nations), all that was done by

Russia in the way of compliance, that is to say, in proving her desire for peace, are questions of detail which do not affect us. War was inevitable!—there we have the familiar phrase of the Pan-Germans which has been ridden to death for years. It is therefore a matter of no moment whether Russia endeavoured to prevent it, and whether Austria by her “maladroitness” provoked it. Here again we have the shy avoidance of the documentary demonstration of the “innermost circle,” an action revealing a consciousness of guilt, and in place of this we have the floundering about in the dirty basin of the “middle” and “outer” circle, where it is possible to fish out at will all that is suitable, and to leave all that is inconvenient lying at the bottom.

Of course Chamberlain also fails to observe that by means of sentences like the above he eliminates the thesis of the defensive war and involuntarily acknowledges himself as a disciple of the preventive war. If, as Chamberlain elsewhere points out even more emphatically, Russia “from the outset and throughout the whole course of the following days revealed a real desire and hope for peace”—if “Sazonof, be his motives what they may, . . . was sincerely anxious to avoid war,”¹ why did Germany declare war against Russia? Why did the Berlin Government not allow the resumed negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd quietly to follow their course? Why did Berlin either refuse or ignore all the Russian and English proposals for agreement? Why have the German people been induced to entertain the erroneous belief that the Tartars and the Cossacks had already broken over the Eastern frontier in order to make Germany a Slavonic State, or, as the familiar formula runs, to march to Constantinople through the Brandenburg Gate.

Russia's compliance in the decisive moment was a question of detail! No, Mr. Chamberlain, that is the most important question of all, that is the cardinal point about which the tumult of charges and counter-charges turns, with which all

¹ *New War Essays*, page 75.

accusations of guilt against the Entente Powers, all Helfferich's theories of incendiarism, stand or fall. If the Russian Government wished to preserve peace, it follows that it did not entice the French Government to become an accomplice in a warlike attack, and that the French Government on its part did not assure itself of the military support of England with a view to the annihilation of Germany. The whole construction of Helfferich and of his followers, among whom Chamberlain is one of the most zealous, thus miserably collapses.

And yet Chamberlain, the disciple, appeals to Helfferich, the master, for the necessary demonstration in the "innermost circle." How are these things to be reconciled?—I ask the English Teuton who constantly repeats this same question on another occasion, namely, when he discusses the inconsistency between Grey's noble peace message of July 30th and England's alleged war-intentions. In the sweat of his face Herr Chamberlain endeavours to dispose of No. 101 of the Blue Book, a highly inconvenient document containing Grey's celebrated Note, which is indeed very hard to reconcile with the assertion of an aggressive conspiracy. He fishes out the most diverse documents from the diplomatic books; he throws and beats them together so that it is a pleasure to watch him; he quotes them, in part incompletely and in part falsely, and behold at the end of pages of juggling, of perversion, and of reshaping he succeeds in harmonising them correctly: The note of peace is a swindle; "the whole thing is mystification."

I may spare myself the trouble of considering in closer detail this historical hotch-potch. The proof of guilt given in *J'accuse* and in the first volume of this work, relying strictly on documents and pursuing the question into all its details, relieves me of the necessity of furnishing a further refutation specially directed to the tendencious superficialities of such an historian, or rather of such a story-teller. I confine myself to giving an example which may indicate the manner of proof pursued by this the most widely read and the most highly valued of all the war-writers of Germany, whose works are

disseminated by German propaganda in all countries and languages, even in the trenches, in a special edition:¹

In no despatch (from England) is a word of censure to be found regarding the revolting crime of Serajevo—this is a highly significant symptom! For the English the Serbians are merely the “valiant people,” the “small heroic nation,” etc. (*New War Essays*, page 69).

This is the crudest falsification. The English Blue Book is full of assurances given by Grey and his Ambassadors stating that Austria was fully justified in demanding satisfaction for the murder of the Archduke and security against similar occurrences. This standpoint was also immediately represented by the English diplomatists to the Serbian Government, who were urged to show an extremely conciliatory attitude. Further, English diplomacy promised in the most binding manner to give effective support to the Austrian demands at the Conference proposed by Grey. Similar declarations were repeatedly given by the Russian and French Governments in the most definite form. Even the Austrian Red Book cannot but confirm this fact.² I have nowhere found an English despatch in which the Serbians are described as “the valiant people,” “the small heroic nation,” or by any similar phrase. The only reservation—a perfectly justifiable one—which Grey and also Sazonof made regarding the Austrian claims was that Serbian territory as well as the sovereignty and the independence of the State should be maintained. In the opinion of the Entente States certain demands in the Ultimatum, particularly Articles 5 and 6, infringed the sovereign rights of an independent State. As had already been proposed by Serbia, it was suggested that these demands should be considered at a conference of the Powers, or discussed before the Hague Tribunal. In any case the way ought to be paved to a solution which would prevent the out-

¹ Other examples of Chamberlain's method of writing history are given in Vol. I of this work, pages 220 *et seq.*

² See *J'accuse*, page 350; also Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12; Orange Book, Nos. 4, 40, 42, 43; Red Book, Nos. 41, 47, 50.

break of a European war on account of this trifling Austro-Serbian question. The statesmanlike, humane, and pacific standpoint thus assumed by the Entente Governments and their peoples is what Chamberlain calls the "almost silent acceptance of the monstrous."

By means of such arguments as these, and others to the same effect, the Anglo-German historian, still arguing from the proposition of England's war-intentions, arrives at the conclusion that Grey's peace proposal of July 30th is either a "subsequent invention" or "a Machiavellian attempt of a deceitful and lying diplomacy"; in any case, it was not seriously intended. Herr Chamberlain would have spared himself much trouble and brain fatigue if he had adopted the converse course of proceeding from the genuineness and the sincerity of Grey's action for peace in the summer of 1914, qualities which are obvious to every unprejudiced reader from all that the English Minister said and did, and if he had then critically examined from this standpoint the alleged bellicose prelude of Great Britain in the preceding years. In that case he would very soon have found out that it was not the peace action of the present, but the war action of the past, that is a Pan-German invention and mystification. For Herr Chamberlain is entirely correct in asserting that the prelude and the main action are irreconcilable. The one or the other must be an invention. But since the main action from July 23rd to August 4th is documentarily proved by all the diplomatic books and by the German Government's own testimony (contained in many passages of the White Book), it follows that the deception can only lie in the prelude for which no evidence whatever is extant but merely vague presumptions, arbitrary arrangements of facts, and imputations. Every earnest inquirer who seeks the truth is bound to apply the critical plumb-line to this alleged prelude. By doing so he would find that England has never entertained warlike intentions against Germany, that she has never forged or promoted aggressive conspiracies, and that therefore Grey's action for peace in the critical days is everywhere consistent with the earlier action of the English Government.

Helfferrich's thesis of "Russia as the Incendiary" can *not*, however, be reconciled with Chamberlain's doctrine of "Russia as the maintainer of peace." The one completely contradicts the other. It is for Chamberlain and Helfferrich to arrive together at a settlement on this point.

CHAMBERLAIN ON THE GERMAN AND ENGLISH PEOPLES

I have elsewhere spoken of the treatment, or rather the maltreatment, accorded by Herr Chamberlain to the exchange of Notes between Austria and Serbia (Vol. I, pages 205 *et seq.*). It would be necessary to write volumes if one wished to nail down all the conscious and unconscious "errors" of this Anglo-German "patriot," or if one wished to describe in appropriate terms his unlimited abuse not merely of foreign Governments, but also of foreign peoples, and his repulsive bungled eulogies of German freedom, German intelligence, German language, German efficiency, etc.

For example, this true-born Englishman says with regard to the English and the German people:

Hand in hand with this sporting idiocy in England goes a complete neglect, indeed a scornful contempt for all spiritual goods. . . .

Every highly educated man is in England an object of suspicion; he is respected only from the moment when his intellectual activity brings him in money. Otherwise he is counted a fool. . . .

I do not know whether the Englishmen of to-day regard Martin Luther as a free man. I fear that the overwhelming majority, even among the so-called educated classes, know little more about him than his name. . . .

An un-German freedom is no freedom. . . . This German freedom is a completely original product. . . . For the first time in the history of the world freedom is possible as a comprehensive, enduring phenomenon. . . . The continued existence and the further development of freedom on earth is inseparably dependent on the victory of German arms. . . .

What promise of freedom could be offered to us by poor, betrayed and demoralised France, the land of political corruption and of empty phrases, needs no explanation. England,

however, understands by freedom only club-law, and indeed club-law for herself alone. It would be impossible to point to a single spark of spiritual life in her immense colonial empire. Everywhere there are merely cattle-dealers, slave-drivers, warehousemen and exploiters of mines, and everywhere we find the domination of that unrestricted arbitrariness and brutality which always emerges where it is not permanently staved off by culture of the spirit. . . .

All these grotesque views and much more of the same sort are contained in a single essay of nine pages on *German Freedom* (in the first volume of *War Essays*). It is possible to imagine what such a writer achieves in the several hundred pages of his collected essays.

Let us take some more from the Essay on *The German Language* (*War Essays*, page 24).

For Germany alone among all the nations still preserves a holy living possession capable of development. It is inscrutable like all that comes from God. . . . Among living languages German is beyond question unique in a majesty and a wealth of life which exclude all comparison. . . .

Among the languages of Europe, German is the only living language. From this fact all else follows. . . . And on this rich soil the spirit has now revealed itself for centuries in such an unbroken wealth, that the content of the German language also is unique to-day. . . .

A Montaigne living to-day would have to be silent or else learn German. . . . The French Revolution could destroy the outer Bastille, but not the inner. The spirit of this people is for ever imprisoned. . . .

It is not, however, possible to think deeply and tenderly in English.

The consequence is that England remains, as it were, cut off from the highest achievements of the last two centuries, inasmuch as it could not participate in the conscious and unconscious spiritual life of Germany, the leading nation. . . .

From this arises the compelling necessity that the German language and not the English should become the language of the world. . . . The moral corruption of England has been revealed in an appalling measure since the beginning of this war: lying,

roughness, violence, boasting, accompanied by lack of restraint, dignity, sense of justice, manliness. It is a sorry spectacle! . . . We perceive with horror what degradation we approach, the final degradation of the whole human race. For this reason it is the German and with him all that is German that must conquer. And when he has conquered—whether it be to-day or in a hundred years, the necessity of victory remains the same—there is no single task which is so important as this, to force the German language on the world. (NOTE.—What an agreeable prospect to wage war for another hundred years in order to put the whole world into the uniform of the German language. But who is then going to speak this language after everyone has been killed?)

Men must learn to realise that whoever cannot speak German is a pariah.

In the Essay on "England" (page 44) Chamberlain the Englishman gives his German readers a terrifying account of the coarseness of the whole English people. He describes the nature of the English Christmas, which is of course fundamentally different from that of Germany, and concludes with a cry of indignation: "It is thus that the birth of Our Saviour Jesus Christ is celebrated in England!" After citing further examples he affirms:

This roughness has gradually penetrated through almost the whole nation working from below upwards, as always happens. Fifty years ago it was still considered an offence against the dignity of rank if anyone belonging to the nobility were to take part in industry, trade and finance. To-day the head of the oldest and greatest house in Scotland, the brother-in-law of the King, is a banker!

Think how terrible! What roughness, what decadence, when the nobility are already taking part in the pursuits of life. There can be no alternative: England must be annihilated! *Gott strafe England!*

It need occasion no surprise that a country sunk so low as this could and indeed must produce such scum of humanity as Sir Edward Grey.

For years he has always presided at conferences for the maintenance of peace—in order that the intended war might come in

time. For years he has sought a *rapprochement* with Germany—in order that the honest statesmen and diplomatists of Germany might not observe the intention to wage a war of annihilation which was all the time firmly resolved upon. Grey has in his pocket the military agreements with France and Belgium for the invasion of Germany from the North, all the details as to the landing and the conveyance of troops are written down in black and white, and yet he is able so to arrange matters that it is Germany which in extreme necessity "violates the neutrality." (NOTE.—There at last we have got to the point: It is not Germany but England that caused the breach of neutrality.)

That is the political England of to-day. . . . Sneaks, hypocrites, liars, tricksters. "England" the State is rotten to the bones. It is only necessary to grasp firmly. It is for this reason that I, as an Englishman, must have the courage to testify to the truth. It is only a strong, victorious, wise Germany that can save us all.

CHAMBERLAIN'S WAR-AIMS

In the *New War Essays* (pages 86-102) Chamberlain also offers us his views on the question of war-aims, and of course arrives at the conclusion that peace can only be a "German peace." This German peace must at any price be attained, whether at the end of this war or as a result of a series of other wars:

It may require a series of wars so to overcome France, England and Russia, and to carry so far the remodelling of Europe, the opening of Asia, the settlement of Africa, the domination of the yellow and the black races, that there can be any question of a "German peace" in the sense in which I use the term.

The German is entering into a struggle which for generations to come will demand the highest exertion of all his powers; it is for this purpose that he must now equip himself. . . . What this war teaches us once for all is that we are face to face with a life and death struggle, and that that struggle is one between two ideals of humanity, between the German and the non-German. . . . The struggle will be waged between roughness and refinement, between lack of culture and culture, between the basest lust of gold and a view of life in which the value of wealth plays a subservient part, but in itself enjoys no respect. . . . Thus, the

one party sows death, the other life. . . . Those States which would grow great by destruction must be opposed by that State, or that union of States, which in building up finds its happiness, and its right to rule . . .

The guiding principle is to the effect that only he who rules can give freedom. What freedom has the German ideal of life to expect from Anglo-Saxons, Muscovites, Franks and Mongolians? On the other hand, if the German Empire is predominant, it lies in the German character to leave to everyone his own customs, because the German is sufficiently gifted and sufficiently civilised to find his pleasure in every mode of life, to learn from each and to enrich himself internally. . . .

I indicate only some of the thousand ways which lead to the German peace that will control the world.

"DEGENERATE SONS" OF THE FATHERLAND

With this pleasing prospect of a further series of bloody wars until the final attainment of the "German peace that will control the world,"—with this panegyric of Germany which brings "life" into the world, whilst its opponents only "sow death,"—with this unsurpassable fulmination I propose to conclude my collection of quotations from Chamberlain. I believe that they afford a sufficient characterisation of this, the most successful of all German war-writers.

I should only like to ask one question at the conclusion of the review of the series of thoughts in unrelieved field-grey which I have placed before the reader. If a German, if the accuser, had written all that this Englishman writes about England—a German writing against the German people!—what would have been done with him? They have already morally so lynched the accuser—and would have lynched him physically if they could have got hold of him—because he wrote a book which was dictated by love of the German people, though also, it is true, by hatred of the seducers and corrupters of this people which is essentially brave, sturdy and peace-loving. They abuse the German friend of his own people, but the English defiler of his own nest, who denounces to the world a whole people, standing

in the forefront of civilisation, as the basest example of moral brutalisation and spiritual imbecility, is overwhelmed in Germany with distinctions and honours, such as are scarcely accorded to any other writer. In England also they combat the opponents of the war, men like Shaw, Macdonald, Snowden, Trevelyan and Morel, but these men are not abused, they are not threatened, they are not persecuted. They are allowed to speak, to write, to agitate; their tongues are not tied; they are not compelled to purchase at the price of exile the freedom to express their own opinions. In Germany, on the other hand, the substantial reasons advanced by the accusers are concealed in silence, and instead of answering these, their persons are discredited by base slanders. The few—unfortunately all too few—Germans who from abroad endeavour to do what these Englishmen in opposition are allowed to do in their own country without injury and without punishment are branded as traitors, and are exposed to universal contempt as disgracefully “degenerate sons of the Fatherland.”

For this they will be able to find consolation. There have already been on other occasions in history such degenerate sons who have later been shown to be the most regenerate, the proclaimers and the founders of a new age. What was Christ in the eyes of the Priests and the Pharisees but a degenerate son of Judaism? What was Luther but a degenerate son of the Church that can alone make blessed? Was Tolstoi anything but a renegade, excommunicated by the Holy Synod? Was Zola, the courageous proclaimer of the truth in the Dreyfus affair, not subjected as a degenerate son of France to the rage, the insults, indeed even the physical attacks of the excited Paris rabble, and exposed to the most contemptuous slanders and aspersions of the whole patriotic Press? In all nations and in all epochs of history is it not the case that the proclaimers of the new have always been denounced, crucified, and burned at the stake by the representatives of the old as renegades, traitors, blasphemers, sorcerers and heretics? The degenerate sons of Germany are thus in good company; they will calmly await the hour when

the misguided nation will erect in the Capitol memorials of honour to those whom once they cast down from the Tarpeian rock.

D

PREVENTIVE IMPERIALISTS

Let us hear further the views of some open confessors of the imperialistic war of prevention, who as such, in contradiction to the "preventive-defensionists," did not go so far as to believe in an intended attack by the Entente Powers—(they only sought for tactical reasons to induce this belief in the people)—but who ascribed to the policy of the Entente Powers, although wrongly, the intention to hamper systematically Germany's world-historical ascent, and who were willing to put an end to these dark plans of strangulation by hacking with the sword through the net of restraint.

Nearly all these adherents and confessors of the war of prevention for imperialistic purposes are at the same time convinced of the blessing and the necessity of a warlike rejuvenation of the German people. For them the professional and habitual pursuit of murder and burning, the wholesale destruction of material and cultural goods, the extinction of untold millions of existences, the awakening of all the barbaric and the animal instincts which unfortunately still slumber in mankind, are a necessary means of disciplining and educating the nations, a healthy revulsion from the "vapourings about humanity" which become too common in times of peace, from the over-appreciation of the peaceful exchange of ideas and of goods between the nations, from the pernicious and enervating influence of a cosmopolitanism which overleaps all national boundaries.

Here, in fact, we meet the remarkable contradiction involved in the method of thought and in the efforts of those who are the very noisiest of the leaders of Pan-Germany. On the one hand they announce the claim which the Germans possess to the domination of the world; on the other hand

they would not at any price have their Fatherland a Cosmopolis—they would not, for the love of Heaven, have German "Kultur" (which for most of these people is identical with that of Prussia) influenced by the "Kultur" of France, England, Russia, or by any other in the world. The most of these blustering generals and admirals have not, of course, the slightest knowledge of any foreign culture. As the parliamentary orator observed, "I do not know the views of the hon. member for X, but I disapprove of them," so in the same way these men hate foreign cultures without knowing them, because they instinctively, and quite correctly, feel that any modern democratic cosmopolitan view of civilisation cannot but be dangerous to their national Prussianism. Those weapons of force, of which they make use to secure the overthrow of the armies of the enemy, they would also fain set in motion to secure the suppression of the democratic West-European views of their opponents,—they would make Prussian drill the taskmaster of the world, not merely in the military and political province, but in intellectual matters as well. Prussianism and World-Power—these are the two conflicting poles between which the fighting armies of Pan-Germany are called upon to establish a road of connection. The aim will never be achieved—even if all the seas of the world should be dyed blood-red—so long as the narrow Prussian spirit, that sharpest negation of a far-seeing world-spirit, directs German thought,—so long as the Prussian parade-march with its ludicrous goose-step is aped by the whole German people, from the North Sea to the Alps, as the symbol of German power and energy,—so long as Weimar is forgotten and Potsdam is the watchword.

GEBSATTEL

One of those Pan-German generals—a South German, it is true, but, after the manner of renegades, almost more Prussian than the Prussians themselves—who ruthlessly acknowledged the imperialistic war of prevention, and as a general proposition the educational necessity of war, is General

von Gebssattel, already mentioned in another place. In an article in the Pan-German review *The Panther* (Vol. X, October, 1915) the Pan-German general admits that in the circles in which he moved there had been a longing for war:

because, having regard to the perverse development which our people threatened to take, we regarded it as a necessity, and because we were further conscious of the fact that a war is all the easier in its military progress as well as in the sacrifices involved, the earlier and the more resolutely a people, which in any case is forced to fight a struggle for existence, chooses the favourable moment for striking the blow.

In the further course of his defence of the preventive war Herr von Gebssattel speaks of the "moral justification of the contemplated sacrifice of blood," of the special qualities which must be possessed by the statesman who has recourse to a preventive war, and then continues:

Should such a one exist, and feel himself supported by the confidence of the whole nation, if he believes that he hears with the sensitive ear of the great statesman the footstep of God resounding through the history of the world, as Bismarck has so beautifully expressed it, he will seize in faith and confidence the corner of his mantle and will allow the confidence of the people still to support him, even if the way leads across the battlefields of a preventive war.

This confession of a preventive war leaves nothing to be desired in the matter of candour. It is, of course, we, the Germans, who are the nation that is in any case compelled to fight a struggle for existence! The favourable moment for striking the blow was chosen by us, the Germans! But what then has become of the attack, Herr von Gebssattel? What becomes of the words of the Emperor William in his appeal to the German people on August 6th, 1914: "In the midst of peace, the enemy falls upon us. Therefore to arms! . . . We will defend ourselves to the last breath of man and horse"? What becomes of the words which the supreme war commander addressed on the same day to the German Army

and Navy: "We are called upon to defend our holiest possessions, our Fatherland, our very hearths against an unscrupulous attack"? Have you considered, Herr von Gebssel, that your confession that the German nation chose the favourable moment for the attack gives the lie to your Imperial master, his Chancellor and his Government?

I do not propose to discuss further at this point the question of the preventive war. I reject it on principle, and I believe that I have proved that the presuppositions in fact which are advanced in its defence are deliberately invented. I am content to make it clear once more that whoever says that this is a preventive war thereby distinctly states that the German people has been shamefully deluded and deceived. An aggressive war has been palmed off upon it under the guise of a war of defence.

HARDEN

Maximilian Harden also has repeatedly admitted, in a veiled form as well as openly, that the war was deliberately and intentionally provoked by Germany and Austria, and he has even manifested his indignation that we lacked the courage openly to acknowledge an act which was no more than the pursuance of a right of domination, due to the German people by virtue of its capacity and its superiority. This is the idea to which I gave expression in my book when I referred to the great conquerors and murderers in past epochs of history, whose brutal acknowledgment of their actions at least illuminated the fascination of a strong personality, whereas our cowardly action in creeping to the enormous guilt of blood behind the attack of the enemy adds to our other shortcomings the shame of a feeble disclaimer.

On August 1st, 1914, Harden writes in the *Zukunft*:

In the Note addressed by Vienna to Serbia, the rough harshness of which is without precedent in history, every sentence makes it clear that Austria-Hungary wanted war, because it was convinced that it was constrained to want it. . . . The mere idea

that Austria could suddenly compel us to face the strongest coalition in the history of the world must infuriate in thrice holy wrath the German feeling of self-respect, the German's right to control his own destiny. Why is the circulation of such dangerous stories tolerated? Why is it not said that the fact is (because it must be so) that everything was arranged between Vienna and Berlin?

In No. 45 of the *Zukunft* of August 7th, 1915, Harden writes as follows:

No one would have wished to take from her (France) a clod of earth or the edge of a meadow. But since she planned vengeance and reconquest, has she any right to complain that the country menaced by such plans as these and confronted by an overwhelming alliance chose for the settlement of the dispute the hour that was still convenient to her? Is the German an infamous blackguard because his strength is not obvious to his neighbour's eye?

In No. 4 of the *Zukunft* of October 23rd, 1915, Harden writes as follows with regard to the policy of encirclement:

Edward also was no enemy to us, and did not want war. As I was the first to speak of the intention to give effect to the "encirclement and the encirclement" of the German Empire, as I was the first to apply these terms to the relation of the Western Powers towards us, I ought to know what warning meaning they were intended to convey. Edward was afraid that his nephew's empire, with which he had never been in sympathetic harmony, would extend over Europe in a position of predominance, that it would one day use its fleet, for which no other conceivable task could bring a sufficient reward, and its power over Islam to make an attack on England's sea-power, on Egypt and on India. From the reports of his friends as well as from his own agile observation he knew it well enough to surmise that it would soon be capable of carrying out such a plan, that the armies of France and Russia would be powerless to hamper it, and he therefore endeavoured to create a union of States, a powerful community for protection, the existence of which might in itself intimidate Germany, and compel her to renounce her impetuous onward movements.

With these utterances from Harden I may rest content.¹ In spite of the stylistic flourishes of this extremely obscure writer, who, however, just because of his obscurity, is better protected than others against the deletions of the censor, these extracts furnish a distinct picture of the methods of our nationalists. At one moment it is France that planned vengeance and reconquest and Germany that anticipated that country. Consequently the war is a preventive war waged for purposes of defence. At another moment we are told that neither France nor Russia nor England desired to provoke a war against Germany, whether sooner or later, but that they merely formed a community for defence in order to restrain the desires for hegemony entertained by their Imperial cousin and nephew. It was this pacific community for defence that we opposed with our warlike initiative. Thus we have a preventive war for imperialistic ends! In either case there is an unconditional denial of the attack by the enemy, and consequently of the German war of defence!

I claim Harden as my ally. Like all the preventionists he gives the lie to all who proclaim the war of liberation, no matter how exalted their station.

¹ Other quotations from Harden are to be found in Grumbach's *Germany's Annexationist Aims* (Payot & Co., Lausanne), [English abridgment: Murray] which appeared in February, 1917, while my book was being printed—a highly valuable compilation, which is absolutely indispensable as a work of reference. This collection of annexationist views expressed in Germany during the course of the war forms a valuable supplement to my collection of chauvinistic, imperialistic, and Pan-German sentiments from the period before the war. The conductors of the chorus are almost exactly the same in both cases: in the period before the war they were concerned with the practices and the dress rehearsals for the national battle song, in the period of the war they were occupied at last with the performance before the world public for which they had so ardently longed. The aims, which before the war were represented to the enthusiastic hearers as a glorious future vision, are now, after the outbreak of the war, shown to them as a tangible possession in the present which has in part already been seized. We see everywhere the same stage managers and conductors at work. The present completes and confirms the past. The chain is complete.

PAUL ROHRBACH

An inexhaustible supply of confessions of the preventive war (with its varying shades of prevention against future attack, or against the hampering of the imperialistic ascent) is to be found in the writings of Paul Rohrbach, the recognised leader of the German Imperialists, who, as such, deserves special consideration. I must here again rest content with some characteristic extracts from his book *The Ascent to a World Nation* (*Zum Weltvolk hindurch*).

In the preface we read (page 4) :

After returning from an American tour, I founded, with my friend Dr. Jaeckh, in the spring of that year, the magazine *Greater Germany*, with the intention of preparing our public opinion directly for war.

Rohrbach's resolution, reached in the spring of 1913, to prepare the German people for war was brought to a head by the fact that Rohrbach, as he tells us, realised, from Russian newspapers and from personal reports from Russia, that the Russian war-party had then gained the upper hand. It is here again remarkable that the protagonist of a "greater Germany" should make his efforts, which were devoted to the necessary upward development of German power, dependent on whether the Russian war-party had the upper or the under hand. Are we to understand that greater Germany would remain smaller if Russia were peacefully disposed? Was it only to pursue the ends it had in view, if Russia's intentions were directed to war? It will be seen how these German Imperialists with their mixture of diverse self-contradictory motives are constantly coming to grief.

In the concluding sentence of the preface, written after the outbreak of war, the violent contradiction between the doctrine of defence and preventionism is divertingly expressed:

May the world-conflagration destroy those who have criminally been its instigators, and may the new and greater Germany radiantly emerge from the furnace of this trial!

Thus on the one hand all the punishments of Heaven are called down on the criminal instigators of the war; on the other hand, however, the new and greater Germany is awaited as the future fruit of the blood that is shed. One is tempted to ask why the author did not supplicate the blessing of Heaven on those who are aiding Germany to so brilliant an ascent—after the example of the old and pious man who, surprised by the arrival of an heir after thirty years of childless marriage, inserted the following notice in the papers: "After thirty years of childless marriage my dear wife Elvira has to-day presented me with a strong and healthy boy. I thank the Lord who has aided me." Why does not Rohrbach thank Grey, Delcassé, and Sazonof that they have aided him and us to a greater Germany? Why does he not praise their kindness instead of accusing them of crime?

In his essay on *German World and Colonial Policy* (of June 25th, 1913) Rohrbach speaks of the "personally pacific and well-meaning character of the Emperor Nicholas II." He distinguishes three strata in Russia, of which two, the official (comprising primarily the Tsar and his Ministers) and the Muscovite, pursued no principle of enmity against their neighbours in the west, and only the third, that of the Pan-Slav, was dangerous to peace. According to Rohrbach, Germany must "count on the fact that passions in that country are in the highest degree inflamed, and that the only bulwark against the deluge is to be found in the discretion and the nervous strength of the Tsar and of the statesmen who at the moment are at the head of affairs." As we all know, the events between July 23rd and August 1st, 1914, showed that the desire for peace entertained by the Tsar and his Minister formed a stronger bulwark against the alleged Pan-Slav war tendencies than did the desire for peace of the German Emperor and his Chancellor, unfortunately shattered for a number of years, against the criminal Pan-Germanism encouraged by the German Crown Prince in his very own person.

With reference to England's attitude towards German colonial ambitions, Rohrbach in the same essay makes certain

admissions which completely dispose of the theses elsewhere advanced by the Pan-Germans on the subject of English envy of German colonial and commercial development, the policy of encirclement and England's intentions to make an aggressive war:

It is a proof of the practical and psychological insight of the English that in recent years they have more and more recognised Germany's need for colonies which formerly they were in the habit of disputing with unrestrained irony. One now finds frequent discussions in the English Press of the necessity which exists for Germany seeking "outlets" for her increasing excess of population. . . . Preliminary conditions of a fairly far-reaching nature on the question of a large general understanding between us and England in regard to African territory are in existence.

It is well known that these intentions to effect an understanding, the existence of which is confirmed by Rohrbach in June, 1913, led in the spring of 1914 to the agreement regarding Asia Minor and the Baghdad line, and further to an agreement, which was practically complete at the outbreak of war, although not signed, relating to the English and German spheres of interest, particularly in the Portuguese possessions. Like so many other things, the agreement as to the Baghdad line came to nothing in consequence of the war: the English are on the march to Baghdad, and when in the end, despite their first reverses, they succeed, in co-operation with the successful Russian army in the Caucasus, in gaining possession of this terminus of the gigantic railway undertaking which for many years has been in course of construction by means of German capital and German labour, they will then have acquired, in addition to the whole of our colonial possessions, an object for compensation which will have to be dearly re-deemed on the conclusion of peace.¹ This also constitutes an enormous item of guilt in the criminal account of our war-party. The peaceful labour of years of German merchants, engineers, and manufacturers, the expenditure of many hundreds of millions of marks, has been unprofitably squandered

¹ Baghdad has meanwhile been occupied by the British.

because the Pan-Germans, the Junkers, the generals and admirals, with the Crown-Princely colonel of the Danzig Hussars at their head, thirsted for the laurels of war and the exercise of arms, because these bearers of uniforms and military cloaks were of the opinion that the German people had been too long addicted to the pursuit of filthy lucre, to the accumulation of material wealth and its enervating enjoyment. Now these gentlemen have got what they wanted. When everything is taken into consideration—the direct and indirect cost of war, the loss in national wealth and remuneration of labour, the economic value of the millions of dead and wounded, the duty of supporting widows and orphans, etc.—a sum of much more than five thousand million pounds has been drained from the body of the German people in thirty months of war. This may well be enough to satisfy these gentlemen who despise material wealth when it enures to others, but who cannot get enough of it when the question involved is that of filling their own pockets.

THE AGRARIAN PATRIOTS

Observe the gigantic increase in the price of all agricultural products, of all the necessary means of sustenance for the people,—increases everywhere to double and treble the normal price; observe the starvation of the people, and then listen to the constant squeals of our agrarian patriots, how badly things are going with them, how the cost of production has increased, how far short the Government are failing in their duty in combating, not the high prices, but the complaints about high prices!

As the Pan-German Union recently celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, so the same solemnity is awaiting the "League of Agriculturalists" on February 18th, 1918. Both organisations originated from the same views and the same efforts, both primarily represent Junker and agrarian interests, which have been amalgamated with militaristic, imperialistic, Pan-Germanistic tendencies for the purpose of more comprehensive activity and effectiveness. Both are composed

essentially of the same persons, groups, professional and social classes. Junkerdom, Agrarianism, Pan-Germanism form an indissoluble amalgam which cannot be decomposed by the most careful chemical analysis.

Thus the appeal which the "League of Agriculturalists" has already disseminated with a view to its approaching twenty-fifth anniversary is also an accurate counterpart to the proclamation, already mentioned, sent into the world by the Pan-German Union on the occasion of its recent twenty-five years jubilee. Let us take a few characteristic phrases from the agrarian appeal:

The time is again gravely serious. What we learned in twenty-five years has been shown to be true.

That we have succeeded in keeping German agriculture in a position to discharge its task is the sole factor which places us in a position to endure this war from an economic standpoint.

Our people know this.

And yet malice disparages German agriculturists, and cowardice tolerates the criminal intrigue.

This teaches us to recognise what awaits us after the war:

A bitterer struggle than ever for the existence of German agriculture.

A struggle for our ordered political existence, and for our throne against the impudently threatened Revolution.

A struggle for the future and the greatness of our people. . . .

Here we have the familiar litany! Agriculture has to its credit the fact that Germany has not starved in this war. This meritorious action requires its reward after the war, that is to say an even higher measure of protection than before by means of legislation dealing with customs, taxes and finance, by the imposition of even greater burdens on the necessary means of life of the labouring classes in favour of the possessors of agricultural land, even greater exemption than before in the matter of taxes and imposts to the detriment of all other productive classes.

All these egotistical profit interests are, however, amalgamated with the alleged protection of the throne against the "impudently threatened revolution," and the struggle for

Germany's greatness and future! Ruthless greed is thus effectively cloaked with ideal efforts! In these few sentences from its jubilee appeal the whole of agrarianism is represented in a nutshell.

When will these insatiable, brutally egotistical Junkers and Agrarians, who ruthlessly exploit the State and the people, be visited with the punishment which these corrupters of Prussia and Germany, these destroyers of the world's peace, have so long deserved? When will the German people arise and drive these bloodsuckers and poisoners of springs from their warm and well-lined positions, and make them once and for all innocuous? After what we have experienced since August 1st, 1914, I am of the opinion that there is no possibility that the *bourgeoisie* will ever arouse themselves to such an act of freedom. Never has Pan-Germanism, Junkerdom, and Agrarianism possessed greater power in Germany than at this very moment when it was in a position to provoke this appalling war. It would never have been held possible by those who know and can impartially judge the German people that this enlightened, aspiring, and peace-loving nation could have so fallen beyond salvation under the influence of the mediæval ideas of this caste of marauding knights, as has in fact happened—that these few thousands of war enthusiasts and jingoes could have instilled into the German people from one day to the next the intoxicating and stupefying poison of their warlike megalomania. Germany was never so far removed from freedom and reason as it is to-day; it was never so completely under the spiritual and material bondage of a criminal upper layer whose train of thought and whose efforts in the midst of an age of electricity, aeronautics, and wireless telegraphy have still remained on the bloodstained field of the mediæval law of feud.

PRUSSIAN AND RUSSIAN REACTION

In a conversation which I had in the summer of 1916 with a Russian "intellectual," he expressed his astonishment and indignation at the uncritical attitude of the German peo-

ple towards its leaders, which appeared to him as a symptom of intellectual decay. To my objection that after all matters were no better in Russia, he informed me that this was a mistake. In Russia the people in all classes knew that it was suppressed and enslaved by a small oligarchy of despots; the war at any rate (this fact was also known to the people) they owed not to their own but to foreign despots. The Russian people feels itself enslaved and misgoverned internally; but in the struggle with external forces it supports the Government, because it knows the truth about the origin of the war and the innocence of the Tsar and his Government, and above all because it has no desire to exchange Tsarism for "Kaiserism." The German people, on the other hand,—and this was the distinction which he drew to the disadvantage of Germany—enthusiastically follows the flag of the Hohenzollern dynasty into a war which that dynasty has consciously and deliberately provoked. It has allowed itself to be cheated and blinded by the deceitful vision of a war of liberation; it has been ensnared by the Pan-Germans, the Junkers and militarists, and has never been so docile to the Government as to-day. In Russia a radical revulsion to democracy was possible and indeed probable any day. In Germany such a revulsion was more remote than ever, since Democracy had been caught in the snare of the reaction.

At that time I was not in a position to refute this convincing account; it has meanwhile been verified more rapidly than I could have imagined. The Ides of March, 1917, have swept away Russian Cæsarism in a whirlwind and have set in place of the worst despotism that ever terrorised a people a democracy which at a stroke has surpassed all other democracies and republics in the establishment of civil freedom and equality. Never in the history of the nations has there been a more striking verification of the principle: *Les extrêmes se touchent*.

In contrast to this, what is the outlook in Germany? As before, there is everywhere the blackness of night! There is no ray of hope for better times. On the contrary, what has meanwhile happened is a worsening of the existing condition.

The "marinists" by the grace of Tirpitz have defeated the civilian Bethmann. Germany's conduct of the war by land and by sea has become more ruthlessly than ever subordinated to purely military considerations. The number of the enemies on the other side is constantly increasing; the damnatory judgment in which the whole of the civilised world is united against the rulers and the governments of Germany becomes constantly more crushing. And within? There are promises—yes. But there is nothing more. Whether they will be observed remains for the future to reveal. But even if they should be kept,—which, in view of the experience of the past, is more than dubious,—they are merely the crumbs from the table of the rich man which are cast to the hungry, not the satisfying nourishment which a highly developed people has a full right to claim after such enormous sacrifices.

To-day—to-day more than ever—it is still necessary to recall to the rulers of Germany Ludwig Uhland's words of warning and exhortation:

No prince is in the world so princely,
 No one on all the earth so great,
 That when the nations thirst for freedom
 He should essay their thirst to sate,

 That he alone should have in keeping
 The wealth that should be each man's right,
 And dole out to the famished people
 So much as seems good in his sight.¹

When will these manly words of the great national poet awaken an echo in the hearts and in the actions of the German people? Will that moment ever arrive? Now, when the

¹ [Noch ist kein Fürst so hoch gefürstet,
 So auserwählt kein ird'scher Mann,
 Dass, wenn die Welt nach Freiheit dürstet,
 Er sie mit Freiheit tränken kann,

 Dass er allein in seinen Händen
 Den Reichtum alles Rechtes hält,
 Um an die Völker auszuspenden
 So viel, so wenig ihm gefällt.]

great fire has burst out in the East, shall we not again find that the golden opportunity will be lost, and that only a spark will remain glowing under the ashes on the German hearth? Will everything again remain in the old grooves? Will it be thought sufficient scantily to refurbish the dusty and tarnished picture of the constitutional conditions of Prussian Germany by providing a new frame and by adding a few small touches here and there, instead of devoting it once for all to destruction on the burning pile of the popular indignation? The prospects for such a radical change are unfortunately very gloomy. No doubt there is here and there a ferment under the surface, but nowhere has any sign emerged that the people have recognised or will recognise their true enemies who sit in their own country, that they will follow the example of their Russian neighbours and draw a line of division between prince and people, taking their destiny into their own hands.

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ROHRBACH ON THE WAR PATH

That Rohrbach should represent the Franco-Russian armaments as a preparation for aggression, but at the same time be silent on the fact that they were occasioned by previous German armaments, must be regarded as inevitable in a German nationalist. In his essay of June 18th, 1914, entitled "*A Hard Necessity*"—written, it will be observed, before the assassination of the Archduke—he paints in alarming colours the danger of a Franco-Russian attack. Why? Because France and Russia have to struggle with industrial and financial crises and "their critical situation urges them more and more insistently to decide either to make the trial of strength at an early date or else to renounce it indefinitely." For Rohrbach the Russian Army Estimates for 1914, amounting in round figures to a hundred and twenty-five million pounds, is "nothing short of alarming," and makes it clear that "the decision will be provoked at an early date." The imperialistic writer draws the same conclusion from the introduction in

France of the three years' period of service. But he prudently conceals the fact that all these counter-measures were occasioned by the increase of the effective German peace strength by 140,000 men, and by the "Defence-contribution" of fifty million pounds.

After the murder of Serajevo the stay-at-home warrior Rohrbach can find nothing better to do than to goad on the Hapsburg Monarchy to effect an entry into Serbia and to place the neighbouring kingdom under Austrian control. "Who would have a right to protest against this course?" is the concluding question in the article of July 8th, 1914. In the eyes of these people Berchtold's policy, which at least promised to secure the appearance of Serbian independence, is thus an unpardonable weakness.

Over an article dated July 27th, 1914, Rohrbach places the characteristic words "Not a step backwards." Austria must show herself resolute, "if need be, even to accept war against Russia." The crowd which on the evening of July 25th sang "The Watch on the Rhine" before the Palace and the Austrian Embassy fills the German Imperialist with the most lively hopes for the future. We know how such demonstrations on the part of a few thousand persons are made, and how they are managed by the wirepullers behind the scenes. If the demonstrations are agreeable to those in high places, the police allows them free rein; if they are not, they are dispersed with drawn sabre. This is what is then called "the will of the people," "a popular movement." Herr Rohrbach, however, finds in such demonstrations of people who are in part befooled, in part paid, in any case influenced, the assurance that "we are politically more mature than we ourselves had believed! It would appear that we feel to-day that it is really 'Greater Germany' that is at stake!"

In the further course of this article Herr Rohrbach proceeds in the most naïve manner to uncover the card of the preventive war, to call in question the fact that Russia and France desired war, and to warn Germany and Austria in the most insistent manner against showing any spirit of com-

pliance, against agreeing to any postponement of the moment for war which was so favourable to them. His gravest warnings, however, are directed against the avoidance of war :

Russia and France have much more reason than we have to tremble at the opening of the temple of Janus. For more than half a century Russia has never been prepared to face the test of a great war from the military and financial point of view. The Russian soldier is brave, but the spirit of the Russian army is not equal to the enormous demands which a modern war makes on the national power of organisation, on the independent spirit of the men and the leaders, on the integrity and devotion which must mark every individual. Within there lurks the danger of revolution; a bad harvest brings a menace to 40 or 50 million men. If one or two great defeats take place, the internal bands of political order may again dissolve as in 1905. That France is very far from being completely prepared is revealed to us more distinctly than anyone could have expected. Something unprecedented happened in Paris, when the danger of war became acute: the rate of French *rentes* began to fall! So uncertain are they of their own strength! They meant to compass our financial ruin, and behold—they themselves begin to totter! We have, however, shown for years that we have as little need to fear a war financially as from a military point of view.

Consequently there must be not a suggestion of pliability; not a step must be taken from the side of our ally! The greatest danger now is that we and the Austrians may allow ourselves to be kept back by Franco-Russian evasions until our opponents have armed. . . . The two allies on the Neva and the Seine did not give Austria credit for resolute action. They counted on her hesitation as in the past, and now terror has seized them; they want to gain time. We would be fools if we allowed them to succeed in this obvious game.

The accuser himself cannot express more clearly than is contained in these sentences the fact that it was not Russia and France who wanted this war, but that Germany and Austria intentionally provoked it, because the moment appeared to them more favourable than ever for the purpose of striking the blow.

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There is a priceless confession by Rohrbach in his article of August 2nd, 1914, that "twenty million Slavs belong to Austria and Hungary, about half the entire population of the Monarchy." What in that case becomes of the contest between German and Slav, which is represented by our Pan-Germans as the essential cardinal point in the present struggle of the nations? What becomes of the protection of the "Teutonic race in Central Europe," which the German Government in its White Book (page 406) described as the real object of this war, as the reason for allowing Austria "a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia"? Were the twenty million Austrian Slavs created by God for the purpose of massacring or of being massacred by their Slavonic brothers? Have these twenty million Austrian Slavs any interest in confirming the position of "the Teutonic race in Central Europe"? This example once again illustrates how all these antagonisms of race and of lineage, in violation of all logic and historical development, are impressed by a merely artificial process on the unfortunate befooled nations in the interests of the ruling classes and their followers. Bohemian, Croatian, and Slavonic regiments are hounded on like wild beasts against their Serbian kindred—for the sake of the Teutonic race! If they desert or refuse to shoot—as has repeatedly happened in the Austrian army—they are themselves shot, mown down in vast numbers, decimated! The black and yellow patriotism of Austria is imprinted on their minds in blood-red colours.

* * * * *

In the article on *Guilt and Destiny*, dated August 4th, 1914, we again find in various places the acknowledgment of the preventive war:

I have always estimated that the Russian plan of attack against us would take place after one or two years' preparation,—and the Russians as well as the French are sorry enough that they have not been given more time for preparation.

In the article there is frequent mention of the trickery of the Tsar who deceived Germany with regard to the prepara-

tions for an attack, and who behaved like a knave or a weakling. That this deception on the part of the Russian Tsar and his Government is a Pan-German invention, that the Tsar as well as Sazonof throughout the whole crisis sought honourably and openly for an understanding, further that they in no way concealed the Russian mobilisation, the counter-stroke against the military and diplomatic action of Austria and Germany—all these are facts which I have proved beyond dispute in my first and in this my second book.

Herr Rohrbach of course enters the war, or rather he induces others to enter, "in the consciousness that it is not our guilt, but a decision of fate forced upon us." He praises an "immeasurably kind destiny" for having provoked the struggle, while sparing us the "stupendous weight of arriving at a decision." He emphatically exclaims:

Now comes the greatest test, whether we are capable of defending our future as a world-nation.

There we again have the cloven hoof of imperialism, which treacherously peeps out from under the field-grey uniform of the defender of the Fatherland: the defence of our future "as a world-nation" is embellished and cloaked—for the stupid among the people!—with the defence against a present attack!

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A wealth of interesting admissions which overthrow the whole body of Pan-German doctrines is to be found in an article entitled *Our Opponents*, dated August 11th, 1914. In the first place, Rohrbach makes it clear that since the end of the two Balkan crises there had been a distinct diminution of the tension between Germany and England; that

the treaties with England as to the delimitation of our spheres of interest in the East and in Africa were ready and signed, and that the only question was as to their publication. In Africa English policy had been surprisingly conciliatory towards us. In Turkey it was not merely in the question of the Baghdad Railway that liberal allowance was made for the German point of view, but also various matters connected therewith, the exploitation

of the Mesopotamian petroleum fields and the navigation of the Tigris, of which England had previously had exclusive possession, were regulated with German participation. France, which had made so much stir with regard to the railway concessions in Syria and the north of Asia Minor which she had demanded in conjunction with Russia, was in reality placed at a disadvantage in both places, for, contrary to her most insistent efforts, she had to acquiesce in a vacant zone between her Syrian railways and the Baghdad railway system, and the Armenian lines, in the opinion of those who knew the facts, were to a very large extent merely window-dressing. . . .

It was therefore neither joyfully nor cordially, although it was with a certain sense of relief, with a mixture of acquiescence and of internal restraint, that English policy entered on the settlement with Germany.

These sentences of Rohrbach make hay of the whole Pan-German theory of England's grudging attitude, of the commercial envy and the encirclement which sought to deprive us of the air and the light to live and to breathe. Immediately before the war a diminution in the tension between England and Germany had replaced the previous tension. Indeed, in the agreements relating to Syria and the north of Asia Minor we received more favourable treatment from England than France did. In view of the facts thus established by Rohrbach, what becomes of English malevolence, English commercial envy, English opposition to every extension of German interests outside Europe? Where is the perfidious policy of suppression and of restriction which, according to Schiemann, had taken concrete form as far back as 1908 in a formal aggressive conspiracy between England, Russia and France, against Germany? How is Herr Rohrbach to arrive at an agreement on these matters with Herr Schiemann?

In another passage in the article in question Rohrbach returns to the already mentioned distinction drawn by him regarding the tendencies existing in Russia. He again emphasises the love of peace animating the Tsar and his Government and their bitter antagonism to Pan-Slavism and its pursuit of war.

The Tsar personally was afraid of the war-party and of the projects of an ambitious Grand Duke, the next heir to the throne in the event of the death or removal of the hopelessly invalid child who is at present the successor to the throne. The prudent statesmen in the Government feared the fanaticism of Pan-Slavism, and the whole of the governmental class feared the revolution.

This last point of view, that of the fear of the revolution, which is rightly emphasised by Rohrbach, receives far too little consideration in discussions relating to the alleged war intentions of Russia. The Russo-Japanese war brought revolution in its train. The Russian autocrats, and generally speaking the whole of the governing class of society, feared nothing so much as a new revolutionary outbreak in consequence of a new war, even if it should prove victorious. Moreover—a further point which receives too little attention from German writers—the Russian reaction had from time immemorial, from the days of the “Holy Alliance,” been so intimately connected with the Prussian reaction by the bonds of sympathy and community of interests, that a war against Germany was the last thing sought by the Russian reactionaries. Even in the course of this war, when the Russian danger appeared to be particularly menacing, before the victorious advance of the allied armies in Poland and Galicia, our Prussian reactionaries were well-disposed to the idea of a separate peace with the “Germanophobe Panslavism” with the object of being able to throw our whole military strength against the much more dangerous democracies in the West. The fact that the separate peace between the three Imperial Powers—a prelude to a new “Holy Alliance”—did not come into being was certainly due neither to the Prussian nor to the Russian reaction. The latter was, as we know, in no way averse from the wooing of the former. It was only the liberal and revolutionary parties in Russia which wrecked the efforts for a separate peace made by certain Court and official cliques, inasmuch as they feared the German Trojans, even when they brought them the gift of freedom.

If the “unforeseen events” in Russia had not upset the

calculation of the reactionaries on both sides, the future would have again proved that greater agreement could not exist than between Prussia of the Hohenzollerns and Russia of the Tsar, that the policy of friendship with Russia pursued by the old Emperor and his Chancellor corresponded not only to Germany's need for security, but also to the inner harmony between the systems of government on both sides. It is a highly characteristic fact that, in the second year of the war, the question of the future commercial and industrial relations to Russia was discussed in a pamphlet issued from a semi-official central office in Berlin. The document in question was written in the German and Russian languages and dealt with the exchange of goods between Russia and Germany as it existed before the war and as it promises to be in future. It emphasised the expediency and indeed the necessity of co-operation between the two States which are in so large measure complementary to each other, and it advocated that a more intimate form should be given to "the friendly intercourse between Russians and Germans which is interrupted exclusively by the war."

For this reason, then, they are robbers and murderers! This then is the reason for the slaughter and the mutilation of millions of men, the devastation of whole provinces,—it is in order that the interrupted friendly intercourse may later be refashioned in a more intimate form, and perhaps may even be given concrete form in a political alliance, such as was formed between Japan and Russia after 1904, and between Bulgaria and Turkey after 1912-13. All the phrases and denunciations about the "Pan-Slav hatred of Germany" which has provoked this war would have melted like butter in the sun, even in the course of the war, if the Prussian and Russian reactionaries had succeeded in interchanging once more a brotherly handshake in a separate peace and in sinking in emotion in each other's arms. True, the millions of dead would not have again risen; the many millions of the maimed would not have acquired new limbs. But what does that matter? The Prussians and the Russians would have brought the matter to a satisfactory conclusion on both sides. The Prussians

would have had their victory, the Russians would have been spared from humiliation, and both peoples alike would have been permitted to enjoy for many years to come the agreeable rule of their dynasties, once more united in peace and friendship.

All these carefully conceived plans have now been upset by the Russian democracy, which—in contradistinction to that of Germany—has shown itself a powerful factor in the Empire of the Tsar.

The revolution of 1917 is the continuation and the completion of the trial-revolution which broke out after the Japanese war; it has shown that the apprehensions entertained by the Russian despots of a new revolutionary outbreak as a result of a new war were well founded. Thus this new circumstance, the downfall of the Tsar's Government even during the war, is new circumstantial evidence of the innocence of this same Government of the war; the mere anxiety for their own existence was bound to restrain the Russian despots, and did in fact restrain them, from plunging their own country and Europe in a bloody war. The hopes entertained by the Prussian reactionaries that a separate peace might be concluded with the Empire of the Tsar and that a future alliance of all the reactionary Powers in Europe might be established are now at any rate dissipated and dissolved. The Russian Republic will not hold the stirrup for Prussian autocracy in order to facilitate their entry, as victors and conquerors, through the Brandenburg Gate into the capital of "Greater Germany."

The fact that the war of 1914 was not desired by Russia and France, but was provoked by Germany as a preventive war, is clearly expressed by Rohrbach in the following sentences from the article mentioned above:

In this situation of affairs the collision could not but be foreseen, and had events followed the Franco-Russian plans, this would have happened in 1916, or at the earliest in 1915. For Russia as well as for France, but especially for the former Power, it was a disagreeable necessity to have to decide on war now. . . . The further development of events on the Austrian and Russian

side is well known, as is also the fact that the trickery of official Russia, with the Emperor at its head, compelled Germany before it was too late to cut through the threads of the net in which we were to be entangled.

It is impossible to confess the preventive war more distinctly than is done in this article. We are told that the Tsar and his Ministers wished to avoid war, from fear of Pan-Slavism and the Revolution; it was not until 1916 that practical effect was to be given to the alleged Franco-Russian plans, that they were compelled to strike the blow now was for France and Russia a disagreeable necessity; it was, however, Germany that cut the net before it was too late. To conceal the fact, here openly admitted, that Germany wanted this war of 1914, and that Russia and France did not want it, "the trickery of official Russia with the Emperor at its head" is of course moved into position; but in saying this Rohrbach forgets that in an earlier article he has expressly acquitted official Russia and the "personally peace-loving and well-meaning Emperor Nicholas II." from the charge of having in any way wanted war.

France also, according to Rohrbach, resolved on the struggle for arms "without any *élan*, and without any enthusiasm for war." How is this to be reconciled with the uncontrollable thirst for revenge, growing more and more dangerous in recent years, which, according to the historical accounts given by the Pan-Germans, is represented as having made the French the prime instigators of the war.

With regard to the attitude of England, Rohrbach also makes invaluable admissions which overthrow all the oratory of the Pan-Germans. In entire agreement with the explanation in my book, he defines the conditions on which England would have remained neutral, viz., that the coasts and shipping of France should be spared, and that the passage through Belgium should be renounced. Differing on this point from Bethmann, Helfferich, and the German chauvinistic Press, Rohrbach considers that these conditions were not pretexts, but constituted a seriously intended demand for a

military handicap intended to hamper Germany and either deter her from war or, at least, prevent her from crushing France and Belgium:

We must not deceive ourselves with regard to the fact that England was in no way simply concerned with the question of being neutral or not neutral, but with the much more far-reaching question of being confronted in future by a possibly, or even a probably, new Germany which would straightway be in a position to gain a position of superiority over England.

This sentence of Rohrbach's supplies confirmation of the English apprehension that the crushing of Belgium and France, quite apart from territorial annexations in Europe, would procure for Germany a position of power on the Continent, and especially on the North Sea coast as far as the Channel, which could not but be dangerous to English naval supremacy. All this is entirely to the point and represents the true motives of England's attitude, which, as I also have explained in my book, was dictated not merely by the moral interest involved in the protection of the neutrality which she had guaranteed, but also by the material interest of her own power. The only point of interest in Rohrbach's dissertations—and it is for this reason that I emphasise them here—is that they completely dispose of the Pan-German thesis of English aggressive intentions and of the exploitation of the violation of neutrality as a pretext for war. England has never thought of annihilating Germany. She merely wished that she should not herself be one day annihilated by a Germany that had become unduly powerful on the Continent. This fact Rohrbach expressly recognises in the above sentences, and therefore I have the right to claim him, in a certain sense, as an ally against the Pan-Germans: he is the most distinct type of the preventive imperialist, who only occasionally, in order to conceal his true character, conceals his face behind the mask of defence.

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At the conclusion of his essay on *Our Opponents* Rohrbach gives a long and instructive explanation in support of the

doctrine: "Least of all need we be anxious about Russia. Only he who does not know Russia can fear it." Rohrbach conscientiously advances all the considerations which, in his view, make Russia a harmless opponent despite, or precisely because of, the greatness of the Empire of the Tsar and its gigantic population. The lack of order, defective discipline, a corrupt officialdom, the enormous distances from one end of the Empire to the other, the imperfect railway connections, are all carefully enumerated in order to dissolve into nothingness the fear of Russia as an opponent:

On the long road which leads from the calling up of the reservists and the militia from their villages on the Volga, in the Ural Mountains, in the industrial area of Moscow, in the South Russian steppes, in the woods of the North to the constitution of the regiments and the army corps for the decisive battle far in the West, as things are in Russia, there are such a vast number of physical, technical, and moral obstacles to overcome—stupidity and resistance of those who are summoned, unscrupulousness, brutality, corruption of those in governing and leading positions, incompetence in disposing the troops, inefficiency of the railway system, rebellious impulses in Poland, etc.—that the effective force finally brought into being can no longer be one calculated to inspire fear.

If all this is correct,—and I do not doubt that it is so,—Germany's behaviour on July 31st and August 1st, 1914, appears all the more plainly to prove a preconceived aggressive intention, and not a defence forced on the country. A demobilisation within twelve hours, such as the German Ultimatum demanded, was an impossibility in view of the internal Russian conditions rightly emphasised by Rohrbach. On the other hand, the mobilisation which was ordered on July 31st could imply no urgent danger for Germany's security, in view of "the vast number of physical, technical, and moral obstacles"; in any case it could constitute no such urgent danger that the Emperor William should have been compelled—instead of being content to "assure the safety of his eastern frontier where strong Russian forces have already taken

up their position"¹—forthwith to surprise Russia and the world on the afternoon of August 1st with the declaration of war. What was the meaning of this over-hasty and fatal action in beginning the conflict when—as everyone knew, and certainly none better than the German General Staff—the Russian mobilisation required weeks and months for its completion? There can only be one answer: because in Berlin war was unconditionally desired.

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I propose to give in the following pages a series of quotations from Rohrbach's pamphlet *Zum Weltvolk hindurch*; I believe, however, that I may refrain from any lengthy commentary upon them, since the sentences as printed speak sufficiently clearly for themselves.

From the essay entitled *Three Principles of War* (page 57):

War should not be waged, until it reveals itself as a national necessity. . . .

War for Agadir, Tarudant and the Sûs would have united France, England and Russia in arms against us, just as has happened to-day. With what conscience should we have taken the decision? Where would there have been any idea of the overwhelming outburst of the feeling of national unity which we see to-day? Where would the Social Democrats have stood, and not merely the Social Democrats, but a large section of the Liberals, perhaps also of the Centre, the Poles, etc.? . . .

It is thus already made clear that we have not merely the strength but also sufficient time to settle matters with the French. Until the Russians are ready to strike, if, indeed, they ever get so far, will be a matter not of weeks, but presumably of months.

In the essay *High Midday* (pages 63 *et seq.*):

The war which we are now waging must be called a "mature" war. The friend of peace in the pacifist sense will suspect that we desired that the crisis should mature in the direction of war. To this it is possible to answer both "yes" and "no." War, regarded from the point of view of ethics and religion, is a conse-

¹ Emperor William's telegram to King George, July 31st.

quence of human imperfections and shortcomings, and regarded from this aspect it can never be desirable. If, however, it is admitted that no great people is capable of maintaining its position if it resolves on principle not to wage any war, it follows that circumstances may arise in which every patriot of insight must wish for war,—of course not for war in itself, but war as a means of salvation from the danger of national downfall. I admit openly that in the days when the decision between peace and war hung in the balance I trembled, not lest the balance might sink in favour of war, but lest it should sink in favour of peace. As far as it is humanly possible to foresee, peace, if preserved for the present, would only have saved us for the moment from the sacrifices which we are now called upon to make, in order to leave us in the lurch a few years later in circumstances of greater gravity. It would not have been a good peace, but a slothful peace. . . .

The war which we might yesterday have avoided at the cost of sacrificing Austria was still intended to be sprung upon us to-morrow by Russia and France, and England would then have been no more neutral than she is to-day. Thus the Emperor and the Chancellor could only accept peace at the hands of England, France, and Russia, if it were really a peace, and not merely a postponement of the attack until our opponents were completely equipped. . . .

The essential determining question for an understanding of the years from 1912 to 1914 is whether England during this period had no other object in view than to make us insignificant, or whether English policy had transiently accepted the idea of a real understanding with Germany. To-day it is not yet possible to give a definite answer to this question. . . .

As we know, the answer to this question is given by Schiemann and his companions to the effect that England never entertained the idea of a serious understanding with Germany, but carried on negotiations merely for the purpose of deceiving the German Michel and to facilitate the preparations for the aggressive war which had already been decided upon at Reval in 1908.

A testimony by Rohrbach to France's love of peace:

In the end, however, the relation was inverted: in France an ever greater part of the nation lost the courage and the desire for

the passage of life and death with their powerful neighbour, but the rabid Russian Pan-Slavism dragged the French to the slaughter-house by the golden chain with which they had bound and delivered themselves. Russia forced on France the three years' period of service, and it was Russia that squeezed out of France the new milliards of francs, in order to bring to perfection the conditions of her mobilisation as against Germany.

While here it is again "rabid Pan-Slavism" that is produced as the great criminal, there are, as we know, others, *e.g.*, Chamberlain, who are of the opinion that the French politicians of revenge were the real inciters to war and that they merely dragged peace-loving Russia behind them. The familiar lie produced by Schiemann is also repeated by Rohrbach when he states that the three years' period of service had already been forced by Russia on the French Government in the summer of 1912, whereas it was, in fact,—as can be historically and chronologically proved—merely the consequence of the German Army Law. The former Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, Baron Beyens, whom the Berlin Government, in other matters in their publications from the Belgian archives, recognise as a classical witness, nails this lie of Schiemann's to the counter, as indeed in various places in his book he describes this same noble inquirer after the truth as a semi-official menial, a maid of all work, whose duty it was to collect all the lying trash which it was proposed to throw on the heads of their opponents.

Another and even stronger testimony by Rohrbach to France's love of peace:

For the French it was all-important not to have to fight now, but the Russian war-party deceived and intimidated the poor devil of a Tsar and dragged their French slaves behind them with threats. When Cambon the Ambassador left Berlin he said: "If we were what the Italians are, we would allow Russia to enter this war alone." This saying shows the true measure of the French feeling for war at the outbreak of the catastrophe.

What do the Pan-Germans say to this testimonial to France's love of peace from the leader of imperialistic Ger-

many—what is said by the whole German Yellow Press which exploited the insignificant incidents of Lunéville and Nancy for the purpose of the basest accusations and incitement against the French people, and which would have preferred to provoke war then, although at the same time it would have laid the responsibility at the door of the French people?

The following confessions by Rohrbach of the preventive war are invaluable:

And now infatuation seized the Serbian murderers and led them to strike down the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and in this way confront Austria-Hungary with the question of her existence, before Russia had prepared her accelerated advance, before France had replaced her outworn rifle by a new, before she had created a heavy field artillery, modernised her northern fortresses, and made good the defects in the clothing of her troops. . . .

Now let us imagine what it would have meant for us to have bought perhaps another two years of so-called peace at the price of compelling Austria to a fatal surrender. Then we should have had in 1916 a railway system in Poland and West Russia so widely developed that the Russians could have marched upon our frontier from East Prussia to Silesia, and could have fallen upon us with all their strength, before we had disposed of the French. Then we should have had to fight against a newly-armed and well-equipped French army and reconstructed French fortifications. Then finally we would have had as allies, not a unified Austria, but a disordered Austria which had already suffered moral defeat. Was it defensible, was it possible in such circumstances to recoil from the decision for war? . . .

Then at last, since it was already high midday and time to turn to the work of salvation of our national future, then the blow fell which delivered us from the danger of procrastination. And now we are at the work, and we are experiencing that the architect of the world encourages and rewards it.

Commentary on these sentences is superfluous. We decided on war in the summer of 1914 because our military situation compared with that of Russia and France would at a later date have been more unfavourable. It rested with us to avoid war, if we had wished to avoid it. We were not at-

tacked, but we carried out an attack in order to anticipate a later attack from the other side. The German Emperor, the German kings and their ministers, may now settle matters with Rohrbach and ask him to explain how he comes to represent them all as liars in proclaiming the German war of defence.

WAR—THE FATHER OF ALL THINGS

I should not like to withhold from the reader a consoling episode in the horrors of war. In an article entitled *The Father of Things* (September 1st, 1914) Rohrbach—relying on Heraclitus—sings an enthusiastic hymn of praise to war as such. Every great advancement in human character is in some way to be traced back to war as its origin:

Without Salamis there would have been no age of Pericles, no Socrates, none of Plato's inheritance. What should we have known, what should we have possessed of all the fruits of the labours of antiquity without the military state of the Romans?

Why do you not continue the parable, Herr Rohrbach? Without the Thirty Years' War there would have been no Johann Sebastian Bach; without the Seven Years' War there would have been no Goethe, Schiller and Lessing; without the War of Liberation there would have been no Theodor Körner; without the war of 1870 no Oscar von Redwitz, no Lauff, no Anton von Werner; without the war of 1914, there would have been no Lissauer!

Yet war is nevertheless a fearful thing; Herr Rohrbach admits so much. Only in this he finds consolation in the thought that there are after all so many other terrible things to be found in the world, such as suicides, small-pox epidemics, etc., which are no doubt less striking, but are not for this reason less appalling.

We men are so constituted that massive effects shake us more than anything else. In observing the drops which fall individually we do not, however, think of the stream which arises out of them. And how uselessly destructive are these individual occurrences—of how much greater things is war the father!

As if war were to take the place of suicide! Is it not the case that suicides are extraordinarily increased in number just because of the horrors and the sufferings of war, the loss of dear ones and of the breadwinners of the family, because of grief, hunger, and misery? Rohrbach reports that an epidemic of small-pox was introduced into Germany in 1870-71 by French prisoners of war, and that it carried off almost twice as many victims as the war itself (80,000). What then, asks this man of feeling, is the use of becoming so much excited over the sacrifices of war, when diseases sweep away even more men? I would recommend that this demonstration also should be further elaborated. Why be horrified at an earthquake which has cost the life of ten thousand men? Have we not in the same year had cholera which caused the death of double the number? Why bemoan the two thousand human lives sunk with the *Lusitania*? In every corner and nook of Europe is there not a daily butchery going on, which deprives double or treble the number of men of their lives or their healthy limbs?

With regard to the horrors of war Rohrbach finds consolation in the progress of operative surgery, which is confronted with the most difficult tasks as a result of the thousandfold variety of wounds. The introduction of the epidemic of small-pox occasioned compulsory inoculation, and in this way in the sequel hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved. It will be observed what a wealth of blessings flows from war! War, as the father of all things, was also the father of the epidemic of small-pox in Germany; this epidemic in its turn was the mother of vaccination; so that a direct relationship, that of grandfather and grandson, exists between the war of 1870 and vaccination in Germany. Typhus, phthisis, cholera, diphtheria, syphilis, are still regarded by superficial people as the worst afflictions of the human race. How far from the truth! They are a blessing to humanity. Had they not existed, bacteriology would not have made the enormous progress which we have to note in the last generation. Hip, hip, hurrah! Long live war! Long live the diseases of the people! Long live death! . . .

If only Rohrbach's theory of beatitude were at least applied to the disease of war and its phophylactic, which is pacifism! Then we pacifists might rest satisfied. Amongst us also there are certainly many who are of the opinion that the world-evil can only perish by its own horrors. The more terrible the effects of this epidemic, the sooner will mankind acquiesce in the introduction of inoculation, in the creation of protective institutions, which will at any rate protect future generations against similar outbreaks of the disease. But of course, when applied to war, the theory of these imperialistic physicians breaks down. War is only apparently an evil—in the eyes of the “vapourers about humanity,” the materialists of business. How small was the number of German dead in the Franco-German War, scarcely 50,000! What do the million and a half dead whom we have already bundled into their graves on the battlefield of Belgium, France, and Russia come to, when weighed against the inestimable national and moral advancement which has been conferred on the German people as a result of the daily massacring and burning for upwards of thirty months. This advancement is an enduring gain for the soul of the people (the increase in criminality after all wars is of course only a chance coincidence). The dead, however, are only too easily replaced, and the newly-founded “League for the Promotion of the Increase of Population,” among whose founders are included a number of patriotically inflamed young ladies, will contribute its share in this direction. “Une nuit d'été à Paris et tout ça est bien réparé” was once the callous remark of a French general when on the evening of the conflict his eyes roamed over the battlefield strewn with corpses. . . .

It is the war which has called us back at the right moment from the materialism of business to the spirit of national sacrifice. Who is there amongst us, even if in the past he may have entertained pacifist views in his heart, who would not admit that, taking all in all, this war has meant for us a bath of moral regeneration? Who can doubt that over wide areas the hateful dross which had already begun to form on the molten mass of our national fire which is nourished from within, and which swam

like dark stains on the surface, will now again be dragged beneath and dissolved? (Rohrbach, page 71).

War is an end in itself. It is the good in itself. Away with the mountebanks who would represent it to us as a disease, and recommend prophylactic remedies against it!

THE FEAR OF PEACE

In an essay *The Fear of Peace* (September 8th, 1914, page 72) we read as follows:

Woe to those who cry "Peace, peace, when there is no peace"! We also could have had peace instead of this war, if we had said to the Austrians: "Submit to the Russian threat! At the most take Belgrade, and then accept the European Conference. . . ." We could also have peace to-morrow! We need only say to the English, the Russians, and the French: "Everything will be forgiven and forgotten; pay us our costs; concede us this or that scrap of territory, a rectification of the frontier, a strip of Africa—and that army of millions and all the crews of the ships everywhere will return to their homes." In that case for what should we have struggled? For what purpose would the great fire have burned in our hearts? For what would it have been given to us to experience something that may recur in a thousand years in the existence of a people, something that may perhaps never occur in the same measure again—to feel God moving in our hearts? For nothing, and again I say for nothing. For a mess of pottage that would cost us our birthright! For an increased and improved edition of the forty years of so-called "peace"! If we did not perish under the weight of arms of these years, it was merely because we were given greater strength than we ourselves knew. Which of our opponents then is now ripe for the peace which we must have, if, as a real world-people, we are to disseminate the thoughts of our people throughout the world?

We could have had peace if we had accepted the European Conference! We are grateful for the admission. In fact, we should have had peace if we had submitted to the European Conference or to the Hague Tribunal the petty points of difference which still existed between Austria and Serbia.

There was no question of a submission to "Russian threats," since Russia from the beginning to the end had shown a spirit of the utmost compliance.

We could also have peace to-morrow. For this second admission also we are grateful! But, according to Rohrbach's view, we may not have it because we dare not be satisfied with a mess of pottage—as a reward for *our* attack!—because as a world-nation we are called upon to disseminate the thoughts of our people throughout the world. Does Herr Rohrbach believe that with these ideas of world-power he will be able to conclude another and a better peace than the previous so-called armed peace? Only if in place of "world-power" he substitutes "world-organisation" is it possible to hope for any improvement in the future. For him there is only one way of salvation, and that lies in victory over England. England must be compelled to give up her booty from past centuries. If this does not take place, "the Briton will continue to maintain the first place before the German." These are the war-aims of the man with whom former Liberals and even the Social Democrats of Germany have combined in common action on committees and in the publication of compilations, etc. These are the war-aims of one who is still a *moderate* Imperialist, who in part repudiates the more extensive efforts of the Industrial League in the direction of annexations and confiscations. These are the peace conditions of a "shamefaced" Pan-German; it is easy to imagine what the unashamed demand before they are prepared once more to sheathe the sword. The most comic feature in this tragedy is, however, found in the fact that the article in which Rohrbach advances as the aim of the war a victory over England and the surrender of the "booty of centuries" concludes with the warning to leniency: "Moderation after the victory."

GERMANY'S WORLD-DOMINATION

I pass over here the various references which Rohrbach makes to the "true war of defence" which we are waging.

We already know that this constant oscillation between defence, preventionism, and imperialism is part of the stock-in-trade of those gentlemen who according to the needs of the moment exchange the homely field-grey of the defender of the German Fatherland for the gorgeous purple attire of the Roman ruler of the world. Let us hear the bombastic, sonorous vision of the future as it appears to the German World-ruler:

There lie before us three worlds, in the case of which it has not yet been determined which of the great Western nations is destined to lead them to participate in the future culture of humanity: these are the Orient, Eastern Asia, and Africa. If we conquer in the fulness of our strength and not merely because we are less exhausted than our enemies, it is we who will be in a position to pour the contents of our national thought into those expectant regions, which are ready to receive an infinite wealth of spiritual impressions. Consequently the outlook of a German statesman must to-day reach as far as this. His mind must be capable of linking China and India, the mouths of the Euphrates, the Cape of Good Hope and the Congo, with the course of the German War; he must be capable of hearing the vibrations of German thought resounding from the ends of the earth, and he must at the same time be able to recognise the sharp outline of the next and the most immediate tasks which must be solved to-day, if these visions are ever to become a reality. (From the essay *Where must the War Lead Us?* page 89.)

What boldness, what energy, what a world-comprehending width of vision! And yet, this man of force would never have drawn the sword from its sheath to realise his plans of world-power—God forbid!—if he had not been basely attacked by his neighbours! What noble self-denial!

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "PLACE IN THE SUN"

In connection with the foregoing quotations from the preventive-imperialistic literature of Germany, it may be appropriate to return once more to the cardinal point in the train of thought of this category of German spokesmen. I have

already dealt in detail with this point in *J'accuse* (page 36), but I should like here to devote to the subject a few supplementary observations arising out of certain critical remarks of my opponents.

The point at issue is the celebrated "Place in the sun" which the Entente Powers, under the leadership of England, are alleged to have denied to the German people (an assertion which, as I have observed above, is disowned in passing by Rohrbach, the leader of the preventive imperialists), and which now, in default of a voluntary cession, must be gained with arms in hand. The German Crown Prince has expressed this train of thought with a definiteness for which we must be grateful. It is true that this talented prince who is also experienced in all other arts and sciences—a universal genius like all the Hohenzollerns—has, as befits his high position, refrained from adhering exclusively to any one definite group of war bards. He is equally at home in all the registers of the lyric of war; he plays with as much virtuosity on the dulcet flute of the war of pure defence as on the deafening trumpet of the war of imperialistic expansion. He loves and celebrates war for war's sake—sitting comfortably in the security of headquarters, with his quill drawn valorously from its sheath—and another time, when it suits his purpose, he hurls the most annihilating anathemas against the enemies who have "forced" on us this blessing which leads to such an expenditure of blood. This dashing cavalryman is at his ease in all saddles; to-day he defends, to-morrow he attacks; to-day he loves war, to-morrow he abhors it; but he never loses sight of one object, that, namely, of representing himself and his followers, the instigators and the abettors of the great crime, as innocent victims of the wiles of the enemy.

Thus one day, when by way of change it appeared expedient to him to sound the note of preventive-imperialism, he coined that sentence which I have already quoted in my book:

"Only thus, relying on our good sword, can we gain the place in the sun which is our due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us."—CROWN PRINCE WILLIAM.

THE THREE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

This sentence of the Crown Prince reproduces with unsurpassable distinctness the quintessence of the doctrine of preventive imperialism. In order to test its justification, it is necessary in the first place to examine the following questions:

1. From the standpoint of modern international morality is it *permissible* to attain the "place in the sun," that is to say, the extension of the economic power of a country, by the sword, that is to say, by a sanguinary struggle, instead of by peaceful labour?

2. If it is morally permissible, is it physically *possible*?

3. If it is possible, is it economically *worth while*?

The answer to these three questions demands little time and consideration. To answer the first question in the affirmative is to adopt the standpoint of the murdering thief, but of the murdering thief under aggravating circumstances. The poor devil who cuts the throat of the greedy extortioner, *à la* Raskolnikof, to rob her of her paltry few hundred marks of savings concealed in her pillow, has in most cases the excuse that he is in fact a poor devil, that he is on the point of starvation, perhaps with his wife and children. He commits a single murder, and he has his head chopped off for it. On the other hand, it is suggested that the millionfold robbery and murder is morally permissible and should remain unexpiated, more or less on the principle that "The little thieves are hanged, but the big are allowed to run"—permissible and unexpiated, although it is a million times more criminal than the individual action. It is more criminal, not merely on account of the gigantic number of those sacrificed, but above all because the wholesale murderer is not, like the individual murderer, poor and powerless, but is someone who is rich and powerful, and merely wishes to become still richer and still more powerful as a result of his misdeed. For myself, I do not admit the validity of the objection that the standard of private morality cannot be applied to political morality.

I know of no morality of double applicability. Like Kant, I know no political morality, but only moral politics. Indeed I go so far as to make the observance of the principles of moral politics not dependent—as many Europeans do—on the colour of the skin of the *objects* of this policy, who, after all, are all human *subjects*. He who deprives black, brown, and yellow races of their land forcibly and without legal reason, in order to bless them with the so-called European culture—which, in fact, is the worst “unculture” that has ever existed in the history of the world—acts in my opinion as immorally as does the other person who robs white men of their property. I can in no way accept the moral standpoint of the missionary, who answered the inquisitive questions of the black native who asked why the Christians first of all took away their land and then blessed it with Christianity, by calmly observing: “The matter is very simple, my friend. To begin with, you have the land and we have the Bible; now we have the land, and you have the Bible.”

The great difference between the expropriation of the blacks and the whites is no doubt to be found in the fact that the former in most cases is effected without an excessive expenditure of blood, whereas the latter, as is shown by the present war, plunges not only Europe but almost the whole world in a sea of blood. This difference in the consequences which ensue from the action makes it necessary in practice to judge the two crimes differently, although morally they are on the same level. All the European nations are more or less guilty of the smaller misdeed; the great gigantic crime has been reserved for the despots of Germany.

The second question to be investigated in this connection—whether, assuming it is morally permissible, it is physically possible in the grouping of European States to-day to acquire “the place in the sun” by reliance on the sword—and the answer to be given to it depend on the military strength of the opposing parties or groups, and thus eludes further discussion here. In any case, the course of this war appears to

prove that the question of physical possibility must be answered as negatively as that of moral permissibility.

The third question, that of the economic advantage which may result even from a victorious war of conquest, has already been so clearly put by Norman Angell in his book *The Great Illusion*, and so exhaustively answered, that I may refrain from again submitting the matter to a detailed discussion. Put shortly and concisely the question is as follows: Under the present world-wide conditions of intercourse, is even a victorious war of conquest worth the sacrifice in wealth and life which it imposes on the conquerors and his opponents—his opponents to whom he always stands to-day in the relation of a buyer and seller, whose loss—therefore involves a loss to himself also? The answer, expressed with equal brevity and conciseness, is as follows: Every war between great States to-day means merely ruin and bankruptcy, for *all* concerned, including the victor. It is for all the most unfavourable, the most miserable business.

What Norman Angell proved theoretically has been visibly demonstrated to all who are gifted with perspicuity by the practical results of two and a half years' world-war. Whoever may emerge as conqueror from the titanic struggle, the Titans will all be more or less crushed by their own blocks of rock, and economically ruined for generations to come.

In his most recent book, *Problems of Peace Economics* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1917), Walther Rathenau estimates the German national wealth before the war at 17,500 million pounds, of which a fifth, that is to say, 3,500 million pounds in capital value, had been destroyed by the war, which till then had lasted upwards of two years. This destruction of capital value, which as a rule is not included in the losses of war, is in addition to all the other losses, the direct war expenditure, the loss of human life, human productive power, etc.

Rathenau is certainly a witness who is beyond suspicion, and at the same time he is an expert of the first rank, having played a leading rôle in arranging our war economics, and having again been called to do so in the preparation of our

future peace economics. Rathenau already estimates, after two years of war, that the amount which Germany will have to raise in future by way of interest and redemption of war debt, for the re-establishment of our industry and our system of defence, for the wounded and for the widows and orphans of our soldiers, is not less than 350 million pounds yearly; that is to say, approximately the sum represented by the yearly creation of new capital in Germany before the war.

* * * * *

In view of all this, the conviction must be borne in upon us that from every point of view—from the moral, physical, and economic point of view—the “good sword” on which the German Crown Prince relies in seeking to gain “the place in the sun” is the most inappropriate weapon to attain this place; that a well-driven merchant’s quill, a well-equipped shipbuilding yard, an industry that produces a good and cheap article, lead to the desired end more surely than bombs and shells.

THE MAIN QUESTION: DID WE STAND IN THE SUN OR THE SHADOW?

Let us assume that the armed struggle for the place in the sun is morally justifiable, that it is physically practicable and could be made to pay economically, there still remains for investigation the main decisive question, whether this struggle was not pointless for Germany; whether Germany did not already in fact possess what it is alleged she must now acquire with the sword in her hand; whether in fact the German people did not occupy that place in the sun, that is to say that economic place in the world, which is due to her industrial and commercial efficiency? The presupposition of all the military appeals of our preventive imperialists is after all that the place in the sun was kept from us by hostile Powers, that we could not obtain it by kindness, and that therefore we were obliged to seize the sword.

To cut the ground from under the feet of this reason for the necessity of war, I have proved in my book that we pos-

sessed not only a place, but a very distinguished place in the sun, and, indeed, that we were on the point of placing competing countries more and more in the shadow. In the last twenty-five years, during the reign of the Emperor William II, our economic development has experienced an enormous period of prosperity, unprecedented in history; it was in a constant state of progress. What more can we ask? What was the meaning of the war for the place in the sun?—I already asked in *J'accuse*. We were already standing in the brightest sunlight, and no one struggles for the things he already possesses.

An answer to this ticklish question has never at any time been vouchsafed by imperialistic writers. They shyly avoided, and still avoid, the inconvenient questioner, because the answer would have uncovered cards which they wished to keep concealed in their hands, because they would have been constrained expressly to acknowledge aims which are not willingly admitted in the open market-place—aims which they only allow to escape from their lips and their pen when they believe that they are in private. That such *lapsus linguae imperialisticae* do not remain concealed, that they also reach unwelcome ears, is proved by the preceding extracts from Pan-German and imperialistic writings.

The *confessed* aim of German Imperialism, the sign-post which it displays towards the street, is the place in the sun which we already possess,—it is the acknowledgment of equal privileges which no one disputes. The *unconfessed* aim, however, the goods which are shown inside the warehouse only to specially trustworthy customers, is the predominance of Germany; it is a position of hegemony, of world-power, the repression of others in the shadow. This exclusive place in the sun, it is true, we do not possess, and it will not be voluntarily conceded to us by the others. It is round this that the struggle turns; it is for this that we have drawn our "good sword"; it is for this that this world-carnage has been provoked.

This, of course, is not said to the people; it is known only to the initiated. The same hypocrisy which the makers of war in Germany reveal with regard to the origin of the war

is developed by them with regard to their war-aims also. The imperialistic reason for war is a web of lies similar to that of the war of defence. The people are shown a *restricted* war-aim, but no mention is made of the fact that we already possess it. In reality, however, an *unrestricted* war-aim is being pursued, but the fact that it is being pursued is concealed in silence. The confessed struggle is pointless, the unconfessed is boundless. Even those classes of the German people who are in themselves accessible to imperialistic considerations would refuse to follow their leaders on such a fatal path, if they could perceive the subtle jugglery.

* * * * *

"We already possess the place in the sun and therefore we do not need to fight for it"—such was the conclusion at which I had already arrived in *J'accuse* on the strength of a wealth of statistical material, and my opponents themselves could not escape the logic of my demonstration. Since they were not in a position to dispute the statistical proof of Germany's economic development in the last quarter of a century, for which I cited as witnesses those holding their own views, they sought convulsively for special reasons which should nevertheless demonstrate Germany's economic strangulation and consequently her right to hack through the Gordian knot.

It is said that we need colonies on which the excess of our population may settle. I have already proved in my book that it is impossible to speak of an excess of population in Germany, that our emigration has fallen to a minimum; that, on the other hand, the immigration has constantly increased, and indeed, taking account of the Russian Polish seasonal labourers, that there is a great excess of immigrants over emigrants. Thus there can be no need for colonies for settlers.

It is further said that we need naval stations, we need the freedom of the seas. Yes, no doubt—if we mean to wage war. In peace our former naval stations were and are sufficient; an increase in their number would merely necessitate an unnecessary new expenditure in men, ships, and money.

All the seas stood open to our shipping. Our mercantile marine surpassed that of all other countries, if not in number, at any rate in efficiency, magnitude, up-to-dateness and comfort. Our exports and our shipping trade were constantly increasing. For what purpose do we require new naval stations, if we are prepared to live with other nations in peaceful commercial competition, and if we do not entertain the thought of new aggressive wars?

According to *Lloyd's Register* for 1913, the leading sea-faring nations possessed in round figures 47,000,000 tons as the total tonnage of their mercantile fleets (only steamers of over 100 gross registered tons and sailing vessels of over 100 net tons being included). Of this total tonnage there belonged:

to Germany,

2,010 steamers with 4,743,046 gross tons;

to England,

10,009 steamers with 19,349,107 gross tons;

to America,

1,871 steamers with 4,302,294 gross tons.

The country which followed next in the scale of merchant navies is Norway with 1,597 steamers and 1,870,793 gross tons. Then only we come to France with 987 steamers and 1,793,310 gross tons, etc.

It will be seen that in the statistics relating to the mercantile marine Germany occupies the second place, before America, immediately after England. The number of her steamers is more than double as great, her tonnage is about two and a half times as great as the French mercantile navy, and this is the case although the French colonial possessions are many times more valuable and extensive than those of Germany.

The above figures form a valuable supplement to the comparative compilations which I gave in *J'accuse* (page 53) regarding the development of trade, of industry, and of the well-being of the great European States. We see here once more that the German people lacked neither "the place in the

sun" nor the "freedom of the seas." Moreover we see it confirmed anew, that the economic prosperity of a country, its exports and its shipping are in no way dependent on the greatness of its territorial or colonial possession. This is illustrated not merely by Germany's position in the above shipping statistics, but still more by the position of Norway, a small country with 2,400,000 inhabitants (approximately the same as the population of Berlin) and a superficial area of 124,130 square miles. Despite this small population and relatively small area, Norway occupies the fourth place in the statistics relating to the mercantile marine, immediately behind America and *before* France.

Just as these lines are going to press the newspapers are reporting the sixty years' Jubilee of the North-German Lloyd. On June 19th, 1858, "Lloyd" opened its oversea operations with the steamer *Bremen* and a single cabin passenger. Fifty-six years later, on the outbreak of the present war, the Lloyd fleet comprised, including ships in course of construction, 102 sea steamers, 40 coastwise steamers, 68 river steamers and launches, 1 training ship, as well as 283 lighters and coal barges, with a total capacity of 982,951 gross registered tons, apart from 17 special vessels, such as grain elevators, etc. In the period from January to July, 1914, the North-German Lloyd conveyed 376,793 persons; in the whole of the previous year 662,385 persons. The number of officials and workmen of the North-German Lloyd on the outbreak of war amounted to about 25,000.

Similar figures could be collected in the case of all German shipping companies. In the face of such figures as these can it be asserted that we did not have the freedom of the seas, that we were hampered and strangled in a "wet triangle"? It was we who hampered and strangled ourselves when we began this senseless war, and amongst those who are throttled, deprived of their freedom and of the breath of their life, we must count in the first place the German shipping companies. German shipping, the branch of German national industry which was most successful and most full of vitality,

is dead—killed by the German sword. It must begin again where it began half a century ago; decades at any rate will pass before it is re-awakened to new prosperity.

THE "STANDARD OF LIFE" IN GERMANY

In the desperate search for reasons to explain why, notwithstanding all that has been said, we still lacked the place in the sun, one of my opponents has finally alighted upon a discovery. True, Germany has indeed experienced a phenomenal industrial development, but—listen and be amazed!—"the standard of life of the German people has still remained materially behind that of the English as well as the American and the French peoples." Now at last we have got it; now at last we know for what we are fighting. It is for the standard of life of the German people. The standard of life of the Germans must be raised to a higher level. This is the reason why we begin in the first place by having some millions of them killed; this is why, in order to make the remaining millions buckle their belts tighter, we bestow upon them fatless, meatless, butterless, sugarless days, weeks, and months by way of introducing them to a better standard of life; this is why we reduce their bread, eggs, and potatoes to a minimum, which just keeps them from dying of hunger; this is why we give them communal feeding, since the individual can no longer get enough for himself, and so on. Hunger and death as a means of raising the German level of life, that is the most recent definition of the purpose of the war, according to the discovery of the most ingenious of my opponents, who accuses me, a poor ignoramus, of my "inability to recognise the true governing reasons of German policy."

O Thou most benignant God, how we thank Thee that at last Thou hast illumined our darkness! Yes, indeed, now we know what we need. Children and fools, as we know, speak the truth. It is the "standard of life" that is wrong with us! Poor Helfferich! If this illumination had come sooner, you would not have collaborated in the joint work in celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reign of William II,

in writing on "Social Culture and the Well-being of the People during the First Twenty-five Years of the Reign of the Emperor William II." Or, at any rate, you would have insisted on the title being changed into "Social Un-culture and the Misery of the People." The standard of life,—did you never think of that, O Helfferich?—the standard of life of the German people has remained so materially behind that of other peoples that all the economic and cultural prosperity of Germany, which you have supported with such striking figures, is on the contrary a thing of naught. Perhaps you believe, grave and learned economist that you are, that your carefully collected figures on the increase of the income of the people in all ranks of the population, on the diminution of unemployment and emigration, on the increasing immigration, on the increase of the national income by almost 100 per cent. And of the national wealth by at least fifty per cent. in the last twenty-five years,—perhaps you believed that all these solid figures collected by you to show the "result of the powerful industrial work of Germany" also involve a corresponding rise in the standard of life of the German nation. Perhaps you believe, being still uninstructed by your youngest (clearly a very young) disciple, that the greater remuneration of all ranks of the people would also have made greater expenditure possible, and would thus have led to a better standard of life. Far from it! The most recent discoverer of reasons for war has decreed—of course without a shadow of proof and without producing statistics—that the standard of life of the German people has remained in a backward condition; the amelioration of this condition is the aim of German policy. Since now, as we know, war is the continuation of policy by other means, the standard-of-life-man quite logically invokes war, and in its sequel death, to come to his aid as the saver of life. As the first success of his policy for the amelioration of life he can already point out, in addition to many other tragi-comic phenomena, that soon after the beginning of his dietary cure (which as a matter of fact developed into a banting cure) the German sandwich, at one time

so appetising and so nourishing, became a paper "meat-card between two bread-cards."

Bernhardi also, the master, the good, brave Bernhardi, must be astonished at the epoch-making discovery of his pupil. Bernhardi indeed is the very man who devotes an extremely detailed chapter to proving statistically the unexampled brilliant development which Germany has experienced since the French war, the growth in wealth and in income which is to be found constantly increasing in every grade of taxation, the increase in the wages of labour, the progress of capital, etc.¹ As we know, this detailed description of our place in the sun is only of use to the warlike General in so far as it proves our capacity to bear an increase of military burdens. At the same time, however, it proves the increased possibility of expenditure in consequence of the increasing income; in other words, it proves the rise in the standard of life of the German people. The man who earns more will, according to his temperament, either spend more or save more. In both cases his position in life will be improved; in the former case it will be improved in the present, in the latter in the future. It is obvious that it can be proved numerically from the statistics relating to consumption and savings that increased expenditure in both these directions is constantly proportional to the increased incomes. Anyone who fails to grasp this obvious fact may obtain from Helfferich's books and from other literature on the subject such instruction as he may require regarding the relation between national income and consumption and savings.

In order, however, to take away even this last point of support from those who cling to this straw of the "backward standard of life," I should like, in addition to the figures already given in my book, to cite here certain facts bearing more particularly on the upward development of the standard of life of the German people in the last twenty-five years.

In Helfferich's book, which has been mentioned on several occasions, the author devotes a special section to the increase

¹ See *J'accuse*, pages 53-71.

in the national income and national wealth, to the "yearly increase in the well-being of the German people," and in his fourth edition (1914) he has added a further appendix entitled "The Division of the National Income in Prussia, 1896-1912." In the prefaces to the third and fourth editions and in the introduction he summarises the result of these investigations in the following words:

The result of the calculations undertaken is that the great increase in the German national income is distributed with almost surprising uniformity over the various grades of the population, and that in particular the income of the "moneyed classes," notwithstanding the great increase of capital wealth, has not risen more markedly than the income of those classes who exclusively or predominantly rely on the fruits of their labour. . . .

Above all, let us be on our guard against self-glorification! In a time in which we are more prosperous than others are, the most modest estimate of our own strength is more than ever necessary. . . . Both in a military and political sense Germany had again gained her position among the nations. To industrial and social labour there was, however, left the great task of bringing the material conditions of the life of the German people up to the level of its intellectual and political achievements.

"As all things are woven into a whole, one working and living in the other"—this truth is made manifest with wonderful clarity in the development which has resulted in the Germany of to-day. . . . And again it is the result of our industrial labour, that is to say, the increase in the well-being of the people, which for the first time has given the great masses of our people the possibility of participating in the attainments and the blessings of spiritual and artistic culture. . . .

It is certainly no mean achievement if the perfection of technical expedients and the improvement of the organisation of industrial labour raise millions out of material misery to a life of competence worthy of man.

A great part of Helfferich's book is devoted to proving this rise in the well-being of the people and consequently of the standard of life of all ranks without exception. The figures given by Helfferich, into which, of course, I cannot here enter in detail, "combine," as the author observes, "to furnish

a highly gratifying and vigorous picture of healthy progressive national force and development." The increase in the national income is proved by reference to the assessment figures for the Prussian income tax, and the figures which are thus found to indicate the increase are then correspondingly extended to the whole of Germany. The total yearly income, according to Helfferich, thus amounts to about 642 marks (£32 2s.) per head as against 445 marks (£22 5s.) in 1896.

In the last seventeen years the increase in the total income is accordingly, in round figures, 83 per cent., and the increase in the average income per head of the population 44 per cent. in round figures. A comparison with other estimates shows how moderate is the calculation here made. (Helfferich, page 99.)

Helfferich compares these figures with the French national income which Leroy-Beaulieu had calculated over a series of years at a thousand million pounds. "As at that time," observes Helfferich on this point, "the German national income could already be estimated at about 1,750 million pounds, France would stand materially behind Germany in national income. Calculated on the basis of the population, the difference is of course less. If the year 1908 is taken as the standard, the average income per head of the population in Germany would then be about 555 marks (£27 15s), in France about 514 marks (£25 14s.)."

Helfferich brings forward another interesting contrast between German and English wages, in instituting a comparison between the average yearly wages of the English coal miner and the corresponding workman in the German Ruhr area. After taking into consideration all charges, insurance contributions, etc., he calculates the average English wage for 1912 at £82 2s. and the German at £89 10s., whereas in 1900 the comparison, made on the same principles, yielded a balance in favour of the English workman of £13 18s. No regard is taken in this calculation of the higher cost of living in England compared with Germany. If this point is taken into consideration, the position of the German workman, com-

pared with the English workman, appears even more favourable. To this investigation Helfferich expressly adds the observation that this development is not restricted to coal-mining, but that the same thing recurs in other branches of national industry (pages 104-5).

* * * * *

The newly added appendix to the fourth edition of Helfferich's book on the distribution of the national income in Prussia has the special object of proving that the lower grades of income have had their full share in the increase of the national income. For this purpose Helfferich gives a tabular review of the distribution of the population in the various grades of income in the years 1896-1912, and on this basis arrives at the following conclusion:

The part of the population whose income reaches only as much as £45 has materially diminished, while there has been at the same time a great increase in the whole population. . . . In 1896 the income grade up to £45 still comprised 75 per cent. of all people assessed and 67 per cent. of the population, whereas in 1912 the corresponding figures were 52 per cent. and 40 per cent. only (pages 130-2). . . . In 1896 there was only 1 in 35 persons assessed who had an income of more than £150; in 1912, on the other hand, this was possessed by 1 in 20 (page 133). . . . It may therefore be said that the lowest grade of the population whose income in 1896 reached to £45 had in 1912 reached a level of income of about £69 (page 139).

I imagine that that should be sufficient to dispose completely of the most recent discovery that the standard of life in Germany had not kept pace with the enormous development of industrial life. Herr Helfferich's eloquent figures prove much more than the stammering drivel of political ignoramuses.

It is a self-evident fact that the increase of income in all ranks of the people also involves an improvement in the standard of life, whether it be by the expenditure of the increased wages or by the formation of capital. Moreover, the

German Secretary of State lays special emphasis on this point in his concluding observations:

Our retrospect causes every heart to beat higher in pride and satisfaction. . . . In the improvement of the scientific and practical aspects of the technical arts, in the advancement of the industrial organisation which effectively comprises all our means and all our forces, in the increase of the production of goods and of intercourse, in the expansion and establishment of our economic world-position, in the betterment of the conditions relating to income and wealth, and in the elevation of the whole standard of life of our population, which is progressively and healthily advancing—in all these lines of progress Germany has worked its way to a stage never before reached in its whole history, and it has shown itself in the peaceful competition of the nations to be a match for the first and the most powerful rivals (page 125).

As the task for the future Helfferich advances *inter alia* that of "keeping the moral and intellectual development of the German people in harmony with the brilliant progress of our industrial development and our advance in well-being."

The reader who desires to become more intimately acquainted with the German industrial and social development in the last twenty-five years may be referred to the remaining sections of the joint work on *Social Culture and National Well-being*, which are written by other authors. All the contributors to this compilation agree in the final conclusion that the material, intellectual, cultural and physical well-being of the German people during the twenty-five years of the reign of the Emperor William II has shown as marked a development as German industrial life, and has kept equal pace with it. Nowhere is there a single word to indicate that the luminous picture on the one side must be weighed against a dark picture on the other. Where has the most recent novice who speaks in Germany's defence really obtained his fatuous distinction? It springs from him, the anti-accusator; it is an original growth, *grand crû*. Here for once he does not quote, as he does elsewhere throughout his whole booklet, which, an unsurpassed treasury of quotations, might enter into competition with Büchmann. Here he has allowed his own intellect

free play! It will be observed what results. May he keep himself in future from such wanton tricks!

* * * * *

There is therefore no substance in the argument which makes the deficiency in the standard of life the reason for the wholesale European carnage. When the discoverer of this ingenious idea proceeds to advance as a further justifiable reason for striving for "the place in the sun" the necessity of a "continual extension and guarantee of markets for our industry," this discovery almost surpasses in originality the idea of the standard of life. The man who writes this refers, ten lines before appealing for an extension of markets, to the "prosperity of German economic life which is disputed by none, and to the enormous progress which German industrial development has made in recent years." In saying this, my honoured friend, you admit the continual extension of markets which ten lines later you are unable to discover. If our industrial life has in recent years made the enormous progress which you yourself recognise, this can only mean, since our trade and industry are to a large extent concerned with exports, that the markets for our goods have constantly extended. Thus you yourself admit that we were already richly in possession of "the place in the sun" in the sense in which you define it. You confirm my appeal to the leaders of the German State: "We have, indeed, already got the place in the sun. Only leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves in the sunshine and to do our work." (*J'accuse*, page 69.)

The development of our export industry, the extension of the markets for our goods, is further, according to your own theory,—which, indeed, is quite correct,—the presupposition and condition of a rise in our standard of life. Ergo: our standard of life has been constantly improved. That our markets and the extent of our sales were constantly increasing, and that, consequently, as long as peace lasted they were bound to yield us an increasingly wealthy source of revenue, is the very fact which is proved by the last figures which

Helfferrich, in his preface to the fourth edition of his work of December, 1913, gives with regard to the development of our foreign trade in the first ten months of 1913. From January to October, 1913, German exports rose by £54,750,000 compared with the first ten months of 1912; imports, on the other hand, fell by £1,100,000. From this it follows that there was for the first ten months of 1913 an improvement in the German balance of trade in round figures of £56,000,000, which is equivalent to an improvement in the year of more than £67,000,000.

It will be seen from these figures for the last year of peace how correct I was in my concluding observation regarding Germany's place in the sun; how, in fact, before the provocation of this insane and criminal war we were standing in the brightest sunshine, and how every year we moved still further into the sunlight. Where then, I again ask, is the economic encirclement of Germany, which, along with the political encirclement, is represented as having been the chief aim of the Entente Powers who are said to have hindered Germany in her natural commercial and industrial development? Where is the reason for the provocation of this unprecedented murder of the nations?

In the very last year before the war the greatest expert on this subject in the German Empire, the former German Secretary of the Treasury, confirms the enormous increase in German foreign trade, and that, moreover, at a time of general economic depression. What more did we want? What did we still lack? Who placed obstacles in our way? No one. If anyone had asked our great merchants, financiers and manufacturers, our shipowners and Hansa traders, whether they felt themselves hampered or strangled in their mercantile or manufacturing activities, they would all have answered with a loud and articulate "No." But they were not asked. It was the Generals, the courtiers, the Junkers, the Pan-Germans, the colonial fanatics, the spokesmen of East Elbe, the men of the riding-whip and the top-boot, who were consulted, and, of course, these despisers of trade and industry unanimously raised their war-cry, and, thinking only of the profits

of agriculture, they passed over the statistics of trade with derisive laughter and proceeded to the business of the day. It is absolutely certain that Helfferich, if he had been consulted in the critical days of July, would have advised against war and would have done everything to prevent it. His statistics themselves prove to us to-day that this war was not merely an enormous crime, but also an act of abysmal stupidity.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

With the collection of opinions given in this chapter from the camp of the Pan-Germans, the Chauvinists, the Preventionists and Imperialists, I believe I have proved that there existed in Germany powerful and influential currents which for years, and indeed for decades, had worked in the direction of a European war, and had done all that lay in their power with a view to its preparation and provocation. I can only recommend anyone who is not satisfied with my evidence to look through the files of the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, the *Post*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, the *Kreuzzeitung*, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Dresdner Nachrichten*, the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, and the *Deutsche Warte* for the last fifteen years, to study the reports of meetings of the Pan-German Union, the German Defence League, the German Navy League, to survey and examine the Pan-German imperialistic and militaristic pamphlet and book literature, and when he has done so he will arrive with me at the conclusion that in no other country in the world were the intriguers and inciters to war so admirably disciplined, organised, and prepared for the decisive blow as in Germany, the model land of the art of organisation. A hint from a central office and all the orators, journalists, leaders of leagues, writers of pamphlets and propagandists swung promptly into the firing-line against the peace of Europe.

As in the case of large movements on the Stock Exchange the initiated, the moving forces, are of course aware in advance of the development in the price which they wish to give

to certain securities, and the public must be content with the "second running" (in doing which it nearly always arrives too late and is taken in), so the leaders of Pan-Germany always knew in advance where the journey would end, since they themselves had determined the object and the direction of the journey. All Germany was surprised by the war, but not Pan-Germany. All Germany, with the exception of the few thousand chauvinistic wirepullers and their confederates and interested followers, was surprised and horrified by the outbreak of the conflagration in July, 1914, while the secret devisers of the holocaust stood by, grinning and rejoicing in the success of the work which they had so long prepared. The war enthusiasm of the Berlin populace on the evening of July 31st when the Emperor and the Chancellor spoke to the excited multitude from the Castle and the Palace windows,—the conviction of the German people that Germany had been fallen upon and attacked,—that, as the Emperor said that evening from the balcony of the Imperial Palace, "the sword was pressed in our hands in just defence"—all these facts, the enthusiasm and the conviction, were the products of the most accurate and prolonged calculation of the Pan-German instructors and taskmasters. These coldly-calculating "patriots" were sufficiently acquainted with the German people to know that it could well be inspired to a war of defence, like the lioness who protects her cubs, but that it could never be inflamed to a war of aggression and conquest, nor even to an aggressive war for pretended preventive purposes. "The others will some day attack us later"—this argument they could successfully make use of with the so-called educated classes, the higher strata of society, who in Germany are less seriously concerned with politics than is the case elsewhere. With the people, however, with the great masses, no bird could be wiled from the bush with this preventive argument. In their case, in order to make the marionettes dance, it was necessary to find arguments which were stronger, more tangible, and more obvious to the simple understanding. Here it was necessary to speak of the treacherous attack on the East and West, of the invasion of the Tartars and Cossacks in

East Prussia, of French aviators over Southern Germany, of movements of French troops across Belgium against our Western provinces. Here it was necessary to speak of an acute present danger, and not of a probable danger in the future.

For years this was known to the wirepullers behind the scenes, and on this they had based their calculations. And when, at the end of July, 1914, the correctness of their calculations was revealed, they were not surprised and horrified, as were ninety-nine hundredths of the German people, but they were proudly satisfied at the prompt result of their war-plans down to the subtlest psychological note. On that memorable evening of July 31st, as was then reported in the Press, the Crown Prince drove simpering and laughing through the acclaiming multitude from the Brandenburg Gate to the Royal Palace, while his Imperial father with earnest mien received the demonstrations of the populace. In the dispositions of the two princes as thus manifested there were reflected the undercurrents, the struggles and the oscillations of recent years. The laughing son, the leader of the war-party at the Prussian Court, had now at last gained the victory over his Imperial father, who had long hesitated, conscious of his enormous responsibility towards his country and the world. . . .

* * * * *

Anyone who would still venture to dispute the cogency of my arguments advanced with the object of proving the existence of an extremely powerful German war-party—anyone who to-day, when the consequences of this movement directed to the incitement to war are clear to the whole world, when the openly proclaimed war-aims of the German chauvinists furnish the irrefutable proof of their war-intentions, should still have the courage to continue the game of lies conducted for years before the war, and should seek to transfer the guilt of the ghastly murder of the nations from the German criminals to others beyond the German frontiers, will at any rate be unable to rely on chauvinist or Pan-Slav move-


ments in France or Russia. It has been documentarily proved that Pan-Germanism and German chauvinism were infinitely stronger, but above all infinitely more influential and therefore more dangerous, than any similar movement in any other country.

In contradistinction to similar movements in other countries, the spokesmen of militant Germany have *alone* possessed the power to direct the ship of State, with the imperial steersman at the rudder, into their dangerous track. They alone have possessed the power to transform their desire and their will into the decisive act. The crowned rulers committed the deed. But it was the German chauvinists who were the uncrowned masters of these rulers, and their aiders and abettors.

END OF SECOND VOLUME



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
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
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
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